

**HISTORICAL SKETCHES
OF THE
SOUTH OF INDIA
IN AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE
HISTORY OF MYSORE**

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FROM THE

ORIGIN OF THE HINDU GOVERNMENT OF THAT STATE,
TO THE
EXTINCTION OF THE MOHAMMEDAN DYNASTY IN 1799.

FOUNDED CHIEFLY ON INDIAN AUTHORITIES

MARK WILKS

EDITED WITH NOTES BY
MURRAY HAMMICK

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THE prevalent impression is erroneous, although fairly deducible from the records of Madras, that Hyder, on his first descent, perpetrated the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of the whole country; a measure directly subversive of his ultimate views of permanent conquest. He calculated on the lapse of a long interval, before the operations of war, and the aid of a French corps, should put him in possession of Fort St. George; and around that centre of the British power, and its maritime communications, he certainly drew a line of merciless desolation, marked by the continuous blaze of flaming towns and villages. He directed the indiscriminate mutilation of every human being who should linger near the ashes, in disobedience of the mandate for instant emigration, accompanied by their flocks and herds; thus consigning to the exclusive dominion of the beasts of the forest, the desert which he interposed between himself and his enemies. This line extended inland, from thirty to fifty-five miles, according to circumstances, and from the head of the lake of Paliacate in the north, to a southern limit, within a few miles of Pondicherry, which of course was

included within the scope of his immediate protection. Round Vellore, of which he expected an earlier surrender, he drew a similar circle, not exceeding a radius of thirteen miles. With these exceptions, and the operations necessary for the siege of the few places which did not immediately surrender, and for impeding the subsequent movements of British troops, the whole of the country occupied by the invader, was as well protected, as his possessions above the ghauts.

Black columns of smoke were every where in view, from St. Thomas's Mount, distant only nine miles from Madras, before an order was issued for the movement of a single soldier. The corps under Colonel Harper in Guntoor, afterwards commanded by Colonel Baillie, was directed to move southwards by the route of Calastray and Tripetti, an order founded in dangerous error, which the superior knowledge of its commandant induced him to disobey, and to pursue a more easterly course to which we must presently return. Colonel Brathwaite¹ who commanded at Pondicherry, was ordered to move northwards to Chingleput, a fort within two marches of Madras, and ultimately to the latter place ; and a select corps of nineteen chosen companies of sepoys, two regiments of Mahommed Ali's cavalry, and two light guns from Trichinopoly under Colonel Cosby, was destined to act on the enemy's communications through the passes, but was afterwards ordered to join the main army.² The description of minor preparations, or the

¹ Major John Brathwaite reduced the Poligars of Madura and Tinnevely in 1772 and, as Lieutenant-Colonel took Mahé from the French in 1779. When commanding in Tanjore in 1782 he was badly defeated by Tippu, taken prisoner and carried to Seringapatam, whence he was released at the peace of 1784. General Brathwaite was Commander-in-Chief, Madras, for four years from 1792, and captured Pondicherry in 1793. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 176, note.)

² Brathwaite's force was composed of—
One battalion European infantry.
Detachment of artillery.

complex results of treachery in the officers commanding forts, or mutiny in the troops of Mahommed Ali, when it was attempted to organize them for field service, would perplex without informing the reader. Such only as mark peculiar character, or aid in a distinctive picture of the times shall be selected for notice. Mahommed Ali had as usual no money for public purposes ; an excellent regiment of cavalry at St. Thomas's Mount mutinied, if mutiny it might be called, to withhold their services in the field, while their families must perish in consequence of an arrear of nearly two years pay. Mahommed Ali's favorite son came on the ground to affect the employment of his influence, but professing inability to pay any portion of their arrears. To save the horses the regiment was disbanded ; eighty of the men adhered to their European officers without pay ; but the same person who had no money to expedite the public service, had abundance to reinlist all the remainder as his own personal guard, on the very next day. The little corps of excellent cavalry afterwards received into the service of the Company was embodied by the patriotism of their English officers, who found the means of satisfying the troops from their own resources and private credit.¹

It was a proposition too familiar to require

One regiment of Nawab's cavalry.

The 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th battalions of Sepoys.

Coshy's force was composed of—

Two regiments Native cavalry under Captain Jourdain.

Grenadiers of the 9th, 13th and 18th battalions from Tanjore.

Grenadiers of the 6th and 19th battalions from Trichinopoly.

Three battalion companies 19th.

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 2, note.)

¹ On the 25th August 1780, when Sir Hector Munro was about to march from the Mount to Conjeeveram, the regiment of cavalry then in camp suddenly refused to move unless their pay, then 14 months in arrears, was immediately disbursed. The

discussion, that not one native officer intrusted by Mahommed Ali with the defence of a fortress, would be faithful to the general cause, and it became an urgent consideration to commit them to English officers. A reinforcement from Vellore was sent to Arcot, the reputed capital of Mahommed Ali's dominions; and the scope of our design requires the notice of four other places, to each of which an officer was sent, either alone, or with one or two companies as a guard of example, and a rallying point to the disorderly rabble of Mahommed Ali.

To Warriapollam,¹ 60 miles south-west from Cuddalore, a fort in the centre of an extensive and nearly impenetrable forest, the seat of a dispossessed poligar, still occupying the woods in hostility to Mahommed Ali, Ensign Allan was sent with one company; the fort was commanded by an European in the service of Mahommed Ali, who made no unnecessary difficulty in transferring the command of his mutinous charge. Ensign Allan, a youth of seventeen, left to the unaided resources of his own mind, reclaimed this disorderly and unpaid rabble to obedience and energy; and in a varied defence of six months against the efforts of the poligar, exhibited all the vigour and enterprize of manly youth, guided by the prudence and wisdom of age; and when ordered, at the expiration of that period, to evacuate

Nawab having refused to comply with the demand, and the government being without the means of doing so, the men were disarmed and sent into Madras with the exception of 56, most of whom were officers and non-commissioned officers.

Owing to this defection, the cavalry with the army was reduced to the party of natives specified above and 33 European troopers under Lieutenant Younge. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 106.)

¹ *Warriapollam*.—Udaiyarpalaiyam, a small zamindari, in Trichinopoly District. The English had driven the Poligar out of his estate for refusing to assist them in Madura and he had taken refuge in Mysore with Hyder. He was afterwards reinstated.

the place, made good his retreat to Tanjore, in February 1781. Although this interesting youth continued in a short and brilliant career to justify and augment these first impressions of extraordinary talent, exertions disproportioned to his strength in the campaign of 1783 produced a dangerous disease, and he did not live to fulfil the promise of his early excellence.

Ensign Macaulay had a similar mission to Gingee. The lower fortress was carried by assault, a Monsieur Burette in Mahommed Ali's service, having given up his post, without firing a shot. Ensign Macaulay deliberately retired to the upper and impregnable rock, assigning to his own company the post of honour nearest the line of ascent. In visiting the upper guards, his mutinous garrison demanded that he should instantly surrender the place, and while attempting to persuade them to a better spirit, they made a direct attempt to assassinate him. He escaped to the protection of his own company; but being out-numbered by the mutineers, was compelled to capitulate, on the condition of being sent to Madras. This condition was violated, and he was sent a prisoner to Seringapatam, and according to my manuscript (the journal of a Serjeant, afterwards Captain Smith,) "they did not leave him a shirt."

Lieutenant Parr was sent to Carnatic Ghurr,¹ but could neither obtain from Mahommed Ali's kelledar, the command of the place, nor even a decent lodging. The fort was sold, and some decorous observances remained previously to its surrender. He had reached the place from Wandewash, through a country occupied by the enemy, singly, blackened and disguised as a native: he left it at the expiration

¹ *Carnatic Ghurr*.—Karnatigur, a fort in the Polur Taluq North Arcot District, Madras, about 20 miles south of Vellore situated on a spur of the Javadi hills, which terminates in a huge rock on which the citadel was built.

of a month, in the same garb, and had only descended three hundred yards by the western face of the rock, when Hyder's troops entering, by the eastern gate, appeared upon the rampart above him. After four nights and three days concealment in the woods, attended by a faithful native servant, he arrived at Vellore, with his feet bleeding and swoln, a beard of ample growth, an aspect scarcely human, and nearly famished for want of food.

An officer was detached by Colonel Brathwaite, when at Carangooly on his march from Pondicherry to Chingleput to take the command of Wandewash.

Hyder was known to be in force in the neighbourhood of that place: its surrender was probable; the distance was thirty miles; and a body of four thousand horse was stated to be interposed: but the great importance of the enterprize justified the attempt under these slender chances of success. Lieutenant Flint was selected for this service, and after a fatiguing march on the morning of the 10th of August, he moved at eleven on the same night, with one hundred firelocks. By deviating to unfrequented paths, he arrived without interruption in the vicinity of Wandewash, late in the forenoon of the 11th. After ascertaining that the place was still in the possession of Mahommed Ali's troops, he sent a message to the kelledar announcing his approach; but was answered, that he would be fired at, if he attempted to come within range of the guns; and met a picket sent to stop him at the verge of the esplanade. He had the address to persuade the officer that he had misapprehended his orders; which could only have been to stop the party till he was satisfied they were friends, of which fact he could entertain no doubts; and during the remaining parley, continued to advance, persuading every successive messenger to return with another reference, until within musquet shot of the ramparts, which were manned with troops, and the gates distinctly seen to

be shut. Here he halted; announced that he had a letter from the nabob Mahommed Ali to the kelledar, which he was ordered to deliver into his own hands, and demanded admission for that purpose with a few attendants. With this demand the kelledar positively refused to comply, but at length agreed to receive the letter in the space between the gate and the barrier of the sortie. Lieutenant Flint was admitted with four attendants, faithful and well instructed sepoy, and found the kelledar seated on a carpet, attended by several men of rank, thirty swordsmen, his usual personal guard, and one hundred sepoy, drawn up to protect him. After the first compliments, Lieutenant Flint avowed that he had no letter from Mahommed Ali, but possessed that which in the exigency of the times ought to be deemed equivalent; the order of his own government written in communication with Mahommed Ali; this order the kelledar treated with the utmost contempt, and his arguments with derision; desired him to return to the place from whence he came; and to the proposition of impossibility from the increased distance of the corps from which he was detached, and the country being in possession of the enemy, he was answered with fresh sarcasm. He mildly replied, that he was placed in a desperate situation, and as the kelledar rose to depart, he suddenly seized him, and announced his instant death if any person should move a hand for his rescue; the bayonets of the four sepoy were in the same instant at his breast, and their countenances announced a firm decision to share the fate of their officer. The consternation of the moment afforded time for the remainder of the little detachment to rush in at the concerted signal and effectually secure the kelledar. Lieutenant Flint then addressed the troops in the language of conciliation, explained the conditions on which the kelledar should retain all the honours of command, while he himself should provide for effectual defence: and

finally the gates were opened, and the whole party entered together as friends.

The act of surrendering the place to Hyder, had been prepared to receive the seal of the kelledar on that very day; and during the interval in which Lieutenant Flint waited the authority of his government to exclude him from the fort, his efforts at incessant counteraction were foiled, by the address of the new commandant, who found means gradually and rapidly to secure the attachment of the better portion of the garrison.

Strange as in these days the proposition may sound, this lieutenant was an officer of very considerable experience. To a scientific knowledge of the theory, he added some practical acquaintance with the business of a siege; and to military talents of no ordinary rank, a mind fertile in resources, and a mild confidence of manner, which, as his troops were wont to say, rendered it impossible to feel alarm in his presence. He found the place in a ruinous state, furnished with abundance of cannon, but no carriages, and little powder; he repaired the works, constructed carriages, and manufactured powder. He had not one artilleryman, but he prevailed on the silversmiths, who, according to the routine of Hindoo warfare, are the apology for cannoneers, not only to attend regularly to be instructed in the exercise, but in the subsequent siege to perform their duties in a respectable manner. From the 12th of August 1780 until the 12th of February 1783, an eventful period, during which the flower of Hyder's army were before the place, seventy-eight days of open trenches, and after being foiled in open force, made repeated attempts to seize it by stratagem, or starve it into surrender, this officer, never once casting off his clothes at the uncertain periods of repose, not only provided the means of internal defence, but raised a little corps of cavalry for exterior enterprise; and during a protracted period of famine and diversified misery

elsewhere, not only fed his own garrison, but procured important supplies for the use of the main army, for which he was justly deemed to be the centre of all correct intelligence. The model proposed by the experienced, for the imitation of the young and aspiring; the theme of general applause; honourable in private life, as he was distinguished in public conduct; the barren glory has remained to him, of preserving the letters on service, written in Sir Eyre Coote's own hand, full of affectionate attachment and admiration. Colonel Flint is living, and in London. Fancy would associate with the retirement of such a man, marks of public approbation and dignified competency: but human affairs too often reflect an inverted copy of the pictures of imagination.

With the exception of such other places as must necessarily occupy a place in our future narrative, every fort opened its gates, and the whole country, north of the Coieroon, submitted at once to the conqueror.

Hyder had descended through the pass of Channama on the 20th of July, and from thence detached a select corps of five thousand horse, under his second son Kurreem Saheb, to plunder Porto Novo, a sea-port, about forty miles south of Pondicherry: a larger body of cavalry was allotted to the work of desolation which has already been described, and the advance of the main army was only retarded by the embarrassing number of places to be occupied. It was not before the 21st of August that he invested Arcot, and on the 29th moved from thence in consequence of intelligence that the English army had made its first march from the neighbourhood of Madras on the 26th.

From the state of party in the unhappy counsels of that day, the Governor found it impossible, by the ordinary constitution of the government, to secure a majority, without requiring the aid of the

Commander-in-chief, Sir Hector Munro, in council, while the command of the field army should devolve on Lord Macleod, who had recently arrived from England in command of one of His Majesty's regiments. No local experience was necessary to demonstrate, that the order which he received to assemble the army at Conjeveram, an open town forty miles in advance, through a country every where occupied by the enemy, was contrary to the ordinary suggestions of military prudence, as risking, without an adequate object, the safety of all its detachments and equipments; and in a judicious letter, almost prophetic of the fate of Baillie, this officer recommended the vicinity of Madras as the only safe point of junction until the army should be in sufficient force by the union of its detachments to meet the enemy in the field. The Commander-in-chief was of a different opinion: he pledged himself to form the junction at the place originally proposed, and accordingly assumed the command of the army, a majority in the council being secured by the appointment of an additional member,³ a measure against which the minority protested as unlawful.

The important corps from Guntoor, under

¹ Sir Hector Munro was the son of Hugh Munro of Novar, born in 1726. He went to India in 1761 as Major of the 89th Foot, was in command of the troops at Patna, and won the battle of Buxar. He was after a period in England appointed to the chief command in Madras, and arrived in 1778.

In 1779 a King's regiment was dispatched to Madras. The corps selected was "the 73rd regiment of Foot commanded by John Mackenzie, Esquire, commonly called Lord Macleod" (*P. from England*. Vol. LXXXII, 23rd December 1778.) The regiment soon after arrival was quartered at Poonamallee, about 15 miles west of Madras. Lord Macleod was in command at Poonamallee, when sent for to Madras in order to take command of the army.

³ The additional member was Alexander Davidson, who had joined the service as writer in 1760. He acted as Lord Macartney's second in his duel with Anthony Sadleir in September 1784.

Aug. 24. Colonel Baillie,¹ had on the 24th of August arrived without interruption, at an encampment six miles to the southward of the village of Goomrapoondy,² a situation within twenty-eight miles of the General's encampment at St. Thomas's Mount, and rather a shorter distance from Madras. Admitting the absolute necessity, which, however, is not apparent, of moving the army precisely on the 26th, there was no probable impediment to the junction of Colonel Baillie by one forced march on the 25th, or by two easy marches at the General's encampment near Conni-toor³ on the 26th; the force under Sir Hector Munro being 5,209⁴ strong, that under Baillie, 2,813. These

Colonel Baillie's detachment was—

Artillery—4 officers, 77 non-commissioned officers and men.

European infantry—7 officers, 2 cadets, 104 non-commissioned officers and men.

Sepoys—36 officers, 24 serjeants, 2,606 native officers and men.

One company of guides.

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 5, note.)

Goomrapoondy.—Gummadipundi, a village in the north of Ponneri Taluq, Chingleput District, on the trunk road from Madras to the north.

³ *Connitoor*.—Kunnattur, a village about 15 miles south-west of Madras on the road to Conjeveram.

⁴ The following is an abstract of the return of the Company's troops at the Mount on the 26th August 1780 :—

	Officers	Conductors	Cadets	Serjeants	Drummers	Native Officers	Rank and file	Puokalties	Total
Cavalry ...	2	3	30	...	35
Artillery ...	17	2	2	26	18	...	250	...	315
2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment.	23	...	5	24	28	...	271	...	351
Grenadiers, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment	5	5	3	...	92	...	105
Cadet Company ...	1	...	27	3	1	...	32
Total Europeans ...	48	2	34	61	49	...	644	...	838

obvious means of placing beyond the reach of accident the immediate formation of a respectable army, were wantonly abandoned, by directing that officer to pursue an independent route of upwards of fifty miles to Conjeveram, a measure not recommended by any speculative advantage that has ever been stated, and inexplicable by any conjecture, excepting that of attempting practically to justify an erroneous opinion.

Sir Hector Munro arrived at Conjeveram on the 29th, the day on which Hyder broke up from Arcot, Aug. 29. after having, on the first intelligence of the deviation to the south-west of Baillie's corps, detached a select corps of 5000 infantry, 6000 horse, 12 light, and six heavy guns, with a large body of irregulars, under his son, Tippoo Sultaun, to intercept its approach, and endeavour to destroy it. Sir Hector Munro marched from St. Thomas's Mount with eight days' provisions for his own corps only, with the view of raising the siege of Arcot, distant seven ordinary marches. On his arrival at Conjeveram, as the remaining four days' stock for his own corps would

	Officers	Conductors	Cadets	Serjeants	Drummers	Native Officers	Rank and file	Puckalties	Total
B. F. ...	48	2	34	61	49	...	644	...	833
14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 21st Battalions of Sepoys.	36	28	55	82	3,143	47	3,391
Company of Marksmen.	2	2	5	3	98	1	111
Grand Total ...	86	2	34	91	109	85	3,885	48	4,340

Not included in the above.—22 Europeans and 153 Natives sick.
56 Native cavalry.

No return of H.M. 73rd Regiment for August has been found, but Sir Hector Munro estimated his whole force, including officers, at 5,209 when he left the Mount. This would make the strength of the 73rd to have been 638, all ranks included. (Wilson : *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 4, note.)

furnish little more than two for the army which he expected to unite at that place, he applied to the Mahommedan *gentleman* deputed to provide for all his wants by Mahommed Ali, a name for ever associated with recollections of disgust at his own character, and of indignation and contempt for those who could still continue to trust him. This deputed non-descript gravely answered Sir Hector Munro* "that he was ordered by Mahommed Ali to attend him; but had no powers given him to procure either provisions or intelligence," and the General was left on the fourth day of the campaign to live by the contingencies of the day, and continued fixed to the spot, gradually collecting from this large but ruined town, a small supply of food, which he deposited within the walls of the Hindoo temple, a place capable of being rendered in two days defensible against a coup-de-main.

- Aug. 25. On the 25th, Colonel Baillie arrived on the bank of the river Cortelaur, then nearly dry, but liable to be swoln by the mountain rains, and committed the great military fault of encamping on the northern instead of the southern bank: the floods descended on the night of the 25th, and prevented his crossing until the 4th¹ of September. On the 1st of that month perceiving by the usual indications that the river would not soon fall, he proposed in a letter to the Government to descend to its mouth and be ferried
- Sept. over to Ennore, thirteen miles to the north of Madras, as the most expeditious, though the most circuitous route; but to this letter he appears to have received
- 4th. no reply. He crossed the river on the 4th of September, with a corps consisting of 207 Europeans, 2,606 sepoys, six six-pounders, and four three-pounder guns.

* "As I wanted neither a valet nor a cook," said the General, "I told the gentleman I would dispense with his services."

¹ Baillie crossed the river on the 3rd September according to his report to Sir Hector Munro.

The vicinity of the fort of Trippasore¹ rendered it imprudent for Tippoo on either that or the following day to attempt any operation beyond the customary annoyances during the march; on the 6th, in the morning, he appeared making dispositions for an immediate attack on Colonel Baillie, who took post in the vicinity of Perambaucum, distant fourteen miles* from the ground occupied by Sir Hector Munro on the same day near to Conjeveram. The action is described in a short note from Colonel Baillie to have lasted from eleven to two; "near 100 Europeans and sepoys were killed and wounded by the guns of the enemy, who never came near enough for musquetry;" and on the same evening he wrote to Sir Hector Munro, that on a review† of his corps after the action, he found it was not in his power to join, but hoped to see the General at Perambaucum; while on the other hand Tippoo, who had suffered much more severely in the cannonade, reported to Hyder that he could make no impression on Baillie without a farther reinforcement. Sept. 6.

During this day (6th September) Hyder who had occupied an encampment strengthened with redoubts, about six miles to the westward of Sir Hector Munro, made a demonstration of turning his right, with the view of covering the operation against Baillie, and this movement induced a change of position in the English army, which now fronted the north on the road by which Colonel Baillie was expected. The hostile armies remained during that day

¹ *Trippasore*.—Tiruppachur. The village is about five miles south of the Kortalaiyar river, about two miles west of Tiruvallur, just north of the railway from Madras to Arkonam. An old fort stood there which served as a protection to the surrounding country.

* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

[*Perambaucum*.—Perumbakkam, a village seven miles south of Tiruppachur, about twelve miles south of the river.]

† Manuscript journal of one of the survivors.

‡ Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

drawn up in order of battle opposite to each other, at the distance of about two miles, without an effort on either part. About noon a heavy firing was heard, which from a change of wind, soon became inaudible. It was evident that Baillie was attacked, and equally plain that Hyder had interposed his whole army to prevent the junction. Either the detachment was expected to fight its way through the troops allotted for its destruction, and afterwards through the united force of the enemy, or it was necessary to make an effort for its relief. But the pagoda at Conjeveram, which contained the provisions, the heavy guns, and most of the baggage of the army, had not been made capable (in Sir Hector Munro's opinion) of maintaining itself for one day. The army lay on its arms Sept. 7th, 8th. without an effort during the 6th, 7th, and 8th. On the latter day the note from Colonel Baillie written after the affair of the 6th, was received. Sir Hector Munro, still adhering to the vital importance of protecting his provisions and stores in the pagoda, which in the event he was compelled to abandon, adopted the determination (in concurrence* with the opinion of his principal officers) of detaching the flank companies of the army on the night of the 8th, to unite with Colonel Baillie, and enable him to form the junction. The original and needless error of any disunion, was thus aggravated by the farther risk of a third division, subjecting 1007 men, the flower of the army, to be cut off in detail, and leaving the main army itself in a state of dangerous weakness. Contrary to all reasonable calculation, Colonel Fletcher, the officer in command of the detachment, by changing his route during the march, and thus deceiving his own guides, who were all in Hyder's pay, passed unperceived by the numerous troops interposed, and joined Colonel Baillie at Perambau- 9th. cum early on the morning of the 9th. The arrival of

* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

this reinforcement encreasing the strength to 3,720* men (allowing a deduction of 100 for the casualties of the 6th), "inspired the greatest confidence in Baillie's troops; no doubt was entertained of his being able to make his way good to Conjeveram, and he marched agreeably to the orders he had received, about eight o'clock on the night of the 9th."

Hyder was full of indignation at the strange negligence by which the detachment had been permitted to pass, without observation, across a country covered with his light troops. The French officers in his service, deemed it to be a profound and skilful manœuvre, by which Hyder's army was to be entangled between two powerful bodies, by a joint operation on the night of the 9th, and strongly urged him to move from the dangerous position which he occupied. Hyder forming a more correct estimate of the actual operation, maintained his ground, but yielded so far to the suggestions of his advisers, as to make dispositions, and even prepare the roads for each column to retire to the westward, in the event of their conjectures being verified. Both armies continued immovable on the 9th, and, towards the close of the day, Hyder having ascertained from his spies that the English army were not preparing to march, sent off immediately after dark, in the direction of Baillie, the great body of his infantry and guns, remaining himself on the ground, ready to move at a moment's warning, with a few light guns and the whole of the cavalry, if his camp should be attacked, and with the same means to harrass and impede the march, if a movement should be made in the direction of Baillie. At four o'clock, finding the same torpor still

* The manuscript journal makes the strength about 3,500. The number stated in the text, is taken from Sir Hector Munro's official statement, and of course from the last returns. The numbers sufficiently correspond, allowing for the sick, and supposing the manuscript to reckon the firelocks only, the returns of course including artillery men.

to prevail in the English camp, he silently followed his infantry.

Colonel Baillie had not proceeded half a mile from his position at Perambaucum, before he was challenged by the enemy's videttes, and as no order had been given to avoid firing, a platoon from the advanced guard, announced to the enemy that all was in motion. The rocket men and irregulars opposed no more than a teizing impediment for five or six miles. The baggage being on the left of the column of march, and a heavy body of horse approaching in that direction from the rear, the officer commanding the rear guard unlimbered his guns, and a halt was ordered for the purpose of making a disposition to place the baggage on the right. This being effected, and the troops resuming their order of march, the halt was unaccountably continued, and some guns, which had been covered by the Mysorean cavalry on the left, soon afterwards opened on the centre of the British troops. A detachment sent to seize them were stopped by an impediment peculiar to that vicinity, although occasionally found in other parts of the south. Water is found at the depth of from five to ten feet below the surface of these extensive sandy plains: and the industrious husbandmen, taking advantage of the slightest deviation from the horizontal line, cut trenches for an extent of several miles to the requisite depth of a stratum impermeable by water, along which the produce of a succession of springs gradually augmented to a streamlet is conducted to a reservoir, or led at once to the fields for the purposes of irrigation. The bank formed by the excavation, added to the depth of the ditch, renders the impediment in many places insurmountable for troops, and presents a cover of the greatest importance to military operations. The whole route of the British troops had been every where previously examined by the enemy, and where the trench was nearest the road occasional openings had been cut in

the bank : the whole thus affording an excellent ditch with parapet and embrasures for the cover of Tippoo's troops and guns. From one of these impediments the detachment returned with some loss, and not in good order ; but the guns, although frequently shifting their position to avoid becoming a mark for the aim of their opponents, were soon silenced by the superior skill and steadiness of the English artillery : a body of infantry, in ambuscade behind a winding of the same work near the head of the column, was soon afterwards discovered and dislodged : all annoyance was removed, the guns were again limbered, and every thing was prepared to continue the march in the most perfect order ; but Colonel Baillie, contrary to the declared and earnest opinion of Colonel Fletcher his second in command, and with no other motive that has ever been conjectured, excepting the expected distinction of exhibiting in the morning the junction of his corps without the loss of any of its equipments, a credit of which he might be deprived by errors inseparable from the obscurity of the night, adopted the fatal resolution of remaining where he was until daylight, and a disposition being made for that purpose, the troops actually lay upon their arms during the remainder of the night, without the slightest molestation from the enemy. This ground was distant no more than eight or nine miles from Sir Hector Munro, and had the precious time thus unhappily wasted, been employed in pursuing the march, although every part of the road had been reconnoitred, and impediments every where prepared, there can be no ground of reasonable doubt, that superiority of discipline, always most decided in operations by night, would have enabled him to surmount all opposition, or at least to have continued his march to a point so near to the main army, as to compel the Commander-in-chief, by placing the enemy between two fires, to realize the apprehensions of the French officers.

Sept.10. At day light on the morning of the 10th, the detachment marched, the enemy was soon perceived on the left moving in nearly a parallel direction, and after advancing about two miles through an avenue of trees to a spot where the road inclined to the left on the plain; four or five guns were opened by the enemy in that quarter from a considerable distance. A village was in sight three quarters of a mile in front, which presented a good post with no impediment to its immediate occupation: but instead of seizing this position, or quickening his pace to approach the guns, the line again halted and formed, and this distant cannonade was returned. "The troops remained in crowded order, partly in the avenue, and partly under cover of some banks and a hollow way at the entrance of the plain, the rocket men and irregulars advancing as usual, and the main body keeping at a great distance among some trees and jungul in the rear of their guns."

Shortly afterwards, ten companies of sepoy grenadiers under Captains Rumley and Gowdie were ordered to storm these guns, and three were accordingly carried with the utmost gallantry, when large bodies of horse threatened to cut off the return of the grenadiers: and the cavalry of Hyder's whole army was seen rapidly approaching from the right, almost as near to the main body as was this its detachment. A hurried retreat caused by these appearances had an ill effect on the remainder of the troops, but with the exception of casualties not very numerous, the sepoys resumed their former stations in the position. The demonstration of Hyder's main body of cavalry to charge the line, only masked, as was usual, the movement of his infantry and guns, which by the recession of the cavalry soon became apparent fast approaching from the right: "but although a considerable period intervened during which there was no cannonade, nor body of horse on the plain to prevent it, no manœuvre was undertaken, no attempt

to seize the village, nor any other disposition, but the detachment remained crowded up just as it had entered the plain. Colonel Baillie himself not being on horseback, by running about and over fatigue, rendered himself incapable of deliberate thinking or cool action; and not only the occupation of the village, but a tolerably strong position, which might have supported the left by an adjacent bank and ditch, and the right by a thick part of the avenue, were equally unobserved or neglected. Hyder's guns opened as they got within distance, aided by those which Tippoo had re-taken, until upwards of fifty from different quarters directed a cross fire on this devoted corps, whilst it remained in a helpless posture, presenting the fairest mark: the ten field pieces indeed returned this unequal fire with powerful effect, until their ammunition was exhausted, an event which was hastened by the blowing up of two tumbrils which stood exposed to the enemy's shot. The impression seemed to prevail among the troops of being subjected to destruction without an effort for defence or retaliation. An audible murmur ran through the ranks, many of the grenadiers crying out to be led on. The cannonade had by this time done considerable execution, the enemy's guns drawing nearer and nearer until almost every shot told. The pressure on the rear appeared to be most serious, and Colonel Fletcher caused a company of European grenadiers to move to its support. The whole of the troops had been previously ordered to lie down in their ranks, and as the grenadiers rose to obey the order, the sepoy's rose also, and crowded to the rear."

In Hyder's stable horse was an officer named Biccajee Sindia, commanding a *dusta*, (or 1,000 cavalry,) who had been placed in command of a larger division of troops, to the northward of the English army, under Sir Hector Munro, to watch its movements, on the night on which Colonel Fletcher had marched without molestation to join

Baillie; and Hyder had personally and publicly reprobated this misconduct with his usual coarseness and contumely. Biccajee Sindia, stung by this public disgrace, resolved to wipe off the opprobrium, or die in the attempt. On observing the crowding of the sepoy, which has been stated, without waiting for orders, he made a desperate charge at the head of his dusta. Himself, fifteen of his family, and a large portion of his corps fell; but the example, supposed to be the result of an order, was instantly followed by the rest of the cavalry. The European companies of the British corps still preserved their order, but the residue of the sepoy, not destroyed in the charge, became mixed in irretrievable confusion with the carts and other baggage, and either stripped for flight, or kept up a straggling fire without an object, the strange but ordinary effect of panic. "Colonel Baillie, after ordering this fire to cease, went forwards to ask for quarter, by waving his handkerchief, and supposing acquiescence to be signified, he ordered the Europeans, who to the last moment preserved an undaunted aspect and compact order, to lay down their arms. The enemy, although they at first paused, and received him as a prisoner, after being slightly wounded, perceiving the same unauthorized straggling fire to continue, rushed forwards to an unresisted slaughter. Of 86 officers, 36 were killed, or died of their wounds, 34 were wounded and taken; and sixteen were taken not wounded; the carnage among the soldiers, being nearly in the same proportion." Hyder's young soldiers in particular amused themselves with fleshing their swords, and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled; on the sick and wounded in the doolies; and even on women and children; and the lower order of horsemen plundered their victims of the last remnant of clothing: none escaped this brutal treatment, excepting the few who were saved by the humane interposition of the French officers,

and particularly Monsieur Pimorin, of the regular French line, who had joined with a small detachment from Mahé, a short time previous to its capture in 1779; and Monsieur Lally, who has already been introduced to the reader's notice. It is scarcely necessary to add that the whole corps, with all its equipments of every description, was irretrievably and totally lost.

The fatal influence of this disaster on the subsequent events of the war, has induced a more detailed description than accords with the general plan of this work. In the respectable publications which have narrated this transaction, and in the first of that class the historical branch of the Annual Register for 1782, the conduct of Colonel Baillie has been the theme of nearly unqualified applause. Obeying, with painful reluctance, the duties of historical truth, I have transcribed from the journal of one of the survivors, the passages marked by inverted commas, with no other alteration than the merely verbal adaptations which were necessary to connect them with the text; and these quotations correspond in the most material facts, with the oral information of others. It may be added, that Colonel Baillie, an officer hitherto of high reputation, but now exercising for the first time an independent command, had appeared from the moment of his receiving orders to deviate to the westward, to be under the influence of some anticipation of disaster, which disturbed his usual faculties: he loitered three days in advancing the distance of fourteen miles, to the bank of the river, by which his progress was arrested. Even on the 26th, that river, although swollen, was reported by the officer commanding the artillery, to be still passable for his guns; but the passage was delayed till on the next day became altogether impracticable.

The distance of Sir Hector Munro from this detachment on the morning of the 9th was, according

to his own statement, fourteen miles. At daylight on the 10th, when he discovered that Hyder had departed, he moved also in the direction of Perambaucum. After marching about four miles he fired three signal guns, saw the smoke of the action and moved to the left in a direct line towards it; after marching one mile and a half more he repeated the signals, but had no return; saw a great smoke (the explosion of the tumbrils), and suddenly the firing ceased, but according to the manuscript journal which has been quoted, a considerable period of time would seem to have intervened between the explosion and the ultimate massacre.

Assuming however these measurements to be correct, and taking those in the manuscript journal at the lowest of the estimate, the distance of Sir Hector Munro at the time of the ultimate disaster, was two miles at the most. The facts have been purposely related with a minuteness which renders comment nearly superfluous. But without recurring to prior errors, if any doubt should exist, that during a period of several days, in which the smaller body was in danger from superior numbers, the larger ought to have moved for its preservation: it will probably be inferred by most of my readers, that if the commander of either of these bodies had on the night of the 9th been guided by the ordinary dictates of military experience, both bodies would probably have been saved, and if both had acted aright, that the Mysoreans instead of the English might have suffered discomfiture.

The movements of Sir Hector Munro had been correctly and incessantly reported to Hyder during the action. At its close he distinctly saw the head of an approaching column, and was about to order the accustomed manœuvre of threatening it with large bodies of horse to cover the retreat of his infantry, guns, booty and prisoners, when he had the satisfaction to see it point in nearly an opposite

direction* to the east, and soon afterwards to the south towards Conjeverain. Without attempting to molest these movements, he directed his tents to be pitched about six miles to the westward of the field of action, and sat in state to distribute rewards for the production of captives, and the heads of the slain which were presented before him, "although, to say the truth, he seemed to take no great pleasure in this horrid spectacle, but rather shewed disgust when prisoners were brought in mangled and covered with wounds."† Such surgical aid as his French

* Sir H. Munro's official letter states that he had moved to the left, in the direction of the smoke ; when the firing ceased he moved to the *right*, towards the Trepasore road, and then to Conjeveram, which corresponds with the statement in the text taken from the Mysorean narratives.

† Manuscript journal.

[The Manuscript journal, referred to by Wilks, was the manuscript of "The Life of Hyder Ally" by Francis Robson, Late Captain in the Honorable East India Company's forces. This was published in 1786. Wilks apparently transcribed his extracts from the manuscript, and Robson seems to have abbreviated and altered his manuscript before he published his book. Wilks apparently did not use the book itself. Wilks considers Sir Hector Munro made an inexcusable mistake in detaching Colonel Fletcher and his small force ; most authorities agree with him. But Captain Innes Munro in his *Narrative of the Military Operations against Hyder Ally Cawn*, defended the course taken. However, whether Sir Hector Munro was right in detaching the small force under Colonel Fletcher or not, the conduct of the campaign in other respects must be condemned. Colonel Baillie's decision to rest on the night of the 9th, instead of pushing on, was fatal to success, and Sir Hector Munro's failure to support Colonel Baillie on the 10th was inexcusable. The whole campaign, beginning from the extraordinary confusion of orders from headquarters, which led Colonel Baillie first to set out to the west towards Cuddapah, and then to contemplate marching by the western route by Tirupati, then finally to advance by Tiruvallur and Perumbakkam, instead of direct to Madras, was pursued by ill fortune. Every step was vitiated by error, and yet, with good generalship, the chances were all in favour of the English. Robson remarked: "This victory cost the Mysore army very dear, as the slaughter of their best troops was immense ; and

establishments enabled him to afford; was chiefly the result of their own spontaneous humanity; tolerated rather than commanded.

The barbarism of Hyder's mind, and his strange ignorance of the practical effects of civilization, are evinced in the following incident. Among the prisoners was a son of Colonel Lang,¹ who commanded Vellore, a child rather than a youth, born in India, who was serving as a volunteer. He sent for the boy, and ordered him instantly to write a letter

nothing but the accident of the tumbrils could have saved Hyder from a total defeat. Had the good genius of the English brought up their troops from Conjiveram, during the battle, the Mysore army must have been inevitably ruined—not one battalion of foot or a single gun, would have probably escaped.” A curious painting illustrating the defeat of the English was placed on the walls of the Daryá Daulat at Seringapatam. Colonel Baillie is shown sitting in his palanquin biting his thumb in vexation and the tumbrils are seen exploding in the background.]

¹ Colonel Ross Lang commanded at Vellore. He was a Lieutenant in the Madras European regiment in 1758. As a Captain he commanded a battalion of native infantry at the siege of Madura in 1763 and as Lieutenant-Colonel served in the first Mysore War in 1768. In 1777 he acted as Commander-in-Chief during the suspension of Colonel James Stuart, and in 1780 defended Vellore. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 365, note 2.) He married in 1773, Mrs. Anne Oats, widow of Captain Thomas Oats. His son who, if the son of Anne Oats, must have been about six years old, when this story was told of him, was Lieutenant Ross Lang, who entered the army in 1787, became a Major-General in 1813 and died in 1822. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 225, note 2, and p. 565.) The ecclesiastical records in the India Office show that Colonel Ross Lang married Anne Oats on 15th March 1773, and the Madras baptismal returns give the names of four children, George, Elizabeth, Robert Charles, and Sophia, who were the offspring of their marriage. There is no trace of the baptism of Ross Lang, junior; he must have been born before the 1773 marriage, either out of wedlock or as the result of a previous marriage of which apparently there is no record. His cadet papers are unfortunately missing. But, as he entered the army in 1787, it may well be that he was 15 or 16 in 1780, and Wilks's story of him may be correct. (Information supplied by Mr. W. Foster, India Office, 24th June 1924.)

to his father, offering him a splendid establishment, on the condition of surrendering the place, and announcing that his own death would be the result of refusal. The boy at first received the proposition with a cool rejection; but on being pressed with direct threats, he burst into tears, and addressing Hyder in his own language, "If you consider *me* (said he) base enough to write such a letter; on what ground can you think so meanly of *my father*? It is in your power to present me before the ramparts of Vellore, and cut me into a thousand pieces in my father's presence; but it is out of your power to make him a traitor."* The threats were however renewed by the attendants in a separate tent; but being found ineffectual, the child was remanded to the quarters of the other prisoners.

Among the wounded of this unhappy day were two cases, in the British, and in Hyder's army, the one remarkable from mere fact, the other from characteristic imagination; both individuals were well known to the author upwards of twenty years afterwards, and the facts were confirmed by the testimony of numerous observers. An English artillery man† had received a sabre wound in the back of the neck, which separated the muscles destined to support the head, and it fell accordingly on his chest‡; on being roused by threats and other wounds, this extraordinary man raised his head to its proper position with the aid of his hands, and supporting it in this manner actually performed the march of six miles, and was perfectly cured.

The other was Mahommed Booden, commandant

* The present Major General Lang; I give the words as stated by the Mysorean officers present.

† Named Twig, well known afterwards as ordnance serjeant at Amboor.

‡ A medical friend explains, that the *Cucullaris* and *Splini capitis*, must have been cut through, and the *biventre*s had also probably received a gash.

of Hyder's artillery. A cannon shot had grazed the back of the occiput, and numerous exfoliations of the skull, which he describes to have afterwards occurred, seem to evince that the contact was severe. He fell, and was supposed to be killed, but almost instantly arose, put on his turban and mounted his horse,* and was found to have received no other apparent injury than a small contusion surmounted by a tumour. The escape of this man became a subject of general conversation in Hyder's army; there could be no doubt of his possessing a charm to avert cannon-balls, and the secret must be invaluable. Tippoo sent for him some days afterwards, and questioned him regarding the charm. He replied (as he always continued to believe) that it was the root of a small plant, which he had purchased from a travelling Hindoo mendicant, to be worn at all times wrapped up in his turban, as an infallible protection to the head. Tippoo desired to see this precious treasure, and after a deliberate scrutiny, very coolly wrapped it up in his own turban for the future defence of his own head, regardless of the fate of Mahommed Booden's, who was perfectly aware, that serious remonstrance would put his head in greater danger than the cannon-balls of the next battle.

Hyder, before day-light on the ensuing morning, moved into his former fortified camp at Mooserwauk,¹ where he was advantageously placed for every event that might occur. He found that his losses, from the resistance of a detachment, did not leave his troops in temper to renew the conflict with the larger body, a measure which every military consideration would otherwise have dictated: the retreat of that body from Conjeveram at the same hour, left him free to the choice of other measures, and detach-

* He describes the great inconvenience he sustained from seeing objects double, for some time after he mounted.

¹ *Mooserwauk*.—*Musaravakkam*, a village six miles west of Conjeeveram.

ing a considerable corps to annoy its march, he remained for several days in his fixed camp, making arrangements for the disposal of his prisoners and for resuming the siege of Arcot.

Sir Hector Munro, as we have seen, after the cessation of the firing to the left, had moved to the right, with the expectation (whence derived he does not state) of meeting Colonel Baillie; but a short interval only elapsed before a wounded sepoy unfolded the fatal truth: "the security of the army determined him to return to Conjeeveram," where he arrived about six o'clock. He found that the grain, which had so long bound him to this fatal spot, now amounted to barely one day's consumption, and that he must starve if he remained. At three o'clock in the morning of the 11th, after throwing his heavy guns and stores into the great tank, he commenced his retreat to Chingleput, where, in consequence of incessant annoyance on the march, involving the loss of a large portion of the stores and baggage, the rear guard did not arrive until nine in the morning of the 12th¹. At this place he expected provisions stored by 12. Mahommed Ali, and, as usual, found none; but was fortunately joined, on the same day, by the important detachment from the south, under Lieutenant Colonel Cosby. Sept. 11.

This judicious and enterprising officer, on receiving orders to join the army, had in his route, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt, on the morning of the 7th, to recover the strong and important fort of Chittapet, which had been one of the first to open its gates to the enemy: and on approaching Conjeeveram, had timely intelligence by his spies, which induced him to deviate to his right, and join his commander-in-chief, a few hours after his arrival at Chingleput. This place is distant thirty-six miles S. W. from

¹ The distance from Conjeeveram to Chingleput by road is twenty miles, a flat road without obstacles.

Madras, and twenty-seven from St. Thomas's Mount. The Dutch fort of Sadras, on the coast of Coromandel, is distant one easy march along or near to the left bank of the Palár, in a direction to the southward of east : a movement to this place, would necessarily increase the distance from Madras, and must have been suggested by considerations connected with eventual embarkation. However this may be, the Commander-in-chief could not determine on the 12th, by which of these two routes he should move, and requested rice in boats, to be sent to the latter place, and to be ready by other conveyance to meet him at St. Thomas's Mount. Happily he adopted the latter alternative : two days food were collected with difficulty from the adjacent villages ; and at six

Sept. 13. in the evening of the 13th, after depositing his sick in the fort of Chingleput, he marched in the direction of St. Thomas's Mount, which he reached at two

14. p. m. on the 14th ; and the English army retired in

15. the morning of the 15th, to a more secure position at Marmalong,¹ with a river covering its front (while Hyder remained in his fortified camp, distant upwards of forty miles) ; thus terminating a campaign of twenty-one days, of which, even at this distance of time, every recollection is associated with sorrow.

A vessel dispatched for the express purpose, conveyed to Bengal this melancholy picture of disaster

Official letter to Government.

[The letter, dated, Chingleput, 12th September 1780, said : " Please, on receipt of this, to send Rice to meet us at the Mount, and some in Boats to Sadras, as I cannot determine the route I shall take till some Hircarrahs come from the Enemy's Camp or near it, who are gone to bring Intelligence of their Motions. I will march on their Arrival, or as soon as I can get two days' Rice beat out of Paddy."]

¹ Marmalong, about six miles from the Fort, Madras, on the Adyar river where the road to St. Thomas's Mount crosses the river. The bridge over the river here was built in 1786.

and dismay. The Governor-general, as we have already seen, had motives of displeasure and distrust, exclusive of the mere imbecility of this subordinate government, and on the first intelligence of the invasion, waited for further information, before he should offer aid where he could not possibly repose confidence.¹

In the ordinary routine of public business, the mind of Mr. Hastings, elegant, mild, and enlightened, exhibited merely a clear simplicity of means adapted to their end ; it was only in the face of overwhelming danger, that, spurning the puny impediments of faction, he burst through the trammels of vulgar resource, and shewed a master spirit, fitted to grapple with every emergency, and equally capable of saving or creating an empire. The *saviour of India*, (a title conferred on this great man, by the general voice of civilized Europe,) became the convenient sacrifice to political manœuvre ; a trial of seven years' duration, terminated in his honourable acquittal, at the bar of his country, of every accusation with which his character had been blackened.

¹ The conduct of Warren Hastings, as regards Sir Thomas Rumbold, who resigned the Governorship of Madras in April 1780, and John Whitehill, who succeeded him as provisional Governor until the 8th November 1780, when he was suspended, is criticized in *A Vindication of the Character and Administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold* by his daughter, Elizabeth Anne Rumbold (1868, Longmans). It is clear, from the papers referred to in this publication, that the Governor-General, as early as June 1780, must have been aware from the information transmitted to him from Madras, that the position then was critical. No attention was paid to the warnings sent to Bengal by Whitehill, and no assistance was sent until the news of Baillie's defeat arrived. It seems not impossible that Warren Hastings himself aided Wilks by his advice, and may have induced Wilks, as the *Vindication* suggests, to make the strong defence of the Governor-General, which he inserts here. As late as January, 1780, Hastings wrote, "I am convinced from Hyder's conduct and disposition, that he will never molest us while we preserve a good understanding with him." (Minute dated 17th January 1780.)

To the charge of oppression, an universal people made answer with their astonishment, their blessings, and their prayers. To the crime of receiving corrupt presents, and clandestine extortions, equal to the price of a kingdom, he answered with poverty; and to the accusation of violating his duty to the East India Company and his country, was opposed the simple fact of preserving unimpaired, the territories committed to his charge, during a period, which elsewhere exhibited nothing but national humiliation. The dregs of calumny and prejudice remained unexhausted for eighteen years, for such was the interval, after an honourable acquittal, before the tardy verdict of truth and justice, brought his wisdom and venerable age to aid in the councils of his country. Recollections too strong and too recent to be easily suppressed, must be the apology, if any be required, for this digressive anticipation of subsequent events.

To the financial pressure resulting from the extensive military operations of the Mahratta war on the establishments of Bengal and Bombay, was now added the still more serious weight of a new war in Coromandel and a general confederacy of the principal states for the final extermination of the British power in India. The emergency was met by corresponding energies and new resources, but Mr. Hastings declared his deliberate opinion, that there was no hope of the proper application of these means, "unless Sir Eyre Coote would at this crisis stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honour of the British arms."¹ That officer occupied at this period the situation of Commander-in-chief in India, and member of the Supreme Council. He was advanced in years,² and oppressed by precarious

¹ Minute of the Governor-General read at Council on the 25th September 1780. (*Forest: Selections from State Papers, 1772-85*, Vol. II, pp. 718-20.)

² Sir Eyre Coote was born in 1726 and so was 54.

health ; but he obeyed, with what remained of life, this honourable summons to the scene of his early glory. Age and sickness had impaired, in a certain degree, the physical strength and mental energy of this distinguished veteran ; but enough remained of both to place him in a high rank among the first generals of his age. He arrived at Madras on the fifth of November, accompanied by such reinforcement of European troops as could be immediately spared ;¹ a considerable body of native infantry was ordered to proceed by land, through the territories of Moodajee Bhounsla, one of the Mahratta confederates whom Mr. Hastings found means to neutralize. Sir Eyre Coote was charged with the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war, and above all he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the governor, Mr. Whitehill, who was succeeded by Mr. Smith, the senior member of council, the same person who had at an early period before the invasion, remonstrated against the apathy of the government in neglecting every branch of military preparation.

This new administration gave an early pledge of zealous co-operation with the measures of Bengal, by investing Sir Eyre Coote with the sole direction of the war. A spirit of hope, vigour, and emulation, succeeded to torpor and despondency ; and the season of the periodical monsoon, when nearly the whole country is inundated by rains, of which the inhabitants of Europe can scarcely form an adequate conception, afforded leisure for equipment, without exhibiting to the enemy the lamentable defects in every department, which remained to be palliated or cured, before the army could move from the cantonments to which

¹ He brought with him a detachment of 330 men of the Bengal European regiment, two companies of artillery, and 630 lascars, (Wilson : *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 17) also a corps of volunteers numbering 45, mostly Irish. (Wully *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 191.)

they were ostensibly confined by the severity of the season : and during this period, Sir Eyre Coote took the precaution of assembling a council of war, who were unanimous in their opinion "that the army was so far from being properly equipped for a campaign, that the utmost to be expected from taking the field, was the relief of some of the garrisons invested by the enemy ; and this effected, that it ought to return for the security of Madras, the grand national object."

It was the 19th of September before Hyder's arrangements admitted of his moving from his fortified camp near Conjeveram, to resume his ground before Arcot. Mahommed Ali had expended a considerable treasure in surrounding this populous and extensive town with a regular rampart, bastions, and ditch, some miles in circuit, constructed under the direction of an European engineer, according to the most approved principles of modern science, but still destitute of the essential addition of ravelins and lunettes. Hyder's approaches and batteries were formed under the guidance of French officers ; and

Oct. 31. after six weeks' open trenches, having effected two practicable breaches, he ordered a simultaneous assault by two columns, one under the direction of his son Tippoo, and the other under Maha Mirza Khan. The former was repulsed with considerable loss, but the latter penetrated, and enabled Tippoo's column to rally, and succeed in a second attempt. The entrance of the enemy at two separate and distant points, made it necessary for the European troops to retire to the citadel, the same spot, and in nearly the same condition, as when defended for fifty days by the great Clive, with a garrison numerically inferior to that by which it was now occupied : but Hyder's political address was ever superior to his military skill. Mahommed Ali's bramin governor, and viceroy of the province, Raja Beerbur,* was taken prisoner

* A title given by Mahommed Ali, his former name being Achena Pundit.

in the assault; and instead of experiencing the brutality exhibited towards the English prisoners, this governor, and all the Hindoo and Mahomedan prisoners of rank, were treated with distinguished consideration; most of them were restored to their former rank, and Raja Beerbur to the same elevated and confidential office under Hyder, which a few days before he had held under his enemy. These measures were infinitely more efficient than open force; and, through the direct influence of Raja Beerbur himself, a spirit was excited in the native troops of the citadel which left to the European officers no alternative but Nov. 3. a capitulation on favourable terms, which the same policy induced Hyder to execute with fidelity.

It was the 17th of January before Sir Eyre Coote 1781. was enabled to move, with an equipment necessarily Jan. 17 crippled, and inefficient, from the difficulty of obtaining draught and carriage cattle through a country everywhere overspread by hostile cavalry. A partial resource against these essential defects was provided by small vessels, with provisions and stores, to accompany the movements of the army, which, by confining its operations within certain limits, might, at this season of the year, move in the event of necessity, to its resources at any point on the coast to which the vessels should be directed to repair.

Hyder was engaged at one and the same time, in the siege or the investment of five different fortresses, commanded by English officers, Amboor, Vellore, Wandewash, Permacoil,¹ and Chingleput. The first of these had surrendered on the 13th, the others were still unsubdued. On the 19th, Sir Eyre Coote relieved 19. Chingleput, in which only fifteen days' provisions remained, and on the same day, contrary to general anticipation, crossed the broad and sandy bed of the river Palār, unmolested by the enemy. About thirteen

¹ *Permacoil*.—Perumukkal, a hill about 7 miles E.S.E. of Tindivanam in South Arcot District, on the road from Tindivanam to Marakkanam on the sea coast.

miles south-west of Chingleput, is the fort of Carrangooly, in the centre of a fertile country : the works of this place had been improved by Hyder, and furnished with a garrison of 700 men : erroneous intelligence had been conveyed to Sir Eyre Coote that the enemy was in the act of removing the provisions and the garrison ; and for the purpose of securing the largest possible portion of the former precious article, he made a detachment at midnight of the 20th, of 1000 men, under Captain Davis, and followed with the army at the usual hour of marching. Instead of a dismantled post, Captain Davis found, on approaching it, about five in the morning, an adequate garrison

Jan. 24. perfectly prepared for his reception. He pushed on however in obedience to his orders, and the place being unprovided with a draw-bridge ; a twelve pounder was rapidly run up to the first gate, which was blown open at the second discharge, so as to admit a single man ; after clearing this impediment, a second and a third gate presented themselves, and were forced with augmented difficulty, in a similar manner ; the assailants in the traverses of the gate, being, during the whole period exposed to the enemy's musquetry from above. With the exception of about one hundred killed, most of the enemy escaped on the opposite side, by ladders previously provided for such an event ; a precaution which probably weakened the energy of defence. The loss of the assailants was comparatively heavy,¹ but the effect produced on the English army, by this opening of the campaign, was highly useful after the late disasters ; and a respectable quantity of grain found in the place tended

¹ The army under Sir Eyre Coote consisted of 4 regiments of Nawab's cavalry and a European troop, 4 5½-inch howitzers, 2 18-pounders, 4 12-pounders and 34 6-pounders ; the 73rd regiment and one battalion of the Madras European regiment ; seven battalions of sepoy, the Trichinopoly detachment, 8 companies of grenadiers from the Northern Circars, a company of marksmen, and one company of pioneers, making up in all

farther to improve the impressions arising from this first enterprize.

The next object was Wandewash, distant twenty-three miles, in a direction nearly west, the actual condition of which it will be necessary to describe. On the first preparation for the investment of the place early in December, the wives and families of the sepoys had, contrary to Lieutenant Flint's wishes and remonstrances, departed with the hope of being permitted to reside without molestation among their friends in the villages of the protected part of the country. Hyder caused all these unhappy persons to be collected, and (the approaches having been previously carried to within fifty yards of the ditch) at daylight in the morning of the 30th December, this motley crowd, surrounded by guards, and preceded by a flag of truce, were perceived approaching the place, the women and children screaming, and the old men imploring the troops to deliver up the place as the only means of preserving them from the most barbarous treatment. The moment was critical: besides the commandant there was only one European in garrison; every other man had either a wife or some other object of affection in the groupe; the few who were on that face of the works strongly objected to the use of cannon, which were all loaded, and whatever should be done was to be effected by the single hand of the commandant. Fortunately the bearer of the flag was considerably advanced, and in a direction which admitted of pointing at him clear of the crowd: after due notice, Lieutenant Flint, regardless of the remonstrances of his sepoys, fired and had the satisfaction to see the flag fall, and a few

almost 8,000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 62 pieces of artillery. 1,600 of these were Europeans. The losses at Karunguli were, killed 3 Europeans and 8 sepoys, wounded 59. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*.) The Government of Fort St. George on the 29th November reported to the Directors that Haidar's force consisted probably of 700 Europeans, 70,000 foot, 30,000 horse and 100 pieces of cannon.

additional discharges close over the heads of the crowd, caused the whole to retire with the utmost precipitation. All this was effected, and the whole had disappeared, before the principal part of the garrison, resting from the fatigues of the night, were apprized of the circumstance : their presence would probably have caused it to terminate in a different manner.

- The subsequent operations were in the ordinary routine of a siege, and of sorties, planned and executed with such skill and coolness, as to be always
- Jan. 16. successful without material loss. On the 16th of January the enemy had entered the ditch by galleries in two places on the west face, and another gallery from the south was nearly ready for the same operation ; but in the course of this day great bustle appeared among the besiegers, a large proportion of the tents were struck and many of the troops marched. At two o'clock on the morning of the
17. 17th, a heavy fire of musquetry and cannon was heard in the direction of the expected relief, and was continued with every indication of a severe action until day break, when a column of about 3000 infantry, dressed and accoutred like British sepoys, approached with English colours flying, drew up behind a village near to the east face, and discharged their cannon at bodies of horse making demonstrations of preparing to charge. At the same moment the troops in the two attacks abandoned their trenches with precipitation, and marched off in the direction of Arcot. Every individual in the garrison was deceived with the single exception of the commandant ; one part of the operation was performed in a manner which could not escape his scrutinizing and experienced eye. The cannon shot discharged at the approaching bodies of horse were seen to graze in directions clear of their object, and were fired at distances not belonging to the practice of British artillery. He had the greatest difficulty in undeceiving

his garrison and keeping them at their posts; but they were ultimately convinced by the evident hesitation of the pretended relief; at this moment Lieutenant Flint ventured to detach a large portion of his little garrison unperceived into the works of the western attack; the galleries into the ditch were destroyed, the materials for filling the ditch set on fire, and the smoke arising from this operation was the first indication to large bodies of the enemy who were in ambush in every direction, and pushed for the recovery of their works. The signal for the return of the sortie was promptly observed, their prescribed route was by the southern attack, the trenches of which they scoured, killing or making prisoners every man who had been left concealed in both attacks. All this was effected without the loss of a man; but a small guard which had been sent to watch the pretended friends on being accosted by men whom they personally knew, were in spite of previous warning completely deceived and prevailed on to enter the village where they were made prisoners. Two of the number were sent back with proposals for a capitulation, an answer was returned from the cannon of the place, and the enemy hastened to re-occupy their cover.¹ The five succeeding days were employed in repairing the damages resulting from this abortive attempt; but on the 22d, movements were observed evidently of a serious nature occasioned by intelligence then unknown to the garrison of the capture of Carangooly by assault on the preceding morning; the batteries and trenches were evacuated on this day, and the tents and baggage sent off in the direction of Arcott. On the 23d, Jan. 23 the enemy disappeared, and on the succeeding day Sir Eyre Coote had the satisfaction of seeing the

¹ An interesting account of this attempt to take Wandewash is given in *The History of Hyder Naik Kirmani*, where the scheme is said to have been the work of Lally and the French soldiers in Hyder's army. Pp. 434, 435.

British colours still flying on the ramparts while only one day's ammunition remained to the garrison.¹

The admiration of this experienced soldier was unbounded, at all he saw of the resources which had been employed, and at the little which he heard in the modest recital of Lieutenant Flint: the interest of the scene was heightened, by a coincidence which this veteran deemed worthy of notice in his public dispatches, that the siege had been raised on the 22d of January, the same day of the same month, on which, twenty-one years before, he had raised the siege of the same place by a memorable battle: and to complete the association of ideas, he encamped upon the same field. Sir Eyre Coote recommended the immediate promotion of Lieutenant Flint to the rank of captain, which was acceded to by his government; but this distinction was rendered nugatory by a subsequent determination* of the Court of Directors, as an inconvenient deviation from the established routine of their service—the rise by seniority alone: a rule upon the whole, perhaps, wisely adapted to actual circumstances, but at best productive of negative good; repressing, without question, the vice of partiality and favoritism, but crushing the legitimate excitements to military enterprize. It is true, that some highly distinguished branches of the royal army, are governed by this rule: but it is relieved by particular brevets for distinguished service; similar to that of

¹ The garrison consisted of—

14th battalion, one company,

15th battalion, one company,

12th battalion, one officer and 37 men.

The only English were Lieutenant Flint and Ensign Moore. Innes Munro estimated the attacking force at 11,000 foot and 22,000 horse and artillery. (Innes Munro: *Narrative of the Military Operations against Hyder Ally Cawn*, pp. 209-210.)

Lieutenant Bishop, commanding Permacoil, and Ensign Moore, the only officer with Lieutenant Flint, were in the same predicament.

which the benefit was most unwisely denied to Captain Flint, and the same unqualified rule of seniority alone continues its depressing influence over the Indian army to the present day.

As the course of our narrative will not again lead to any detailed notice of Wandewash, it may be interesting to explain one of the modes by which grain was obtained for the consumption of the garrison, and an occasional aid to the supplies of the army; the villages under Hyder's protection, and in full culture, were sufficiently near to admit of occasional enterprize by night, but instead of desultory success which would dry up the source of supply, Lieutenant Flint conceived, and absolutely executed the idea, of laying them all under a secret, but regular contribution, on the condition of leaving them unmolested; these contributions were faithfully and punctually delivered by night, and were managed with such address, as completely to elude the knowledge or the suspicion of Hyder during the whole course of the war.

Before Sir Eyre Coote left Wandewash, he ascertained that Hyder had raised the sieges of Permacoil, and even of Vellore, indicating the intention of a general action, which circumstances induced him to postpone.

On the 25th, a French fleet appeared off Madras, Jan. 25. the intelligence was rapidly conveyed to Hyder, who anticipated with confidence the arrival of the expected co-operation, and a farther interval elapsed before he was apprized that no land forces were on board. The appearance of this fleet was announced to Sir Eyre Coote on the day of his departure from Wandewash for the relief of Permacoil. He instantly retraced his steps towards Madras, but on farther intelligence relieved Permacoil, and from thence moved towards Pondicherry with the view of destroying the boats, an operation which was eminently useful in impeding the communications of the hostile

fleet through a surf nearly impassable by boats of European construction, and for the necessary purpose of demolishing what remained of military resources, which had been employed in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the capitulation, the political condition of the place, and the peculiar indulgence which had been extended to the inhabitants, for such is the character involved in the levy and equipment of troops for the service of the enemy.

Feb. 7. These services were still imperfectly accomplished, when Hyder's army appeared in great force. On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the French fleet, and of Sir Eyre Coote having in consequence commenced his march to Madras, Hyder, with the view of throwing himself by forced marches between the General and that place, moved rapidly to Conjeveram; but on his arrival learning that Sir Eyre Coote, instead of pursuing his march in the direction of the capital, had resumed a southern route, he followed, by forced marches, with his cavalry, select infantry, and all his lighter equipments. The presence of the enemy's fleet had frustrated the project of supplying the English army by sea; and in moving to Pondicherry Sir Eyre Coote had calculated, from intelligence doubly defective, not only on finding a few days' provisions in that populous town, but from Hyder's reported position, on being enabled to reach the fertile countries south of the Coleroon before him, and thereby to obviate every risk of want. There was but one day's rice in camp, it was impossible, with this stock, to attempt a movement to the northward: the direction of Hyder's march pointed south towards Cuddalore, and nothing remained but the desperate alternative of moving still farther from the main source of supply at Madras to cover Cuddalore, which it was of main importance either to dismantle or protect, to prevent its becoming a depôt and point of support for the future operations of the land forces expected from

France. The supplies at that place were known not to exceed three days' food, but in any other direction he could have found none. Sir Eyre Coote accordingly moved in a direction parallel to that of the enemy about two p. m.; while day-light continued he experienced little annoyance, and a heavy and continued cannonade throughout the night neither materially impeded his march, nor produced any serious casualties, excepting the loss of some stores. Arrived at Cuddalore (the French fleet being still at Feb. 8. Pondicherry) his situation became critical, and may most suitably be described in his own words. "I cannot command rice enough to move either to the northward or the southward. I offered him (Hyder) battle yesterday, but I no sooner shewed myself, than he moved off, and has taken possession of and strengthened all the roads leading to the southward. I have written to Nagore in the most pressing terms 11. for supplies—I depend upon every effort in your power—every thing must be risked to assist me—my difficulties are great indeed. I need say no more to induce you to take such steps as will speedily enable me to act as becomes a soldier." Hyder perfectly 12. apprized of these facts had made detachments to the southward to lay waste the country round Nagore, and cut off its communications with the sources of supply in the interior, and he depended on the services of the French fleet to augment the difficulties of the British army. Without possessing the means of forming a correct judgment regarding the motives which may have influenced the measures of the French admiral, Monsieur d'Orves, the proposition is unquestionable, that had he continued his co-operation in these measures by preventing supplies in any direction by sea, the campaign and the existence of the British army must in the opinion of its commander-in-chief, and according to all human calculation, have soon been brought to a fatal close. The sudden elation at an unexpected relief from these

gloomy forebodings is strongly depicted in the following brief dispatch. "The French fleet under sail standing to the eastward: there is not a moment to be lost in sending me provisions—that supplied, I will answer for the rest."

The intermediate days before the arrival of supplies, like many of the preceding, were passed in a precarious dependence for food on the skill and industry of the persons employed to discover subterranean hoards of grain,* and when these difficulties were in some degree relieved by the arrival of supplies by sea from Madras and Nagore, the reduced state of the draught and carriage cattle, rendered it impracticable to carry even one day's provisions, and fixed the army to the ground which it occupied. Hyder deemed it imprudent to attempt a decisive attack on an army, which, in the event of discomfiture, could retire on a fortress in its rear. Contemplating also the hilly and confined space which must bound his own rear in any attack, as unfavourable to the precaution which he uniformly adopted, of preparing, as the first preliminary to an action, clear, open, and well-finished roads for the retreat of his guns; he determined to leave in the vicinity of Cuddalore, such a body as was sufficient to prevent its deriving any supplies from the interior. He reduced and occupied in force all the intermediate posts between the English army and the southern provinces, and proceeded with the main army to the northern bank of the Coleroon, from whence he made large detachments into the territory of Tanjore. Without attempting the capital of that country, he occupied such posts as commanded its territorial revenues, and enabled him to apply its resources to the support of his own army, and still farther to augment the difficulties of his enemy in any operation to be attempted in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote had no

* See p. 552, Vol. I.

prospect of relief from the embarrassments of his situation, excepting from the opportunity of a general action, which it was highly improbable that the enemy would afford. His force, originally insufficient, had been reduced by casualties and by detachments to garrison Carangooly, and reinforce Wandewash. Some native troops from the south had been prepared to join by land, but were effectually prevented by the dispositions which have been stated. Mr. Huddleston, of the civil service, had, however, managed with energy and skill the collection and embarkation of grain and other supplies at Nagore; and an arrangement was made for embarking the detachment at this place, to be conveyed by sea to join the main army. The vicinity had previously been laid waste by Hyder, to prevent communication with the interior; and a small redoubt, hastily constructed for the purpose, was the sole protection of the factory, and the only cover to eventual embarkation.

Immediately after the embarkation of this detachment, consisting of two battalions, a considerable force of infantry and guns under Mons. Lally entered the town, but the previous dispositions had been made with such care, that not only the troops on shore were saved, but all the public and private property was embarked without loss. A detachment which had been serving under Colonel Goddard in the Mahratta war, consisting of a battalion and a May. half of native troops and two companies of Europeans also accompanied Admiral Hughes's fleet on his return from the western coast of the peninsula, and farther strengthened the army. But numerical force 25. without the means of movement tended little to relieve its complicated embarrassments. All that vigilance and energy could accomplish was incessantly attempted to procure immediate supply or the means of future equipment; and among the losses sustained by the enemy, was that of Sidee Hellal the commandant, an Abyssinian, and an officer of distinguished

reputation. From the 8th of February till the 16th of June, the army was certainly stationary, with the exception of one ineffectual demonstration of a single march to relieve Tiagar,¹ a hill fort fifty miles to the westward, commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, which June 7. fell on the 7th of June for want of ammunition; but during the whole of that period few nights elapsed in which detachments were not abroad, supported on the ensuing day by the whole or various portions of the line, which, by varying their directions and modes of proceeding, frequently succeeded in procuring from distances supposed to be too great for a forced march, flocks of sheep and droves of cattle, which not only furnished food for the troops, but gradually, although slowly, added a few oxen of a proper description for the departments of ordnance, stores, and provisions.

During this long and mortifying delay, the government of Madras naturally regretting a state of apparent inaction, which consumed the resources of the state as rapidly as an active campaign, transmitted to Sir Eyre Coote an elaborate exposition of his present military situation, disclaiming however any intention of interfering with the conduct of the war, which they had committed to his guidance, and meaning to aid his decisions, by submitting to his judgment the result of their own deliberations on the

¹ *Tiagar*.—Tyaga Drug, almost due west of Cuddalore, in the Kallakurchi Taluq, South Arcot District, on the road to Salem. The rock rises almost perpendicularly, 740 feet above the plain. It was captured by the French in 1759. Roberts held the fort with two companies of the Company's sepoye and two of the Nawab's. It surrendered, Roberts having exhausted all his ammunition.

² Sir Thomas Munro, probably correctly, thought that Sir Eyre Coote remained at Cuddalore, for good reasons. His army was small, insufficiently furnished with cavalry and cattle, and he desired to keep Haidar in the south, while Colonel Pearse, with the Bengal reinforcements, was marching south. He reached Ellore on the 20th May. (Gleig: *The Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. I, pp. 35-36.)

actual state of public affairs, and the reasoning which might affect his adoption of a northern or a southern movement. Among the most perceptible changes superinduced by years and ill health, was a defect in that admirable serenity of temper which had strengthened and embellished his earlier military virtues. Surrounded by difficulties, which appeared to be insuperable, he had frequently seemed to ascribe to the Government impediments which they were strenuously labouring to remove; and as suddenly acknowledged their zeal on the receipt of any unexpected supply. This exposition was treated, justly perhaps, but with unnecessary asperity, as a covert attack on his military character, by persons unqualified to form a military opinion. Nothing, he said, but his zeal for the interests of his country could have originally induced him to undertake the charge of an army so miserably equipped, as to be pronounced unfit for service before it had moved. After reciting the motives and results of the few measures he had been enabled to risk, and the utility of his present position with reference to the expected French forces, and preventing Hyder from undertaking the sieges of either Trichinopoly or Tanjour, he intimates that if he had been invested with any powers besides those which he derived from his commission as Commander-in-chief of the British forces in India, such powers had only loaded him with labour and anxiety foreign to his duties, and appertaining to themselves. "Having stated, (he adds,) the circumstances which proved the impossibility of marching this army at all, it does not seem immediately necessary that I should enter upon an enquiry, whether a southern or a northern movement is to be preferred." If a movement of necessity should be made, (and by the non-arrival of supplies which ought to have been sent, that necessity appeared to be approaching,) he must move northwards, which he adds "I am happy in thinking I shall do without

apprehending any material danger from even a more formidable enemy than a body of horse, which you have, with so much precision, pointed out as the only impediment I am likely to meet with in taking a northern route. In justice to both myself and the service, I promise you that the army I now command, shall not remain a moment unemployed, if you will only supply me with provisions and the means of carrying them." While thus animadverting on opinions drawn from crude and partial views, it is instructive to observe this respectable veteran, uniting with the Government whose suggestions he condemns, in the most decisive inferences with regard to the general policy of the British state in India, drawn from the insulated application of that policy to the affairs of Fort St. George alone, while the interests of the other establishments, and the difficulty of adopting the measures proposed, were either overlooked or treated as points of minor consideration. The Government of Bombay deprecated the war with Hyder. The Government of Fort St. George, uniformly affected to consider the Mahratta war as the efficient cause of Hyder's invasion. Sir Eyre Coote dissented from this opinion, but anxiously concurred in the positive necessity of a Mahratta peace. He severely arraigned the conduct of Colonel Goddard, his military inferior, on the western side of India, who was invested with diplomatic powers from the Government-general, for not employing those powers to terminate the Mahratta war, a criticism which, if their relative situations had admitted the retort, might have formed a pretty exact parallel in recommending to Sir Eyre Coote an immediate peace with Hyder, who, like the Mahrattas, and most other powers, would be averse to peace in the direct ratio of his success in war; a proposition which the conduct of the Mahratta nation had made familiar at Bombay.

Colonel Goddard had in effect made very

strenuous efforts for the termination of the Mahratta war. On receiving his diplomatic instructions towards the close of 1780, he had offered to the consideration of that state reasonable terms to serve as the basis of a treaty and proposed a general cessation of hostilities these propositions were treated with silence and contempt, exactly because the affairs of the English were deemed to be in an unprosperous state. Colonel Goddard concentrated every possible means at his disposal to remove that impression; and in February 1781 made a demonstration of attacking the enemy's capital by ascending the Bore ghaut, when he hoped to treat with better effect. He was permitted to ascend, but the whole force of the state was prepared, if he should advance, to prevent his return. He was in greater force than the army which surrendered at Worgaum in 1779; and the Mahrattas, deeming it possible that he would be able to reach Poona, deliberately prepared to set the capital on fire, together with every thing intermediate that could furnish forage or subsistence, in order that they might insure his unconditional surrender. The experience of 1779; the unexpected numbers and quality of the troops by which he perceived himself to be opposed; the utter hopelessness of advance to any useful purpose, and the determined rejection of negotiation, except on terms which it was impossible to admit; all combined to convince Colonel Goddard of the expediency of retracing his steps. His first retrograde movement was the signal for determined attack, and he effected his retreat with the utmost difficulty. Having practically ascertained that the resources at his disposal, were not sufficient for an effective diversion into the interior, he reserved such troops as were necessary for the operations on the coast, and returned those of the Madras establishment, which at the period in question, were actually on their voyage to join Sir Eyre Coote. Of the local and subordinate authorities, Colonel Goddard thus

appears to have taken the most impartial view of the general interests of the state.¹

Each presidency seemed to attach a paramount importance to its own local objects; and the Government of Madras seconding the opinions of the Commander-in-chief, reiterated their condemnation of the origin, the continuance, and the consequences of the Mahratta war, and stated to the Government-general the urgent necessity of its termination; as if the case had no parallel to the war in which they were themselves engaged, or could be terminated by different measures, or by an opposite consideration of the motives which influence human conduct. Mr. Hastings, placed in a situation which gave him a more enlarged view, and possessing a scope of mind adapted to the high and perilous station which he occupied, answered to the propositions which accompanied this recommendation. "We (viz. the Governor-general and council) wish for peace with the Mahratta state, but we will not make it on terms dishonourable to ourselves; we will not disgrace the English name, by submitting to conditions which cannot be complied with, without a sacrifice both of our honour and our interest: yet such are the conditions prescribed in the paper before us (prepared by Mahommed Ali). The distress which the Company's arms had suffered, and their belief of our consequent inability to support the war against them, has raised their presumption, and induced them to insist on terms

¹ General Goddard was pressed in March 1781 by Sir Eyre Coote to bring about a peace with the Mahrattas. (Letter in *Forest's Selections, Maratha Series*, Vol. I, p. 446.) Colonel Goddard in 1778 had been entrusted by Warren Hastings with instructions to treat with the Mahrattas and the power of the Bombay Government over the army under him was suspended. In 1780 Colonel (now General) Goddard was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, but he was still entrusted with his former powers from Bengal. (For an account of his dealings with the Mahrattas, see Grant Duff *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, Chap. XXIX.)

which the worst state of our affairs would not warrant us in yielding to. We are now morally convinced, that nothing but a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war, will prevail on them to make peace, or overcome their present disinclination to it. Peace is our object, and we are determined to pursue the only means which appear to us to lead to its honourable accomplishment."

The wretched equipment of Sir Eyre Coote's army kept him stationary in the neighbourhood of Cuddalore until the middle of June: its march to June. any distance from the sea was literally impracticable; and along the coast was only possible, with the substitution of ships for an ordinary commissariat. Every movement to be attempted, was consequently dependent on the co-operation of the British admiral, for the protection of the transports; and for the more awful purpose which entered into the cool calculations of this interesting veteran, of saving the wreck of his army, in the event of total discomfiture in that general action, which it was the uniform object of all his measures to force upon the enemy.

The village of Porto Novo¹ (or Feringepet) is situated on the north bank of the river Vellaar close to the sea. The fortified pagoda of Chillumbrum² is three miles south of that river, and about twenty-six miles

¹ Porto Novo, from Portuguese, (Tamil name, *Farangi-pettai*, European town) 15 miles south of Cuddalore, 32 miles south of Pondicherry, at the mouth of the river Vellar. Formerly of considerable prosperity. An agreement for making a settlement was obtained for the English in 1681, from the then ruler of Ginji. The Danes and Portuguese were already there. In 1748 an English Resident was appointed. In 1758 it was captured by the French, who were driven out in 1760. In 1824 iron works were established here, with iron ore brought down from the Salem District, but the enterprise was soon abandoned. The place proved very unhealthy, and cast iron tomb stones with inscriptions and the ruins of furnaces are all that remain of the venture.

² *Chillumbrum*.—Chidambaram, a town with 18,000 inhabitants, 21 miles S.S.W. from Cuddalore. A Siva temple occupies 39 acres in the centre of the town. In the centre is the shrine of

in the same direction from Cuddalore. This pagoda was one of the posts materially strengthened by Hyder, for the double purpose of arresting his enemy's progress to the southward, and serving as a depôt for provisions for the eventual use of his own army, and that of his French allies; purposes which rendered it of corresponding importance to Sir Eyre Coote, that he should attempt its reduction. He moved on

16. the 16th June, and on the 18th at noon, crossed the
 18. Vellaar. Finding that the enemy was nowhere near it in considerable force, and being greatly misinformed regarding its garrison, which was reported to be but a few hundred irregulars, and actually consisted of nearly three thousand men, partly regulars, and the remainder the distinguished peons of Chittledroog under Jehan Khân,* an officer of reputation; he determined in pursuance of this defective information, to attempt carrying it on the same night by a *coup de main*. Four battalions of sepoys with eight† pieces of ordnance, moved under his own immediate direction at dusk; they carried the pettah or town without difficulty, and pushed on with rapidity to a second line of defence, which surrounded the place at the distance of about one hundred yards. the gate of this line of works was forced by a twelve pounder, and the troops advanced under a heavy fire, with the greatest spirit to the body of the place, the entrance into which was protected by the usual Indian apparatus of winding traverses, and three successive gates, built up behind with a few feet of masonry to prevent

Parvati, a building of great beauty. The temple is the property of the local Brahmins, and the Hindus of Ceylon and Madura contribute largely to its support. It is held in great sanctity by the Hindus of South India.

In 1753 the French occupied the temple of Chidambaram, on its being evacuated by the English. In 1760 it surrendered to the English. Hyder took it, and in 1780 improved the defences.

* The officer mentioned in page xxix of the preface, and from whom I received the details, which relate to his own measures.

† Two 12 pounders, four 6 pounders, and two howitzers.

their being blown open. The first gate was forced after some difficulty, and the outer area between the first and second, being as usual inadequately flanked or commanded, the troops succeeded in forcing the second gate also; but for the area between the second and third gates, commanded by the rampart of the body of the place, and lined with thatched huts, where a portion of the garrison usually resided, a better preparation was arranged. Exclusively of the ordinary means of defence, bundles of straw had been placed on the rampart in reserve, with vessels of oil ready to moisten them and encrease the combustion: a few lighted port-fires dropped down on the straw roofs, gave a commencement to the flame, and the bundles of oiled straw successively thrown down, converted into a mass of flame nearly the whole area to be passed: as a farther defence, if even the third gate should be forced, a select body of Chittledroog spearmen were placed in reserve on each side of the interior of the gate. But the retreat of the assailants rendered this reserve unnecessary; nothing could prevail on the sepoys to rally, and the officers and artillery-men compelled to abandon one gun drew off the remainder with great difficulty and serious loss. The small amount of the European troops, and a desire of reserving them for greater emergencies, had prevented their employment in this enterprize; but on being thus foiled, Sir Eyre Coote ordered up the grenadiers of the army with the intention of resuming the assault; but before their arrival, being better informed of the actual means of defence possessed by the garrison, he drew off the whole in the course of the night, carrying with him a small supply of grain which had been found in the pettah; and after the lapse of four days re-crossed the river, and encamped near the village of Porto Novo.¹

¹ The casualties in this attack were—

Killed.—1 Sergeant, 1 rank and file —Europeans.

1 Subadar and 72 rank and file.—Natives.

Admiral Sir Edward Hughes in the *Superb*, June 24. arrived from Madras on the 24th, and was visited by the General on the ensuing day. He brought intelligence of the arrival of Lord Macartney to assume the government of Madras; and of his being charged with orders for the immediate commencement of hostilities against the Dutch possessions in India. On proceeding to consult regarding the measures which became requisite in consequence of this important intelligence, the admiral's first suggestion was a descent on Negapatam, aided by a detachment from the army; but on examining their resources, it was found that exclusively of the danger of detaching from a body already too small, if the object should not be accomplished within twelve days, the army would be left without food. It was therefore resolved, that the united efforts of the fleet and army should be directed to the early reduction of Chillumbrum; and the preparation of fascines and gabions having already commenced with this view, arrangements were immediately ordered for landing the battering train. Sir Eyre Coote had however scarcely returned to camp, when he received intelligence of the presence of Hyder's whole army within the distance of a few miles.

During the four months in which Sir Eyre Coote had necessarily been fixed at Cuddalore, Hyder, expecting to draw him from that position by his proceedings to the southward, had abstained from the regular siege of Tanjore or Trichinopoly, as an operation which might embarrass the rapid movements essential to his future plans. Exclusively of minor interprizes, in which he was generally successful, he considered his time to be not unprofitably

Wounded.—2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 2 Lieutenant fire workers, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants and 6 rank and file.—Europeans.

7 Native officers, 105 other Natives.

Missing.—3 Europeans and 34 Natives. (Wyllie: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 221.)

employed in the occupation of every tenable post, and the means of realizing the revènués of the whole country, the collection of an enormous booty in money and merchandize, and the transmission to the upper country of all that was moveable, including immense herds of cattle. The human race was made the unrelenting object of similar calculation; weavers and their families were collected and forcibly sent to people the island of Seringapatam. Captive boys destined to the exterior honour of Islam, were driven to the same place with equal numbers of females, the associates of the present, and the mothers of a future race of military slaves. On receiving from Jehan Khân the intelligence of what had occurred at Chillumbrum, a forced movement of one hundred miles in two days and a half, placed him between the English army and Cuddalore, and he immediately began to fortify a position scarcely three miles from the English encampment, covering the whole country with cavalry, to prevent the possibility of intelligence, regarding either its strength or situation, and thus rendering the camp guards "the boundary and limited extent of their knowledge."* This position was taken with the view not only of frustrating the intended operations against Chillumbrum, but of covering his own against the fort of Cuddalore, the destined depôt of his French allies, while his position should render it impracticable for the English army to move in any direction, or receive any supply, excepting from the sea.

In these critical circumstances, Sir Eyre Coote had recourse to the opinion of a council of war. The June 27. preparations for the siege were discontinued; the battering guns, and every possible impediment embarked, and four days' rice, to be carried on the soldiers' backs, was landed for the purpose of enabling the army to manœuvre for turning or forcing the

* Sir Eyre Coote's words.

[From his account of the Battle dated 6th July 1781.]

enemy's position, or bringing on a general action. Sir Edward Hughes being requested to cover Cuddalore with a portion of the squadron, and with the remainder to watch over the operations of the army, or the embarkation of its wreck during the few ensuing days which were to determine its eventual triumph or possible annihilation.

July 1. By seven o'clock on the 1st of July, the British army had drawn out of its ground of encampment. The direction of the road to Cuddalore pointed north north-west, leaving on its left the termination of a lagoon. Considerable bodies of cavalry, with this lagoon in the rear of their right and centre, appeared covering the plain, but were destined to retreat, as the English army should advance. Hyder's select cavalry, accompanied by some light artillery, was drawn up behind this lagoon, fronting the north, ready to operate on the British army in flank, when it should have passed the end of the lagoon, and be embarrassed by the batteries in front. Sir Eyre Coote, utterly uninformed of the nature and position of the enemy's works, could only reconnoitre at the head of his little army, which he formed into two lines fronting north a little west and advanced in order of battle over the plain, his numbers being necessarily diminished by a strong baggage-guard which moved between his right and the sea. After marching in this order little more than a mile and a half, the position of the enemy's works was clearly distinguished. The ground which they occupied was strengthened with great judgment and skill, by front and flanking batteries, in a line which crossing the road to Cuddalore, extended from commanding grounds on the right, to a point on the left, where the sand hills of the shore were thought to oppose sufficient difficulties, and form a support to that flank. An hour was passed by Sir Eyre Coote, in examining

* Noticed in the Mysorean, but not in the English narratives, although inserted in Pringle's topographical manuscript map.

with his accustomed coolness and penetration, the critical circumstances in which he was placed, the army being during that period, exposed to a distant but incessant cannonade on their front, from the batteries and guns advanced from that position, and on the left flank from the guns which had been moved from behind the lagoon; but in order that their limited store of ammunition might be reserved for more decisive purposes, the English artillery was strictly prohibited from returning a single shot.

At nine o'clock Sir Eyre Coote had determined on his measures; and without any previous movement among the troops that should indicate a change of disposition, he ordered both his lines to break into column, by the simple tactic of that day, of facing to the right, a battalion from the left of each line changing their front, for the purpose of protecting that most exposed flank, and covering the whole interval between the lines. In this order he moved with rapidity and precision to the right, to the eastward of the range of sand hills which follow the direction of the coast, at the distance of about eleven hundred yards from the sea, and which covered the greater portion of this movement, until he reached an opening in that range, where it was discovered that a practicable road had been made by Hyder, for far other purposes than the approach of his enemy: a commanding sand hill close to this opening was also fortunately unoccupied. The British general penetrated this pass with the first line; and after clearing it of a strong corps charged with its defence, deployed again into order of battle, with his front to the west, and waiting with impatience under a heavy fire until the sand hill should be effectually possessed by the artillery of his second line, he moved on with the first, as fast as order and an advancing fire of artillery would admit; a long and thick caldera*

* *Pandanus odoratissima*. Ainslie, page 145.

hedge covering his right, and his left being protected by a corps and some guns in column. The artillery in Hyder's batteries had already been withdrawn to a new line at right angles with the first, formed with considerable promptitude, and defended with great obstinacy. After a long and tremendous cannonade, the British line still slowly and gradually advancing, and availing themselves, with the greatest military address, of every successive advantage of ground; an attempt was made to break and overwhelm it by a general charge of cavalry, directed diagonally on the angle of the left: this also failed by the superior fire and steadiness of the British troops; and it was not until four o'clock that Sir Eyre Coote succeeded in forcing the enemy's line and compelling it to a precipitate retreat.

In the mean while, the advantage of the judicious position so promptly and ably assigned to the second line became eminently conspicuous. A strong body of infantry with their guns, and a very large mass of cavalry were detached to fall upon the rear of the British army. A close and severe contest ensued between this body and the second line, which obstinately disputed every point, drove them from the contiguous heights which they attempted to seize, and foiled all their efforts to charge and force this most important position; the occupation of which enabled the first line to advance, not only without apprehension for their rear, but with the most important aid from the artillery which occupied the heights; and the same position enabled the baggage guard to take post without molestation between the northern extremity of this range and the sea. The success of these efforts, in which the select corps of Hyder's army were employed, was necessary to the developement of a more general operation, and Hyder becoming impatient at this obstinate resistance, and the consequent progress of the first line, ordered a simultaneous and desperate charge of the whole

cavalry upon both lines. The stable horse under Hyder's immediate direction was destined to act against the first line, and Meer Saheb against the second. The stable horse advanced with a good countenance, but were repelled as we have already seen. Their standard elephant, on approaching, received a slight wound, took fright, and fled with precipitation off the field, and the horsemen suffering severely from the English grape, which probably would in every event have foiled their efforts, were furnished with the convenient apology of following their colours. The general charge on the second line was observed by Hyder to be prepared but suspended, and a floating to take place along the whole mass; impatient at this want of concert, he sent successive messages to Meer Saheb, and all his commanders, ordering them, as they valued their heads, instantly to charge; and some interval elapsed before the fall of Meer Saheb by a mortal wound was added to the report of other causes of delay. A small* schooner from the British squadron approaching the shore as near as soundings would admit, opportunely and judiciously opened her fire upon this mass of cavalry; the loss of their commander, and a considerable number of men from the broadside of one little vessel, was magnified in the imaginations of men unsuspecting of annoyance from another element, into a dreadful fire from the whole squadron; which is to this day represented as a fact, by some of those who witnessed the transaction. But this flanking fire, highly important and effective, without any exaggeration, disposed the second in command to seek the cover of a sand bank, from whence he reported this new impediment.

This double disappointment in the efforts of his cavalry, added to the very near approach of Sir Eyre Coote's first line to his own person, induced Hyder

* The Intelligence.

to listen to the suggestions of some of his officers, and to order the successive retreat, first of his guns, and afterwards of his infantry and cavalry. Men who have witnessed similar scenes, as well as those who are indebted to the artist for a pictured representation, will figure to themselves an image of this oriental chief seated on an elephant, for the advantage of surveying the operations of the field, on horse-back, for the convenience of closer inspection; or peradventure on foot, to lead and animate the efforts of his infantry. Hyder, from the commencement to the close of this action, was seated cross-legged, on a choukee (a portable stool about nine inches high, covered with a carpet), and placed on a gentle eminence in the rear of the centre of his line of works, and now a little to the southward of the line of fire. When in the course of the operations of the day, he could scarcely believe the evidence of his senses which indicated the danger of this situation; he received, with that torrent of obscene abuse which formed the character of his eloquence, the first suggestions to move, and obstinately stupid with vexation, continued in his seat, until a groom who had long served him, and was in some sort a privileged man, had the audacity to seize his legs one after the other, and put on his slippers. "We will beat them to-morrow," (said he,) "in the meanwhile mount your horse," and he was quickly out of sight, leaving his attendant chiefs, (whom oriental etiquette would not admit of being on horse-back while their Sovereign was dismounted; and whose grooms and horses had disappeared, on the near approach of the English line,) to the unaccustomed effort of a long and hurried pedestrian march.

Sir Eyre Coote's first line rested for the present on the ground which the enemy had abandoned, and it was not until midnight that a due attention to the casualties of the day admitted of its being joined by the second, when the whole moved on by the road by

which the enemy had retired, and after crossing without molestation a strong pass formed by a ravine, most injudiciously unoccupied by the enemy, took up their ground near to the village of Mootypolliam, the name by which the Mysoreans distinguish this day's action, as Porto Novo, the village from the vicinity of which the opposing army marched in the morning, is made to designate the same battle in the English narratives. If the accident had not intervened, of a heavy rain, which rendered it impossible for the miserable cattle of the English army to move their tents, this action would have been fought on the 30th June, and happily the same circumstances did not postpone it to the 2d of July. The road which facilitated the able manœuvre of the British general, had been prepared by Hyder, for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large work for the reception of twenty guns, lined out on the best principles of European science, situated within three hundred and fifty yards of the sea, and commanding every part of the ground on which Sir Eyre Coote's masterly movement had been made. The work was so far advanced as to require but a day more for its completion; and had it been finished and occupied, the extrication of the British army would have become nearly an hopeless enterprize.

The artillery brought into action by Hyder on this day, was no more than 47 pieces, chiefly long guns, of heavy calibre, and well served: the English guns of lighter metal, were 55, served with an energy and precision beyond all praise. The most moderate computation of comparative numbers* will make the force of Hyder eight times greater than that of his

* English force.

Cavalry	880
Artillery	598
Infantry	7048

Total ... 8476, or exclusive of artillery, 7878.

opponent, although a large corps under the command of his son Tippoo was absent on another service.

Sir Hector Munro, who commanded the first line, deserved and obtained the praise of his general, for "conduct equally spirited and active." Brigadier General Stuart's determined occupation and defence of the heights with the second line, was declared to have been highly meritorious. "Every individual (says Sir Eyre Coote) of this little army, seemed to feel the critical situation of our national concerns: our falling interests required uncommon exertions for their support, and to the honour of this army, every nerve was exerted to the very extent of possibility."

The loss of the English army, lessened by the peculiar skill with which the operations were conducted, was comparatively trifling, being 306 killed and wounded, exceeding not much above one-fourth the loss sustained in the unfortunate attempt on Chillumbrum. It is at all times difficult to ascertain the casualties of an Indian army; but, on a comparison of statements, I am disposed to estimate the lowest amount of Hyder's loss on this day, at ten thousand men killed and wounded; the density of the masses, and the immense extent occupied by irregulars in the rear, giving certain repetition of effect to the flight of every shot.

The physical means of the English army had been in no respect augmented by the events of this extraordinary day; the same difficulties with regard to money, provisions, and equipment, and the same impossibility of following the enemy continued without diminution, and are described with peculiar force in the dispatch which announced the victory, (an achievement calculated to exalt the imagination and disturb the judgment of an ordinary mind), and are closed with the following modest and appropriate reflection: "If Hyder Ali, buoyed up with former success, had not come down to seek us, I could not have moved the army to follow him; and this is a

situation so trying to the responsible military commander, that an officer of character shudders at the idea of being placed in such a predicament." But the moral energies of the troops exhibited the most lively contrast to their former despondency, and had increased in an incalculable ratio, means far more efficacious than physical force for sustaining difficulties, which it was impossible to surmount.

During the period of Hyder's operations to the southward, Tiagar had surrendered to his son Tippoo Sultaun, who had now been ordered to resume the siege of Wandewash, with an equipment of thirteen battering cannon, supported by an adequate force, and he invested the place on the 22d June. The respectable detachment from Bengal had arrived at Nellore on its route to Madras, and the importance of covering its junction, added to the danger of Wandewash, induced Sir Eyre Coote to move in a northerly direction, receiving his food from the ships. On every successive day's march by Cuddalore and Pondicherry, he had reason to conclude that the enemy was preparing for another general action, and from the vicinity of the latter place he made a move- July 15.
 ment which placed him in view of Hyder's encampment, for the purpose of inviting and ascertaining that issue. Hyder however struck his tents and moved off to the westward, without attempting any operation of consequence: and Sir Eyre Coote, quitting the sea-side, moved in the direction of Permacoil and Carangooly, into the former of which places a small store of provisions had been thrown by the unremitting zeal of Captain Flint, while Hyder was occupied to the southward, and Tippoo at Tiagar, and into the latter from the resources almost under the protection of its guns. At Carangooly Sir Eyre Coote received intelligence that Tippoo, largely 21.
 reinforced, had moved to intercept the approach of the detachment from Bengal, having raised the siege of Wandewash. With the aid of requisitions on the

- villages of the whole surrounding country, Tippoo had formed round that place a line of nearly complete circumvallation, and batteries were in readiness to have opened, when he received from his father the new destination which has been stated, with positive orders first to attempt the place by an escalade at all accessible points, of which the number was considerable. The construction of ladders was not only reported, but their distribution to every corps distinctly seen, and Captain Flint had intelligence of the exact
16. hour of the night of the 16th of July at which he was to expect the escalade. Every post listened in silence, and all heard a low murmuring noise gradually approaching: at the proper period every column was received with a discharge of grape: the noise was for a time exceedingly increased, but it gradually diminished until all was silence. The moral influence of Hyder's late defeat, and the evidence of perfect preparation in the garrison, rendered it impracticable to retrieve the confusion occasioned by this timely check. Attempts to compel the resumption of the escalade on that and the ensuing day produced indications approaching to mutiny, and on the same day
 18. that Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Carangooly, Tippoo decamped from Wandewash, leaving to Captain Flint the laborious care of demolishing his batteries and approaches, together with an extensive line of circumvallation. The event was reported to his Commander-in-chief in an unassuming letter of eight lines, five more being allotted to an unaffected congratulation on the late victory and its consequences. The relief of a place, rendered interesting by so many recollections, was announced by Sir Eyre Coote to the Government of Madras, in the following terms.
 20. "Wandewash is safe, being the third time in my life I have had the honour to relieve it." Nothing now remaining to detain him from prosecuting his union with the detachment from Bengal, he moved by Chingleput, to St. Thomas's Mount.

The lake of Pulicat, nearly forty miles in length from north to south, and six in its greatest breadth, is an inlet of the sea, formed by a narrow insulated stripe of land, separated from the continent by small openings at each extremity, which form the communication between the lake and the sea. The small fort of Pulicat,¹ recently captured from the Dutch, is situated on the southern bank of the southern strait, and is distant about thirty miles from Madras. The ordinary road from Nellore to Madras passes to the westward of this lake, at the distance of from fifteen to twenty miles from the sea; but travellers lightly equipped, sometimes prefer the shorter route along the shore, and are ferried over these openings. It had not entered into Tippoo's calculations, that the latter route was practicable for troops and military equipments, and while he was preparing impediments and ambush on the upper road, the detachment had crossed the northern opening, distant nearly seventy miles from Madras, into the insulated spot which has been described, and were successively transported across the strait at Pulicat, without the necessity of firing a shot. Sir Eyre Coote, however, would not even risk the separate movement of this corps for the remaining thirty miles: he made two marches, in that direction, from St. Thomas's Mount, and on the third day had the satisfaction of inspecting at Pulicat, Aug. 2.

¹ *Pulicat*.—(derivation of the Tamil word is probably *pazha*, old, *vel*, babul tree, (*acacia, arabica*), *kadu*—forest) A small village at the southern extremity of an island in the inlet between the sea and the Pulicat lake, which runs north and south in the Chingleput and Nellore Districts, Madras. The Dutch erected a factory here in 1609. They called the fort Geldria. Lord Macartney arrived at Madras on the 22nd June 1781, and under his orders Major Elphinston of the 73rd Regiment seized Pulicat and destroyed its fortifications. Two Dutch ships were taken. [Letter from Major Elphinston to Lord Macartney, dated 2nd July 1781. (*Mackenzie Collections*, Vol. lxxv, 3rd July 1781.)]

this important reinforcement, which added nearly one third to his numerical strength.¹

It is difficult to contemplate these cautious operations without reverting to the unhappy fate of Baillie, whom, in advancing from the same quarter, a very inferior degree of military prudence would have placed in equal security. The faults of Hyder in permitting the unmolested march of Sir Eyre Coote one hundred and fifty one miles from Porto Novo to Pulicat with a crippled equipment, with numbers daily and rapidly diminishing from sickness, to form a junction so important in its consequences, when in each of sixteen successive marches he might have offered serious annoyance without the risk of material loss, can only be explained by his imperfect knowledge of facts, and by the necessity of consulting the temper of his army.²

¹ Colonel Pearse's detachment, which had marched from Midnapur, Bengal, in January 1781, suffered severely from cholera and desertion on its way south. It was formed of one Company of European and one Company Native Artillery and the 12th, 13th, 24th, 25th and 26th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry. Each Regiment was composed of two battalions of 500 men each. It is doubtful what number joined Coote. In the *History of the Bengal Artillery*, it is put at about 4,000. In the *Life of Sir Thomas Munro* (Vol. I, p. 43) it is said to have been little more than 2,000. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 28.)

² The united forces were formed into brigades on the 8th August 1781.

The four regiments of cavalry formed a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Cosby:

1st Brigade of Infantry—

73rd Regiment, Bengal European Infantry,

2nd battalion, 1st Madras European Infantry,

9 12-pounders and five howitzers.

2nd Brigade of Infantry—

12th and 25th Regiments, Bengal Sepoys,

8th, 16th and 21st Carnatic battalions,

1 18-pounder, 1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.

3rd Brigade of Infantry—

13th Regiment Bengal Sepoys.

9th, 17th and 18th Carnatic battalions,
Trichinopoly Detachment (5 companies of the 19th, 2
of the 6th, 2 of the 12th and 2 of the 13th Carnatic
battalions),

1 18-pounder, 1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.

4th Brigade of Infantry—

24th Regiment, Bengal Sepoys,

2nd and 14th Carnatic battalions,

7th and 8th Circar battalions,

1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.

5th Brigade of Infantry—

26th Regiment, Bengal Sepoys,

4th, 15th and 20th Carnatic battalions,

1 5½-inch howitzer and 10 6-pounders

CHAPTER XXIII.

Wretched state of military equipment—Sir Eyre Coote turns his attention to Tripassore—Hyder attempts to relieve it—without success—The place falls—Negotiation regarding prisoners—shewed Sir Eyre Coote's imperfect knowledge of Hyder's character—Fights Hyder on ground chosen by himself—Battle of Polliloor described—Dubious victory—does not improve the aspect of English affairs—New means of carrying grain—Western and Chittoor poligars—promise supplies—Sir Eyre Coote determines to relinquish the command—but is prevailed on by Lord Macartney to resume it on the faith of these promises—disappointed—perseveres—Battle of Sholinghur—Poligars come over from Hyder to Sir Eyre Coote—enters the Pollams—erroneously supposed to be inexhausted and abundant—reason—Hyder sends a detachment to ruin the Pollams—defeated and dispersed by Sir Eyre Coote in person—Detaches Colonel Owen—Hyder attacks him in person—dangerous retreat—junction of Sir Eyre Coote—Distress of Vellore—relieved—Retrospective account of Hyder's operations against that place—and its gallant defence—Sir Eyre Coote returns to the Pollams—takes Chittoor—Defective intelligence—Loses his depôt in the Pollams—distress—necessity of returning to Tripassore—Serious loss from the monsoon—Misconduct of Mahommed Ali—Assigns the country for the support of the war—Strange misinformation regarding Chanderghery and Mahommed Ali's brother—Facts related—Hyder's brutal outrage—Affairs of Tanjour during this campaign—

Hyder's treaty with the Dutch at Negapatam—Colonel Brathwaite's assault of two successive posts—wounded—succeeded by Colonel Nixon—more successful—Colonel Brathwaite resumes the command—defeats Hyder's provincial field force—Sir Hector Munro besieges Negapatam—Effective co-operation of the fleet—Capture of the place—Monsoon—Critical situation of the fleet—Capture of Trincomalee—Renewed distress of Vellore—Sir Eyre Coote marches to relieve it—Alarm for his life—recovers and effects the service—Cannonaded on his approach and return—Ineffective attempt to pursue Hyder—who makes a fresh demonstration near Sholingur—the English army returns to Madras.

THE detachment from Bengal had moved through a country untouched by the enemy, and was expected to be accompanied by the requisite number of draught and carriage oxen to complete the deficiencies of the army; but owing to the difficulties of the times, added to the most serious defects in the whole system of the commissariat, the supplies were not only lamentably defective in number, but every animal, wild from the pastures, was still to be trained before his services could be of value. Of the cattle officially reported to have been collected at Madras during the absence of the army, not one half was forthcoming; and after a plain calculation it was discovered, that exclusively of what the men could carry on their backs, the actual means provided from all these sources was capable of carrying no more than one and a half day's rice for the consumption of the army. It was not only impracticable to attempt either of the great objects of the campaign, the relief of Vellore or the siege of Arcot, but with an army of 12,000 men, capable with proper equipments of achieving any service, and drawn together from the most distant quarters, it did not seem very obvious

by what possible means it was to accomplish any thing. Under circumstances thus "heart breaking," as Sir Eyre Coote emphatically designates them, he turned his attention to Tripassore, a fortress important from position but defective in strength, situated about thirty-three miles to the westward on one of the roads leading to Arcot and Vellore. This place was in the occupation of the enemy, but the intermediate post of Poonamalee¹ was still possessed by the English. By encamping between Madras and Poonamalee, and subsequently between the latter place and Tripassore, he was enabled to employ the cattle of all his departments to bring successively into advance a sufficiency of grain to attempt Tripassore.

Aug. 19. On the 19th of August he arrived before the place, which had been much improved, and was garrisoned by fifteen hundred men, but inadequately provided with cannon. On the morning of the 22d a good breach having been effected, and preparations made for the assault, a flag of truce appeared, offering to surrender the place on terms previously offered but now rejected, with a demand that they should surrender unconditionally within a quarter of an hour, or await the consequences of the assault. In the instant after dispatching this answer, intelligence was brought of large bodies of the enemy being in sight, and Sir Eyre Coote, on going to an eminence to reconnoitre, perceived the advanced guard of Hyder's whole army in full approach: there was not a moment to lose; he sent orders to storm instantly, and the troops had just emerged from the trenches when the flag of truce returned with the declaration of surrender, and left the assailants to ascend the breach without opposition, Hyder drawing off as soon

¹ *Poonamalee*.—Poonamallee, a village 13 miles west of Madras. It was granted to the English in 1750, by Anwar-ud-din. It is now a cantonment for European recruits and invalids. The old fort is used for keeping stores. It is now a healthy well-drained village, with a good water supply.

as he discovered the event. With only one day's provisions in camp, Sir Eyre Coote had risked the consequences of an assault, in all cases a doubtful operation, on the single question whether the garrison should or should not be prisoners of war, and was so ill apprized of Hyder's character as to expect his assent to an exchange of these prisoners for an equal number of British troops in his custody. "The men taken at Tripassore (said Hyder in reply) are faithless and unworthy; they know that they dare not approach me; they are your prisoners, and I advise you to put every one of them to death speedily." To feed 1,400 prisoners did not accord with the state of the English commissariat; and Sir Eyre Coote, instructed by this feature of barbarous policy in his future estimation of the value of prisoners, had no alternative but to release them on parole, an obligation to which he could scarcely have ascribed any real force. The store of grain found in the fort was so trifling, that it became necessary, on the night of its capture, to send a convoy for a fresh supply to Poonamalee; and having, by the 25th, obtained a sufficiency of rice for a few days to be carried on the men's backs, the English general marched on the 26th, with the view of bringing Hyder to action on ground selected by himself.

During the period in which Sir Eyre Coote had been employed in forming the junction so judiciously effected, Hyder had moved into the *fortunate* encampment of Mooserwauck which he had occupied in the preceding year, when opposed by Sir Hector Munro. He examined with renewed care, and made himself more completely master of the *fortunate* ground on which Baillie had been defeated; and in determining to offer battle to Sir Eyre Coote on the same spot, and if possible on the same auspicious day of the same lunar month, the 11th of Ramzan; (coinciding in this year with the 31st of August, as it had done in the preceding with the 10th of September) his

military judgment was supported by the concurring predictions of all the astrologers, whose prognostics were favourable for every day, but were deemed certain for the 11th. Had an invitation been conveyed to his opponent for that particular day, there can be no doubt that Sir Eyre Coote, to whom all days were indifferent, provided he could obtain close action, would cheerfully have indulged him in every coincidence required by every astrologer; for on the particular scene of Hyder's former triumph, he was most anxious to obliterate the remembrance of that unfortunate event.

18. 26. His first day's march brought him to the vicinity of Perambaucum, where large bodies of cavalry to the south-west indicated the presence of the enemy
27. on the expected ground. On the 27th he was again in motion, and about nine o'clock the advanced guard, on reaching the precise spot on which Colonel Baillie had taken the fatal resolution of passing the night of the 9th of September, 1780, perceived the enemy's army in force in front, and extending towards both flanks. The column of march was pointing nearly west. A strong land-wind raised clouds of dust which rendered distant objects imperceptible, but a small thick grove on a gentle eminence, with a water course encompassing its front and right, about 800 yards to the left of the advanced guard, appeared to be a position of so much importance, that it was immediately occupied by a battalion of native troops and its guns: the first line being directed to form in order of battle, fronting what then appeared to be the chief mass of the enemy's force, to the south-west, to the right of the great avenue of banyan trees by which the English army had approached, and at about an angle of forty-five degrees with that avenue; the second line being destined to support the first, and to reinforce the post at the grove. This formation, necessarily slow from being made over broken ground, and among patches

of underwood, had been scarcely completed, when a heavy but rather distant cannonade from a grove and village on the right, was found nearly to enfilade the first line, by a troublesome ricochet along its whole extent, and a rapid manœuvre became necessary for throwing back the right, and changing front. A jungul or underwood was interposed between the new position, and this division of the enemy's army commanded by Tippoo; and the cannonade was returned until it could be discovered whether the intervening jungul were penetrable:—this point being ascertained in the affirmative, the British troops moved through in columns, after considerable delay in removing impediments, and formed fronting the west, on the opposite side, where a commanding bank gave such superiority to their cannonade, that the enemy's guns drew off, and seemed, by a circuitous movement, in a southern direction, to be joining the main body.

In the meanwhile, the grove first occupied on the left, had been cannonaded by an increasing number of guns, from a position of great strength and extent, formed by the occupation of a bank and water-course, previously prepared with embrazures, receding on its left, towards the pagoda and village of Pollilore, which formed the support of that flank; the right resting on another village, with vast masses of troops extending in the rear beyond the right of that cover. Every corps of the second line, together with an entire brigade from the first, had successively been ordered to strengthen and extend the position at the grove, against which, as the day cleared, the main force of the enemy was found to be directing its principal efforts. These operations varying their aspect according to the points successively occupied on either side were certainly wearing an appearance far from cheering to the British army; a battalion of native troops lately raised, had been ordered to dislodge the enemy from a village, which galled with musquetry the left of the position at the grove, and

returned in disgraceful confusion, in spite of the efforts of their officers; but this disaster was repaired by the veteran 20th,* which effected the object with the precision of a parade movement, and the steadiness of the best European troops.

It was three o'clock when Sir Eyre Coote, after the movements on the right which have been described, came to the left, for the purpose of examining the whole of his situation, and ascertaining whether any mode could be devised, of extricating himself from a formation disjointed in all its parts. He had hitherto been foiled by cross or enfilading fires, in every successive movement undertaken throughout the day, and, with the single exception of the grove, every point successively seized, was found to be within range of more commanding ground. The village of Pollilore, that which, according to the manuscript journal of Colonel Baillie's operations, ought to have been occupied by that officer, was now evidently the support of the enemy's left; but before attempting to carry that point, it was necessary to have a connected line of sufficient extent, to take advantage of the success of a flank movement. The first line had by its efforts against Tippoo's division, been drawn off from the real point of attack, and had become separated by a considerable interval, from the troops which were most severely pressed. It was now therefore directed, to form a third change of position, which brought its front to face the south, the line being drawn up in the avenue with its left about 1300 yards farther to the west, than the point from which it had issued for the first formation, and its right exactly opposite the village of Pollilore. The post at the grove was consequently about 1,400 yards in a diagonal direction in front of its extreme left, and the same post formed a support to the right of the second line, which extended to the left of that post, nearly opposite to the enemy's right. These forma-

* Sepoys.

tions being effected, a brigade from the right of the first line moved in compact order, and with a rapid step, under cover of an animated cannonade from every gun along both lines, to seize the village of Pollilore, and turn the enemy's left; and the success of this movement, which was soon determined, was the signal for the second line, by a similar operation, to force the right, supported by a forward movement of the remainder of the army, preceded by their guns, with the exception of three battalions left at the grove to cover the rear while advancing, and to command the ground occupied by the baggage guard, which was so posted as to give and receive reciprocal support.

Upwards of eight hours had elapsed from the commencement of the action before the decisive movement of the right brigade was completed; the direct advance of the first line to support and unite with that brigade, led them over the unburied remains of their comrades, who had perished on the same ground in the preceding year; but this movement on the right, drew the enemy's attention from the second line, which ultimately succeeded in forcing their right, and attaining an eminence from which it was enabled about sunset, to cannonade the retreating columns of the enemy. The impediments, however, which had been prepared, against the advance of every portion of the English troops throughout the day, had been such as merely to admit of their occupying before dusk, the ground abandoned by the enemy, and in so far claiming the usual criterion of victory.

Sir Eyre Coote's varied experience had never placed him in embarrassments so serious, and had never excited in his mind the gloomy forebodings, which for the first and last time in his military life, were distinctly depicted on his countenance when in the presence of an enemy, and from which he was ultimately relieved, contrary to his best expectations.

The Mysorean manuscripts invariably admit the action of Porto Novo to have been a severe defeat; that of Pollilore is as invariably claimed as a drawn battle. The losses on either side were prevented from being so considerable as might be anticipated from the length of the action, in consequence of the nature of the ground, and particularly the cover afforded by the intersection of the water-courses and banks, which have already been described. The English army, which went into action eleven thousand strong, lost no more than 421 killed, wounded, and missing; among them were Captain Hislop, the General's aid-de-camp, an officer of much promise, killed, and Brigadier-General Stuart, and Colonel Brown, officers of approved merit and long experience, who by a singular coincidence, each lost a leg from the same cannon shot; the former recovered, but the latter died on the same night. The force under Hyder's command had been augmented by the division under his son, and comprised his whole disposable force. He had on this day fired from 80 pieces of cannon, but had found no opportunity of employing with effect the services of his numerous cavalry. The loss of the Mysoreans probably did not exceed two thousand; the general impression was far from that of defeat; and the effect upon their minds was, to recover in a considerable degree from the humiliating sense of inferiority which had followed

Aug. 28. the events of the 1st of July. A portion of the 28th was employed not only in due attention to the casualties of the preceding day, but in the melancholy task of gathering together and interring the remains of 29. Colonel Baillie's detachment; and on the 29th, Sir Eyre Coote returned to Tripassore, not having a single day's provision left for the fighting men, and the natives attached to the public departments, having been without food for the two preceding days.

This dubious victory¹ had in no respect improved

¹ Wilks's account of this "dubious victory" follows the

the aspect of English affairs; and, in the necessity of having recourse to some untried expedient, the active mind of Lord Macartney suggested to him the possibility of employing some portion of the fugitive population which had taken refuge at Madras, in carrying loads of grain on their heads for the use of the army. Considerable numbers were easily found to engage their services, but in the scarcity of food which prevailed at Madras, the temptation of such a

account given in Sir Eyre Coote's official report of the action. Mill in his account exaggerates the losses suffered by the English, and speaks of the mismanagement of the battle. Mill also refers to the differences of opinion between Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Hector Munro on the field, and to a conference of officers after the battle, when a "retreat" was suggested, to which Sir Eyre Coote replied that he had never "retreated," but added that he would allow the army "to fall back." Robson says, Sir Eyre Coote in the result "drove Hyder's people from all their strong posts, and obliged them to retreat with precipitation, leaving him in full possession of the field of battle." *The History of Hydur Naick*, (Kirmani), remarks: "In short; it went very near that the storm of defeat and dispersion would fall among the troops of the General, when gloomy night suddenly arrived; and cast a veil of darkness over the world, and closed the contest of the two fierce lions." Sir Thomas Munro, who was present, says that Haider's army fled in confusion beyond Conjeevaram. Wilks's account of the battle gives probably an accurate account of what actually occurred. It was a victory, so far that Haider's army was driven from the field. Sir Eyre Coote's small force had achieved what few armies could have done, and he had again demonstrated his wonderful ability and knowledge of the temperament of the troops opposed to him. It was no fault of his that he could not follow up the battle by a further advance but had to fall back on Tripassur. (Robson: *The Life of Hyder Ally*, p. 136; Mill: *History of British India*, Book V, p. 506; Miles: *The History of Hyder Naick Kirmany*, pp. 441-442; Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*. Vol. II, pp. 31-42; Wyly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 236-241; Gleig: *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. I, p. 40.)

The battalion of native troops mentioned as retiring in disgraceful confusion, was a Circar battalion, enlisted in the north of Madras in one of the Northern Circar districts. Sir Eyre Coote in consequence formed a very bad opinion of these regiments; It was nearly a century after his time, that all recruiting

load was too powerful to be resisted; numbers disappeared on the road, and of the remainder who arrived with loads uniformly diminished, a very large proportion took alarm at what they saw and heard of their new situation, and absconded in the night; but by occupying a position between Tripassore and Poonamalee, and throwing grain forward into the former place, it became practicable by all these united means, at length to move from Tripassore.¹

for the Madras Army from the Telugu speaking districts north of Madras was stopped, the result of the experience gained since that General expressed his opinion so forcibly. He anticipated the views taken by the military authorities at the close of the nineteenth century.

¹ "The relief of Vellore became therefore an object of Lord Macartney's most anxious attention, well knowing that the fall of that fortress to the enemy would establish him in complete possession of the greater part of the Carnatic. But the army was unable to move for want of provisions and about to return to the neighbourhood of Madras, whose situation was truly alarming, the wretched inhabitants being at that moment agitated by every afflicting symptom of an inevitable famine. It was considered however by Sir Eyre Coote as absolutely necessary for the safety of the army, should it keep the field, to be supplied with twelve days' rice; to effect this was a task of infinite difficulty; but great difficulties are only to be overcome by great exertion; and Lord Macartney was resolved that no exertion should be wanting, no effort remain untried to avert the fatal consequences which must inevitably follow the loss of Vellore. Coolies to the amount of six thousand were pressed into the service by military force, to carry from Madras to Poonamalee the quantity of rice required. The extreme necessity of the case could alone justify the risk incurred to the settlement by these exertions, for at the time the army was again put in motion for the relief of Vellore on the 19th September, there was not actually at Madras a grain of rice left in store; they trusted solely to three thousand bags on board different vessels in the road, and to future supplies for their support." (John Barrow: *Public Life of the Earl of Macartney*, 1807, pp. 100-101.) Lord Macartney landed in Madras and took over the Government on the 22nd June 1781, having heard from Sir Edward Hughes, the Admiral, who was at anchor with his squadron off Pondicherry, of the war with Haider, the invasion of the Carnatic and the ill success of the English.

To the north-west of the road leading from Madras to Arcot, is situated the strong country usually denominated that of the western and *Chittoor* poligars, placed between the range of hills which bound the Balaghaut, and a second chain, which approaching within a few miles of the sea, near the lake of Pulicat, forms an irregularly indented concave sweep of varied elevation until its south-western extremity overlooks, at the distance of a few miles, the town of Arcot.

The chiefs or poligars of these countries, varying in strength and extent of territory, had sought to conciliate the belligerents, to extend their possessions at the expence of their neighbours, or by neutrality to save their countries from devastation, as suited their respective views of their own relative strength and interest. The poligars of Vencatigherry, Calastry, and Bomrauze, were the most powerful of these chieftains; the spearmen of the former had joined Sir Eyre Coote, and had formed a portion of his baggage guard in the late action; but their expenditure of provision much outweighed their utility. Calastry and Bomrauze were both with Hyder; but had, with a very pardonable prudence, assured his adversary that the junction was of mere necessity, to save their countries from devastation, and that they awaited the opportunity when they might safely change sides, and place their resources at his disposal. The numerous minor chieftains had also, after the first symptoms of a favourable change, sent deputations of similar character, and all were profuse

The western poligars comprised Venkatagiri, in the Nellore District, and Kalahasti and Karvetnagar in the Chittoor District. Karvetnagar was also called formerly from the Telugu name of the ruling family, Bomraz. The title "poligar" was given by the Vijayanagar kings to the chiefs of the Telugu colonies planted in the provinces for the purpose of controlling the inhabitants of the districts assigned to them. (*Madras Manual of Administration*. Also see article "Poligar," in *Hobson Jobson*. 1903.)

of assurances that the English army would find abundance of provisions by moving in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote, feeling the conviction, that he was wasting his large store of character, and what little remained of life, by continuing in command of troops unprovided with all but arms, that really constitutes an army, had gone down to Madras to confer with the Government, to resign his charge, and to declare the inutility of keeping together a nominal army, incapable of movement: but had been prevailed upon by Lord Macartney's representation of these prospects to make one further trial.

Sept. 21. On the 21st of September he moved from Tripassore, two days march, to Tritany,¹ through the skirts of these countries; where he sought in vain for the realization of any one promise, made by men, who were actuated chiefly by fear, in making and in breaking their engagements. In the vicinity of his encampment was the little fort of Poloor,² which he captured, with two hundred prisoners to be liberated; and with the aid of a small store found in this place, but more from the skill of his searchers for subterranean hoards, he continued to subsist from day to day, constantly receiving fresh promises, and reiterated disappointments. On this ground, he received from Colonel Lang the commandant at Vellore, an account of the reduced state of his provisions and the necessity of an early surrender of the place, if not relieved. Hyder was also reported to be distant only ten or twelve miles, near to the hill of Sholingur,³ and to be strengthening a position to obstruct the farther

¹ *Tritany*.—Tirutani, a village and hill 47 miles from Madras, on the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway, north of Arkonam. It is in the south of the Karvetnagar Zamindari.

² *Poloor*.—Polur, a small village in North Arcot District, 4 miles south of Tiruttani.

³ *Sholingur*.—Sholinghur, 15 miles west of Polur, a town containing about 7,000 inhabitants. Near it is a steep hill with a temple at the summit. The town is 8 miles north of the railway station of the same name, on the line from Madras to Calicut.

approach of the English army towards Vellore. Sir Eyre Coote reckoning on exactly a sufficiency of provisions to carry him back to Tripassore, determined to try the effect of another action, and wrote to the Government, describing his situation, and requesting that at least one day's rice should, if possible, be advanced to Tripassore, to provide for the event of the enemy declining the meeting, or of its result not opening such unlooked for prospects as might afford the hope of relieving Vellore.

Throwing his heavy guns and every impediment with a small garrison into Poloor, he made a short movement of seven miles on the evening of the 26th. Sept. 26. The night proved tempestuous; and with his miserable cattle, it was impracticable in the ensuing morning to move the tents, drenched and doubled in weight by rain. Hyder, whose encampment was near, and considerably in advance of the position which he was preparing, being accurately apprized of every circumstance, announced to his army that there would be no movement on that day; all the cattle of the army were in consequence sent to a better pasture, at the distance of some miles, and many of the troops, together with most of the drivers and followers, dispersed, as was usual on such intimations, to seek for grain, or to supply their other wants in the adjacent villages; for the want of cavalry in the English army left them free to wander at large without the apprehension of danger.

Sir Eyre Coote, lightly escorted, went out in 27. the morning to examine the country in his front, and from an eminence which he ascended, a long ridge of rocks was observed possessed by the enemy's troops; being desirous of farther examination, he ordered a brigade from camp, and proceeded to dislodge the troops from the ridge, on ascending which Hyder's whole army was clearly discovered in a southern direction, distant about three miles, with some strong corps a mile in front, and an advanced encampment

of cavalry close under the ridge, who struck their tents on the first appearance of the brigade. Orders were immediately dispatched for the army to join without delay; the camp was struck and the troops were in motion with all practicable dispatch, the baggage under cover of two battalions with their guns skirted the hills, and was conducted to an eligible spot on the right of the ridge described, where it remained secure during the operations of the day. The army told off as usual for forming into two lines, but marching by files in one column, moved after doubling the left extremity of the ridge, in a direction parallel to the line of the enemy's encampment, until the centre of the first line, when faced to the front, should be opposite the main body of the enemy, distant about two miles, and drawn up in front of their encampment then in the act of being struck: a small rock in front of the right, and a grove and eminence on the future left of the first line, offered supports for each flank, while a ridge advantageously placed in the direction of the baggage-guard would protect the rear; the oblique direction of this position would in some degree turn the enemy's left, and might thus offer an opportunity of taking advantage of any awkward movement: the second line forming an extension of the first when the movement commenced, successively broke into echelon of corps, partly in consequence of previous orders, but with increased intervals from the difficulty of the ground: a disposition which was necessary for the double purpose of watching powerful bodies of cavalry on the left flank, and observing and supporting the baggage-guard.

While the troops were in motion to take up these positions, Sir Eyre Coote, with a small escort, advanced midway between the two armies, more thoroughly to reconnoitre. The country was comparatively open, but ridges and groupes of rocks, irregularly scattered over the plain, and emerging to

unequal heights, admitted of each party availing itself of the advantages of ground. Hyder's main force was judiciously drawn up behind the crest of a long ridge, not rocky; its front, covered with swampy rice fields, while his guns were placed on the summit of this ridge, or on commanding positions among the more advanced groups of rocks. Exclusively of the advanced corps in position, several detached bodies, exceeding in numerical strength the whole of the English army, were seen in motion towards each flank, and large masses of cavalry were collected on various points, evidently prepared to charge on an appointed signal. In fact the whole movement had operated as a surprise on Hyder; he had reckoned with certainty on the impossibility of Sir Eyre Coote's marching on that day. The movement of the brigade he treated merely as a reconnoissance; and it was not until intelligence was brought of the English army having struck their encampment, that he ordered horsemen to be dispatched in every direction to recal his cattle, drivers, and followers; and they had but just begun to strike the tents, when the head of the English column had reached a point nearly opposite the centre of his encampment.

Thus circumstanced, it was Hyder's design to act on the defensive as long as possible, and to make such demonstrations as should delay the movements of his adversary, and give time for repairing the confusion of this unexpected event; and above all, for yoking the cattle to the limbers, with a view to the leading principle of all his tactics, never to risk a gun. The day was far spent; the English army had not yet completed the formation which has been described; nor had Hyder shewn the least indication of changing his front. The two leading brigades of the English army had, in preparing to take up their ground, extended farther to the right than ordered, and an interval was thus opened between them and the remainder of the line. Hyder, on perceiving this

error, opened a general cannonade along his whole front, and from the advanced positions ; and Sir Eyre Coote, deeming the moment too critical, to suffer the enemy's posted guns to annoy him, while performing any thing but a forward movement, ordered the whole line instantly to front and advance, the divided corps being ordered to bring forward its right, as it moved on.—The enemy's guns were ill pointed, during a steady but not rapid advance of both lines, which, as they approached, are described to have had the appearance of diminutive corps almost surrounded by several separate armies. The necessity of defiling to pass the groups of rocks, had at one time caused several temporary openings in different parts of the line, and at this moment the two principal masses of the enemy's cavalry charged these points with a determination hitherto unexhibited ; each mass as it reached the opening, wheeling to the right and left, to overturn the naked flanks, but no flank was found exposed, the very act of defiling had provided the required protection, which was formed with the greatest coolness and precision at obtuse angles with the line, and received the masses with a cross fire. These masses had sensibly thinned in their approach, from the havoc effected by grape and musquetry in the front, and by the consequent hesitation of the rear, and when, on reaching their object, they found the fresh and unexpected annoyance of a cross fire : one of these masses fairly galloped through, and went off to the rear, sustaining additional loss from the fire of the rear rank of the line, everywhere faced about for the purpose. The other mass sustained a direct repulse with still severer loss. The charges had been ordered, with the double view of direct and complete success, or in the event of failure, they would cover the retreat of the guns, which were ordered to limber up at the moment of the charge, and to retire the instant it was found to have failed ; and the unavoidable suspension thus produced in the advance of the

English army, enabled them to draw off the whole excepting one 6 pounder. The right brigades had by the movement described, gained the left flank of the enemy's position, and were enabled to bring their guns to bear with considerable effect on the retreating columns from the ridge abandoned by the enemy ; the remainder of the first line, adapting its movements to that of the detached brigades, by gradually bringing forward its right, and forming an extension of their line of front.

During these operations of the first line, the second making little advance on its left, was also gradually bringing up its right, as the movements of the enemy threatened the left, which in the course of a severe struggle, and several charges of cavalry, was at one time nearly turned, but on completing a partial change of front with celerity and precision, the enemy, not equally expert in the corresponding movement, suffered severely from the English guns, and finally drew off about the same period as their main body ; an attempt on the baggage-guard, consisting of two battalions and four guns, by a large body of infantry and cavalry with twelve guns, having proved equally abortive from the judicious dispositions of that guard and of the second line. It was midnight before the English army was re-united on the ground occupied by the advanced brigade. The acquisitions of the day were three cavalry standards and one gun ; but as Sir Eyre Coote states in a note written from the field of battle, he would willingly have exchanged these trophies, together with the credit of the victory, for five days' rice. The strength of the British army in this day's action, was 11,500 men, and their loss no more than 100 men killed and wounded ; the unexpected events of the day, had even left many of the enemy's bazar tents still standing, and the shopkeepers actually ignorant of the result, were selling their wares to the English followers, who mistook them for their own people, for some time before

the error was reciprocally discovered. Hyder's whole force was in the field, with the exception of ten guns, for he fired only from seventy. The Mysoreans uniformly describe the battle of Sholingur as a surprise, and admit it to have been a severe defeat, in which their loss probably exceeded 5,000 men.¹

Sept. The poligars of Calastray and Vencatigherry, weary of military dangers which promised them little advantage, and ascribing to this victory consequences which their defection from the enemy might render decisive, agreed to avail themselves of the events of the evening. A thick mass of spears was observed going off towards the hills at the close of the action, and in the morning messengers arrived in camp to announce the event. With a sufficiency of rice barely to carry back the army to Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote on this intelligence incurred the risk of increasing his distance from that post, and moved through a pass to the westward of Sholingur, into a country supposed to be unexhausted and abundant. These expectations were found in the event to have been greatly exaggerated; the market of the Mysorean army had furnished a certain and ready vent for surplus produce; and prices sufficient to tempt the more provident husbandmen to spare even a portion of their secret hoards. The English army therefore found a precarious subsistence from day to day, and the hopes of throwing a scanty supply into Vellore depended on the actual crop. Hyder full of indignation at the defection of these chiefs, detached a

¹ The despatch of Sir Eyre Coote to Lord Macartney, dated 6th October 1781, on the battle of Sholinghur, will be found in Wylly's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 415-420. Mill calls it "A slight action in the attempt to supply Vellore." (Book V, p. 507.) Had Sir Eyre Coote been able to press Hyder after the battle, the result might have been an early peace, but as invariably happened in this campaign, Sir Eyre Coote, owing to want of supplies, was unable to follow up his victory and had to fall back again on Madras. It is not surprising that the General began to show "a susceptibility of temper."

select and experienced corps of six thousand men, without guns, who, by forcing another pass, commenced the devastation of the rich intermediate vales, and the conflagration of every village. This unfortunate event produced most unfavourable impressions, seriously affecting all Sir Eyre Coote's prospects of Oct. supply; and the animated veteran, although suffering from severe illness, feeling the importance of counteracting these effects, placed himself at the head of a light corps, and after an absence of thirty-eight hours, during thirty-two of which he had never dismounted from his horse, returned to camp, having completely surprised, discomfited, and dispersed the enemy, and compelled them to leave behind, not only the whole of their plunder, but the few tents and light equipments with which they had entered the woods.¹

The extreme urgency of the relief of Vellore, induced the English general, to risk a detachment under Colonel Owen, consisting of five battalions with their guns, two flank companies of an European regiment of the Bengal establishment, and a portion of his small corps of cavalry, twenty miles in advance²; for the purpose of commanding the resources of a greater extent of country, and affording the chance of intercepting some of the convoys of grain, frequently descending the pass of Damalcherry, for the supply of the enemy's army. On the 23d of October, about 23. eleven o'clock, he received intelligence from Colonel Owen of the enemy's first appearance. About two o'clock, (being as soon as circumstances would admit,)

¹ Sir Eyre Coote dated his report on the battle of Sholingur at Attimunjeri, 6th October 1781. Attimunjeri is about 8 miles north of Sholingur in the Chittoor District, 6 miles south of Pallipattu, then the headquarters of Bomraz, the Poligar of Karvetnagar.

² Colonel Owen had camped at a village, south of Devalampets, at the southern end of a pass from the north, 20 miles north of Sholingur, and the same distance west of Pallipattu and east of Chittoor. (Wilson : *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 50.)

he moved forward with a select body, ordering the remainder of the army to follow as soon as possible. After marching about four miles, he met a few of his own irregular horse, who had fled from the field of battle, and reported the detachment to be entirely destroyed. The impressions excited by such intelligence, may easily be imagined ; judging however, from experience, of the credit due to the reports of early fugitives, he quickened his pace, and sent corresponding orders to the army ; and, after a further advance of two miles, he had the happiness to receive a note from Colonel Owen, intimating his safety in a strong position, where the army joined him on the same night.

This detachment encamped considerably in advance of a strong pass,* situated between it and the main army, had at daylight been attacked at all points by Hyder in person, at the head of nearly his whole regular infantry, and light guns, and all his select cavalry, who made the most vigorous efforts for the destruction of this corps before it could reach the pass, or be relieved by the army. Although the position of the encampment would appear to have been selected with too much confidence, the exertions of Colonel Owen, and the excellent conduct of the troops, extricated him from a perilous predicament, and enabled him to gain the pass between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, with the loss of all his camp equipage and baggage. In the course of his retreat, one gun had fallen into the possession of the enemy, by a furious attack on the native corps which protected it : but this disaster was instantly repaired by the promptitude and decision of Captain Moore,¹ who, at the head of his two flank companies of Europeans, supported by a veteran corps of

¹ Captain Moore and four officers commanded the Grenadier Company, Bengal European Regiment. For a detailed account of Colonel Owen's operations, see Wyllie : *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 248-249.

sepoys, forced his way with the bayonet, through the masses which were bearing it away, and brought it back in triumph to the protection of the detachment. The services of the artillery under Captain Moorehouse,¹ an officer eminently distinguished on every occasion, had essentially contributed to the success of this arduous day, by the uncommon judgment, coolness, and decision evinced in taking up the great variety of points successively destined to cover the retreat of the troops; and although the casualties of the detachment amounted to three hundred and seventeen men, the loss of the enemy was computed by themselves, to have exceeded three thousand.

The distresses of Vellore had by this time approached their last crisis. During all the difficulties of the times, faithful sepoys had been found, who made good their way in disguise, with small sums of money entrusted to their care at Madras; and throughout the whole of this eventful war, not one example occurred, either in this case, or the more arduous service of conveying aid to the English prisoners in Mysoor, of one individual having betrayed his trust. The garrison of Vellore had for some time past subsisted on grain purchased in the distant villages, and carried in by stealth, on dark nights. Not one day's grain was in store: the approaching moon-light nights, and the expected filling of the river, would decide their fate, and the commandant stated to Sir Eyre Coote, the inevitable alternative of immediately throwing in a supply, or making a movement to cover the escape of the garrison, from the only remaining

¹ Captain Moorhouse was a Lieutenant and Commissary of Stores in 1780 and obtained sanction for a scheme for raising two native companies of Pioneers. He was killed at the storming of Bangalore in 1791. The Government then directed that his remains should be interred in the church of Fort St. George at the Company's expense and a suitable inscription placed on a marble tablet in commemoration of his merits. The body was placed close to the spot where Sir Eyre Coote was buried. (*Madras Courier*, 22nd December 1791.)

fortress which could favour the eventual hope of recovering the possession of the country. The exertions for collecting grain in the Pollams, had procured a small surplus, the whole of which was destined to the
 lov. 3. relief of this important garrison; and on the 3d of November, Sir Eyre Coote had by three marches from his encampment among the hills, thrown in six weeks' rice; Hyder having, on his approach, retired to the opposite side of the river Palâr, a weak determination, ascribed by Sir Eyre Coote to the discouragement of having recently been foiled with great loss, in an attempt on a detachment only.

The situation of Vellore since the commencement of the war had been critical and highly interesting. Hyder had, after the capture of Arcot in the preceding year, allotted the largest portion of his army and his best battering train for the siege of Vellore. This fortress, nearly an exact square, still exhibiting in its antique battlements, for match-locks, and bows and arrows, the evidence of no modern date,* was built, according to the ideas of strength which prevailed at the period of its erection, when the use of cannon was little understood, close to a range of hills, to favour the introduction of supplies, or the eventual escape of the garrison; and thus situated, it is also commanded by those hills; a defect, which its Mahratta and Mahomedan conquerors† remedied in part, by fortifying the points

* Vide vol. i. page 21.

† The evidence of the names by which they are distinguished, shews that two points were fortified by the Mahrattas, and one by the Muhammadans. See vol. i. page 100.

[Vellore fort is a perfect specimen of military architecture, nearly an exact square. The old entrance was by a winding road way with massive gates, and protected by a drawbridge. The ditch is supplied with water by a subterranean drain connecting with a bathing tank. Of the three peaks which overlook the town, two, Sajjaraogarah and Gajaraogarah, were fortified by the Mahrattas, one, Murtazagarh, by the last Mahomedan Killeddar of Vellore. (Dr. Macleane: *Madras Manual of Administration*.)]

which overlooked it. These points, as the use of artillery came to determine the defence of places, became accordingly the keys of the fort below ; for, although surrounded by a rampart of masonry which might be deemed Cyclopean, and a wet ditch of great breadth, the possession of these points command in flank and reverse (although at too great a distance for certain effect), three faces of the fort, and leave but one face affording good cover. The arrangements of the siege, directed by French officers, were judiciously directed to two simultaneous operations, the principal hill-fort being the primary object, while approaches and batteries from the west were pushed on to the proper positions for breaching the south-western face of the lower fort, and enfilading that next to the hill, which in the event of success in the primary object, would alone afford adequate cover to the garrison from the fire of the hill.

The operations against the principal hill fort were conducted with great skill, overwhelming numbers, and an abundant artillery, for five weeks. The post was commanded by Lieutenant Champness, and his second in command Lieutenant Parr, whose adventures at Carnatickghur have already been recited, officiated as his engineer. The greater portion of two faces, of a rather extensive post, were razed to the foundation by the enemy's fire, and the breaches were completely accessible ; approaches over the bare rock, were carried on by means of wooden frames filled with fascines ; and on the 13th January, about nine at night, the assailants issued from points distant only twenty yards from the breaches : but every thing had been completely retrenched with infinite labour and skill ; and, on ascending the breach, and almost filling the place with assailants, up to the ditches of the retrenchment, the impediments in every direction, and the masked fire which had been prepared, and well reserved, drove them back with great slaughter : a second, and third attempt

was made, with the aid of ladders, and repelled with the same steadiness and gallantry; the imperfect construction of the place gave the defenders no flanking command over the foot of the breaches, where the enemy remained completely covered, and they now began to form lodgements on the breaches and successively to fill the ditches of the retrenchment with fascines. Lieutenant Parr, perceiving that all was lost, if this work was permitted to proceed, obtained the permission of this commanding officer to attempt to dislodge them: and descending about two o'clock by the very ladders which had been placed by the enemy to ascend the retrenchment, commenced a close encounter with the bayonet, which terminated in the entire expulsion of the assailants; and a powerful sortie of European and native troops from the lower fort, a few nights afterwards succeeded in entering the flank of the enemy's parallel, spiking his guns and damaging his approaches. This extraordinary energy of native troops (for there were no other on the hill) induced Hyder to proceed from Arcot, for the purpose of personally examining the state of the siege, and giving his own directions, accompanied by several French officers: but the intelligence of Sir Eyre Coote's march from Madras at that exact period, determined him, as we have already seen, to raise the siege, which from that period had been converted into a blockade. Colonel Lang the commandant (together with a portion of the garrison for the purpose of reducing the expenditure of provisions) joined the army, and the command devolved on Captain Cuppage, Sir Eyre marching off on the day succeeding his arrival to seek for subsistence for his own army.

His first object on returning to the Pollams, was the fort of Chittoor, situated N.W. of the spot lately occupied by Colonel Owen, reported to be the intermediate depôt of provisions descending the pass of Damalcherry; and it fell after a siege of four days on

the 11th of November. But no character of the war Nov. was more conspicuous, than the almost invariable defects of Sir Eyre Coote's intelligence, with the exception of that received through Lieutenant Flint, or by means of sepoy's disguised for specific purposes. This defect is frequently stated in his official correspondence, but he does not appear to have suspected, that all his guides and spies were in the service of the enemy. There was no grain in Chittoor; it was a weak place; and Sir Eyre Coote seemed to be acting in opposition to his own principles of military conduct, in throwing into it a battalion which was eventually sacrificed, as were the heavy guns which he had thrown into Polloor previously to the action of Sholinghur; the garrison however of the latter place, having in conformity to provisional orders, made good their retreat into the woods. Before moving to the relief of Vellore, Sir Eyre Coote had left a battalion, with some guns, in a good position near to his former encampment at Polipet, to protect his sick and cover the collection of grain. On the second day after the capture of Chittoor, he had the mortification to learn, that this battalion had been obliged to retreat to the woods with severe loss, and the capture of its cannon and stores, including the important article of grain, not without suspicion of treachery on the part of the officers of Bomrauze.

There was now no hope of being able to subsist the army in these countries during the monsoon, if indeed it had been prudent to expose the troops to the usual inclemency of that season. Two rivers¹ daily expected to be impassable were interposed between the army and Tripassore. Intelligence of the investment of that place, communicated in an express from its commandant, was audibly confirmed by the firing of the siege. On the 22d of November, he 22 crossed the Cortelaur (which had so long stopped the

¹ The Palar and Kortalaiyar rivers, both liable to sudden heavy floods in November and December.

progress of Colonel Baillie in the preceding year), and encamped on the same day in the neighbourhood of Tripassore, after a forced march over an incipient inundation. His whole march from Chittoor had been a series of difficulties, surmounted from day to day, by one half of the army being alternately without food, and these distresses were aggravated by the bursting of the monsoon on the latter days of the march; not only cattle and their loads were lost, but the excellent little corps of cavalry, formed from the ruins of those in Mahommed Ali's service, was deprived of nearly half its numbers; and a considerable proportion of human beings, chiefly followers, were destroyed by the united effects of flood and famine. The Commander-in-chief had for many days been confined to his bed,* and had announced to the Government the necessity of appointing a successor: and thus, after a campaign interspersed with the most dazzling triumphs, the English army entered into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Madras, with prospects for the ensuing year, which offered little of cheerful expectation to the most sanguine observer.'

One prominent topic pervades the official correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote throughout the whole of this campaign, namely, "the duplicity and iniquity of the nabob Mahommed Ali's government." The few remaining resources of the country, placed beyond

* Palankeen in marching.

¹ Sir Eyre Coote wrote on the 29th November 1781 to the Supreme Council in Bengal: "Such was the distress to which the army was reduced for provisions in the march from Chittoor to the relief of Tripasore, one half was three successive days alternately without rice. The followers of the army from the last time of their leaving Madras until they came back to Tripasore had had two seers (4 lbs.) of paddy served out to them. Numbers have died by hunger and the inclemency of the weather." "In short the scene exhibited was more like a field of battle than a line of march." (*Selections from State Papers* preserved in the Foreign Department, Vol. III, p. 827, quoted in Wyllie's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 254.)

the control of the power which directed the war, were employed not to support but to counteract the general cause. To the ordinary misrule of a wretched native government was now added, in all cases to which the power extended, the clandestine sale of the grain, which might have mitigated the distresses of the army, and the remittance of the pecuniary amount to the privy coffers of Mahommed Ali. Not one soldier paid by this sovereign prince accompanied, as a mere demonstration, the army which was now fighting for his nominal sovereignty; and while this army was actually sustaining the severest privations, Mahommed Ali, with an audacity of falsehood, and ingratitude to a great and early benefactor, destined as Sir Eyre Coote supposes to mislead the English* cabinet, addressed a letter to Lord Macartney, announcing his having supplied the army with an abundant store; and intimating that nothing but unnecessary delay prevented the expulsion of the enemy. Sir Eyre Coote had reiterated, and the Governor-general had strongly impressed on Lord Macartney the necessity of assuming the direct management of what remained of this misgoverned country; and Mahommed Ali skilfully anticipated the event about the close of the year, by most graciously *assigning* a country which, if *assumed* on undisguised grounds, might not have been so easily restored by the baneful influence so often deplored.¹

* Letter 29th October, 1781.

¹ For a fuller account of the conduct of the Nawab of Arcot and the differences between the Governments of Bengal and Madras, reference should be made to Mill's *History*, Book V, pp. 512-516, and *The Life of the Earl of Macartney* by Barrow. In the latter book, in the appendices, the correspondence will be found: The Nawab served us badly in the war with Hyder, but it must never be forgotten in dealing with these transactions, that both in Bengal and Madras, Civilians and Military officers alike had had illegal dealings with him; the unfortunate Nawab did not know where to look for funds to meet his liabilities, and many officers in high position both in Madras and Calcutta

In perusing the voluminous correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote from these woods, it is not a little remarkable, that he seems to have been entirely uninformed regarding the locality or strength of Chandergherry,¹ a fortress situated in the centre of those resources whose fragments had subsisted his army for nearly two months, and enabled him to relieve Vellore; one cursory mention is made of the kelledar of Chandergherry, as concurring with the aumil² of Tripety, in counteracting his collection of supplies; but without any indication of being aware

were interested in securing their position as creditors. Early in 1781, the Supreme Government had advised the Madras Government that they would be amply justified in demanding from the Nawab the immediate transfer of all the districts in his charge to them, and considered that they should insist on this being done. Then, a few months later, the Nawab deputed his Dewan Kwajah Hashim Khan and Richard Joseph Sullivan, a Madras Civil servant, who acted as the Nawab's friend, without orders from his Government, to go to Calcutta. They succeeded in obtaining from the Bengal Government, a reply to their representations, which the Governor-General communicated to the Government of Madras on April 2nd, 1781, with an extraordinary intimation that he had appointed Richard Sullivan to be his representative and minister at the court of the Nawab in Madras. The Madras Government replied in a letter dated 8th September 1781, after Lord Macartney had become Governor, strongly objecting to the arrangement. However the quarrel closed for a time, owing to the Nawab, having consented to assign the revenue of his districts to the Company for a period of five years, reserving one-sixth part for his own personal expenditure, the revenue being administered by a carefully selected Board of Commissioners. This the Nawab did by a document signed by him and Lord Macartney, dated December 2, 1781.

¹ *Chandergherry*.—Chandragiri, a small town in the Chittoor District, 29 miles N.N.E. from Chittoor. The fort was originally built in 1000 A.D. In 1758 it was held by Abd-ul-Wahab Khan, son of Anwar-ud-din, brother of Muhammad Ali Khan, the Nawab, who also assumed the protection of the sacred town of Tirupati, seven miles to the east. The style of the fort is similar to that of Vellore.

² *Aumil*.—Aml. Amildar, is the title of the native collector in charge of a taluq.

that this kulledar was Abd-ul-Wahab Khān, Mahomed Ali's brother, or that the place was nearly impregnable, and calculated, if placed at his disposal, to have a material influence over his future operations. The Government at Madras seemed to have been unaccountably kept in the same ignorance: they received the account of its surrender from Sir Eyre Coote, and notice it in their narrative of transactions, merely as "a fort garrisoned by the nabob's troops." Hyder's more than half-Hindoo propensities had induced him to grant unqualified indemnity to the sacred temple of Tripety, only nine miles distant from Chandergherry, to the extent of not even interfering with the payment of a tribute to Mahommed Ali for similar indemnity; but his connection with Abd-ul-Wahab is involved in some obscurity. It can only be ascertained with certainty, that before the invasion, this person had corresponded with Hyder; that his vakeel, Mahommed Secunder, was seen in camp on the first day of the invasion; and having soon afterwards, in public durbar, communicated his master's answer to a letter he had written by Hyder's desire, (probably to demand his presence in camp at the head of his troops,) Hyder, after hearing the contents in a low tone, flew into a passion, and exclaimed aloud, "Is this the end of your invitations? and have I expended crores for the purpose of feeding a fat, lazy fakeer*? Return to your worthless master, and tell him to expect me at his mokaṇ."† Immediately after the return of Mahommed Secunder, Abd-ul-Wahab, who usually resided at Chittoor, suddenly retired to the droog of Chandergherry, which he prepared for defence. Hyder was not at leisure to undertake the siege until January, 1782, when Abd-ul-Wahab Khān, possessing a superabundant store of grain, capitulated without the most remote necessity,

* A religious mendicant.

† The residence of a religious mendicant. It also means a place of importance.

on the condition* of being permitted to retire with his property to Madras. A previous breach of faith (of what nature we can now only conjecture,) was Hyder's apology for disregarding his own; and he ordered the whole family to be sent to Seringapatam, with the exception of two grand-daughters, who were detained at Arcot for his own future pleasures. This brutal outrage was, however, not accomplished by Hyder. The children were of too early an age, and the consummation meditated by the father, remained to be exacted as an hereditary claim.

During the operations which had occupied Hyder's personal attention to the army of Sir Eyre Coote, his troops in the southern provinces of Trichinopoly and Tanjour had not been inactive. After his departure from these countries in June, considerable exertions had been made to collect a field force at Tanjour, whither Colonel Brathwaite had been sent to command. Hyder had drawn his accustomed circle of desolation about twelve miles round that fort; but with the exception of the capital, the whole country was in his undisturbed possession; the revenues were collected with the greatest regularity; every fort was well garrisoned, almost every pagoda fortified, and a well equipped field corps was prepared to act as circumstances might require. On the commencement of hostilities against the Dutch, a defensive treaty was concluded between Hyder and the Governor of Negapatam, by which the English district of Nagore and other places were ceded to the Dutch, and measures of reciprocal co-operation were concerted—on the one part, for the security of Negapatam; and on the other, to procure for Hyder any aid from that garrison which might be necessary for maintaining his ground in the province, or eventually for the reduction of the capital. So soon as

* The author saw this person on his return from prison in 1784, and heard him relate Hyder's breach of the capitulation, but not its alledged cause.

the forces under Colonel Brathwaite had become, by successive reinforcements, sufficiently strong to leave the protection of the capital, his first object was to attempt the extension of his resources, by the capture of the nearest posts, but his troops being exclusively native, and those of the enemy chiefly select spearmen, peculiarly adapted to the defence of places, he failed in two successive attempts at carrying by assault two different places, the first having been dismantled and the garrison removed after the assault to the second. In the latter of these operations, he had himself been wounded, and had ordered Colonel Nixon from Trichinopoly, to assume the intermediate command of the troops, which had been recently augmented by the arrival of two corps from the more southern districts, to about 3,500 men. The first efforts of this officer were more successful. He besieged and took two places, by placing his officers and serjeants at the head of the forlorn hope, losing in the latter of these operations upwards of three hundred officers and men; and it is remarkable, that he assigns as a reason for not besieging another place, that it was defended by the "famous Papinairoo" of *Chittledroog*, who, with his own hardy irregulars, had defended both the places from which Colonel Brathwaite had been repulsed.¹

Colonel Brathwaite was soon afterwards sufficiently recovered to resume the command, and proceeded towards the enemy's field force, which was

¹ Major John Brathwaite reduced the Poligars of Madura and Tinnevely in 1772, and, as Lieutenant-Colonel, took Mahé from the French in 1779. When commanding in Tanjore in 1782 he was badly defeated by Tippu, taken prisoner and carried to Seringapatam, whence he was released at the peace of 1784. General Brathwaite was Commander-in-Chief, Madras, for four years from 1792, and captured Pondicherry in 1793. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 176, note 3.) The two places where Colonel Brathwaite was repulsed were Tirukkattupalli and Pattukottai in the Tanjore District; at the latter place he was wounded.

Sept. 30 strongly posted at the village of Mahadapatam, an insulated spot, covered by field works, and surrounded by rice swamps: the attack was judiciously planned and well executed, with only 2,500 men and eight guns, against nearly double the number of men, and six guns strongly posted. After a close encounter of several hours, in which every street was defended, Hyder's forces retreated in disorder, with great loss, and leaving behind them two guns.

Sir Hector Munro's health had been so much impaired, that soon after the battle of Pollilore, he was advised by his medical friends to proceed to England for its re-establishment; and Sir Eyre Coote, who had uniformly found him an excellent second in command, assented with great reluctance, to the necessity of his departure.* While waiting at Madras for an opportunity to embark, he had yielded to the wishes of Lord Macartney, that he should assume the direction of the siege of Negapatam; for which the requisite equipments were embarked on the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, and arrived off Nagore, situated a few miles to the northward of Negapatam,

Oct. 20. about the 20th of October. The English field corps, which had been operating in the province of Tanjore, and had, as we have seen, established its superiority over that of the enemy, was destined to form a large numerical portion of the besieging force; and Colonel Brathwaite, returning to the charge of the capital of the province, detached all his disposable troops, under the command of Colonel Nixon, who arrived
21. at Nagore on the 21st, and in view of the fleet, made

¹ *Mahadapatam*.—Mahadevapatnam, a village five miles south-west of Mannargudi in the Tanjore District. Wilks makes an error here. Colonel Brathwaite did not command; he was not present. Colonel Nixon commanded. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 59, note 6.)

* His departure is said to have been influenced by a harsh reply, to a suggestion offered during the battle of Pollilore.

[For the incident see Mill: *History of British India*, Book V, pp. 506-507.]

a spirited and eminently successful attack on the enemy's troops, in the act of their evacuating Nagore. Sir Hector Munro went immediately on shore for the purpose of concerting the requisite measures: the marines of the fleet, and a large detachment of seamen were landed, and the engineer and senior officer of artillery commenced the preparations necessary in their respective departments. A chain of five redoubts, connected by lines to the northward of Negapatam must necessarily be forced before trenches could be opened before the place; and this operation having been effected by a combined attack, planned and executed in a masterly manner, and with little comparative loss, on the 29th of Oct. 29. October; trenches were opened on the 3d of Nov. 3. November, and the place surrendered by capitulation on the 12th. In this very remarkable service, the 12. numbers of the besieged doubled those of the besiegers, who at no time exceeded 4000 men; while the besieged, including Hyder's troops, who had joined according to treaty, amounted to full 8000. The rapid success of this operation is chiefly to be ascribed to the impression produced by the peculiar energy and intrepidity of the seamen and marines, in the assault of the redoubts; and the immoveable steadiness with which they repelled two determined sorties made with the whole disposeable force of the garrison. The result of this invaluable co-operation of the fleet, was not only the possession of a place intended to be a principal depôt for the expected French forces, but the evacuation by Hyder's troops of all the posts in that part of the country, and the consequent command of considerable resources.

The monsoon set in with such violence, immediately after the surrender of the place, that the Admiral was for upwards of three weeks unable to embark the seamen and marines, who had performed these valuable services; and the ships were during the same period placed in the most critical situation, from

the fury of an incessant storm, and the absence of a considerable portion of their crews. Towards the close of the year, the moderate weather admitted of embarking a detachment of volunteer sepoys, and artillery-men, to aid in the reduction of Trincomalee and fort Ostenburgh, in the island of Ceylon; forts which command the harbour of the former name, deemed of essential importance to naval operations, by enabling the power which possessed it to remain, during the tempestuous season in the vicinity of that scene, on which the national interests in India were about to be contested: and in this operation the Admiral was successful.

1782.

The period to which the garrison of Vellore was provisioned expired on the 15th of December, but some reliance was placed on a scanty addition to this store by the means which have already been described. Sir Eyre Coote had, as already noticed, made his arrangements for embarking to proceed to Bengal, partly to concert with the Governor-general the possibility of some remedy, for the succession of wretched expedients, which served as apologies for equipment; but chiefly because his health had sunk under the pressure of bodily fatigue and mental anxiety, to a degree that had induced his medical advisers to protest against the fatal consequences of his continuing in the field. The public importance which the Government attached to his presence, added to reports of serious urgency from the commandant at Vellore, induced him to acquiesce in their desire: and although the Government, from a solicitude for his health, rather wished that the immediate relief of that place should be committed to subordinate hands, the General conceived it a service of such paramount importance, that he resolved to incur all risks and every mortification to ensure its accomplishment, and joined the army for that purpose

Jan. 2. on the 2d of January.

5. On the morning of the 5th, a little before the

break of day, when the army had struck their encampment, then about a mile west from Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote's valet, on entering his tent to awake his master, found him senseless. medical assistance was instantly called, and he was found to be in a fit of apoplexy. For nearly two hours, during which little hope was entertained of his recovery, the despondency painted on every countenance, and particularly on those of the native troops, whose attachment and confidence exceeded the bounds of human veneration, and who could with difficulty be restrained from transgressing the limits of decorum, to satisfy their anxiety, presented altogether a scene of mournful interest. Expresses to Madras, excited a corresponding degree of apprehension. an earnest intreaty from the Government urged his immediate return, "for the preservation of a life so valuable to the state, and Colonel Lang was ordered to take eventual charge of the army. While the Government waited with impatience for the return of the general, intelligence was brought, that he had marched on the next morning for the relief of Vellore, so far recovered, Jan. 6. as to admit of his being carried in a palanquin. Nothing material occurred until the 9th, when about 9. to cross the dry bed of the river Poony the enemy appeared in force, on the opposite bank. The confluence of this river with the Palār, which flows from the west, is immediately opposite to Arcot. Vellore is situated on the same bank of the Palār. about fifteen miles farther to the westward, and the course of the Poony being from the north-west, the English army was now at nearly the same distance from Vellore and Arcot. The arrangements of Sir Eyre Coote, for passing the river. were made with so much caution and skill, that Hyder desisted from his intended attack, but on the ensuing day, after marching about five miles, his army appeared in two powerful columns, pointing towards the left and the rear, just as the convoy were entering a swamp of

- rice grounds, which must necessarily be passed. Sir Eyre Coote directing his exclusive attention to the preservation of the convoy, caused each brigade to take separate but connected positions, to keep the enemy in check, at a suitable distance, and scarcely condescending to notice a distant but incessant cannonade of four hours, which produced few casualties, passed over the whole in safety, encamping on the same evening, about four miles from Vellore, and close
- an. 10. 11. under its walls on the 11th, being the precise day on which the commandant had announced by express, that he must necessarily surrender, if not relieved, and the general had the satisfaction to deposit unimpaired, a store of provisions equal to three months' consumption.
 13. On the 13th he commenced his return towards Madras, and Hyder appeared in full force, to dispute his passage over the same swamp, one division of his army making a disposition to oppose the head of the principal column of march, while another was in rapid motion to fall on the rear, while it should still be entangled in the morass; there was now less of impediment than had been experienced on the 10th, and the leading corps were enabled to cross with rapidity, and occupy a position beyond the morass, which checked the enemy in front, and covered the passage of the rear. The troops sustained a heavy but distant cannonade, with little comparative loss, (the casualties of both days not exceeding 120 men,) for about three hours, when the whole having passed to the firm ground, formed and advanced on the enemy, about four o'clock in the afternoon. Hyder's line of infantry stood until the advancing fire of the English artillery did some execution but Sir Eyre Coote had the mortification to see the cannon already far retired before the infantry gave way the pursuit was continued until dark, but the guns kept encreasing their distance; and it was midnight before the English army reached the encampment to which the

position of the baggage obliged them to return. On the 16th in the morning, the army having on the Jan. 1st preceding night occupied the same encampment from which it moved to the action of Sholingur, Hyder appeared in full force, with an apparent intention of offering battle on the same ground. The invitation was not declined, but after ten hours spent in unavailing manœuvres, the army pursued its march to Tritany, and the remainder of the route to Tripassore, was without incident.¹

¹ For a fuller account of the march to Vellore, see Wyllly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 264-268. "Coote, shaken by age and disease, and haunted at every step by the spectre of famine, marching, manœuvring, fighting unceasingly to relieve his beleaguered comrades." (Fortescue: *History of the Army*, Vol. III, p. 464.)

CHAPTER XXIV

Affairs of Malabar—Siege of Tellicherry—from 1780 to 1782—relieved—Besieging army defeated and taken—Peculiar plan of the siege—Defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite's corps in Tanjour—Despondency of each belligerent from causes unknown to the other—stated—Sindea detached from the Mahratta confederacy—Nature of the influence of this event on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas, concealed from the English—explained—Digressive illustration of Sindea's mixed character of dependency and superiority, in a sketch of the Mahratta constitution—Origin of Choute, &c.—Return from the digression—Hyder seriously reviews his actual situation—determines to concentrate his force and move to the westward—Commences the destruction of the posts and the desolation of the country—Speech to Poornea—Detaches to Malabar—Coorg and Bullum—Spoliation of Coromandel in full progress—Unexpected arrival of the French at Porto Novo, and difficulty of supplies in consequence—Efforts of the French and English nations in India—Bussy—capture of his first division by Admiral Kempenfeldt in 1781—of a second in 1782—arrives at the Isle of France—troops sent to India before his arrival—Suffrein—Sir Edward Hughes—First naval action off Madras, 17th February—English equipments—Commodore Johnson, and General Medows—Naval action at Porto Praya—Capture of the Dutch merchantmen in Saldanha bay—Commodore Johnson returns with the frigates—Remainder of the expedition proceed to India—

and had joined before the above action—Dis-sensions between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney—explained—discussed—Second naval action 12th April—French take Cuddalore—Appear with Hyder before Permacoil—March of Sir Eyre Coote for its relief—dreadful storm—Permacoil falls—Enemy advance to Wandewash—relieved by Sir Eyre Coote, who offers them battle—moves to Arnee—Battle of Arnee—Question of the baggage of an Indian army, discussed and described—Connected incidents—Dallas—Grand guard cut off—Singular plan for the relief of Vellore—succeeds—The escort taken in its return—Suffrein appears before Negapatam—Sir E. Hughes sails—Third naval action July 16—Suffrein takes Trincomalee—Fourth naval action September 3—Erroneous estimate of the importance of Trincomalee—Suffrein winters at Acheen—Farther relief of Vellore—Sir Eyre Coote plans the re-capture of Cuddalore—Precarious nature of naval co-operation—returns to Madras—Sir E. Hughes sails for Bombay—Arrival of Sir R. Bickerton—Hyder's advances for peace—Strange result of English dissensions—Suffrein's scandalous transfer of his prisoners to Hyder—Sir Eyre Coote proceeds to Bengal—hostile fleets as already stated—Hyder to the neighbourhood of Arcot for the monsoon.

THE commencement of the year, unpropitious to Hyder in Coromandel, was attended with events still more unfavourable to his interests on the coast of Malabar. At an early period of the war, in 1780, an adequate force had been allotted and successively increased for the reduction of Tellicherry the only possession of the English on that coast, a mere mercantile factory fortified according to the early practice of European nations, against the ordinary insults of banditti. But as the population had

increased from the superior protection experienced by the inhabitants, an extensive but indefensible line surrounded the limits of the town. The English troops were entirely inadequate in numbers to furnish even sentinels for such a line; but a timely reinforcement conveyed from Bombay by Sir Edward Hughes, and the zeal of the inhabitants and adjacent chiefs, who detested the Mysorean rule, enabled them to continue a protracted and highly meritorious defence, deserving a more ample description than the records afford, until the early part of this year; when the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abington, enabled them by a determined sortie to raise the siege by the capture of all the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, with the whole of their baggage equipments. The Mysorean general, Sirdar Khân, was wounded and taken prisoner, with about 1,200 men who failed in effecting their retreat; and in a few days afterwards the remaining fugitives who had taken post at the dismantled French settlement of Mahé, surrendered at discretion.

Sirdar Khân, whose conduct at Nidgegul* in 1770, has already introduced him to the reader's notice, had no acquaintance with the European science of attack and defence, but after failing in several assaults which were repelled by the bravery of the defenders, and finding every ordinary battery opposed by corresponding and more skilful defensive means, or destroyed by sorties; adopted a species of offensive work, which from its height should enable him to see and counteract the designs of the besieged, and from its construction be exempt from the dangers of assault. An immense extent of base served as the foundation for several successive stories, constructed of the trunks of trees, in successive layers crossing each other, and compacted by earth rammed between the intervals the contrivances in the rear for raising the guns were removed when the erection was

* Vol. i. page 690.

complete, and enormous inaccessible towers rearing up their summits by the successive addition of another story, as the besieged covered themselves from the proceeding, exhibited a system of attack too curious to be dismissed in silence, but too imperfectly impressed by distant recollection* to be well described. Hyder distinctly perceived the danger to which his affairs on that coast would be exposed by the ruin of this corps, and the necessity which might ensue for detaching a large portion of his army, or moving the whole, if the English should sufficiently augment their force on his western frontier and his anxiety on this and other accounts, although softened, was Feb. not relieved by the success of his son against Colonel Brathwaite, who since the capture of Negapatam had been enabled to re-establish the Rajah's government over the territory of Tanjore. This officer, encamped in a plain with about 2000 men, and trusting to a system of intelligence actually conducted by Hyder's agency, continued to disbelieve the approach of an enemy as announced to him by an intelligent native,† until he perceived himself to be surrounded by superior numbers. The attempt to retreat was found to be unavailing, and the highest efforts of gallantry, skill, and perseverance in the commander and his troops could not avert a fate similar in most respects to that of Baillie. Mons. Lally, who as usual, attended Tippoo with his corps, establishing in a still more distinguished manner, by his endeavours to arrest an unavailing carnage, and by such attentions to the wounded as he was permitted to extend, a character too amiable for the savage scene in which he was doomed to participate.

Although the behaviour of all the English

* From the relation of the late Sir Barry Close, one of the besieged.

† This native, an opulent man, after solemnly protesting against the Colonel's incredulity, mounted his horse and escaped to Tanjour.

officers in this unfortunate affair was highly creditable to the national character one coincidence is too remarkable to be overlooked. Lieutenant Sampson, who commanded the little corps of cavalry with Colonel Brathwaite, had so peculiarly distinguished himself as to cause his name to be united by the enemy with that of his chief; and to this day the Mysoreans, in narrating the campaign of Tanjour, continue thus to associate the name of this gallant young man, *Brathwaite Sampson*, as if it were one name.¹

The temporary exultation produced by this intelligence, and his consequent command over a large portion of the Tanjorean territory, could not remove the settled dejection of Hyder's mind. He and his English opponents reciprocally apprized of events unknown to the other and each ignorant of facts which the other knew were severally disposed to gloomy anticipations. The English knew of the powerful body of French troops which might be soon expected on the coast, and feared an indefinite protraction of the Mahratta war Hyder whose original plan of conquest essentially depended on French co-operation, ascribed to insincerity and evasion, delays, which had arisen from causes which that people could not control, and certainly from no disinclination to aid in the destruction of the English power. Added to this distrust of the French, he had reasons too unequivocal, for knowing, that he was immediately to lose the co-operation of the Poona Mahrattas, as he had already been disappointed of the aid of Nizam Ali. and two branches of the Mahratta confederacy Moodajee Bhoomla and Sindea, by the commanding talents of Mr. Hastings.

Brathwaite was defeated at Anakkudi, a village about 6 miles north-east of Kumbakonam in the Tanjore District. The cavalry, 200 in number, were commanded by Lieutenant Sampson and Bowles. The whole force, about 1,600, surrendered at discretion.

The first and second of these had been neutralized by means to which we have already adverted, and Sindia had been converted into a friend, by the influence of the same great mind. While that chief continued to give the weight of his talents and military force, to the Mahratta operations on the western side of the peninsula, the efforts of Colonel Goddard, although conducted with skill and energy, had led to no decisive result and Mr. Hastings, while pressed for exertions on the eastern and western coasts, of a magnitude which would have appalled an ordinary mind, conceived the masterly design of detaching this chief also from the Mahratta confederacy, by attacking from the side of Bengal, the seat of his resources in the centre of the peninsula. A respectable detachment, under Colonel Carnac, conducted the service in a manner worthy of its original conception: and the junction of an additional force under Colonel Muir, having placed the latter officer in command, he concluded a treaty of peace with Sindia, on the 13th October 1781, by which that chief "*agreed, if it should be deemed advisable, that he would endeavour to mediate a peace between the English and Hyder, and also between them and the Pêshwa, but if these objects should not be effected, he engaged not to assist or oppose either party.*"²

The importance of detaching Sindia from the alliance, by weakening the power of the Mahratta confederacy was sufficiently obvious; and the influence of this secession in determining the Poona Mahrattas to pacific views was merely probable; but the exact nature of the influence of these preliminary events on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas appears to have been known to themselves alone, and so dexterously concealed by both, as apparently to

¹ Major, afterwards Colonel, Jacob Carnac.

² For an account of the operations in Gujerat and the Concan under General Goddard see Edwards: *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*. Vol. II, Chap. XXIX.

have escaped the observation of the English diplomatic agents. The nature of the treaty with Sindea was soon discovered by Noor-u-Deen the Mysorean vakeel at Poona, and late in the preceding year Hyder had become apprized of all its intended bearings. It will be recollected, that as a preliminary to the war, the territories formerly Mahratta, north of the river Toombuddra, occupied by Hyder in consequence of his connexion with Ragoba, had, in 1779, been confirmed to him, on certain conditions, by the existing government at Poona, and when Noor-u-Deen requested an explanation of the views of the minister Nana Furnavese, consequent on the treaty concluded between Sindea and the English, he was distinctly informed of Nana's intention to accept the mediation in its fullest extent; and to unite with the English in compelling Hyder to make a reasonable peace: but it was added, that Hyder had still one method left of averting an arrangement, rendered necessary by the interests of the Mahratta state. If he would immediately evacuate the territories north of the Toombuddra, and abandon his claims on the poligars south of that river, which had also been the subject of negotiation in 1779, the Poona Mahrattas would not only continue the English war with renewed vigor, but find means of regaining the co-operation of Sindea; and before concluding any treaty, time would be given for Noor-u-Deen to receive his master's instructions on this overture. Hyder's answer was of course of a nature to protract the negotiations, but the treaty of *Salbey* between the English and Mahratta states was concluded on the

May 17. 17th of May, 1782. and by one of the stipulations, the Mahrattas cautiously avoiding any notice of the territories abovementioned, engaged that within six months after the ratification, Hyder should be obliged to relinquish to the English and to their allies all territories taken from them since the date of his treaty with the Pêshwa (Madoo Row) on the 10th of

February, 1767. The diplomatic oversight was committed of not limiting a time for the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty that of the Governor-general is dated on the 7th of June, 1782. The delay of Nana Furnavese, the Poona minister, at that period the topic of various conjecture, is now for the first time developed by the facts above recited: the date of his ratification being the 20th Dec. 1782, immediately after he had been secretly apprized of the death of Hyder on the 7th of the same month.¹

The treaty of Salbey was negotiated with great ability, by Mr David Anderson, as English plenipotentiary on one part, with Sindea, ostensibly a military chief and subordinate member of the Mahratta confederacy, in the strange and anomalous capacity, not only of plenipotentiary on behalf of the Peshwa, as head of the Mahratta state, but also of guarantee, mutually chosen by both parties, and bound by this treaty to unite with either against the other, in the event of its infraction. An attempt to unravel these complex relations, so often represented as unintelligible,* may be acceptable to some of my readers, and will afford the opportunity of endeavouring to trace from its source the true character of those relations between the various branches of the Mahratta state, which have sometimes been dignified with the name of Constitution.

When the results of the early predatory habits of Sevajee began to assume the character of importance which pointed him out to the Mahratta people, as the deliverer predicted in their numerous prophecies; the force which he acquired from their re-union, from the gorgeous improvidence of the kings of Decan, which compelled them to disband their means

¹ The treaty of Salbai consisted of seventeen articles. It was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June 1782, at Poona on the 20th December, and was finally exchanged on the 24th February 1783.

* See particularly the very able historical branch of the Annual Register, on this subject.

of safety and subsequently from the false policy of Aurengzebe, who transferred the remnants of subdued armies into the most formidable enemies of the state*; these united means enabled Sevajee to seize an extensive portion of territory both above and below the western ghauts, which, as his power assumed a more solid consistence, he converted into a sort of national domain, a new and enlarged centre, for a more widely extended plan of universal plunder. A range of forts erected or improved along the summits of the lofty granite mountains, composing the various chains, which issue from the great range of western ghauts, served as depositories for spoil, and of security for the families of the chiefs. These chiefs almost exclusively arose from among the agricultural or pastoral tribes; and during the periods unfavourable for military operation, on the original pursuits of their forefathers was engrafted the care of military equipment and chiefly of rearing among the mountains, that hardy race of horses, which, mounted by a more iron race of men, carried from the abodes of peace, and of a simplicity of manners still not extinct, the horrors of indiscriminate desolation and murder over the other portions of India. Such were the Mahratta horse; and the infantry, which could even outstrip them, in a rapid course of several hundred miles was composed of a lower class, named Malhouees, the inhabitants of the more elevated hills, hardy as they were poor.

The reader is requested to consider the application of these observations, and of the early history of Sevajee, sketched in the 1st vol. p. 80, and 112 et seq to the condition, in 1817 of the Pindareers, of Mālwa and Candeish.

The Mavalis, or Mavales (Mawnlees) are the inhabitants of the hilly portion of the modern Satara and Poona Districts. They are usually dark-skinned, small and active, and able to endure much fatigue. During the last sixty years they have become orderly and have adopted agricultural pursuits. It is probable that the Kotis, as distinct from the Kuntis, formed the bulk of Sivaji's fighting Mavalis." (I. G. Bom. 1909, Vol. I, p. 538 Edwardes *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, p. 7, note 1.)

The successive adventures of the followers of Sevajee, led them to consider this hilly tract as their place of refuge, and their home ; and more distant countries in the single light of a fund, on which they might draw at pleasure. These primitive ideas, of simple, unqualified, and unlimited rapine, gradually led to a policy unexampled in the history of the world, and interesting, as it explains the claim of *choute*, to which modern Mahrattas have ascribed a fictitious origin. Experience enabled them to discover, that a regulated portion of plunder from another country, was ultimately more profitable than an inconsiderate system of occasional rapine ; which, by letting loose the instruments of destruction for the extinction of the capital stock, should disqualify it for many years from administering to their future rapacity. A fourth part of the crop was the portion,* which the sovereign, in conformity to the Hindoo law, was entitled to demand from his subjects, in time of public distress. The heaven-inspired sovereign of all India, fixed upon this fourth, or *choute*, as the regular amount of his demand, a war-tax in preference to the peaceful sixth ; and we find him forcibly levying this fourth by means of officers regularly appointed, on countries as regularly occupied by the revenue establishments of Aurengzebe ; and even on the property of mercantile travellers, passing the Mahratta fortresses. Every year, Sevajee and his immediate successors, issued forth to levy this contribution, to the utmost extent that the nature of the resistance, and the physical strength of his troops enabled him to travel ; resistance being always deemed to justify the largest attainable booty. At a late period of the most successful efforts of Aurengzebe, when he had obtained possession of the person of Sahoo, the Mahratta Raja, that captive attempted, but failed, in a negotiation for the submission of his people, on the condition

* Menu, and Digest passim.

of allowing to them the *dêshmookee*¹ (tenth handful), the most antient Hindoo assessment, as a sort of national quit-rent.

On the death of Aurungzebe, Zulfecar Khan,² who had possession of the person of the prisoner, released him, on obtaining a considerable ransom, and the services of a body of Mahrattas to aid his own party in the wars of the succession, (from 1707 to 1713) and the Raja, restored to liberty, spurned at the proposed *dêshmookee*, and exacted the *choute* of Decan without opposition. In the still weaker reign of Furruckseere, when the two *Seyeds of Barah*³ had usurped nearly the whole powers of the state; the younger brother, as governor of Decan, not only acquiesced in the *choute*, but when proceeding to Delhi (A.D. 1719) for the dethronement of his sovereign, this rebel conceded to Sahoo, the double tax of *choute* and *dêshmookee*, as a reward for the services of a Mahratta army, under the command of Balajee Visoonauth, the first *pêshwa*, not by the authority of the sovereign, but to purchase the means of dethroning the sovereign. Such is the true history of the corrupt transaction on which the Mahrattas have, in all subsequent times, affected to found their claims to the *choute*, as a royal grant of the Mogul emperor, abandoning the original ground of national exaction.

¹ The *Chauth* (one-fourth) and *Sardes mukhi* (one-tenth) developed into a regular system of blackmail imposed by the Marathas upon districts under the government of other powers, which desired protection from plunder. These payments of one-fourth and one-tenth of the revenue, coupled with the proceeds of pure marauding, represented a considerable portion of the Maratha state revenues. (O.H.I. p. 434.)

² *Zulfecar Khan*.—Zulfikar Khan. (*Vide* Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, p. 314.)

³ Abdulla Khan Sayyid, and Husein Ali Khan Sayyid. For the latter's negotiations with the Marathas, *vide* Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, pp. 333-335.

* This explanation, founded on a variety of manuscript

According to the hereditary tendency of all Hindoo institutions, Balajee was succeeded in the office of peshwa (or head of the administration) by his son Bajee Row, who, under the weak government of Mahommed Shah, after burning the very suburbs of Delhi, was not only bought off by that feeble prince by a confirmation of the ignominious stipulation of the choute of Decan, but was even appointed the imperial governor of that province, in the vain hope of terminating the depredations of his countrymen (1735). Subsequently to the invasion of Nadir Shah, (1739) Bajee Row employed his increased power and influence to terrify the unhappy Mahommed Shah into an extension over the whole of Hindostan of the double grant of choute and deshmooken; but these regions being too far removed from the original centre of the Mahratta state to admit of an annual enforcement of the demand, Bajee Row found it expedient to establish his nation, by conquest or connivance, in the provinces of Gujjerat and Malwa. Goandwana and Berar were seized for the same purpose by a branch of the house of Sevajee, and these possessions served as new centres of new orbits, moving in harmony and correspondence with the original system. Gooty formed a new centre farther south; and the little states of Tanjore on the east, and Colapoor* on the western coast, branches of the

authorities, will be found confirmed in all its principal facts, by reference to Scott's *Ferishta*, vol. ii. page 150 to 153; and in the passages quoted from that publication, in the first volume of this work.

The origin of the house of Tanjore has been already explained; that of Colapoor is more complex. Sevajee had two sons, Sambha and Rama; the first of these had two sons, Sahoo and Sambha; Sahoo died without issue; Sambha adopted a son, from whom is descended the family of Colapoor, and according to Hindoo law, the present Raja of that place is unquestionably the lineal heir of Sevajee in the elder branch; the line of pageant Rajas still kept in Sittara, being as unquestionably descended from Rama, the second son of Sevajee.

[In 1839 the Chief at Satara was deposed, and his brother,

house of Shahjee, maintained pretensions, sometimes subordinate and sometimes independent of the Poona state, but generally concurring in its national objects. From these new centres new armies issued forth to perform their annual circuits of exaction: Gujjerat extended its demands from the mouths of the Nerbudda to those of the Indus: Mālwa stretched to the north, until ultimately, under Ragoba, a Mahratta army established a Mahratta post at Lahore, the capital of Penjab*: Goandwana took the circuit of Berar to the south-west, and looking to the north-eastward, extended its depredations across the Hoogly to the capital of Bengal.

These expeditions originally miscalled *mulk geeree*, *territorial conquest*, came in process of time to justify the name; and this people, by seeking for the permanent occupation of territory, subverted the original principle of Mahratta domination, by absorbing in establishments which seldom leave a surplus, that abundant fund which had been cheaply realized at the expence of others, and served to keep the army in a state of constant and active efficiency. So long as the old and new centres preserved their primitive destinations, the national domains of each flourished by the accumulation of the wealth of the surrounding states but in proportion as the appetite for fixed territory was indulged, the hardy habits of the people gradually declined, the growth of the English power, and the severe defeats sustained from the Abdalli Afghāns of the north at length began to limit the extension of the *choute*; the chiefs of the new centres of plunder began to forget their subordinate character; the Pêshwa himself had usurped the power of the head of the state, which had become

placed on the musnud, died without heirs in 1848. The State was resumed by the British. The Kolhapur Chief still rules in Kolhapur State in Bombay Presidency.]

* Literally five waters. the country watered by the five branches of the Indus.

hereditary in his family; and at the period of the treaty of Salbey, this hereditary usurper was as infant; a minister (Nana Furnavese) acting in his name even before his birth,* himself founded a second hereditary usurpation, by rendering the Pêshwa a pageant, and assuming the title and pretension of hereditary Dewan, or minister. This old man did not till the last relinquish the hope of heirs from his own body, and left a virgin widow† who was to have fulfilled his vows; if these hopes had been realized, the infant minister must have had his guardian; that guardian must necessarily have been himself the minister, and would have been embarrassed with the custody, 1st, of the hereditary Raja, 2d, the hereditary Pêshwa, 3d, the hereditary Dewan; and would without much doubt have been himself prepared to add another link to the chain of usurpation. In such a conflict of pretensions every way defective, the chiefs were embarrassed in the choice of parties; and each,

* See Hyder's curious comments on this event, pages 761-762 of volume i.

This lady continued to hold possession of the impregnable rock of Loughur, (the iron fort,) until she surrendered after a lapse of upwards of twenty years, to the Duke of Wellington, or obtaining the English protection for her person and treasures.

It may here be observed, with reference to subsequent transactions, that the Pêshwa, continuing to be the acknowledged head of the Mahratta empire, was nevertheless, from this period forward, sometimes actually, but always virtually, a prisoner, in the hands of successive parties of his subjects, and never felt himself to be really liberated from that degrading and perilous thralldom, until restored, if not to imperial dominion, at least to liberty and free agency; and to the enjoyment of a more moderate, but a safer power than that of his predecessors, by the consequences of the treaty of Bassein, concluded on the 31st December, 1802. A short abstract is annexed of the fate of the Peshwas subsequent to Madoo Row. Narain Row fell by the consequences of intestine commotion. Sevai Madoo Row, the infant above described, from the miseries of his situation, was guilty of suicide: the present Peshwa, alternately a prisoner and pageant, lived from his infancy in the hourly dread of assassination; and after being tossed about as the prize of combatants and

as was natural, thought himself as well entitled as Nana, to the custody of the pageant, and the office of usurper. The character therefore of political independence, and the quality of guarantee, engrafted by Sindea on his military and diplomatic powers, in the treaty of Salbey, was not so much an assumption of authority over his acknowledged superior the Pêshwa, as over the person who governed in the name of that infant, and whom Sindea, as a soldier possessed of substantial power, thought himself qualified at any time to supplant.

We return from this digressive illustration of the treaty of Salbey, to the military operations of the Mysoreans and the English.

Hyder, in reviewing his actual situation, felt himself foiled in every battle with Sir Eyre Coote. Disappointed, and as he thought, deceived by the French; assailed in a vulnerable part of his western territories, where a detached army was destroyed, and

intriguers, he finally escaped in 1802, to the protection of the English, from a pitched battle fought by the troops of Dowlut Row Sindea, and Holcar, for the possession of his person. It was the national character of the English, and the known treachery of his countrymen, that determined his preference; those who may doubt the policy, are at least not entitled to question the humanity of this arrangement. The author has the most unquestionable grounds to know, that the feeling which determined his choice, had, up to the departure of the late Sir B. Close from that court, continued daily to encrease, and from the character of his successor, there is no reason to doubt of its continuance.

[Loughur (Lohogarh) is a fort lying at the edge of the Western Ghats, four miles west of Khandala, in the Bombay Presidency. Baji Rao II, the Peshwa, in 1802, after the battle of Poona, in which Jaswant Rao Holkar defeated Daulat Rao Sindia, fled with about 7,000 followers and accepted the treaty pressed upon him by the Governor-General. He was sent to Bassein. He was installed as Peshwa by General Sir Arthur Wellesley at Poona. In 1818, the office and title of Peshwa were abolished by the Governor-General, and the perpetual exclusion of the family of Baji Rao from any share of influence or dominion decreed.]

farther reinforcements threatened more extensive operations ; a general insurrection of the Nairs over the whole province of Malabar, aggravated by a rebellion in Bullum and Coorg, two districts on the summit of the hills which overlook that province, might be deemed in the ordinary course of Indian warfare ; but in addition to all these misfortunes, he was now openly threatened with the more embarrassing danger of a Mahratta invasion from the north. Deeply reflecting on this unprosperous aspect of affairs, he determined to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest in Coromandel, and to direct his undivided efforts, first, for the expulsion of the English from the western coast, and afterwards for the preservation of his dominions, and for watching the course of events. With these views, he commenced in December 1781, the destruction of most of the minor posts of Coromandel in his possession, mined the fortifications of Arcot, preparatory to its demolition ; sent off by large convoys all the heavy guns and stores, and compelled the population of the country, hitherto well protected, to emigrate, with their flocks and herds to Mysoor.

It was about this period that Hyder being much indisposed, was either by accident or design, left entirely alone with his minister Poornea : after being for some time apparently immersed in deep thought, he addressed himself to Poornea, in the following words :*

"I have committed a great error, I have purchased a draught of Seandee, at the price of a lac of pagodas : " (Seandee, the fermented juice of the wild date tree,† produces the most frantic species of intoxication, and a draught of it is sold for the smallest copper coin ;) he intended to intimate by this

* Related to the author by Poornea.

† *Elate Sylvestris*. Ainslie.

[*Phoenix Sylvestris* : *Seandee* is the Maratha *Shindi*, the juice obtained from the wild date tree]

forcible idiom, that the war was an act of intoxication; and that its advantages and disadvantages bore to each other, the relation of a farthing and a lac of pagodas, (40,000%.) "I shall pay dearly for my arrogance; between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Mahommed Ali the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Brathwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting. I ought to have reflected that no man of common sense will trust a Mahratta, and that they themselves do not expect to be trusted. I have been amused by idle expectations of a French force from Europe, but supposing it to arrive, and to be successful here, I must go alone against the Mahrattas, and incur the reproach of the French for distrusting them; for I dare not admit them in force to Mysoor."

Preparatory to his own ultimate movement, a force under Muckdoom Ali was appointed for the restoration of his affairs in Malabar, and another under Woffadâr (a Chêla) to Coorg, while a still more remarkable Chêla, Sheick Ayâz, (Vol. i. page 741, and Appendix to chap. 18.), was ordered from Bednore for the recovery of Bullum. The spoliation of every moveable property in Coromandel was in rapid progress, and a few days only remained before he should have completed his arrangements for springing the mines at Arcot and evacuating the country;

Mar. 10. when intelligence was received of the actual arrival and landing at Porto Novo of the long expected succours from France, amounting to about 3000* men including a regiment of Africans. Tippoo, whose corps still operated in the southern countries, was immediately ordered to proceed thither, and

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 297.

confer with the chiefs. Hyder had soon afterwards a personal interview with Monsieur Cossigny and Admiral Suffrein, and being entirely satisfied of the expected arrival of Monsieur Bussy at the head of a larger division, it was agreed that while waiting the junction of these troops, the fort of Cuddalore should be reduced and prepared as a French depôt, and that on the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, the united forces should seek a decisive action with the English army. In the mean while, the difficulty of providing supplies consequent on his late arrangements for desolating the country, aggravated the ordinary causes for mutual distrust, and prevented that cordial intercourse so indispensable to the success of conjoint operations.

The French and English nations had severally made the greatest exertions to obtain that pre-eminence in Coromandel, which in two successive wars, continued to be a main object of national policy; and the French government had wisely committed the supreme direction of their affairs in the East to the able and experienced hands of Monsieur Bussy. The first impediment to the execution of his plans arose from the capture, by Admiral Kempenfelt, of a convoy, on which was embarked the first division of his troops, in December 1781, and a second convoy experienced a similar fate in April 1782. Monsieur Bussy arrived at the Isle of France, in June of the same year, and found that the governor, unapprized of these disasters, had already, in the preceding December, before it was possible to have received the consequent orders dispatched by Monsieur Bussy from the Cape of Good Hope, embarked the first division of the troops destined for Coromandel, on the fleet under Monsieur D'Orves, by whose death on the passage, the command devolved on Admiral Suffrein, an officer for activity, enterprize, and resource, not exceeded by any of his cotemporaries. He made the coast with 12 ships of the line, and 18 other ships, chiefly transports, considerably to the

northward of Pulicate, on the same day that Sir Edward Hughes, after the capture of Trincomalee, had returned to anchor at Madras with six; but by a fortunate coincidence, he was on the very next day joined by three ships of the line from England, and ventured with these unequal numbers to encounter the French fleet. Mons. Suffrein, whose intelligence indicated only six ships of the line, hoped by a decisive blow, to have destroyed the English squadron in the open roads of Fort St. George, and thus to have been in a condition for the complete investment of the place by sea and land; but on approaching the roads in this confidence, and perceiving the unexpected reinforcement of three ships, he hesitated in his manœuvres, and ultimately stood away to the southward, followed without any hesitation by the British fleet the action terminated without the capture on either side of a ship of war; but the masterly conduct of Admiral Hughes, who commenced the battle, by bearing down upon the transports, left him in possession of six vessels, five being merely re-captures; but the sixth, a transport laden with troops, which operated as a farther reduction of the means possessed by Mons. Bussy. The French fleet after this action, proceeded to land at Porto Novo the troops already adverted to, and afterwards to the rendezvous of the scattered convoy at Point de Galle, while Admiral Sir E. Hughes, whose ships had suffered severely, repaired his damages at Trincomalee. and returned to Madras early in March.

Although similar disasters did not befall the reinforcements of troops dispatched by the English government, a variety of causes contributed to render

The account of the action of the 17th February, 1782, is given in a letter from Admiral Hughes to Lord Macartney, dated March 9, 1782, given in Wyll's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 317-318. The letter from the Madras Government to the Company reporting the action is given in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 259-260.)

them ineffective. About the same time that Admiral Suffrein left France with a naval reinforcement for Mons. d'Orves, carrying also a division of the troops to be employed under Mons. Bussy, a similar expedition under Commodore Johnson and General Meadows sailed from England. The intermediate object of both, was the Dutch settlement of the Cape of Good Hope; of the French to secure it to their new allies; of the English to wrest it from both. The English expedition watering at Porto Praya, in one of the Cape de Verd Islands, was actually surprised on the 16th of April 1781, by the squadron of Mons. Suffrein, who by a precipitate confidence in the facility of success against a state of defective preparation, failed by the same disregard of careful disposition, and retired after a confused and irregular action without the capture of any vessel on either side. It was late in June before the British squadron, after the repair of their damages, obtained by the capture of a Dutch ship as they approached the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope, the requisite information for their future guidance. In the winter of the southern hemisphere, Table Bay, or the port of Cape Town, the capital of the colony, situated to the westward of that promontory is an unsafe anchorage; while Simon's Bay, at the bottom of False Bay, to the eastward of the Cape, affords a secure harbour. Admiral Suffrein had anticipated the English by repairing to the latter port; but the homeward bound merchant ships of the Dutch, who always considered Simon's Bay a hazardous inlet for unwieldy vessels, preferred to encounter the dangers of an hostile squadron by anchoring in the eminently secure, but ill watered and nearly uninhabited haven of Saldanha bay, on the western coast, and there, in consequence of the intelligence obtained from the prize, they were captured by Commodore Johnstone. The prior arrival of Mons. Suffrein at the Cape having disconcerted the first part of the English plan, Commodore Johnstone

returned with his prizes and three frigates to England, while the remainder of the squadron prosecuted their voyage to Bombay an arrangement to which the French* attributed much of their own success, and the want of frigates with the British squadron in India was equally unfortunate to the national commerce as unfavourable to its maritime and military operations. A fifty gun ship, accidentally separated, was captured by the French, and occupied a place in their line on the 17th February 1782, while the three ships[†] already mentioned of the same squadron joined Sir Edward Hughes a few days previous to that engagement. A portion of the troops with General Medows arrived in these ships; and by a singular determination, that general officer continued to serve on ship-board, instead of occupying his proper place in the army, which Sir Eyre Coote had declared his intention of resigning to his charge.† The remaining troops of this expedition intended by Sir Eyre Coote to reinforce the army under his own command, had, in consequence of an open rupture between him and Lord Macartney, been employed on operations on the western coast, to which our narrative will return.

Sir Eyre Coote, Commander-in-chief of all the King's and Company's troops in India, and member of the Supreme Council of Bengal, was, when acting

Histoire de la dernière guerre, note to page 313.

[†] This was the *Hannibal*. On the 17th December 1781, the French fleet under Suffrein sailed from the Ile de France for the Madras coast, and on the way captured the *Hannibal*. He joined D'Orves, who was with the French fleet off Pulicat on the 7th February 1782, where D'Orves was attacked by illness and died, leaving Suffrein in command.

These ships were the *Hero*, *Monmouth* and *Iris*, under Commodore Almo, which were sent with the transports to India, by Commodore Johnstone from the Cape, to reinforce Admiral Hughes. The transports had on board 400 men of the 98th Regiment under Fullarton, and General Medows. Some of the troops with Almo had been landed on the Malabar coast.

"It is not with me," (said the General, in a private letter to a friend at Bengal,) "as it was with the Duke of Marlborough

within the territories of Fort St. George, a member of that council, and considered by them to be constitutionally subject to the orders of its majority. Although Lord Macartney professed to follow the example of his predecessors, in committing to Sir Eyre Coote the military conduct of the war, it was argued, that the cession by a Government of all controul over its military measures, would, with the extinction of its powers, involve a dereliction of its duties; and the very orders requisite for the remedy of those defects of supply, of which they received such incessant complaints, necessarily involved operations not alone collaterally, but directly of a military nature. The arrangements for the capture of the Dutch settlements had been made without the participation of Sir Eyre Coote, and during his absence in the field. The abstract propriety of these measures was justified by their success; and military instructions to the distant provinces, (when the absence of the Commander-in-chief rendered it impracticable to consult him,) was not deemed to be an undue interference with the conduct of the army under the immediate orders of Sir Eyre Coote. On the part of the Commander-in-chief, it was argued, that all interference in military command, was an invasion of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-chief of the troops of all the Presidencies; and that every such interference of the local Government had a direct tendency to

after the battle of Blenheim, who, seeing a French soldier fall wounded, after bravely defending himself, rode up to him, and said, my brave fellow, had all the French been like you; — 'no General,' (said the soldier,) 'it is not many like me that were wanting, but one like you; and it is not one *like me* that you now want, but many like those I have brought; but to be plain with you, I have so little information respecting Indian warfare, being altogether without experience in it, that I should do much more harm in learning my trade, than I could ever compensate for having learnt it. I must, therefore, decline the honour you intend me." This passage, although given from memory, is believed to be literally correct.

obstruct and defeat military plans of a wider range, of which that local Government had neither information nor controul. Although for some time after the arrival of Lord Macartney, an intercourse prevailed, full of reciprocal courtesy and respect these indications of confidence and co-operation had gradually diminished, and ultimately disappeared. On the last return of Sir-Eyre Coote from Vellore, he complained with the greatest asperity of the neglect of the department of supply during his absence; declared, that experience had shewn he could place no reliance on the proper attention being paid to the wants of the army; formally absolved himself from all responsibility; announced his intention of immediately resigning a command which his honour and reputation would no longer allow him to retain, and in a subsequent dispatch, intimated that he waited for that purpose the arrival of General Medows, from Bombay.

He had applied to the Supreme Government of Bengal to restore his authority, without having previously noticed to that of Madras, the points in which he considered it to be invaded, and did not even condescend to explain, when after an admonition from Bengal, that Government requested information; the interposition of the Supreme Government, first, by temperate advice, and ultimately by command, led to a farther distraction in public councils, where unanimity was so urgently required. The employment on the western coast (contrary to the wishes of the general) of the troops to which we have adverted, was a consequence of these dissensions. Mr. Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, and charged with a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, had from his central situation, and the confidence reposed in his talents, been made the medium of communication between the two coasts, and was authorized by Lord Macartney to open all his dispatches, and make all the communications in duplicate which their contents should require. In the exercise

of this discretionary power, which he inferred to extend to every thing connected with the public service, he was induced by his public zeal to open dispatches addressed to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at Madras; from the officers commanding these reinforcements and unsuspecting of the existing disunion among the higher authorities, officially knowing from his own Government the importance which they, as well as the Governor-general attached to strengthening the diversion on the western coast, already commenced at Tillicherry, and naturally concluding, that the views of his Government could not be different from those of the Commander-in-chief; ventured to address letters to the naval and military officers on the western coast, unfolding these views, expressing his confidence that they would receive corresponding orders, and communicating such information as he possessed, and such opinions as he had formed, regarding the most advisable plan of operations in that quarter.

Although Sir Edward Hughes, on first receiving from Lord Macartney the dispatches of Mr. Sullivan, expressed his approbation of the whole proceeding and its consequences; yet on communicating with Sir Eyre Coote they addressed a joint* letter to Lord Macartney, treating the conduct of Mr. Sullivan as an unauthorized violation of their official dispatches, and an illegal assumption of authority which they had not delegated and could not transfer to any man, and much less to a man who must necessarily be uninformed of their intentions and plans: and this unfortunate incident was considered by Sir Eyre Coote as an aggravated invasion of his lawful authority, branching from the head of the Government to its subordinates, although he must have been at the time distinctly aware that from the intermediate country being covered with the enemy's horse. the

* 13th March 1782.

dispatches themselves could not possibly have been sent; and that the extracts in a diminutive hand rolled up to the size of a quill, and successively transmitted by Mr. Sullivan's spies, constituted his only information of his own dispatches, the originals of which he probably did not receive for many months afterwards. Without farther observation on the effects of this unhappy controversy, the reader will probably be disposed to concur in the opinion, that it resulted infinitely more from the defective system of the government, than from the eminent men who were entrusted with its execution; and although this estimable veteran could not fail to discover through the fullest drapery of Lord Macartney's compliments, many intelligible insinuations, that much more might have been done, than was actually accomplished by the army; it must, with whatever reluctance, be allowed that the temper evinced by Sir Eyre Coote on this and other occasions, exhibited mournful evidence of his having outlived some of the most attractive qualities of his earlier character.

For further light on this question of the dissensions between Lord Macartney and Sir Eyre Coote, Wyll's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, and Barrow's *Life of the Earl of Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 138-161, should be consulted. The conclusion at which Wilks arrived was fairer to both parties than that arrived at by either of the above protagonists. Lord Macartney succeeded a number of Governors, who had brought the administration to the lowest ebb of efficiency, and it was only to be expected that his assertion of authority would be resented. On the other hand, Sir Eyre Coote's state of health made him over-critical and ready to take offence, while the incapacity shown by the military administration, for which Lord Macartney was not responsible, gave him ample ground for complaints. The contradictory orders sent from Bengal in their letters of the 10th March and the 4th July did nothing to make the position easier. The length of the letter from Lord Macartney dated 30th August, which excited Colonel Wyll's astonishment, should not have astonished any one conversant with the minutes and correspondence of the period. The papers that were drawn up in the secretariats of the three governments in India were seldom brief, and the Bengal Govern-

The serious importance which was attached March. to the preservation of Trincomalee, had induced the admiral, late in March, to sail for that place, with a reinforcement of troops, and a supply of military stores. On the 30th of that month, he was 30.

ment could not find fault with Madras on this score. It was the fashion of the time. The responsibility for affairs after all rested with the Governor and his Council, and Lord Macartney cannot be blamed for asserting his authority. Reference may be made to Mill's *History of British India*, Book V, Chap. V. Mill was too ready to criticise anything that came from Warren Hastings, but surely he was right when he wrote: "Instead of interfering with their authority to allay the unreasonable dissatisfactions of the querulous General, and to strengthen the hands, at so perilous a moment, of the Government of Madras, the Supreme Council encouraged his discontent, and laid their exhortations upon the Presidency of Madras, to place themselves in hardly any other capacity than that of commissaries to supply his army." (Mill *History of British India*, Book V, Chap. V, p. 549.) Lord Macartney's defence of Sullivan's action will be found in a letter from the Government of Madras to the Court of Directors, dated 5th September 1782, paras 47-57. They said: "In our answer to their second complaint against Mr. Sullivan we wrote to Sir Eyre Coote that Mr. Sullivan had imagined that in the disposition of troops and succour of any kind sent by His Majesty to the relief of the East India Company the Persons entrusted with the Government of their Possessions and the management of their Affairs should have at least considerable influence if not a deliberative voice: that on the first intimation of his (Sir Eyre Coote's) and Sir Edward Hughes' dissatisfaction at such an interference in Mr. Sullivan. We had written to that Gentleman to be particularly careful in any thing that might affect either his or the Admiral's Authority, and we should repeat that caution, leaving to higher powers the further consideration of the Offence he had given to the Commanders in Chief, which however heinous it might be considered with respect to them, arose not only from the purest motives of zeal and public spirit but the recommendation in which that Offence consisted appeared to him to correspond with the sentiments of the Governor General and Council of Bengal," and as the General had now ordered Colonel Humberston to obey the Bombay Government, which receives instructions from Bengal, it was probable that so far from Mr. Sullivan's impeding such orders, the early advice he gave, if followed, would have accelerated their good effects."

- joined on his passage by two ships¹ of the line from England, whose crews were extremely reduced by the scurvy; but the importance of his immediate object, and the farther view of covering and receiving a convoy with troops and stores from England, at an appointed rendezvous, induced him to keep on his course, with the determination of neither seeking nor shunning the enemy. But the same object, though with different views, which affected the conduct of the English admiral, had a corresponding influence over that of Monsieur Suffrein; for he also knew of the approaching convoy, and the future fate of the campaign made it equally important to the French, that it should be cut off, as to the English, that it should be preserved. The hostile fleets came in sight of each other on the 8th of April, fifteen leagues from Trincomalee, the English line consisting of eleven ships, carrying 732 guns, and the French, of twelve, carrying 770. A sanguinary contest, which, after a
12. variety of manœuvres, took place on the 12th, terminated as before, without any decisive result, and both fleets, crippled to the extent of being unable to renew the contest, continued at anchor, in sight of
 19. each other, until the 19th; when the French fleet, after an ineffective demonstration, made sail and disappeared, for the purpose of repairing its damages at Baticolo, a port in Ceylon, while the English proceeded for a similar purpose to Trincomalee, in the same island.²

Every hope of decisive measures by land was necessarily dependent on naval co-operation. Although the embarrassment of a convoy with the French fleet had induced Sir Edward Hughes in the

¹ *The Sultan and Magnanime*, sent from England.

² Suffren was on the *Héros*, which with the *L'Orient* engaged the English Admiral's ship, the *Superb*. The British losses amounted to 137 killed and 480 wounded. Admiral Hughes landed 1,462 sick and wounded at Trincomalee, and was obliged to remain inactive for six weeks.

first action to meet it with inferior numbers the same inferiority of nine to twelve when he left Madras, precluded the attempt to cover the transports necessary for the conjunct operations to the southward, which, with a decided naval superiority, Sir Eyre Coote would have been inclined to propose. The result of these naval contests, therefore, although uniformly honourable to the British character, and productive of the high'y important but negative consequence of preventing the contrasted effect of a conjunct operation against Fort St. George, had in the mean while limited the plans of Sir Eyre to movements purely of a defensive nature. On leaving Cuddalore, in the preceding year, he abstained from the effectual demolition of that weak place, in the hope that the naval superiority of the English would preserve its great convenience to his own operations, without risking its being seized and strengthened as an important depôt for the French. The precaution even of mining the place appears to have been omitted; and although two ships had been dispatched from Madras with a reinforcement, it capitulated without even the show of resistance on the 8th of April, before their arrival; the whole April 8.

"Towards the end of March, Tippoo Saib moved with his army within a few miles of the Bound Hedge of Cuddalore, and invested that place the 2nd April, in conjunction with Mr. du Chemin and all the French troops from Porto Novo, with a large train of heavy artillery.

"On the 3rd two French officers came to the Fort with a flag of truce from Mr. du Chemin, and offered terms of capitulation, the substance of which was that the Fort should be delivered up at 5 o'clock that evening to the French troops, private property secured, and the Garrison to proceed to Madras, there to be exchanged for an equal number of French troops.

"Captain Hughes, to whom, agreeably to your orders, the Chief and Council had delivered the command of the place on its being invested, in answer demanded 5 days, and said he would treat for the surrender of the Fort if not relieved by the expiration of that time. This the French General refused, and the place being too weak to make any effectual resistance against

garrison of this extensive town not having exceeded four hundred sepoys and five artillerymen. While the operations of the army were suspended in anxious expectation of the result of the naval action of the 12th of April, of which rumour had conveyed various and contradictory accounts, the united forces of May 11. Hyder and the French on the 11th of May suddenly appeared before Permacoil,¹ a hill fort situated about twenty miles N.W. from Pondicherry.

Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving this intelligence, instantly marched for its relief; but one of those violent storms, accompanied by the descent of torrents of rain by night, followed by suffocating heat in the day, which at this season of the year sometimes precede the change of the monsoon, not only arrested his progress, but was eminently destructive to his equipments and his troops; and while witnessing a scene of distress which no human means could relieve, he had the mortification to hear that Permacoil had capitulated on the 16th, and that the united forces were advancing towards Wandewash. Sir Eyre Coote, on the first intelligence of the landing of the French, had ordered this place to be mined pre-

so great a force, the Garrison consisting of not more than 400 regular sepoys and 4 or 5 European artillery men, Captain Hughes accepted the terms, and the French took possession of Cuddalore the next morning.

"Upon receiving Intelligence of the Investment of Cuddalore, two ships were despatched to the Assistance of the garrison, but it had surrendered before their Arrival." (Fort St. George to the Company, dated 5th September 1782, quoted in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 240.)

¹ *Permacoil*.—Perumukkal, a small fort on a hill, about 437 feet above the sea level, 15 miles west from the sea, and 6 miles E.S.E. from Tindivanam in the South Arcot District, Madras. The summit is about 400 yards by 200 yards in extent, and ascent on all sides is difficult. In 1761 it was captured by Sir Eyre Coote. In 1780 it was besieged by Haider, and taken by him in 1782, regained by the English in 1783. In 1790 it was taken by Tippu. Only a few ruins remain, to indicate the position of the fort.

paratory to its eventual demolition, if that measure should become necessary ; but although in his public dispatches of this date he describes the aspect of public affairs, in consequence of the destruction of May 19. the southern corps under Colonel Brathwaite ; the junction of the French forces ; the capture of Cuddalore and Permacoil, and the indecisive nature of the last naval combat to be, not only embarrassing, but *desperate* he determined to present himself before these united forces, and to trust for the rest to the tried valour of his troops, and their confidence in the skill and fortune of their commander. The united armies had been for four days in sight of Wandewash, when on the approach of the English, they withdrew 24. towards Pondicherry. The importance of Wandewash, or rather the inestimable value of its commandant,² may be conceived from the enumeration of one thousand head of cattle and four hundred sheep, among the supplies which waited the acceptance of his general, while his post was invested, and immediately after the whole country had been desolated, preparatory to its evacuation.

Finding that the enemy declined to wait the encounter in the neighbourhood of Wandewash, as from their superior numbers he expected, Sir Eyre Coote marched in the direction of Pondicherry, and came in sight of the united army encamped in a

Sir Eyre Coote when he left Madras, was apparently not aware that Haider had appeared before Permacoil (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 287). But he suspected that, while Haider would probably desire to go south to Tanjore, the French would be anxious that he should first obtain possession of the three forts, Karanguly, Wandewash and Permacoil, in order to recover Pondicherry as soon as possible. He wrote to Madras when he heard Permacoil had fallen, that "a day's rice more or less may decide the fate of the British Empire in India." Madras was at this time suffering from famine, which lasted all through the year 1782, and the provisioning of Sir Eyre Coote's troops was a matter of immense difficulty. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras* Vol. III, pp. 230-236.)

² Captain William Flint.

strong position, deliberately prepared, in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. Reasons of a powerful nature, of which Sir Eyre Coote was very imperfectly informed, had induced the allies severally to concur in the propriety of avoiding a general action on equal terms. Hyder, as we have seen, had been under the necessity of detaching largely from his best troops for three separate objects. The French, reduced by sickness, and the occupation of Cuddalore and Permacoil, had in the field probably not twelve hundred Europeans; and Monsieur Bussy's directions were imperative, to risk no general action until his own arrival with the last of the reinforcements. It was to be expected from the tried prudence of Sir Eyre Coote, that he would not commit the last stake of his nation in India on the desperate hazard of attacking an enemy eminently superior in numbers, and every way formidable, in a position chosen by themselves, in the vicinity of their resources, and at a distance from his own. It was his practice, on questions of great difficulty, to consult the opinions of his principal officers; and his present situation appeared to be one of the most critical importance. To try the fate of battle on the enemy's chosen ground; to attempt a movement which should draw them from this ground, and compel them to fight on more equal terms, but at a still greater distance from the English resources, was the alternative of active measures; and if both were rejected, it only remained to retire towards Madras, destroying Wandewash, or still risking its occupation.

Arnee, from its central situation relatively to the scene of Hyder's operations, the sources of his supply, and the destination of his plunder, had at this period become the principal depôt of all that remained to him in the lower countries. From the absence

¹ *Kellinoor*.—Kilyanur, a village on the road from Tindivanam to Pondicherry, about 14 miles north-west of the latter place.

of all apprehension of danger, it was loosely garrisoned, and Captain Flint had for some time been in secret treaty with its commandant for the purchase of the place, and obtained from him the most complete and minute information (verified by subsequent inspection after the peace) of the means of carrying the place by surprise. The completion of this conditional arrangement furnished but a collateral prospect of success, liable to be disturbed and anticipated by any alarm which should suggest a reinforcement of the garrison but it was an object of more certain calculation, that a movement threatening this depôt, and intercepting the enemy's supplies, would draw them from their strong position, and afford the chance of engaging on more favourable terms. In conformity to these views, Sir Eyre Coote marched on the 30th in that direction, and Hyder on the same May 31 evening detached Tippoo, with orders to proceed by forced marches, and throw a strong reinforcement into the place, following himself on the ensuing day, without his allies, whose instructions would not admit of their accompanying his march; and it is a curious illustration of character, that in retaliation for a refusal, the grounds of which he would not understand, the supplies of provisions which he had made to depend on his own daily will and pleasure, were during his absence ordered to be entirely suspended.*

On the 2d of June, about eight o'clock, when June 2 Sir Eyre Coote, after a short march, was preparing to encamp near to the fort of Arnee, a brisk but distant cannonade opened on his rear; and from a variety of distinct points, previously selected by Tippoo, and Monsieur Lally, on his front. A day of severe fatigue and varied cannonade, rather than of battle, and a succession of skilful manœuvres, to combine with the essential protection of the baggage, the means of closing with the enemy, were performed

* Intercepted letter from a French officer, confirmed by the oral information of the Mysoreans.

by the troops with a degree of confident steadiness and alacrity, which were deemed even to surpass all that their veteran commander had before witnessed in their conduct; and the operations terminated a little before sunset, with the capture of one gun and eleven tumbrils, and ammunition carts, secured by a spirited and judicious push of the European grenadiers, supported by a Bengal battalion, at the corps of Monsieur Lally, when covering the retreat of its artillery across the dry bed of a river. A loss of this nature, to which Hyder always attached an importance beyond its value, was ascribed to the misconduct of *Lutf Aly Beg*, who at this critical juncture, had been ordered to make a desperate charge, with a large and select body of cavalry, on the enemy's rear, but suffered himself to be checked by an active and well-directed fire from the horse artillery attached to the English cavalry. The reader may be prepared to hear of decapitation, or public disgrace, as the consequence of Hyder's rage at this imputed misconduct, which was really that of the troops and not of their leader. *Lutf Aly Beg** was committed to the custody of *Jehan Khan*,† then in the temporary command of Chittapet, with orders to inflict on him a corporal punishment prescribed, and after exhibiting the marks to certain witnesses named, to transmit their attestation of the infliction of the sentence the united wealth of these two most improvident Mahommedan officers could not furnish a bribe for the bramin witnesses named. *Jehan Khan* approached the prison of his friend, threw himself at his feet, and declared that he would rather die than obey the order. *Lutf Aly Beg*, a man of wit and resource, devised a better alternative: procure, said he, some milk-hedge,‡ shut the door, draw the proper number of lines across my back, I shall hollow most dramati-

* The person mentioned in p. xxix. of the preface.

† The person mentioned in p. xxix. of the preface.

‡ *Euphorbia Tiraculli*; the milky juice of which is a caustic

cally, and to-morrow with only a little smarting pain, my back will be in a state to exhibit to your witnesses. The separate personal narration of the two individuals who have been named is the sole authority on which I should have ventured to relate an incident so little according with ordinary credibility.

The usual necessity of allotting the greater portion of the small but efficient corps of English cavalry for the protection of the baggage, deprived Sir Eyre Coote of the opportunity presented by the discomfiture of Lally's corps, of securing a long train of retreating artillery; and the want of depôts, or of any means of commanding food for a few weeks, left him the usual mortification of being unable by a series of active operations to profit by his success. The loss of Europeans and natives, including the wounded, amounted on this day to no more than seventy-four, among whom were seventeen who died of fatigue, chiefly of the 78th regiment. The example of this corps, which joined the army on the 25th of April, furnished a memorable proof of the inexpediency of appointing for field service European troops not habituated to the climate, nor instructed in the arrangements for subsistence peculiar to the country. With no other casualties from the enemy than the few which had occurred on this day, its effective strength was found at the expiration of thirty-eight days to be exactly one-third of its amount at the commencement of that period.¹

familiarly employed by the palanquin bearers, in raising blisters, as a remedy for local pains.

¹ In a letter from Sir Eyre Coote, dated 31st August 1782, he said: "Preference may certainly be given to the Highlanders for their temperance," but he remarks on the fatal effects of the climate on the 78th then lately arrived, "which furnishes strong and recent proof that their constitutions are not adapted to service in this country," and states that he has always observed the sufferings of Highlanders in India to be greater in proportion than those of men of other countries. (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 202.)

In closing our narrative of the last general action in which either of these eminent commanders were destined to engage, it may be proper to observe with reference to the general character of the tactics of Sir Eyre Coote that one of the obstructions to active operation which has so often been described, as arising from attention to the baggage, may appear to those who have not experienced an Indian campaign, to involve the opprobrium of a too curious attention to the comfort, perhaps the luxury of the troops; terms which certainly had no appropriate existence in these campaigns. These *impedimenta*, (the significant Roman term) consist chiefly of three articles; military stores, camp equipage, and provisions; the first requires no comment; but a short observation on each of the other two may tend to render more intelligible the degree in which these impediments are necessary. Such observations as the author has had an opportunity of making, incline him to the opinion, that a more expensive, but not therefore a more cumbrous camp equipage, than has ever yet been provided for the European soldier in India, would be equally promotive of efficiency, and true economy; and the example of the 78th, who would unquestionably have suffered less under better cover, may tend to illustrate the grounds of this opinion. With regard to the article of provisions, it is necessary to recollect, that the modern system of supply, reduced to a science in the commissariat of European armies, has no application to a country whose resources were uniformly destroyed in every direction approached by the English army; which was thus necessarily dependent on the few depôts it possessed, and primarily on Madras. A ship provisioned for a voyage, or a caravan preparing to traverse the great desert of Arabia, are the most appropriate emblems of the army of Sir Eyre Coote. Stored for the period calculated to elapse from quitting port, until its return to port, it is scarcely a figure to affirm, that in its first march it

was at sea, or more literally, in the desert; with the additional feature of being incessantly surrounded by swarms of irregular horse, presenting individual incidents too remarkable to be entirely excluded from the picture. To approach within speaking distance of the flanking parties, was known by the enemy from experience to be safe for an individual horseman; as the soldiers were expressly prohibited from throwing away their fire the conversation always assumed the character of contemptuous abuse, of a mode of warfare, which they stigmatised as unmanly, by excluding the exercise of individual prowess and skill; and not unfrequently would terminate in a general challenge to single combat. There was in Sir Eyre Coote's body-guard, a young cavalry officer, distinguished for superior military address; on ordinary service, always foremost, to the very verge of prudence, but never beyond it; of physical strength, seldom equalled; on foot, a figure for a sculptor; when mounted—

—“ he grew unto his seat,
And to such wondrous doing brought his horse
As he had been incorporated and demi-natured
With the brave beast.”

In common with the rest of the army, this officer had smiled at the recital of these absurd challenges; but while reconnoitring on the flank of the column of march, one of them was personally addressed to himself by a horseman, who from dress and appearance, seemed to be of some distinction. He accepted the invitation, and the requisite precautions were mutually acceded to: they fought; and he slew his antagonist. After this incident, the challenges were frequently addressed, not as formerly to the whole army, but to *Dallas*, whose name became speedily known to them and whenever his duty admitted, and his favorite horse* was sufficiently fresh, the

* This singular animal, besides the common duty of carrying his rider, exercised, when required, and sometimes spontaneously,

invitations were accepted, until the Mysoreans became weary of repetition. With a single exception, the result was uniform. On that one occasion, the combatants, after several rounds, feeling a respect for each other, made a significant pause, mutually saluted, and retired. As a fashion among the aspiring young officers, these adventures were not calculated for general adoption; it was found, that in single combat, the address of a native horseman is seldom equalled by an European.

We return from this digressive matter to the operations of the 2d June:—

- June 2. Sir Eyre Coote encamped at the close of day on the ground which he had prepared to occupy in the morning. and on the ensuing day, made demonstrations of besieging the place, with the hope of adding the influence of his success to the other motives of the kelledar; but the presence of a powerful garrison, and the vicinity of Hyder, rendered the attempt even to communicate, too dangerous to be hazarded by an individual traitor; and as no message was received, and the vigilance of the garrison precluded the hope of surprise, under present circumstances, the object was abandoned, and Sir Eyre
4. Coote moved against the enemy on the 4th, in a south-western direction Hyder retreated as he
 6. advanced, and he returned to Arnee. On the 6th, Hyder having moved to the eastward, Sir Eyre Coote
 7. again pursued on that day, and on the 7th, but without any other effect than the tantalizing view of an easy retreat, and the capture of some stragglers. The
 8. army halted on the 8th, to refresh the cattle and

all the aggressive force with which he was furnished by nature; and the Mysoreans, whose imaginations had added to the evidence of sight, would make inquiry regarding the extraordinary phenomenon of a gigantic figure mounted on a furious black horse of enormous size and destructive powers; the stature of the man being just six feet, and that of the horse fourteen hands three inches and a half.

troops, and Hyder, anxious to obliterate in some degree the impression of so many defeats, prepared in person an ambuscade which effectually succeeded. Some camels and elephants, insufficiently guarded, were made to pass within a short distance of the grand guard, and the officer commanding, with more zeal than prudence, attempted to carry them off, sending a message to the field officer of the day, Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart, of the 78th, to inform him of the circumstance: that officer instantly mounted, proceeded at speed to stop the imprudence of the young officer, and approached in time to see the guard charged on all sides by clouds of cavalry, within the skirts of which he was himself enveloped: seeing that all was lost, he trusted to the goodness of his horse, and singly escaped, by leaping a ravine over which none of the enemy could follow him. The loss of the English was 166 men, 54 horses, and two guns: Hyder's, about 60 horses, and as many men, but the achievement was deemed of sufficient importance to justify a salute, on his return to camp, as a demonstration of victory. Sir Eyre Coote mounted on the first alarm, and at the head of his cavalry, proceeded as quickly as possible to the spot, but arrived only in time to direct the interment of the mangled remains of his troops, having the melancholy consolation to observe, that the artillerymen had fallen at the muzzles of their guns, and the infantry in their unbroken ranks. The influence of the climate, and of fatigue, having encreased the number of European sick to an alarming degree, he moved by Wandewash, where the never-failing energies of its commandant, enabled him to remain four days, to refresh, and afterwards returned to the vicinity of Madras.

June 18.

¹ The guard was composed of a detachment of cavalry, two small guns, and 100 sepoy under Lieutenant Cruitzer, who was taken prisoner. He was drawn away from camp and surrounded by 6,000 horse commanded by Hyder. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 66.)

The distresses of the garrison of Vellore had again assumed a serious aspect, and the commandant had named the 1st of July as the latest period to which the place could be maintained. During the operations which have just been described, Sir Eyre Coote had apprized the Government of the impossibility of affording any succour from the army, and Lord Macartney devised a mode of relief, which was calculated to succeed from its extreme improbability. While Hyder's attention was closely occupied by the movements subsequent to the action of the 2d of June, one hundred irregular sepoy's under the command of an ensign,* escorting five hundred bullocks, twenty-four carts, and two thousand coolies loaded with provisions, moved on the 6th of June to the skirts of the hills; a detachment of one thousand five hundred poligars there joined them, and by forced marches the whole was deposited in Vellore before the movement was suspected by Hyder. But the feeble escort of this most opportune relief was intercepted in its return, and compelled to surrender at discretion.

The importance already described of acquiring the fort of Negapatam, as a depôt for the future operations of the French, induced Admiral Suffrein to avail himself of the earliest possible opportunity for attempting that enterprize; and Admiral Sir E Hughes on the first intelligence of his being anchored in that vicinity sailed from Madras to prevent its July 6. execution. The number of ships engaged in the naval action which ensued were on each side precisely equal, with a small superiority in favour of the Eng-

* Burn.

[Ensign Byrne, with 100 volunteer sepoy's, 250 horse, and 2,163 sepoy's, with 3,000 cooly loads of rice, 62 kegs of country spirits, 21 kegs of salt provisions, and 250 bullock loads of rice. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 662.)]

† Men who make it a trade to carry loads on their heads, or to perform ordinary labour.

lish in the number of guns,* but like all the encounters which occurred between these distinguished officers, it terminated without a capture, but not without results; for the French were in consequence, avowedly compelled to abandon† the design of attempting Negapatam, which the Government of Madras, with a more than doubtful policy, ordered to be destroyed in the following January, during the absence of Sir Eyre Coote, and without his sanction. The next object of Admiral Hughes, was the revictualling of Trincomalee, but in this purpose he was anticipated by the activity of Monsieur Suffren,† who after receiving at an appointed rendezvous off Ceylon, a reinforcement of two ships of the line, a frigate, and eight transports full of troops, aware of the probability of the early arrival of the English fleet, suddenly appeared before Trincomalee, landed two thousand

* French ships	...	11	...	706 guns.
English ditto	...	11	...	732 ditto.

[The British fleet bore down upon the French and engaged ship against ship, and an action ensued which, as Mahan tells us "was the only one of the five fought by Suffren on the coast of India, in which the English admiral was the assailant. There can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical combinations; but, on the other hand, Hughes is continually showing the aptitude, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as well as a courage beyond all proof." (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 321.) The British loss was 77 killed and 233 wounded; the French was 178 killed and 601 wounded.]

† Histoire de la dernière guerre.

Wilks generally spells the Admiral's name in this fashion: his full name was Pierre André de Suffren Saint-Tropès, Baille de Suffren. He was born in Provence in 1729; he had fought against the British at Toulon in 1744 and at Cape Breton two years later, being there captured. He was released and again taken prisoner in Boscawen's action in 1759, and spent four years in captivity in England. He was killed in a duel in 1783. (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 311-12.) Suffren, after his action of the 6th July, went to Cuddalore to refit, and was ready for sea long before Hughes, who went to Madras and delayed there refitting his vessels. He did not put to sea again until August 20th.

- four hundred men, and pushed the siege with such vigour as to induce the commandant to surrender at
- Aug. 31. a much earlier period than had been anticipated by Sir Eyre Coote. Suffrein had scarcely occupied the forts¹ with the garrison intended for their defence, when a signal was made announcing the appearance of the hostile fleet. The English were prevented from desecrating their opponents, by the back ground
- Sept. 2 of the land intercepting the light of the horizon, while through the same light their own ships formed opaque objects distinctly visible to the French; * they accordingly stood on with easy sail during the night, and in the morning had the mortification to see the French colours flying on shore as well as in the anchorage. During the interval since the last combat, the French force had been augmented to fifteen ships of the line, while the English was no more than
3. twelve; an action notwithstanding ensued, which terminated as before, without capture, and the fleets respectively returned to Cuddalore and to Madras; the French to deposit at the former place the military stores, and troops received in the transports, and the

¹ Hughes had sent two ships, the *Monmouth* and *Sceptre*, to Trincomalee with a reinforcement of 200 men of the 42nd and 98th regiments under Captain Hay MacDowell, who took command at Trincomalee. Suffren landed 2,500 Europeans under Baron d'Agoult and invested and took the place. The forts were in such a condition as to make defence by the small garrison impossible, and MacDowell capitulated on the terms he asked for.

* I am not acquainted with any terms in ordinary use, to describe these phenomena so familiar to every person who has made a voyage. A seaman would say, that the French fleet was not visible, because it was *under the land*. If Humboldt's terms were in familiar use, they would be sufficiently expressive. He distinguishes between distant objects seen in a positive and in a negative manner. In the first case, the light is reflected from the object; in the second, the object intercepts the light. According to this distinction, the English fleet was seen by the French in a negative manner: and in conformity to Humboldt's doctrine and observations, a much nearer approach was necessary before the French fleet could be seen in a positive manner.

English to concert measures preparatory to their departure to refit at Bombay. But it is worthy of particular remark, that the port of Trincomalee, considered and contested by both nations as the key of all their naval and military operations in the bay of Bengal and the coast of Coromandel, was found to be so utterly destitute of every resource, that Admiral Suffrein was under the necessity of seeking at Acheen, in the island of Sumatra, in the port of an uncivilized chief, those aids during the monsoon, which a conquest of reputed importance achieved for that special purpose was found unfit to supply. Whether in addition to these well known defects, Monsieur Suffrein may have been influenced in his choice of Acheen, by having previously made it the rendezvous of the *Pourvoyeuse* frigate laden with teak-wood from Pegue, and a store-ship from the Isle of France which joined him there, the French author does not enable us to determine. The Annual Register of that year has fallen into the error (apparently derived from the public records) of supposing Monsieur Suffrein to have wintered at Trincomalee, but the very accurate author of *Histoire de la derniere guerre*, who appears from internal evidence to have been a naval officer serving under that admiral, not only places the fact beyond doubt, but enables us to state the singular coincidence of Monsieur Suffrein having sailed from Cuddalore in fair weather on the 15th of October, the same day that the English fleet was driven in the utmost danger from the roads at Madras by a hurricane, which, as usual, soon changing its direction, strewed the shore for several miles with the wreck of country ships, and the dead bodies of their mariners; a loss the more afflicting from their containing a store of grain intended to avert the impending famine.¹

¹ The famine was not "impending" in October 1782. In January 1782, the Madras Government had reported to the Company "for the country remains in a state of absolute Desolation, nor is there any appearance of cultivation in the Carnatick, except

The hope of each army had for several months been incessantly and anxiously fixed on the consequences of each successive naval combat, and the indecision of each result necessarily extended its influence to the military operations. The views of Hyder were chiefly directed to his distant detachments on the western hills of the peninsula and in Malabar, and to some inefficient operations in Tanjour, which were defeated with very inferior means by the distinguished energy and perseverance of Colonel Nixon.¹ Positive orders, as well as insufficient strength, kept the French on the defensive, and Sir Eyre Coote, estimating the united force opposed to him in Coromandel at higher numbers than their actual amount, gave to his movements more cautious and defensive character than he might possibly have adopted, had his intelligence been more correct. After, however, depositing in Vellore, in the month of August, a sufficiency of

within the bounds of our different Factories and Garrisons." (P. to Eng. Vol. XXIX, 26th January 1782). In May 1782, there was acute distress in Madras, and as the year advanced, the famine became more acute. In November, the Madras Government wrote to the Company: "On the 15th Ultimo a very severe Gale of Wind happened here, in which most of the vessels were either blown out of the road or lost. All his Majesty's Ships slipped their cables and went to sea. Ten ships and snows of considerable burden were entirely destroyed, besides nearly one hundred country vessels of inferior size." In a letter to the *India Gazette*, it was announced that the admiral who was at anchor in fifteen fathoms, was giving an entertainment on board the flag ship when the gale began at noon on the 15th. He at once slipped his cable, and carried his guests to sea. In the night the Hertford, the Free Trade, the Shannon, the Nancy, the Essex, and a Moorman's ship were all drove on shore. The Free Mason foundered at her anchors; and near one hundred snows and donies were entirely lost. It is impossible to describe a scene of such horror and distress." (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 261-262.)

¹ Colonel Nixon was a cavalry officer, who had distinguished himself in Tanjore under Colonel Brathwaite, and had taken over command temporarily after Brathwaite's defeat in February 1782.

provisions to last until the 1st of March, 1783; and accomplishing that object without the slightest molestation from the enemy he was induced, from this and other circumstances, to avail himself of the interval between the two last naval actions, and the absence of both fleets from the coast, to concert the means of attempting the re-capture of Cuddalore, if on approaching that place he should find the aspect of affairs and of the opposing force to be favourable to the enterprize. The absence of the fleets afforded the advantage of embarking at Madras on transports escorted by a frigate left for that special purpose, the requisite military stores and battering train; but the precarious nature of naval co-operation was never more manifest than on this occasion. On arriving on Sept. 6 the high ground above Pondicherry, he was astonished to find that the ships expected to be there waiting his arrival, were still invisible. The insufficient store 11. of provisions with the army rendered him dependent on their arrival and ultimately compelled him to return to Madras without an effort, having first however ascertained that Trincomalee had fallen; that Admiral Sir E. Hughes had returned to Madras after the action of the 3d of September, and that all hope of attacking Cuddalore must for the present be suspended. This mortification was farther aggravated, on the return of Sir Eyre Coote to Madras, by learning that the transports had arrived at Pondicherry on the day succeeding the departure of the army, a disappointment eventually fortunate in its consequences, as from the unexpected return of the French fleet to Cuddalore, the English expedition, if more successful in its early combinations, must have terminated in failure and considerable loss.

The ships of the English fleet had kept the sea during the monsoon of 1781, and from the injuries sustained through the want of periodical repair, and from four subsequent general actions, were in so defective a state, as to render their refitment at

Bombay indispensable in the opinion of their commander-in-chief. Lord Macartney, justly apprehensive for even the safety of Madras, if the hostile fleet should winter at Trincomalee, and be thus on the spot, not only to co-operate with the expected army under Monsieur Bussy; but to intercept the supplies of grain from Bengal, which constituted the sole hope of averting the miseries of famine at Madras, solicited the admiral, in several successive conferences, to risk the English fleet, for the purpose of covering a decisive attempt to reduce Cuddalore, and thus decide the war before the arrival of Monsieur Bussy; and his Lordship ineffectually, and somewhat indecorously, continued to press this measure, and to animadvert on the refusal, after the admiral had more than once declared his professional conviction of the absolute necessity of repairing to Bombay. Sir Edward Hughes accordingly sailed, as we have seen, for Bombay on the 15th of October about twelve days after his departure, a respectable and long expected armament from England, under Sir R. Bickerton, anchored in the roads the ships, of course, proceeded to form a junction with their commander-in-chief at Bombay, after having landed at Madras the troops intended to reinforce the army at that presidency.¹

¹ The account given of the attempt on Cuddalore, is given in the *Life of Sir Eyre Coote* and in Mill's *History of British India*. Sir Eyre Coote arrived at the Red Hills, a group of small hills north of Pondicherry, on September 4, and there expected the frigate the *Medea* and the ships carrying the supplies from Madras. The *Medea* arrived on the 13th September without the ships, which were still off Madras, some miles to the north. Sir Eyre Coote had to drop any idea of making the attempt on Cuddalore. He had been attacked on the 8th of September with severe illness, which prostrated him. In consequence he made over command to Major General James Stuart, who, hearing of the action between the French and English fleets off Trincomalee on the 3rd September, that Admiral Hughes had returned to Madras, and that reinforcements for the French had arrived under Bussy, decided to return to Madras and left on the 11th Septem-

During this campaign some advances to negotiation through Colonel Brathwaite a prisoner in Hyder's camp, were no otherwise remarkable than in assuming as the grounds of the present war, the fraud practised by Mahommed Ali on the state of Mysoor, in 1752, without noticing the treaty of 1769, which terminated all preceding differences: these advances were followed by the mission of an envoy to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals, and instructed merely to feel the dispositions and probable demands of that nation upon Hyder, in the event of his finding it expedient to abandon his French allies: and the dissensions among the English authorities were in no case more prominent, than in Sir Eyre Coote's declining to satisfy the official enquiries of Lord Macartney with regard to the nature of these communications.¹

The praise of friends and enemies extorted by the eminent talents and unrivalled energy of Monsieur Suffrein, was tarnished in the course of these operations, by an occurrence which must leave an indelible stain on the memory of that distinguished officer. He had proposed to the English Government, through Monsieur du Chemin, commandant of the troops, a

ber and reached Madras a few days later, Sir Eyre Coote being carried in a palanquin all the way.

¹ In July 1782, it was decided to communicate with Hyder on the matter of the treaty of Salbai, on the terms of which he had not been consulted. Sir Eyre Coote, to whom the negotiations were entrusted, considered that he was acting on behalf of the Bengal Government. Lord Macartney, in the letter from Madras to Bengal dated August 30, 1782, said: "A late plan of Mr. Sullivan's depended much as to its eligibility on a knowledge of Hyder's disposition to refuse or accede to the Mahratta treaty, concluded on the 17th May. At that knowledge we endeavoured to arrive by requesting Sir Eyre Coote to be so obliging as to let us know whether from any later event, he had been able to judge of the present disposition of that chief towards peace, or whether he had received any kind of information from or concerning him, by which we might form an opinion of his intentions to reject or abide by the treaty in which he was included by his allies. But

cartel for the exchange of prisoners ; the dissensions of the time held Lord Macartney to the etiquette of referring the proposition to the commander-in-chief, then absent with the army ; and Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving the reference, expressed his ready concurrence ; desiring however to include in the exchange, the English prisoners in the custody of Hyder, as a member of the allied hostile force, to which he was actually opposed ; which conditions seem to have been rejected by Monsieur Suffrein. Hostile operations rendered the communications extremely precarious, and those relating to the subject of the exchange could not have been conducted through the medium of a flag of truce, as the first letter of Monsieur Du Chemin to Lord Macartney, on that subject, appears never to have reached its destination, and others may have shared a similar fate. However this may be, it is certain that Monsieur Suffrein, shortly before his departure from Cuddalore, on the 1st of August, caused his English prisoners to be delivered to Hyder,* by whom they were marched, chained two and two together, to Mysoor : that Monsieur Motté, the intendant, and several respectable officers and inhabitants of Pondicherry, distinctly announced to

the General, justly enough deeming that the only matters now remaining necessary for our consideration, were such as immediately related to the supply of aids for enabling the army to act, and professing with some degree of humour, his wish to furnish us with every information, keeps back the information we desire on the ground of having communicated whatever occurrences had happened of that nature to your Board, as the only persons who could decide on points of that kind, and in all of which he had acted in a manner strictly conformable to the directions he had received from you." (Barrow: *Life of the Earl of Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 159-160.) It was hardly to be expected that Lord Macartney would accept a position in which he was kept in ignorance of all the negotiations with Hyder, and also it was not probable that Sir Eyre Coote would prove a successful diplomatist. The negotiations proved fruitless.

* They were landed at Cuddalore on the 30th June, and commenced their march as prisoners on the 12th August.

Monsieur Suffrein, and earnestly deprecated, the inhuman treatment to which these unhappy prisoners were destined; and that this Admiral defended the measure on the ground of his having declared to the English Admiral, "that if no exchange took place he should be obliged to keep his prisoners in one of Hyder's forts," or in language more correctly describing the state of the fact, that he would transfer them to the custody of that ally, whose prisoners he refused to include in the exchange: but it is on far other grounds, than a questionable construction of the customary laws of war, among civilized nations, or the imputation of political error, or even the reciprocal accusation of diplomatic subterfuge, that the whole civilized world must unite in its abhorrence, of delivering to the custody of a barbarian, notorious for his contempt of those laws, prisoners of war entitled to honourable treatment from an honourable enemy.¹

¹ It is impossible to justify Admiral Suffren's conduct as regards the handing over of the English prisoners to Hyder. Innes Munro in the *Operations on the Coromandel Coast* blamed the Madras Government for not consenting to the change which the Admiral proposed, and laid the blame on the dissensions between Sir Eyre Coote and the Madras Council. The first communication from Suffren does not appear to have been received. But on the 26th April 1782, Lord Macartney received the proposal for exchange through M. du Chemin, the commandant of the French troops, which was referred to Sir Eyre Coote, who was absent from Madras with the army. Sir Eyre Coote wished that some of the prisoners with Haidar, who were at Seringapatam, should be included in the exchange, and this caused delay in replying to the French. On the 14th of August, the English prisoners who had been landed from the French ships on the 30th June at Cuddalore were sent to Haidar, who sent them on to Mysore. In the *Memoirs of William Hickey, 1782 to 1790*, (p. 59), the explanation, which Admiral Suffren gave to Hickey at Trincomalee in January 1783 is given. He said he twice wrote to Lord Macartney and was insulted by "his insolence and rude silence," that he then addressed Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, who wrote regretting that it was not in his power to promote the desired exchange; Suffren said he again

The daily declining health of Sir Eyre Coote, had compelled him, before his return from the southward, to commit the command of the army to the next in seniority of His Majesty's, as well as the Company's troops, Major-General Stuart*; and in compliance with medical advice, he embarked for the benefit of the sea air, and proceeded to Bengal.¹ The hostile fleets wintered in the ports already noticed; the English army cantoned for the rains, in the neighbourhood of Madras, the French in Cuddalore

wrote to Hughes that he would "be under the disagreeable necessity of handing over the prisoners" to Tipu, and that as he had been treated "with contumely" by Lord Macartney, he desired that no further reference should be made to him. Sir Edward Hughes again wrote that he regretted his inability to treat for the exchange, and begging that Suffren would not adopt his threatened measure of sending the prisoners to Tipu, as he feared that such a step would be worse than condemning the unfortunate men to death. The French Admiral replied that he had no alternative, but would wait for three days to elapse before carrying out his intention. Admiral Suffren then told Hickey that as he understood that the English Admiral had submitted his representations to Lord Macartney without any effect, he was compelled to hand over his prisoners to Tipu. He defended his conduct on the ground that he had no port to receive them on the coast, that he was in great distress for want of provisions, and could not continue to maintain the four or five hundred prisoners he had. The French Admiral's defence of his conduct is certainly not sufficient to justify his conduct, against which a strong protest was raised at the time by several French officers at Cuddalore as repugnant to ordinary humanity. Suffren must have known at the time that Lord Macartney had, just before this, ordered the officer commanding at Negapatnam to release eighteen French surgeons, who had been made prisoners off a French hospital ship which had been captured there, and he might in any case have prevented the English prisoners from being removed from the Madras coast to Mysore. Sir Eyre Coote's delay in coming to a decision was lamentable, but in no way justified the French Admiral in the course he took.

* The same officer who had lost a leg in the battle of Polliloor.

¹ Sir Eyre Coote embarked and sailed in the *Medea* frigate on the 28th September, accompanied by his Assistant Secretary Mr. George Tyler, and Lieutenant-Colonel Owon.

and its vicinity, and Hyder selected for the same purpose, an elevated ground on the left bank of the river Poní, about sixteen miles to the northward of Arcot.

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of Malabar—since the defeat and destruction of the besieging army at Tellicherry—Reduction of Calicut—Arrival of Colonel Humberstone—lands and assumes the command—defeats Hyder's corps under Muckdoom Ali—Plan for the attack of Palgautcherry—Loss of his stores—Moves to Paniani—Mysoreans rally—Second defeat—Colonel Humberstone moves for better cover to Calicut—his measures contrary to the views of the Government of Bombay—and of Sir Eyre Coote—The latter, however, disappointed, directs Colonel Humberstone to remain under the orders of Bombay—and recommends a concentrated effort—Before the communication of these views, was again in motion against Palgaut—Extreme peril of the attempt—Driven back to Paniani with precipitation, by Tippoo and Lally—Arrival of Colonel Macleod—Circumstances which led to this attack—Colonel Macleod strengthens his position at Paniani—Tippoo attacks it—is repulsed—retires to await the arrival of his heavy guns—disappears in consequence of the death of Hyder—Interesting circumstances attending that event—Concealment of his death—His army marches towards the point of Tippoo's approach—Tippoo's first measures—for Malabar—New Governor of Seringapatam—arrives in camp—Succession acknowledged—Resources to which he succeeded—French connexion—Tippoo obliged to depart to the west, before the arrival of Bussy—Dissensions in Madras, consequent on Hyder's death—Animadversions of Mr. Hastings—Madras army at length takes the field—Lord Macartney

assumes the direction of military measures—their character—General Stuart's conduct—Demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash—Offers battle to the French and Mysoreans—Revictuals Vellore—Change of opinion consequent on the departure of Tippoo—Suffrein's early appearance in the upper part of the bay of Bengal, 1783—rendezvous with Bussy at Trincomalee—lands him and his troops at Cuddalore—his grievous disappointment at the departure of Tippoo—English march for the siege of Cuddalore—Sir Eyre Coote embarks at Bengal—chased—agitation—and death—Review of his military character.

THE operations in Coromandel, during the year 1782, deeply important in their aspect, but inconsequent in their effects, have been described without much reference to cotemporary events in Malabar, in order that we may resume, with greater perspicuity, the narrative of occurrences on that coast, subsequent to the relief of Tellicherry, and the destruction of the Mysorean army under Sirdar Khān, in January 1782.

That event had been followed by the early reduction of Calicut, and by the arrival at that place from Bombay of a portion of the armament originally placed under the orders of General Medows,¹ consist-

William Medows, son of Philip Medows or Meadows, was born in 1738, and entered the army at the age of eighteen. From 1760 to 1764 he served in Germany, and subsequently as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the 55th Regiment in the American War, where he distinguished himself at the Battle of Brandywine. In 1778 he took part in the capture of St. Lucia, and two years later he was placed in command of a secret expedition against the Cape. French action preventing the attainment of the desired object, the transports proceeded to India, and arrived at Madras on the 13th February 1782. Medows was with Colonel Fullarton in his operations against Mysore, and was present at the signing of the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784. He was a brave, high-minded, chivalrous soldier. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 401.)

ing of about a thousand men under Colonel Humberstone,¹ who states the force to be now "so scattered and dispersed, that it is hardly possible it can ever be assembled, and so diminished in numbers, from disorders incident to a long voyage; that were it assembled, it would not, without reinforcement, be equal to the plan proposed for it;" which appears to have been a conjunct operation with Sir Edward Hughes's squadron, against the Dutch possessions in Ceylon.² The naval and military officers commanding this portion of the armament, having received the communication from Mr. Sullivan which has been described, and deeming the attempt to reach the opposite coast, while the French were understood to have the superiority at sea, as a precarious undertaking, determined that the troops should be landed at Calicut, in aid of the proposed diversion, and that the ships should return to Bombay, in furtherance of the same design. Colonel Humberstone, as senior officer, assumed also the command of the troops which had hitherto served under Major Abington, and being

Colonel Humberstone (or Humberstone Mackenzie) had arrived from England at Calicut with the 100th Regiment and part of the 98th.

² Commodore Johnstone, who was sent out to the Cape in 1781, convoyed ten East Indiamen and a large body of troops, including the 100th Foot under Lieutenant-Colonel Humberstone. When Johnstone returned to England, he sent on the *Hero*, *Monmouth* and *Iris* under Commodore Almo with the transports, having the troops on board, to Bombay. Commodore Almo selected his best sailing transports with 700 of the 98th Regiment, under Fullarton and General Medows, and pushed on to join Admiral Hughes at Madras. The rest of the transports and troops went on to Bombay and arrived there early in February 1782. From there they sailed for the Madras coast; but Lieutenant-Colonel Humberstone, who was in command, thinking that, if he attempted to get round to Madras, he would probably fall into the hands of the French, disembarked his troops at Calicut on the west coast of Madras on the 18th February 1782; viz., part of the 98th Regiment, the 100th Regiment and four independent companies: in all, about one thousand men.

joined by a body of Nairs, anxious to emerge from a long and cruel subjugation, he moved about twenty miles to the southward, and close to Tricalore,¹ came in contact with Hyder's detachment under Muckdoom Ali, already adverted to.* That officer, confident in superior numbers, estimated at seven thousand, waited the result of an action, in a strong but most injudicious position, with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right: from this position he was dislodged, and the retreat by the left being interrupted by a judicious movement of the English troops, a large portion of the Mysorean right was driven into the river, with a loss in killed alone, estimated by Colonel Humberstone, at between three and four hundred men; and among that number, Muckdoom Ali, their commander: 200 prisoners, and 150 horses were secured; and the total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, may thus be estimated at from 1,500 to 2,000 men, while that of the English was inconsiderable. April 7.

Colonel Humberstone followed the route of the fugitives as far as Andicota,² but finding pursuit unavailing, he resumed his plan of proceeding to the attack of Palgautcherry, by the river Paniani,³ which passing near to that fort, discharges itself into the sea at a town of the same name with the river, distant about sixty miles; and is navigable for boats to distances fluctuating with the season, but sometimes for 30 miles. While moving southward for that purpose, and waiting the arrival of the boats which conveyed his stores, a violent gale of wind,

¹ *Tricalore*.—Trikkalayur, about 16 miles east of Calicut on the Beypore river.

* Page 122.

² I cannot trace this place. It may be Angadipuram, about 20 miles south of Trikkalayur. All this part of the country is hilly, covered with forest, and the home of the Moplahs.

³ *Paniani*.—Ponnani, river and town. The town is about 35 miles south of Calicut, at the mouth of the river. Palghat is about 50 miles east of Ponnani, south of the river.

April 17 attended with five days incessant rain, dispersed the boats, spoiled the provisions, and damaged the ammunition; and the soldiers from exposure to the inclemency of the season becoming sickly, he was induced, as soon as the violence of the weather would allow, to march his troops to the towns of Tanoor,¹ and Paniani. During these events, the Mysoreans rallied at Ramgerry,² a place situated about half way from the coast to Palgautcherry, whence detachments of cavalry were advanced for the usual purposes of annoyance. Colonel Humberstone, being himself seriously indisposed, directed Major Campbell in an interval of fair weather, to advance towards the

May 18. enemy, who again waited the attack in an injudicious position, and were defeated with the loss of two guns. Experience of the nature of the season already commenced, compelled Colonel Humberstone to seek for better cover to shelter his troops during the monsoon, and he availed himself of the first favourable interval to return to Calicut, after a short course of operations, highly creditable to his energies as an executive military officer, but founded on views neither sufficiently matured nor combined by the Governments who were to supply the means necessary to the execution of the service, and finally undertaken at an improper season.

In contemplating the policy of such diversions, the Government of Bombay were wisely of opinion, that no middle course was expedient between measures purely defensive on that coast, and an armament capable not only of penetrating into the interior, but maintaining its communications. Previously to the departure of Colonel Humberstone from Bombay, the Government had distinctly objected to a project which he had suggested for employing the troops under his command in the reduction of Mangalore or

¹ *Tanoor*.—Tanur, a town on the coast about 15 miles north of Ponnani.

² *Ramgerry*.—Ramagiri Kotta.

Cochin, and urged his proceeding to Madras where the reinforcement was expected. The operations which have been described are therefore to be viewed as resulting from a coincidence of circumstances, and not the effect of digested measures, for we shall hereafter have occasion to see that the combinations which might have rendered them safe and efficient were never practically adopted. On receiving intelligence however of his landing at Calicut and sending back the ships, although the Government of Bombay state this determination to have "disconcerted their measures," they nevertheless resolved "to take the proper means to assist him;" afterwards however expressing their regret that "while General Coote is July 2. in want of every European we can collect, as appears by the Madras letter received the 13th ultimo, the force under Colonel Humberstone should be shut up at Calicut in the utmost distress for many necessary articles; in no situation to render any service to the public; and out of the reach of support or supply from hence at this season of the year."

Sir Eyre Coote, however, judiciously converting his own disappointment with regard to this reinforcement, into the means of effecting a secure diversion, placed Colonel Humberstone under the orders of the Government of Bombay, recommending to them such a concentrated and powerful attack on Hyder's western possessions, as should have the effect of compelling him to return for their defence, and thus leave his French allies in Coromandel to their own separate resources. Before, however, these measures could be matured, or the season could admit of conveying to Colonel Humberstone the requisite orders for his guidance, that officer was again in motion for the prosecution of his original design. The river Paniani afforded conveyance for his stores, as far as the post of Tirtalla 30 miles inland, and he soon afterwards obtained possession of Ramgerry, a Sept. 21. place of some capability five miles farther up the

- Sept. 28. river. Fortunately the extreme peril of the expedition was here tempered by the consequences of local inexperience, and apparently inadequate means of communication with the natives; he describes himself to be "ignorant of the road and situation of the country, and could place little dependence on the information of the Nairs," natives of that part of the country, and deeply interested in his success: he consequently determined to leave under the protection of a battalion of sepoys at Ramgerry, the whole of his battering train and heavy equipments, and
- Oct. 11 marched with six six-pounders, two one-pounders, and the remainder of his force "to reconnoitre the country and fortress of Palgautcherry, before he
18. should undertake to attack it." The remains of the Mysorean troops appeared to make a stand in a position not far from the place, but suffered themselves to be easily dislodged, and retreated into the fort. The Colonel proceeded under cover of his troops, to reconnoitre the southern and western works; he moved on the ensuing day to the northward of the fort, and after finding by a complete examination, that it was "every where much stronger
21. than he had reason to apprehend," he returned to his first ground to the westward of the place, but in this movement, a judicious and well-timed sortie produced the loss of nearly the whole of his provisions, and the discomfiture of all his Nairs, who seem to have gone off in a panic, in consequence of being attacked in a morass during a thick fog. On the ensuing day he fell back to a little place named Mangaricota, eight miles distant, where he had left some provisions. An attack in force upon his rear repelled with judgment and spirit, was of less importance than the distress sustained by rains, which fell
24. from the 21st to the 24th, with as great violence, as during any period of the monsoon, and rendered, impassable, for several hours, a rivulet in his rear. It appears by letters, not officially recorded, that on

the 10th Nov. he received at Mangaricota, orders Nov. from Bombay to return to the coast: he commenced his march for that purpose on the 12th. On the 12. 14th, he was at Ramgerry, about half way from 14. Palgaut to the coast. A chasm occurs in the materials which the* public records afford from the 30th of October till the 19th of November, when Colonel 19. Macleod, who had been sent by Sir Eyre Cooto to assume the command, landed at Paniani. "On the 20th, Colonel Humberstone,† with his whole force 20. came in, having made a rapid retreat before Tippoo and Lally, who followed him by forced marches with a very superior force;" the last march being from Tirtalla 30 miles. The public dispatches are silent with regard to his numbers, and the fate of the battering train; but the circumstances which led to this attack are better ascertained.

After the defeat of Muckdoom Ali, Hyder had made all the requisite arrangements for endeavouring to repair that misfortune as soon as the season should permit. Tippoo's usual command, including the corps of Monsieur Lally, had been reinforced and improved, and towards the close of the rains in Malabar, affected to be meditating some blow in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, in order that when the state of the season and of the roads should be reported favourable, and above all when Colonel Humberstone should have advanced a sufficient distance from the coast, Tippoo might be enabled, by a few forced marches to come unexpectedly upon him. The receipt of orders from Bombay for his return to the coast, considered by himself as a public misfortune, may be deemed the efficient cause of the preservation of the troops under his command. Tippoo commenced his forced march from the vicinity of Caroor, in the confidence of finding Colonel Humberstone at Mangaricota, advancing his stores

* The intermediate dates are derived from unofficial letters.

† Letter from Colonel Macleod, 29th November.

for the siege of Palgaut. Tippoo arrived at the latter place on the 16th,* when his enemy had receded to Ramgerry: it was not however until the 18th, at night, that he had any intelligence which satisfied him of the necessity of retreat at four o'clock on the ensuing morning; but from an official neglect to send the order to a picquet of one hundred and fifty men, stationed at the extraordinary distance of three miles, five hours were lost; incessantly harrassed and cannonaded throughout the day, he attempted, without success, to pursue his route on the right bank of the river, which was not fordable, but found himself stopped by impenetrable swamps. The early part of the night was passed in anxious search for a practicable ford, and at length one was found so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin; yet by clinging together in silence, the tall assisting the short, the whole got across without the loss of a man. Tippoo, supposing the river to be every where impassable, employed the night in making dispositions for destroying his enemy in the snare in which he supposed him to be entrapped; but by day-light on the 20th the detachment had performed the largest portion of the march, and was only overtaken within two miles of Paniani. The hope of intercepting him was thus frustrated by an unexpected event, but Tippoo determined to persevere in the attack.

Colonel Macleod, on examining his position at Paniani, began to strengthen it by some field works, and on the 25th attempted to surprise Tippoo's camp by night, an enterprise from which he desisted, on forcing a picquet, and discovering regular military arrangements and a strong position. On the morning of the 29th, before day, the field works being still unfinished, Tippoo attempted the strong, but

* The dates are given on the authority mentioned in the preceding page, and do not exactly correspond with those of *Memoirs of the War in Asia*.

weakly occupied position of Colonel Macleod, by a well designed attack in four columns, one of them headed by Lally's corps; but such was the vigilance, discipline, and energy of the English troops, that the more advanced picquets were merely driven in on the outposts, not one of which was actually forced, support to the most vulnerable having been skilfully provided, and Monsieur Lally's corps having fortunately been met by the strongest, each column, before it could penetrate farther, was impetuously charged with the bayonet. The errors incident to operations by night divided the columns, but the English tactic was uniform. A single company of Europeans did not hesitate to charge with the bayonet a column of whatever weight, without knowing or calculating numbers. Monsieur Lally's dispositions were excellent if the quality of the troops had been equal, a pretension which could only be claimed by a portion of one column out of the four, and the attempt ended in total discomfiture and confusion, the Mysoreans leaving on the field two hundred men killed, and carrying off about a thousand wounded: the loss of the English was forty-one Europeans, and forty-seven sepoy killed and wounded, including eight officers.

Sir Edward Hughes proceeding with his squadron from Madras to Bombay, came in sight of the Nov. 30. place on the ensuing day;¹ and on learning the circumstances in which the troops were placed, offered to Colonel Macleod the alternative of receiving them on board, or reinforcing him with 450 Europeans. He adopted the latter, from considering that while Tippoo should remain in his front, the small body under his command could not be better employed, than in occupying the attention of so

¹ Hughes sailed from Madras in the middle of October. Lord Macartney protested against Madras being left without the protection of the fleet, while the French squadron was in Trincomalee.

large a portion of the enemy's army; and that while at Paniani, he was equally prepared as at any other part of the coast, to embark and join the concentrated force which he knew to be preparing at Bombay. The return furnished by Colonel Macleod, to the Commander-in-chief at Madras, of his total number, after receiving from Sir Edward Hughes the reinforcement of 450 men, was, Europeans 800, English sepoy 1000, Travancorean troops 1200, shewing that the number of Europeans engaged in the late encounter were fewer than 400 men; and as he had been accompanied in landing by 40 men, the number with which Colonel Humberstone returned to Paniani could not have exceeded 300 men, out of the thousand with which he had landed in the preceding February.

Dec. 12. Tippoo, after this ineffectual attempt, retired to a farther distance, to wait the arrival of his heavy equipments, in order to resume the attack on the position at Paniani: but on the 12th of December, the swarm of light troops, which had continued to watch the English position, was invisible; and successive reports confirmed the intelligence, that the whole Mysorean force was proceeding by forced marches to the eastward, whither our narrative must return.

The health of Hyder during the course of this year, had begun perceptibly to decline, and in the month of November, symptoms appeared of a disease (unknown as far as I am informed in Europe) named by the Hindoos *Raj-pôra* (or the royal sore or boil) from its being, or supposed to be, peculiar to persons of rank; and by the Mahomedans, *Sertân* or *Kher-cheng*, the crab, from the imaginary resemblance to that animal, of the swelling behind the neck, or the upper portion of the back, which is the first indication of this disorder.* The united efforts of Hindoo,

* A surgeon, in performing the operation of opening one of these imposthumes, many years afterwards, happened to have a scratch on one of his fingers, which was accidentally touched by

Mahomedan, and French physicians, made no impression on this fatal disease, and he expired on the 7th of December.¹ It is deemed by the Mahomedans a remarkable coincidence, that the numerical letters, composing the words *Hyder Aly Khan Behauder*, correspond with the year of his death (1197, Hc.)² and the epitaph on his mausoleum, at the Lall Baug, on the island of Seringapatam, is founded on this coincidence, as are all Mahomedan epitaphs, on some particular words, whose numerical powers correspond with the date of decease.

The official situations of Poornea and Kishen Row, two bramins of opposite sects, but corresponding principles, who directed the measures of state on this important occasion, can scarcely be described by corresponding English terms. Hyder himself, being the head of every department, and signing the order for every disbursement, the business of the treasury and exchequer was conducted in two dufters or departments, independent of each other, and meant as a reciprocal check, but parallel and similar in their details, with little other difference, than that

the virus of the wound; and the author had the opportunity of seeing the alarming livid swellings which for some time afterwards successively appeared and subsided, on his hands, arms, and forehead.

¹ Haider died in his camp at Narsingh Rayanapot, near Chittoor, on the 7th December 1782.

² The year of Haider's death was Hijri 1195. The process called *abjad*, in which every letter has a numerical value, gives in this case the following:—

(Arabic letter) <i>H</i> =	8	Arabic guttural <i>a</i> =	1
<i>ai</i> =	10	<i>n</i> =	50
<i>da</i> =	4	<i>ba</i> =	2
<i>r</i> =	200	<i>h</i> =	5
(Arabic <i>ain</i>) <i>A</i> =	70	<i>a</i> =	1
<i>l</i> =	80	<i>du</i> =	4
<i>i</i> =	10	<i>r</i> =	200
Arabic guttural <i>kh</i> =	600		

1,195

(Lewis Bowring: *Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 105)

one was conducted in the Mahratta, and the other in the Canarese language, the latter under Poornea, the former under Kishen Row.

It was Poornea's suggestion, when the recovery of Hyder became improbable, that his death should be concealed, as the only possible means of exercising the authority necessary to keep the army together, until the arrival of Tippoo. This project was accordingly concerted with Kishen Row, and with the public officers and domestics, to whom the event must necessarily be known. Immediately after his decease, the body was deposited in a large chest, filled with *abeer*, (a powder composed of various fragrant substances,) and sent off from camp, in the same manner as valuable chests of plunder were usually dispatched, to Seringapatam; and the confidential persons directing the escort, were ordered to deposit their charge at the tomb of his father at Colar.* Successive couriers were at the same time dispatched to Tippoo, to apprise him of the event, and of the consequent measures, and to recommend his joining with all possible dispatch.

The whole of the arrangements of the army, the weekly relief of the 2000 horse which constantly hung round Madras, the issue of pay, the adjustment of military accounts, the answers to letters received from the envoys of the different courts, and all the

* It was afterwards removed by Tippoo's orders to the superb mausoleum, still endowed by the English at Seringapatam; and on that occasion 40,000 pagodas were disbursed in charity, and to the priesthood, for offering up prayers, with views similar to those of the Romish masses, for the souls of the deceased. The removal of the body furnishes an occasion for noticing a determined belief among Mahommedans of the south of India, (whether elsewhere the author has not ascertained,) almost miraculous for its absurdity, in opposition to evidence equally accessible to the ignorant and the wise; that a body committed in due form *to the charge of the earth*, will, without any previous embalming, or other preparation, remain uncorrupted for any length of time, until re-assumed by the person who had deposited the charge.

business of the state, went on as usual. The principal officers of the army, and the foreign envoys made their daily enquiries, and were answered that Hyder, although extremely weak, was in a state of slow, but progressive amendment. The French physicians, sent from Cuddalore to attend him, on the first serious symptoms, had, of course, conveyed to Monsieur Cossigny, who now commanded the troops, confidential intelligence of the whole proceeding. The first impression on that officer's mind was that of immediately marching with all his force, to watch over the interests of his nation, and guard the succession, until Tippoo's arrival; and it was with great difficulty, and after a pecuniary advance on account of subsidy, to prove the sincerity of the persons administering the provisional government, that he was prevailed on by the Mysorean envoy at Cuddalore to abandon a design which would have frustrated all their measures; and after moving a few marches by the route of Ginjee, he forbore to approach, but held his troops ready to march at a moment's notice.

The most trusty chiefs of the army were successively, and without any circumstances to excite suspicion, admitted into Hyder's tent, for the purpose of communicating the plan which had been adopted; all on their return to their respective corps made the concerted reports of the state of his health, and all were faithful to their trust, excepting *Mahommed Ameen*, the son of Ibraheem Saheb, and cousin-german to the deceased. This chief, who commanded 4,000 stable horse, formed a project with Shems-u-Deen (Buckshee) to cut off the persons provisionally exercising the powers of Government, to seize the treasury, and proclaim Abd-ul-Kerreem, Hyder's second son, a person of defective intellect, as a pageant who would permit them to exercise the Government in his name. It was necessary to the execution of this design, that it should be communicated to certain ressaldars (officers commanding battalions), and

a French officer named Boudenot, who commanded a troop of 100 French cavalry, attached as an honorary guard to head quarters, associated himself in their plans. The intelligence of this conspiracy was not long concealed from Poornca, who sent for the French officer to Hyder's tent, where being confronted with some of the rcssaldars who had spontaneously revealed the plot, he confessed the whole design on the previous promise of personal security. *Mahommed Ameen*, and Shems-u-Deen were then sent for, on pretence of consultation, and finding it in vain to equivocate, confessed the whole. The disposal of these persons was managed with corresponding address; they were put in irons, and sent off publicly under a strong guard, as if by Hyder's personal orders, for having entered into a conspiracy to overturn the Government in the expectation of his death.

On the 16th day after his decease, the army marched in the direction of Tippoo's approach. The closed palankeen of Hyder with the accustomed retinue, issued at the usual hour from the canvas enclosure of his tents; and the march was performed in the ordinary manner, observing of course the proper attentions, not to disturb the patient in the palankeen; and a few similar marches brought the army to the appointed rendezvous at Chuckmaloor, on the river Pennaar; an intermediate situation between Cuddalore and the pass of Changama, for the convenience of communicating with the French, or of moving to the westward, if that determination should become necessary; and the junction of the French troops was effected in the same encampment a few days after Tippoo's arrival.

Suspicious of Hyder's death had from the first been whispered about the camp with various and fluctuating credit. But it soon became evident, as well to those who believed, as those who were inclined to discredit the report, that whatever might be the state of the fact, the Government was in vigorous

hands, and that obedience was the safest course. Notwithstanding the appearances which have been stated, there were few persons in the army who were not now satisfied of Hyder's death; but the examples which had been made, restrained the disaffected within the bounds of order.

Tippoo received his first dispatches on the afternoon of the 11th, and abandoning for the present all operations in Malabar was in full march to the eastward on the morning of the 12th. At Coimbetoor he met Arshed Beg Khân, who a short time before Hyder's death had been sent, in the expectation of Tippoo's success and early return, to assume the Government of Malabar; and that officer was ordered to remain on the defensive at Palgautcherry. At the same place he made a selection for the Government of the capital which seemed to afford a favourable earnest of steady gratitude and attachment; *Seyed Mahommed* the associate and protector of his youth who had saved his life in the battle of Chercoolec, and had up to this period, from the unaccountable jealousy of Hyder, continued to serve as a simple horseman in Tippoo's personal guard: and the battalion of Assud Khân, an experienced and trusty officer, was assigned as the escort of the new governor. Tippoo on considering his distance* from the capital and the army, avowed to Seyed Mahommed his despair of an unopposed succession, and gave him two distinct commissions, one to serve under the commandant of Seringapatam, the other to supersede him. The actual commandant was named *Shitamb*, a Chêla, (slave) a description of persons in whom Hyder, in conformity to the views already explained,† appears for some time past to have placed the most

* The distance from his camp at Paniani, may, on a rough estimate, be stated at from 380 to 400 miles, and the dromedary courier, who brought the first intelligence, must have travelled about 100 miles a day, for four successive days.

† Vol. i. p. 742.

unlimited reliance; and it was not until a month had elapsed, and satisfactory intelligence had arrived from the army, that Seyed Mahommed* found it prudent to produce his second commission.

Tippoo's marches in the early part of his route were of course the longest that his troops could support. On his nearer approach to the army they became gradually shorter, for the purpose of sending confidential messengers and receiving reports. He particularly prohibited the usual procession to go out in advance and receive him;† and declining even the compliment of turning out the line, entered the camp in a private manner after sunset.

783. Arrived at his father's tent, he made the most ample acknowledgments to the persons who had conducted during this most critical interval the charge of public affairs; and particularly to Poornea, who had first suggested the arrangement. On the same evening he gave audience to all the principal officers of his army, seated on a plain carpet; declining to ascend the musnud,‡ from an affectation of grief, by which no one was deceived.

an. 2. The actual strength of the Mysorean armies in the field, at the time of Hyder's death, exclusively of garrisons and provincial troops, but including a new levy of 5000 horse raised on the northern frontier, subsequently to the intelligence of the Mah-ratta peace, was, according to the return of actual payments made by Poornea as treasurer, 88,000;§ it will be recollected that the strength with which he

* The personal information of Seyed Mahommed.

† Technically designated by the Arabic term *istekbal*, which is literally translated by the French idiom *aller au devant*; it is so common that every public officer of rank, on approaching a village, is met at some distance by an *istekbal* of the villagers.

‡ The elevated seat, or cushion, occupied by the prince, or person in authority.

§ The best military officers of Mysoor, estimate 120,000, but the difference between estimated and effective strength, is familiarly known.

entered that country was 83,000, but the corps of Meer Saheb, then on its route from Kurpa was not included in the number: these authentic statements, so nearly corresponding to each other, are merely intended to correct the exaggerated estimates hitherto published: and it may be added, for the purpose of illustrating the nature of the resources to which Tippoo succeeded, that the treasury at Seringapatam contained at this period, three crores of rupees, (three millions sterling) in cash, besides an accumulated booty of jewels and valuables, in Poornea's language, to a countless amount.

The measures to be adopted by the united French and Mysorean armies, necessarily depended on an enlarged view of the probable events on the western, as well as on the eastern coast; of the latter, the early arrival of Monsieur Bussy was most important; and until that event, it was deemed most prudent to postpone any distant operations, which might interfere with his plan of the campaign. But before the occurrence of this long expected arrival, the alarming aspect of intelligence from the western coast, and the actual capture of Bednoor, was represented as imposing on Tippoo the absolute necessity of proceeding in person, for the preservation of his own dominions; in spite of the brilliant results which might be anticipated* from waiting with his main strength, the certain and early co-operation of Monsieur Bussy, and sending a respectable detachment, for the purpose of a defensive war in his western possessions. It was accordingly resolved, that Monsieur Cossigny, with a French regiment, March 1. should accompany the Mysorean army, to the westward, and that a respectable division† of Tippoo's

* Tippoo represents the proposition of first taking Madras, as a matter of course, and then Bednoor, as a gasconade, by which he was not to be deluded.

† Stated by Budr-u-Zemân Khân, who commanded the infantry, at 3000 horse, 4000 infantry, and 5000 peons.

army, under Seyed Saheb, should be left to co-operate with Monsieur Bussy.

The cotemporary events on either coast will perhaps be rendered most intelligible by continuing for the present the affairs of Coromandel, leaving the operations on the western coast, which terminated this eventful war, to be afterwards resumed in one unbroken narrative.

The rumour of Hyder's death, prevalent in his own camp even before his actual decease, was circulated in every other direction with the same shades of fluctuating credit. But two days after the event, it was reported by the commandant of Vellore to the Government of Madras, as a fact on which he placed reliance; and from every other source of intelligence, the same impressions were received. The well-known condition of every Asiatic army on the death of the prince, aggravated in the present instance by the absence of the heir apparent, furnished an opportunity of presenting a point of support to the intriguing or disaffected, which seldom fails to effect the dismemberment of the army, and ought not to have been neglected by an enemy possessing common energy or wisdom. The immediate march of the English army, however defective its preparations, and however unfavourable the season, was earnestly and urgently pressed on General Stuart by the authority of his Government. He answered his immediate superiors, that he "did not believe that Hyder was dead, and if he were, the army would be ready for every action in proper time;" and on repeating, some days afterwards, their conviction of the fact, the undoubted intelligence of the consternation which prevailed in the enemy's army, and the consequent importance of moving; he answered the same superiors that he "was astonished there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy," in the actual state of the army and the country; although in a preceding controversy, on

the 17th of November, a resolution of the council of which he was a member declared that "the army on its present establishment ought to be at all times ready to move," and the General assured the members, that "upon any real emergency, the army might and must move and would be ready to do so:" a pledge obviously lax and imprudent, under the circumstances of famine which divided the army and its equipments during the monsoon; but which either ought not to have been given, or ought to have been effectually redeemed on the real emergency of the death of Hyder. The unqualified condemnation of one party, in an unhappy controversy which embraced almost every point of military policy, must not be deemed to imply an unqualified approbation of the other party; of whose conduct and opinions it affords no favourable impression, that they complained of counteraction from all authorities with which they were in any way connected. "Records (say the Government of Bengal on this subject) of laborious altercation, invective, and mutual complaint, are no satisfaction to the public in compensation for a neglect that may cost millions, and upon a field where immense sums had been expended to maintain our footing;"* and in a subsequent letter.† "In reply to our desire of unambiguous explanation on a subject of such public concern (viz. the imputed counteraction) you favour us with a collected mass of complaint, and invective against this Government, against the nabob of Arcot and his ministers; against the Commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, against the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's fleet, against your own provincial Commander-in-chief, and again against this Government. Had you been pleased, in so general a charge of impeachment, to take cognizance of the co-operative support which

* 11th March, 1783.

† 24th March, 1783, a performance of infinite force, and worthy of perusal, even as a specimen of literary talent.

was till of late withheld from you by the presidency of Bombay, your description of the universal misconduct of the managers of the public affairs in India (the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George excepted) would have been complete." After a dignified reprobation of the temerity of persons in their situation, coming forward as censors of the state, to criminate a superior government, and the conduct of the naval and military commanders in chief: the letter proceeds: "Honours thus detracted, suit not the detractors, nor can they for a moment cover their mismanagement: no artifice of reasoning, no perversion of distorted quotation, no insinuations of delinquency, no stings covered with compliment, no mechanism of the arts of sophistry, can strip Sir Edward Hughes and Sir Eyre Coote, of the glory of having, in repeated and well fought days, defeated the powerful invaders of the Carnatic, on the ocean and the field:" and again, "the reputation which you would wish to ascribe to yourselves particularly, is not founded upon what you have done, but on what you are prevented from doing: your management from the time of Sir Eyre Coote's departure from the coast, at a crisis the most favourable for recovering the Carnatic, and when you had the unparticipated conduct of the war, with an increased army, and the most liberal supplies, your management at such a period, when your efforts have only produced the destruction of three of your own forts,"* &c. &c. &c. These extracts are presented, for the purpose of enabling the reader to form his own reflections on the scene before him; and none shall at present be obtruded on his notice, except that, in so advanced a period of civilization and knowledge, the existence of a constitution of civil and military government, containing in its very structure the elements of discord, insubordination,

* Negapatam, Carangoly, Wandewash.

and inefficiency, furnishes mournful evidence of the slow and difficult progress of practical wisdom.

In effect, the English army made its first march for the purpose of advancing provisions to its first intermediate depôt, (Tripassore,) exactly thirteen days Jan. 15. after Tippoo's arrival and succession had been quietly proclaimed, in the united camps; and did not make its first march of departure, for the attainment of any of the objects of the campaign, until thirty-four days after that event, and sixty days after the death of Hyder. After the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney, assuming the direction of the ensuing campaign, and assigning only the execution to his provincial Commander-in-chief, repeatedly called on that officer, to submit a plan of operations, for the approval of Government, and successively complaining of reserve, and the absence of a specific project, proceeded to propose his own. Offensive operations were little in the contemplation of either, and the reserve of Major-General Stuart, might have been defended in the words ascribed to the greatest captain of this, or perhaps of any age, when pressed by the British cabinet for a plan of operations, "tell me what the enemy will do, and I will tell you what I will do." Of Lord Macartney's political and military plans, it has been seen that his Superior Government expressed no approbation. In policy it was imputed as an error, that he pressed negotiations for peace, with an anxiety which counteracted his own object, by impressing on the enemy his incapacity to continue the war; an error peculiarly dangerous in India, but referable to a principle so incontestably ascertained in all ages, and in all countries, as to extend its operation, not alone to political measures, but to the ordinary transactions of life; for even in those it is peculiarly known, that an urgent desire in any person to obtain, what another has to bestow at an optional price, is the direct means of raising the amount or conditions of that price. Of his military

plans, the demolition of three of his own forts, which Sir Eyre Coote had anxiously desired to preserve, was considered an erroneous branch; and of the remainder it was objected, that they proposed a dangerous dispersion of force, into separate expeditions, too weak to resist a powerful attack, and too distant for reciprocal support.

General Stuart employed the greater part of the month of February in the demolition of the forts of Carangoly and Wandewash, and while in the vicinity of the latter place offered battle to the united forces of the French and the Mysoreans, then encamped within twelve miles of the place: the invitation was not accepted, although Tippoo in his narrative of the transaction expresses disappointment at the retirement of the English, when he had concerted with the French the plan of an united attack. A large portion of the month of March was occupied in conveying to Vellore a fresh supply of provisions, an operation in which the English army was not interrupted, because in the first week of that month, Tippoo had already ascended the western passes in consequence of the intelligence of the capture of Bednore, having previously destroyed the works of Arcot, and every remaining post in that territory deemed worth the expence of demolition, with the exception of Arnee, which was still preserved as a dépôt for the division under Seyed Saheb, left to co-operate with the French at Cuddalore. It appears that General Stuart had concurred in the expediency of that part of Lord Macartney's plans which involved the demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash, but in less than three weeks after the accomplishment of that object, on the first and still doubtful intelligence of Tippoo's departure, and on recurring to their infinite importance in the scheme of warfare which must consequently ensue, he had the candour to express his regret at that precipitate measure: and yet the departure of Tippoo either was not, or ought not to

have been an unforeseen event, inasmuch as the diversion under General Matthews on the western coast, to which all the Governments had attached the greatest importance, was professedly undertaken for the purpose, (which seemed to have been forgotten), of drawing the Mysorean from his offensive operations in Coromandel, to the defence of his own dominions.

The operations now to be undertaken against the French force at Cuddalore, were necessarily dependent on the return of Sir Edward Hughes from Bombay: and the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements, considerably preceded that event.¹ In the meanwhile, Monsieur Suffrein had appeared at the head of the bay of Bengal, and captured a considerable number of vessels; laden with rice, to supply the necessities of Madras. The energy of Mr. Hastings, had however, in the intermediate time, enabled him to dispatch to that place, a store sufficient for all the exigencies of the army, but not for a crowded population, increased by new fugitives, from the lately desolated countries. It became necessary, in consequence, to remove, under proper protection, the great mass of this population, to the provinces north of Madras, and chiefly to Nellore, where each successive journey northwards, afforded increasing plenty: but after the adoption of this indispensable measure, a population still greatly exceeding the actual supply, presented on every successive morning the mournful spectacle, of numerous dead bodies, on the esplanade, and in the public roads and streets, to be removed for interment by the daily care of the police.

Monsieur Suffrein, having accomplished the chief purposes in his contemplation, on the northern coast, and having left some cruizers to pursue the same

¹ Count de Bussy arrived off the coast with 2,500 men in March 1783. Sir Edward Hughes came to Madras from Bombay in May 1783.

object; calculating on the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes at Madras, at a much earlier period than it actually occurred, and having objects in view to be accomplished before he should seek a naval action, proceeded to his rendezvous, with Monsieur Bussy, at Trincomalee, without looking into the roads at Madras, where he would have either captured or destroyed a considerable number of merchant ships. Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements from the Isle of France, joined him at Trincomalee, whence he proceeded, without delay, to land the troops at

Mar. 17. their ultimate destination, while still uninterrupted by Sir Edward Hughes. The numerous disappointments and reverses have already been noticed, by which the able plans of Monsieur Bussy had hitherto been either frustrated or delayed. On reaching his ultimate destination, with a force probably less than one-fourth of the number required by his original calculations; he had the farther mortification to learn that Hyder was no more; and that the army with which he expected to co-operate, had departed to a far distant country. Still the operations of that army were directed against the common enemy; and however mortifying the contrast of the actual and expected scene—of the existing combinations, and those which his eminent talents would have framed; he had no alternative, but to abide by the event, and make the best use in his power of the slender means remaining at his disposal. Monsieur Suffrein, having opportunely effected the operation of landing the troops and stores at Cuddalore, returned for farther refitment to Trincomalee; from which place, on the evening of the day he entered the harbour, he saw the English fleet pursuing their route to Madras.

April 10. All the requisite measures having been concerted with Sir Edward Hughes, the army* under General Stuart commenced its march from the second stage

* I find the following statement of its strength on the 29th January :—

beyond Madras, towards Cuddalore, on the 21st of April; almost every individual anxiously expecting the arrival of their venerated Commander-in-chief, who had improved in health by his voyage to Bengal, and had announced his approaching return, accompanied by a large supply of money, with the confidence of bringing to a speedy termination a war, which for the first time in its progress, opened a gleam of reasonable hope. Sir Eyre Coote embarked for this purpose in the armed ship *Resolution*, belonging to the Company, and, unfortunately, towards the close of the voyage, was chased for two days and nights by some French ships of the line. Justly conscious of the deep and irreparable wound which the country would sustain, in being deprived of his services at this critical juncture, the General's anxiety kept him constantly on deck. The influence of excessive heat by day, the dews of night, and above all, extreme agitation of mind during a long period, in which escape appeared improbable, produced a relapse of complaints, rather palliated than cured. The ship with its pecuniary treasure got safe to Madras; but April 26 its most precious freight was lost to the state. Sir Eyre Coote expired two days after his arrival.

Viewing the career of this great man as that of a soldier merely, his character may be deemed as faultless as any that history presents; and if the pressure of years and disease had latterly impaired his physical powers, and even disturbed that mental composure which gave so much of force, and of grace,

Europeans	2945
Natives	11,545

Total ... 14,490

Part of a reinforcement from England, which arrived on the 15th of April, followed and joined him; I cannot ascertain the exact amount, but it probably did not make his effective force in Europeans before Cuddalore to exceed 3500 men.

[According to Innes Munro the British numbers were: Europeans 1,660, sepoys 8,340, and cavalry 1,000.]

and of moral influence, to the virtues of his mature life; still, in his last decline, the lowest comparative estimate would place him, with a measureless interval between, above any that the scene presented to supply his place. It may be inferred, from the most superficial observation of the conduct of states, that the degree in which a cabinet ought to direct the operations of the field, has not yet become a settled point in the military policy of nations; and among the various shades of opinion, arising from national habits and constitutions of government, the question can never be totally independent of the personal character of those, who preside over the several branches of public administration. In ascribing therefore to Sir Eyre Coote the nearest imaginable approach to perfection as a soldier, we must be considered to speak of qualities exclusively military: for, if in the requisites of a great general, invested with the powers necessary for giving effect to great talents be included, as they ought, the highest attributes of the statesman, it were injurious to the memory of Sir Eyre Coote, to bring his character, however eminent, to a test from which it must recede.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Want of harmony between the Government of Madras and General Stuart—Description of the fort and vicinity of Cuddalore—General Stuart unexpectedly takes a position to the south—Monsieur Bussy assumes and fortifies a corresponding position—daily becoming more formidable—Attack of this position—Serious contest—and its results—The French retire into Cuddalore—Original misapprehension at Madras, regarding the nature and extent of this service—Reciprocal want of confidence regarding the junction of the southern army—French fleet under Suffrein, appears on the day of the action—Sir E. Hughes covers Cuddalore—quits his station, which is seized by Suffrein—who is reinforced by Bussy, and sails to meet the English fleet—Action—Ostensible superiority and real inferiority of the English—Fleet crippled—Suffrein attains his object—and resumes his station before Cuddalore—Lands a reinforcement of seamen—Monsieur Bussy makes a vigorous sortie—entirely unsuccessful,—Capture of the Crown Prince of Sweden—The force under General Stuart not equal to the service undertaken—Bussy, superior in numbers, determines to march out and attack his camp—General Stuart assuming the tone of being abandoned by his government, determines to abide the result—Crisis averted, by the intelligence of peace, and the arrival of a flag of truce—Commissioners from Madras settle a convention with Monsieur Bussy—Its relation to Tippoo—His intermediate operations.

FROM the specimen which has been presented of the reciprocal feeling of the government of Madras, and its provincial Commander-in-chief, much harmony will not be expected in the narrative of their measures. The General, sneering at theory, declared, that he was advancing, as fast as was practically compatible with the means of transport he possessed, and the Government observe, that with carriage for twenty-four days' provisions, he occupied forty days, at the average of less than three miles a day in performing a distance of twelve ordinary marches.¹

The fort of Cuddalore is a quadrangle of unequal sides, with an indifferent rampart and ditch, and no out-works, excepting one advanced from its north-eastern angle; a bastion covers each of the other angles, and the curtains are furnished with the imperfect kind of flanking defence, obtainable by means of a succession of bastions, placed in a prolongation of one and the same straight line. The ruins of Fort St. David, situated on a peninsula at the mouth of the river Panâar, are about a mile and a half to the north of Cuddalore, and a second river, of smaller size, forming the peninsula, descends close to the fort, and renders difficult the approach from the north. The Bandapollam hills, woody eminences of moderate height, embrace the western face, and

¹ It is impossible to suppose that Stuart had no motive but an obstinate determination to disobey the orders of the Madras Government in making this dilatory march. The country he marched over offers no obstacles to rapid progress, open and flat with nothing to impede except a few rivers, which must have been dry at this time of the year. Sir Thomas Munro defended him, probably on good grounds. "He arrived there (Cuddalore) as soon as the store ships; his going a month sooner would have been to no purpose; for as our intrenching tools and heavy cannon were in them, we could not have begun our operations. We could only carry ten days' provisions, and therefore could only have remained four days before the place, as we must have kept six days to carry us back to Chingleput, the nearest place we could have got a supply." (*Life*, Vol. III, p. 39.)

south-western angle, at distances varying from two to four miles; the space directly between the hills and the western face, being occupied by rice fields, this access is also inconvenient: a little estuary, formed by the sea, and the rivers, runs along the eastern face, and leaves a narrow insular stripe of land opposite the fort, between that water and the sea; and a continuation of the same estuary to the south, inclining however inland, receives the branches of some considerable winter streams: the space between this latter estuary and the Bandapollam hills, is firm ground, too elevated for rice fields, and narrows in extent as it recedes from the fort. General Stuart, approaching from the north, till within an easy march of Cuddalore, made an unexpected circuit behind the Bandapollam hills, and in two marches took up his ground fronting the north, with his right to the estuary last described, and his left resting on the Bandapollam hills: his force, when in position, June 7. occupying the whole space, and leaving a respectable second line. The French narrative,* states the force under Monsieur Bussy, which, according to preceding details, ought, including the garrison of Trincomalee, to have amounted to 10,000 Europeans and Caffres, exclusively of sepoys, to be reduced at this period, in effective men, to 2,300 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys; 3,500 Mysoreans are probably not intended to be included in the latter number.

Monsieur Bussy, on perceiving the ground taken up by the English army nearly two miles to the southward from the fort, assumed an intermediate position, not exactly parallel; with his left on the estuary, about half a mile from the fort; his right, thrown a little back, rested on a gentle eminence where the rice fields commenced, not quite a mile

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 330.

¹ According to Innos Munro's account, the French forces were:—Europeans 3,000, French sepoys 3,000, Tippoo's sepoys 3,000, and Tippoo's cavalry 2,000.

from the nearest part of the fort. On inspecting a plan of the works* thrown back en potence from a salient work at this point, this angle was evidently the key of the main position, which may be considered here to terminate; and a line occupied by the Mysoreans, resting its left on nearly the centre of this retired flank, and extending with its right thrown considerably forwards, across the rice fields, now dry, to the Bandapollam hills, appears to have been intended as a subsidiary position, of great advantage while occupied, but which might be carried without endangering the main position. The English army encamped on the ground described, on the 7th of June, and continued until the 13th, employed in arrangements for landing stores and making the preparations which were deemed necessary before commencing serious operations. In the meanwhile Monsieur Bussy proceeded with the skill and rapid execution which distinguish his nation, in covering, with the most judicious field works, the position which he had assumed: every successive day the aspect of these works became more formidable, and on the 12th it was determined in a council of war to attack them on the ensuing morning.

June 13. A division under Colonel Kelly moved long before day-light to turn the extreme right of the subsidiary works on the Bandapollam hills, and arrived at the point of attack between four and five o'clock. The Mysoreans,† after a feeble resistance to an attack which they expected, and did not think themselves able to withstand, fled, and were no more seen in the course of the day; a portion of this subsidiary position, with seven guns, fell accordingly with little loss; Colonel Kelly proceeded to occupy with a detachment, for the purposes of farther reconnoissance,

* Of two plans before me, that which appears to be most correct, was drawn by Captains Warsebe and Du Platt, of the Hanoverian regiments, then in India.

† The information of the officer commanding.

commanding ground farther to the north, which saw in reverse the whole main position, with the exception of the works en potence, partly masked among the mud-walls of a village, and his report from this situation induced the General to persevere in the original plan. A corps of grenadiers under Lieutenant-colonel Cathcart, with the picquets under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart of the 78th, who commanded this attack, was ordered by a circuitous movement to turn the right of the main position, supported by the troops under Colonel Kelly. This division arrived at the intended point of attack about half past eight, and immediately advanced with great order: but they were received with so powerful a fire of grape and musquetry from the masqued works and troops en potence, that Colonel Stuart, after a heavy loss, judiciously desisted, replaced his troops in the cover from which he had made his dispositions for the attack, and made a minute report of the nature of this unexpected impediment, and the means by which it appeared practicable to surmount it. A battery of English guns brought to a proper point of the Bandapollam hills, now directed their fire against these works. A reserve under Colonel Gordon, and another column under Colonel Bruce, who commanded this third attack, was ordered at half past ten, to force with the bayonet the salient work on the right of the enemy's main position, and the trenches immediately to its left, while Colonel Stuart was directed to avail himself of the proper moment to resume his attack. The resistance to this third attack was still more destructive than that experienced in the second by Colonel Stuart; and is described by the General as "the heaviest fire he had ever beheld;" the troops however pushed forward with the finest spirit; the head of one column consisting of a flank company of the 101st actually penetrated within the trenches; the Hanoverians of that column and a portion of the 20th Madras battalion of sepoy are mentioned with

applause, and in the opinion of General Stuart if the remainder of the 101st had seconded the efforts of their flank company, the business of the day would have been decided; "but (he adds) they did not." The usual consequences of a repulse under such circumstances produced the usual carnage, and the French, not satisfied with the effect of their batteries and musquetry, issued in considerable force from the trenches, and charging the fugitives with the greatest fury, continued the pursuit to a considerable distance, until checked by a reserve, and by the troops rallied by Colonel Bruce, who even attempted without success to cut off their retreat. Colonel Stuart in the meanwhile anxiously watching every change of circumstance, observed on the first movement of the two columns, a portion of the troops in the works before him to be drawn off to reinforce the points most seriously threatened; he was accordingly in motion fifteen minutes before the fire of the third attack commenced, and seizing the critical moment when the principal force of the enemy had been seduced to quit their works; by a determined attack in front, and a rapid flank movement round the extremity of the works en potence, carried every thing before him, drove the French right upon its centre, compelled the troops who had rallied to take a circuitous route to regain their lines, and was in possession of nearly one-half of the line of works, when his progress was arrested by fresh troops and superior numbers. On the first moment of carrying a redoubt on the right, he had ordered it to be occupied, to be closed at the gorge, and its defences to be reversed: and now slowly retiring to a position strengthened by the works he had carried, the operations of the day relaxed, as if by mutual consent, and terminated about two o'clock. The French have uniformly ascribed to General Stuart the credit of a profound and able manœuvre, in the well-executed feint which drew them from their works, and enabled Colonel

Stuart to carry his point : but although the operation was somewhat too sanguinary for a feint, and none was really intended, (the failure of the attack being regretted in the public dispatch); the actual combination appears to be entitled to the success it obtained. The number was limited of the troops on each side, closely engaged in this important day, and bore an inconsiderable proportion to the whole : but comparing the actual loss with the numbers actually engaged, few actions have been more sanguinary. The English returns ascertain their loss to have been one thousand and sixteen. The French accounts* state theirs to have been four hundred and fifty, a number considerably below the English† computations. Thirteen guns, and the key of the contested position, remained in possession of the English army. The retirement of the French on the same night, within the walls of Cuddalore, evinced their sense of the operations of the day ; but their being permitted during the night to draw off without molestation, all their heavy guns from the exterior position, furnished equal evidence of the impression made on the English, by a victory so dearly purchased.¹

The tone of opinion in the first circles at Madras, represented the expedition to Cuddalore rather as an operation requisite to satisfy the point of honour for Monsieur Bussy's surrender, than as one which depended for its success or failure on the numerous contingencies of war. General Stuart is represented by the Government before his departure for Madras, as avowing the army he commanded to be sufficient

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 332.

† The Annual Register makes it 640.

¹ The returns of the casualties among the British troops

gave —			Killed	Wounded
European officers	18	33
Non-commissioned officers and			147	395
men.				
Native troops, English officers..			4	4
Indians	56	288

for the enemy he had to encounter, but requesting a discretionary authority over an army assembled to the south of the Coleroon, under the command of Colonel Fullarton, a power which was reluctantly granted on the express condition that it should be exercised only in the case of indispensable necessity. Distrust does not usually generate candour, and in the instant of his obtaining this almost extorted authority, he is represented as proceeding to its exercise without the knowledge of the Government, immediately after his departure from Madras; to the insufficient extent, however, in the first instance, of directing Colonel Fullarton to cross the Coleroon, and wait for farther instructions on its northern bank; and this alleged evasion and disobedience of the letter and spirit of his orders, was assigned as the principal cause of General Stuart's subsequent recall* from the command of the army in the field. Whether any and what portion of the necessity for now

* The dissensions terminated in his being placed in close arrest by Lord Macartney, and in that state sent to England. General Stuart was the officer employed as the instrument of the majority in council, who arrested Lord Pigot in 1776. His own arrest, on this occasion, produced many effusions of wit, and among the epigrams of the day, was the observation in broken English, of the second son of Mahommed Ali, on his first hearing the event. *General Stuart catch one Lord; one Lord catch General Stuart.* There is reason to suppose, that the Lord apprehended his own arrest; his Lordship's suspension from the Government having been in the avowed contemplation of Mr. Hastings.

[In the minute which Lord Macartney wrote, dated 17th September 1783, giving his reasons for his action against General Stuart, he specified the following instances of failure on the General's part to do his duty: (a) his failure to follow the orders of the Government to be ready with the army to march immediately on the death of Haidar, (b) his having abused the discretion vested in him in ordering the division of the army under Colonel Fullarton to join him from the south, by which the operations of the southern army against Tipu were impeded, (c) his delay on the march from Madras to Ouddalore, by which the French were enabled to establish themselves in strength

ordering up Colonel Fullarton, arose from mismanagement or delay, is not so obvious as the indisputable existence of that necessity after the action of the 13th of June; and General Stuart, in his communications to the Admiral, after that event, states seven weeks as the period during which he should require the co-operation of the fleet to cover the siege of the place.

On the same day, and towards the close of this severe conflict, the French fleet, under Monsieur Suffrein, appeared in the offing. Sir Edward Hughes, who was anchored nearly off Porto Novo, about eleven miles to the southward, for the combined June 13. purposes of obtaining water, forwarding supplies, and covering the siege of Cuddalore, weighed to assume a nearer position, and to interpose his force to any communication between the hostile fleet and the besieged. The improvements, derived less perhaps from a doubtful application of pneumatic chemistry, than from a systematic attention to ventilation, to

there and resist the attack on Cuddalore with success, (d) his disobedience of the orders of Government in not giving up his command before Cuddalore, (e) his refusal to come to Madras in obedience to orders, (f) his repeated neglect of the orders of the select committee as regards the appointment of Adjutant-General, and Judge Advocate-General. General Stuart was dismissed on the 17th September by the order of the select committee; but as General Burgoyne, who was appointed to the command, declined, on the ground that he owed obedience to General Stuart until the latter resigned, the committee resolved to arrest General Stuart, and he was arrested the same day. Although the relations between the Madras Government and the Government of Bengal at the time of General Stuart's arrest were strained to the utmost, it seems very improbable that Lord Macartney had any apprehension of his own arrest. In Lord Pigot's case there was a strong party in his own Council who opposed him, and Stuart was thus able to act with impunity. But there was in Lord Macartney's case no opposition in his own Council, and he had no reason to fear that General Stuart would find any support, if he tried extreme measures. Lord Macartney took the only course which was possible in arresting and deporting General Stuart, who had defied his authority.]

scrupulous cleanliness, to dryness and regulated diet, which render not only the comparative, but the positive healthfulness of the British navy, perhaps the most remarkable fact in the history of modern discovery, leave us divided between grief and astonishment, in finding the fleet under Sir E. Hughes, in an easy cruize from the 2d May to the 7th June, diminished in effective strength to the amount of eleven hundred and twenty-five men, by the effects of the scurvy alone, and after disposing of these in hospital, that in the short space of another fortnight, near seventeen hundred* more became incapable of duty, from the same cause. It was obviously the great remaining purpose of the war in India, to ensure the conclusive operation against Cuddalore, but it were injurious to the memory of a distinguished officer, if judging from the event alone, we should pronounce the unqualified condemnation of Sir E. Hughes, however weakened in numbers, because anchored for this purpose with seventeen ships carrying twelve hundred and two guns, he felt himself as a British Admiral, unable to refuse the daily challenge of Monsieur Suffrein, with fifteen ships carrying

June 16. one thousand and eighteen guns. On the 16th he weighed anchor, with the expectation of bringing the enemy to close action, but such was the superior skill or fortune of Monsieur Suffrein, that on the same night at half-past eight,† he anchored abreast of the fort, and the dawn of morning presented to the English army, before Cuddalore, the mortifying spectacle of the French fleet in the exact position abandoned by their own on the preceding day, the English fleet being invisible, and its situation unknown. It was necessary, however, to the purposes of Monsieur Bussy and Suffrein, not only that the English fleet should be prevented from resuming its

* "In the healthiest ships, 70 to 90 men a-piece, and others double that number." Annual Register, 1783.

† Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 333.

position, but that it should be sufficiently crippled, to prevent its disturbing the French Admiral in the debarkation which he contemplated, for the reinforcement of Monsieur Bussy. In the mean while, that General, calculating on a considerable interval before the regular approaches now commenced by the English army, should be sufficiently advanced to cause immediate apprehension, embarked on the 17th at night, a reinforcement of twelve hundred troops on board the fleet, thus augmenting the balance of numbers against Sir Edward Hughes, to the enormous amount of about four thousand men, compared with their relative numbers on the 2d of May; or admitting Monsieur Suffrein's numbers to have diminished during the same period of time, in a degree far exceeding the ordinary proportion, we cannot estimate the comparative balance against the English Admiral, at less than three thousand men.

After a series of manœuvres, exhibiting much reciprocal skill, Suffrein succeeded on the 20th in bringing on the sort of action best suited to his designs. A distant cannonade of three hours cost the English fleet 532 men; and what was of more importance to Suffrein, a large proportion of their spars and rigging. Night terminated the combat, which on the ensuing day Sir E. Hughes anxiously sought to renew, and his adversary to avoid, except at his own distance; and the English Admiral, after receiving the detailed reports of the state of each ship, found the whole of his equipments so entirely crippled, his crews so lamentably reduced, and the want of water so extreme, that he deemed it indispensable to incur the mortification of bearing away for the roads of Madras, while Suffrein, wresting from his enemies the praise of superior address, and even the claim of victory, if victory belong to him who attains his object, resumed his position in the anchorage of Cuddalore, where he not only returned the 1,200 troops, but landed an aid of 2,400 men from the fleet.

June
25.

Monsieur Bussy, thus reinforced, lost no time in making a vigorous sortie with his best troops. The attack commenced with the greatest vivacity before day-light in the morning, while it was still quite dark, and perhaps a short time earlier than was favourable to its success. The darkness afforded no opportunity for distinction of troops; the bayonets of the sepoys of Bengal mingled with eminent success among those of the French regiment of Aquitaine; and not one point of the English trenches, occupied as they were by every variety of troops, suffered itself to be forced. The loss of the French in this well-planned but ill-executed sally was estimated by General Stuart at 450 men; a number probably not exaggerated, when considering the circumstances of a *melée* of this nature; the prisoners actually secured, were found to amount to 150,* including the Chevalier de Damas,† who led the attack. The loss of the English was surprisingly small. Major Cotgrave, who commanded the Madras sepoys in the trenches, was killed; three other officers wounded and missing; and twenty rank and file killed and wounded, chiefly sepoys. Among the wounded prisoners was a young French serjeant, who so particularly attracted the notice of Colonel Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service, by his interesting appearance and manners, that he ordered the young man to be conveyed to his own tents, where he was treated with attention and kindness until his recovery and release. Many years afterwards, when the French army under Bernadotte entered Hanover, General Wangenheim, among others, attended the levee of the conqueror.

* *Histoire de la dernière guerre*, page 339, states the prisoners at 80, and the killed at 20; the former is known to be erroneous, and that nation is not restricted, like the English, by the checks of their constitution, from mis-stating the amount of their losses.

† He was inconsolable at not being wounded.

You have served a great deal, said Bernadotte, on his being presented, and as I understand in India.—I have served there. At Cuddalore? I was there. Have you any recollection of a wounded serjeant whom you took under your protection in the course of that service? The circumstance was not immediately present to the General's mind, but on recollection, he resumed. I do indeed remember the circumstance, and a very fine young man he was, I have entirely lost sight of him ever since, but it would give me pleasure to hear of his welfare. That young serjeant, said Bernadotte, was the person who has now the honour to address you, who is happy in this public opportunity of acknowledging the obligation, and will omit no means within his power, of testifying his gratitude to General Wangenheim. It can scarcely be deemed digressive to have presented the sequel of an incident appertaining to our narrative, in illustration of a character since distinguished by a still more extraordinary elevation, and as an evidence of moral worth affording to the Crown Prince of Sweden an honourable claim on other nations for the respect which he is said to possess in his adoptive country.

According to the ordinary rules of war, the force under General Stuart could at no period have been deemed adequate to the siege of Cuddalore, defended by the land forces of Monsieur Bussy, and an equal numerical force of Mysorean auxiliaries; a body, which however unsuited, from discordant habits and defective discipline, to mix with regular troops in the more prominent duties of a siege, performed other essential services within the walls, and as light troops, were eminently useful without. In effect, General Stuart had never been able to attempt the first regular operation of a siege by investing the place. After the reinforcement received by Monsieur Bussy from the fleet, his troops outnumbered the besiegers, whose force was gradually wasting away by casualties

and sickness, and by the performance of duties constantly encreasing, with numbers as constantly and rapidly diminishing. Monsieur Bussy, fully aware of the physical and moral influence of such disproportioned exertions, maintaining a free communication with every part of the adjacent country, except the ground occupied by the English army, and considering his late sortie to have failed merely from errors incident to operations in the dark, determined, after allowing to his enemies a few days more for the exhaustion of their strength, to march out in force by a circuitous route, and attack them in their camp.

General Stuart in the meanwhile, fully aware of the critical circumstances in which he was placed, complaining in his official correspondence of the impenetrable silence of his Government on every subject; and above all, regarding the succours which he had repeatedly demanded from Madras, and from the south, while private correspondence announced these troops to have received counter orders, and a different destination, assumed the tone of being abandoned to his fate by his own Government, and determined to persevere under every difficulty, and to abide the result, whatever it might be. The retreat of the English army, with the loss of its battering train and equipments, is the most favourable result that could possibly have been anticipated from a continuation of hostilities, and a crisis honourable only to the army, and disgraceful to the character of our public councils, was terminated by the arrival of an English frigate bearing a flag of truce, and commissioners deputed by the Government of Madras to announce to Monsieur Bussy the certain intelligence of the conclusion of peace between their respective nations in Europe: perfectly aware of the condition of the army before Cuddalore, these commissioners were instructed to declare that they were charged with positive orders to that army to abstain

from hostilities, whether Monsieur Bussy should accede to an armistice or decline it. Three days however intervened before the terms of a convention could be adjusted, and communication being interdicted between the commissioners and the army, they had no other information than the apparent existence of a flag of truce, and hostilities did not finally cease until the 2d of July. The only difficulty which July 2 occurred in these negotiations, related not to the necessity of due notice to Tippoo Sultaun, as an ally of the French nation, and to the French troops serving in his army, in order that they might withdraw, but proceeded from an attempt to procure an anticipated cessation of hostile movements on the part of the English, before ascertaining whether Tippoo would reciprocally consent to the proposed armistice. This point being at length amicably adjusted, our narrative necessarily returns to the operations on the western coast, which had caused the separation of that prince from his French allies previously to the arrival of Monsieur Bussy at Cuddalore.¹

¹ The English Commissioners were Anthony Sadleir, who had been in the civil service since 1760, (he was a member of the Fort St. George Council,) and George Leonard Staunton, Private Secretary to Lord Macartney.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Resumption of the affairs of the western coast, from the disappearance of Tippoo at Paniani, in December 1782—General Matthews sent from Bombay, to support the troops at that place—hearing of Tippoo's departure, lands at Rajmundry—Reasons—Carries the place—Colonel Macleod ordered up from Paniani—Capture of Hondver (Onore)—and ships of war—Government of Bombay, hearing the death of Hyder, send positive orders to General Matthews, to quit all operations on the coast, and march to Bednore—Fatality of incessant contention—General Matthews protests and obeys—the letter, not the spirit of these inconsiderate orders—lands at Gundapoor—which he attacks and carries—violating the letter of his orders in the very act of obeying them—marches for the Ghauts—Colonel Macleod carries the works at their foot—Attack of the Ghaut—carried with Hyderghur at its summit—Bednore surrenders on terms—Extraordinary facility of this success—explained by the personal enmity of Tippoo, to the Governor Ayáz, and the design not only to supersede, but destroy him—Singular mode of discovering these designs—which determined the surrender—Lutf Aly, the successor of Ayáz, arrives in the vicinity—reinforces Anantpoor—which is carried by the English by assault—Cruelties imputed to the English on that occasion—disproved—Lutf Aly ordered to Mangalore—General Matthews relieved from the restraint of the positive orders—acts as if they were still in operation—and disperses instead of concentrating his force—Strange superstition

regarding his past and future fortunes—Imputations of corruption and rapacity retorted—Illustrations—Approach of Tippoo—Flight of Aydz—Tippoo takes Hyderghur—assaults and carries the exterior lines of Bednore—siege—capitulation—surrender—Infraction imputable to the English—garrison confined in irons—Tippoo descends for the recovery of Mangalore—Attack of an advanced position—Critical circumstances—The place summoned—Preparations—Cavalry sent above the ghauts, overtaken by the monsoon—Kummer-u-Deen sent to Kurpa, in consequence of a diversion in that quarter ordered from Madras—Brief notice of this diversion—Siege of Mangalore—Excellent defence—Intelligence received by the garrison—Intimation from Tippoo, of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore, treacherously postponed—Armistice—Arrival of Brigadier-General Macleod—lands and is entertained and deceived by Tippoo—Disguised plan for gradually starving the garrison—Tippoo throws off the mask—but allows General Macleod to depart—The garrison subsists on short allowance, till November 22d, when General Macleod appears with a large armament for its relief—Extraordinary correspondence with Tippoo—General Macleod departs, having thrown in a nominal month's provision, but without being permitted to communicate with the garrison—Discussion of the reasons assigned for this erroneous conduct—Appears with another insufficient supply, on the 27th December, which is landed, but still no intercourse—Shocking extremities to which the garrison was reduced—Council of war—Capitulation—which was fulfilled—Death of Colonel Campbell—Reflections on Tippoo's conduct—Remarkable incident during the siege—Execution of the late Governor, and death of Mahommed Ali—Explanation of these events.

OUR narrative of operations in Malabar was interrupted by the sudden disappearance of Tippoo's army from Paniani, in December 1782, in consequence of the death of Hyder. The intelligence received at Bombay, of the rapid retreat of Colonel Humberstone to Paniani, and the presence of Tippoo in full force before that place, determined the Government to send their provincial Commander-in-chief, Brigadier General Matthews, for its relief, with such a body of men as could be immediately embarked, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops, for the general purposes of the service. In his progress down the coast, that officer received intelligence at Goa of the circumstances, but not of the cause which had a few days before removed the danger from Paniani, and consequently determined on making a landing at Rajamundroog, in the northern part of Canara, commanding the entrance into the commodious estuary and navigable river of Mirjee, reputed to afford the best, although not the shortest line of access to Bednore; and when connected with the possession of the fort and river of Honâver (Onore) a few miles to the southward, and the fertile territory between those rivers, to furnish not only security to his rear, but an abundant supply of provisions for the future necessities of the army. Rajamundroog was carried by assault, and almost by surprize, with little loss; and the ships were immediately dispatched to Colonel Macleod, at Paniani, with orders to transport his force to Rajamundroog. Honâver soon fell, with all its dependent posts, and Colonel Macleod, who had arrived, was preparing for the capture of Mirjee, or Mirjân, higher up the river, which would have completed the first part of the plan for the safe ascent to Bednore, by the passes of Bilguy. The easy capture in these operations, of five ships of war, from 50 to 64 guns, and many of smaller dimensions, evinced the extent of Hyder's ambition, rather than the correctness of his political views.

In the meanwhile however the Government of Bombay having received intelligence of the death of Hyder, and acting apparently more on the impulse of the moment, than in the spirit of a grave and deliberate political instruction, sent on the 31st December 1782, *positive orders* to General Matthews, "if the intelligence were confirmed, to relinquish all operations whatever upon the sea-coast, and make an immediate push to take possession of Bednore." Without imputing too much to the defective constitution of the Government at that period, a fatalist might find the most plausible illustrations of his doctrine in the universal tendency to contention between public authorities, which wasted and perverted all their energies, and to ordinary observation had infinitely more the aspect of an unhappy fatality than of the common infirmity of human irritation. General Matthews and all other persons, must on the 12th January, when he received these positive orders, have been well satisfied of the death of Hyder; but after weighing and combining intelligence and observation, he not only at this period, but even at the moment of his greatest subsequent success, declared his deliberate conviction, that the operations in which these orders found him engaged, of securing by a strong occupation of the country in his rear, a secure and easily defensible communication with the sea coast, constituted the only safe plan for the invasion of Bednore. On the receipt of these unconditional orders however, he instantly countermanded the operations which were destined to lead him to Bednore by the longer route of Bilguy, and prepared to obey his orders to their very letter; he remonstrated against the frustration of his plans; disclaimed all responsibility for consequences; upbraided the Government with neglecting the promised reinforcements and supplies; declared that the force at his disposal was utterly inadequate to the service he was ordered to execute; and finally requested, that if they "could not

repose confidence in his military judgment, they would permit him to retire and save his own reputation."

The reciprocal confidence which ought to subsist between a government and the military officer entrusted with the execution of its measures, was most unwisely violated in the first instance, by a positive order to be executed under all circumstances, or rather, literally viewed, by an abandonment of the measures necessary to its safe execution: but the absurdity which its literal accomplishment involved, ought to have suggested to a temperate mind a compliance rather with its spirit, than its letter.* General Matthews, however, obeyed with precipitation: he landed at Cundapoor, the point of the coast nearest to Bednore, and in carrying the place experienced considerable resistance, not from the ordinary garrison, but from a field force of 500 horse, and 2,500 infantry; a part of the reinforcements which had been detached by Hyder from Coromandel, for the protection of his western possessions, and thus in the very act of obeying his orders to "relinquish all operations whatever on the sea coast;" he was obliged Jan. to undertake new operations on the sea coast, in the mere execution of these orders. Continuing to protest against the insufficiency of his means, and to disclaim all responsibility for consequences, he proceeded in the same spirit of precipitate obedience. Without any regular means of conveying provisions or stores, he was three days in marching 25 miles to the foot of the mountains, opposed every day by encreasing numbers; not in any serious stand, but chiefly by light skirmishing, and the incessant annoyance of rockets. The ascent of the ghauts presented impediments of a more serious nature; the difficulties of a rugged acclivity of seven miles were encreased by a succession of the most formidable works. Hussen-

* They were afterwards explained and rescinded at Bombay on the 6th of February, ten days after General Matthews was in possession of Bednore.

gherry,¹ a place at the foot of the hill called a fort, and assuming that appearance, on approaching it, was in reality no more than a well-built barrier with two flanks, but entirely open in the rear. About three miles in front of this post, the enemy had felled trees across the road, and lined the thick brushwood on each flank; and about 400 yards in front of this abbatis, another breastwork was lined with between two and three thousand men. The 42d, led by Colonel Macleod, and followed by a corps of sepoy attacked these positions with the bayonet, and pursuing them like Highlanders, were in the breastwork before the enemy were aware of it; four hundred were bayoneted and the remainder were pursued close to the walls of the fort; preparations were made for attacking it the next morning, but although furnished with 15 pieces of excellent cannon, it was found abandoned; the first barrier, mounting eleven pieces of cannon, was also evacuated without attempting defence; the second, two miles farther up the hill, mounting nine guns, was carried at the point of the bayonet with a loss of only seven or eight men. "From the second fort, or barrier to the top of the ghaut is almost one continuance of batteries with cannon and breast-works; the firmness and intrepidity of the 15th battalion, who were foremost in the several parts of the conflict, was rewarded with the honour of taking the fort of Hyderghur, on the top of the ghaut, in which were found twenty-five pieces of cannon, &c. &c.; this fort was well constructed, had a good ditch, was extensive, and the other works were defended by 17,000 men. My loss during the day about fifty killed and wounded." * The fort and

Jan. 26

27.

¹ *Hussengherry*.—Hosangadi, a village in Coondapoor Taluq, South Canara District, 18 miles E.N.E. of Coondapoor town, at the foot of the hills, over which there is now a good road into Mysore.

* The passages between inverted commas, are extracted from General Matthews's official dispatch, dated 28th January, 1783.

town of Bednore or Hydernuggur was still 14 miles distant: but the numerous bodies above described, are stated to have abandoned its defence; "Hyat Saheb having retired into the fort with no more than 1,350 men, of whom 350 were English sepoys taken in Coromandel, who had enlisted in the service of Hyder. Captain Donald Campbell, a prisoner in irons, was released on the preceding day, and sent to General Matthews, to propose terms, which were to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the English, as he was under the nabob," (Hyder); to which conditions General Matthews immediately assented. On the ensuing morning, although a division of the army under Colonel Macleod, detached from the foot of the ghaut, to endeavour by a circuitous route to turn the works, had not yet arrived, and the troops present for duty (who had not eaten the preceding day) amounted to no more than 360 Europeans and 600 sepoys, without a field gun; he moved forward, and was received without hesitation into the fort, and to the acknowledged command of the capital and territory of Bednore, without farther treaty or capitulation.

Such is in substance the whole amount of the facts already before the public connected with the capture of Bednore. "To what" says General Matthews, "can it be owing, but to the divine will, that my army, without provisions or musquet ammunition, should have our wants supplied as we advanced, for without the enemy's rice, and powder, and ball, we must have stopped until the army could be furnished." "Panic" is the secondary cause assigned by the General for these extraordinary effects, and there can be no question regarding the influence of the attack on the breast work; but the reader will probably have anticipated some further explanation which we shall now endeavour to present.

The considerations have been already stated*

which induced Hyder early in 1782, to make considerable detachments for the restoration of his affairs not only in Malabar, but in Coorg and Bullum, the two last under the command of two *Chélas*, *Woffadar* and *Sheick Ayáz*, the latter of whom was for this purpose appointed Governor of Bednore, the province adjoining Bullum on the north; and we have had occasion to notice* the early history and character of *Sheick Ayáz*.† In the interval between the death of Hyder, and Tippoo's arrival in camp, a letter arrived from Ayáz, reporting the invasion under General Matthews, the capture of Rajamundroog and Onore, and the intention of the Governor to withdraw his troops from Bullum, and march without delay to oppose the enemy. This letter had among others been opened by Poornea, and afterwards dispatched by express to Tippoo Sulatun.

Sheick Ayáz had, while a youth, and a common *chêla* of the palace, rendered himself unacceptable to Tippoo by the independence of his character, and had, in consequence, been treated by that prince with gross and repeated indignity. In mature age, Hyder's extravagant praises of his valour and intellect, and the habit of publicly contrasting the qualities of his slave with those of the heir apparent, perpetually embittered all the feelings of former enmity, and rendered the death of Hyder a crisis which Ayáz must necessarily have contemplated with alarm. Immediately after Tippoo's junction with his army, after his father's death, he detached Lutf Aly Beg, with a light corps of cavalry, by the shortest route, to supersede *Woffadar* at Coorg; and after making the requisite arrangements in that quarter to assume the government of Bednore, with a larger and heavier corps detached about the same time by the ordinary road. He had however con-

* Vol. i. pp. 741-42, and Appendix to Chapter 18.

†: *Ayáz Saheb*, is readily corrupted into *Hyat Saheb*, the name by which he is designated in the records of that period.

siderable doubts whether the fears and the ambition of Ayâz might not induce him to resist, and had accordingly sent secret orders to the officer next in authority to put him to death and assume the government. Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Ayâz at this period, it is certain that apprehensions of treachery were mixed with all his deliberations: he had taken the precaution of ordering that no letter of any description from the eastward should be delivered without previous examination; and being entirely illiterate, this scrutiny always took place, with no other person present than the reader and himself, either in a private chamber, or if abroad, retired from hearing and observation in the woods. On the day preceding that on which the ghauts were attacked, and while Ayâz was occupied near Hyderghur, in giving directions regarding their defence, the fatal letter arrived, and was inspected with the usual precautions: the bramin who read it, and to whom the letter was addressed as second in command, stands absolved from all suspicion of prior design by the very act of reading its contents; but in the perilous condition of Ayâz he durst not confide in a secrecy, at best precarious, even for a day: without a moment's hesitation, he put the unfortunate bramin to death to prevent discovery; put the letter in his pocket, and returning to his attendants, instantly mounted, and without leaving any orders, went off at speed to the citadel, to make the arrangements for surrender which have been related. It may well be presumed, that this horrible scene could not have been enacted, without some intimation reaching the ears of the attendants; and the very act of abandoning the scene of danger contrary to his usual habits, spread abroad among the troops those rumours of undefined treachery which abundantly account for their dispersion and dismay.

On the arrival of Lutf Aly Beg at Sheemoga,

(Simoga) about forty miles to the eastward of Bednore, he learned the disastrous issue of public affairs, and began to collect the scattered remains of the troops who had been abandoned by their leader. An English detachment was marching to take possession of Anantpoor, about 30 miles north-west of his position, this and most other dependencies of Bednore having surrendered on receiving the orders of *Aydz* to that effect, and the garrison and inhabitants had sent an agent to offer their submission. On receiving intelligence of these events, Lutf Aly sent a trusty officer with 300 Chittledroog peons to anticipate the arrival of the English detachment, and with positive orders to supersede the actual commandant, and to admit no farther communication of any kind with the enemy. On the approach of the troops, it was pretended by Lutf Aly, that repeated signs were made to them to withdraw, that on persisting to advance, the flag of truce was fired at. No disparagement to the accuracy of either representation is involved in the supposition, that the English confident of admission recognise only the second part of the statement, in retaliation for which no quarter was given to the garrison on the capture of the place by assault. Such is the amount of fact involved in the atrocities imputed to the English on the capture of Anantpoor. The touching tale descriptive of 400 beautiful women, "all bleeding with the wounds of the bayonet, and either already dead, or expiring in each other's arms;" the soldiers "stripping them of their jewels and committing every outrage on their bodies, while others, *rather than be torn from their relations*, threw themselves into large tanks and were drowned," has long since been traced to its author, a silly young man, whose amende honorable for dressing his adventures into a romantic tale, is not so generally known as the historical record of that supposed event in the respectable pages of the Annual Register. Of a conduct so

atrocious, if true, the reprobation could not be too severe, and if unfounded, the disproof could not be too anxiously established: the author of this work has therefore not neglected the ample means within his reach, of ascertaining that the tale in all its parts is destitute of every shadow of foundation in truth.*

The capture of Anantpoor occurred during the period that Lutf Aly was waiting the slower approach of the infantry from Coromandel, and on its arrival, he was arranging the means of its recapture, when he received orders from Tippoo, to proceed with all expedition by the pass of Soobramonee, to prevent if possible the fall of Mangalore; but before he could arrive, the place had surrendered by capitulation, on the 9th of March. General Matthews, after descending to the coast to direct this operation, now prepared to return for the defence of Bednore. The unconditional orders had been revoked, which formed the apology for disclaiming responsibility, and he was now left to the guidance of the general instructions with which he left Bombay, on the 11th of December; a document as wise and judicious, as the subsequent order had been precipitate. The invasion of Bednore had been suggested in these instructions from the Government, as the plan of all those submitted to their consideration which seemed best adapted to the actual scope of their resources, and combined the most reasonable hope of success with the greatest facility of communication and support. Permanent conquest was excluded from their views of possible contingency; the plan of securing such a footing as could safely be held, and the view of alarming Hyder with the threat of relinquishing to the Mahrattas that country which they were known to covet, was expressly suggested as a probable means of disposing him to

* Without the fort, the body of one woman was some days afterwards found, who had fallen into a well; but it was not known in what manner, or on what occasion, the accident had occurred.

peace; and these temperate views concluded with the widest latitude of discretionary authority.

Thus circumstanced, General Matthews, incessantly reporting the approach of powerful bodies of troops from Coromandel, stated 400 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys to be the largest force with which he could meet the enemy *in the field*, and represented the indispensable necessity of large reinforcements, "without which it would be next to a miracle if he could preserve his footing." Instead, however, of concentrating at the point which he considered most defensible, the greatest possible number of his avowedly insufficient force, he continued up to the moment of his last departure from the coast, to narrate with complacency that he was "in possession of the whole country westward of the range of mountains from Sedasheeghur to Mangalore; beyond the passes, he possessed Bednore, Anantpoor, and the fort of Cowlydroog, 15 miles east" (more nearly south) "from Bednore, with their dependencies; and a detached body was seeking to obtain possession of the distant province of Soonda." The only explanation which has been attempted, of the blind confidence with which he frittered away his means of defence, relates to his hope of a simultaneous invasion of Mysoor, by the troops under Colonel Fullarton, from Coimbetoor, to whose operations we shall presently advert; but a hope better founded than any he possessed, would furnish a rational motive for concentration and certainly not for dispersion. The tenor of General Matthews's dispatch, written on the day of his first entrance into Bednore, is strongly tinged throughout with the belief of supernatural interposition, in a success of which the true secondary causes do not appear to have reached his knowledge, or that of any of his officers; and it is difficult to account for the conduct which we have just stated, without supposing the existence of a similar superstition with reference to his future fortunes; a confidence

in the divine protection, implying direct insanity, if the corrupt rapacity imputed to him before, and still more explicitly after the capture of Bednore, have the foundation which various circumstances seem to confirm. The charge, however supported, of insubordination, producing in the army a conduct "loose and unfeeling as that of the most licentious free-booters," retorted on his accusers; and the direct announcement of bringing them to military trial, cannot obliterate the strong grounds of original accusation. The publicity given to this unhappy controversy in the Annual Register of 1783, had induced the author to examine all the documents with scrupulous care, and to prepare an abstract of the whole, which, on farther reflection, has been expunged: the subsequent unhappy fate of General Matthews, without the opportunity of defending his reputation, might seem to expose any such abstract to the imputation of an *ex parte* statement; and mourning over a large portion, at least of impropriety, which pervades the reciprocal discussion, we shall close the subject with observing, with reference to the countless treasures supposed to be found in Bednore, that Tippoo Sultaun, in narrating,* with the utmost bitterness the defection of Ayâz, states, that he carried along with him a large property in cash and valuables. The minister of finance, Poornea, ignorant of the contents of Tippoo's book, states, in his manuscript, the embezzlement at upwards of a lac, and the detailed account afterwards rendered by Ayâz to the Government of Bombay, of the amount and appropriation of his pecuniary possessions in Bednore, gives a total of one lac and forty-eight thousand pagodas,† the balance of which he claims

* Sultaun-û-Towareekh.

† A considerable amount of valuables, constituting what is usually called the Tôsha Khana, or store of articles provided for public presents on occasions of ceremony, as stated both by Poornea and Ayâz, is exclusive of this pecuniary amount.

from the justice of that government, as secured to him by the terms of capitulation: nor can the fact with propriety be suppressed, that General Matthews, in a testamentary memorandum delivered to his fellow prisoners, to be used only in the event of his death, declares that the public was indebted to him for money advanced from his private fortune during his command, in the sum of 33,000 rupees, besides the arrears of his military allowances.

On the approach of Tippoo with the whole of his army, Ayâz had too much wisdom to await with General Matthews the supernatural aid which was to protect him from disaster; his flight to the coast was so precipitate that he lost the small remains of his property, and in a few months afterwards we find him soliciting the means of subsistence from the English Government. Tippoo Sultaun in narrating the flight of this person, affirms that the most explicit assurances of protection and encouragement had been conveyed to him on the occasion of his father's death, and amuses himself with the parallel and well known anecdote of that Ayâz * from whom he was named, the slave and unhallowed favourite † of Sultaun Mahmood. This Sultaun after exhausting his imagination in procuring for his favoured slave every gratification and convenience that empire can command, asked him one day if any one wish remained ungratified. Yes, said the slave, I have one remaining caprice, I think it would be pleasant to run away.

On approaching Bednore the army divided into two columns, one of which took the southern route of April 7.

* He quibbles very successfully, by naming him Ayâz-è-na Mahmood, for the purpose of the double meaning, Ayâz, not he who belonged to Mahmood, or Ayâz, the unhallowed; or more literally unglorified.

† This part of the parallel certainly did not apply, and I do not impute to either Tippoo or his secretary, the intention of such insinuation, however obviously implied in the tale.

Cowlydroog¹ and Hyderghur, which fell without material opposition, and cut off all communication with the coast; the other column proceeded by the most direct north-eastern road, leaving a force to mask Anantpoor, and completely invested the place. The English troops were found in possession of the extensive lines which surround Bednore, and after some skirmishing to ascertain the most vulnerable points, a disposition was made for a general assault and escalade in several columns, which completely succeeded; the English troops who had attempted a defence to the extent of which their numbers were altogether inadequate, retiring with great loss but in excellent order to the citadel. The author has had no access to accounts of this service written by any of the besieged; the work of Tippoo Sultaun* gives ample details in which Monsieur Cossigny is represented as an inexperienced officer, whose blunders were of course corrected by the commanding genius and personal intrepidity of the Sultaun himself; but in the most inflated exaggeration of his own exploits, and affected contempt of his enemy, an unwilling homage is rendered to the energy, the spirit, and the bravery of the besieged, until the place became a heap of ruins, and farther resistance unavailing. Under these circumstances, General Matthews, in conformity to the opinion of a council of war, sent out a flag of truce, with proposals for a capitulation in seven articles, detailed by Tippoo Sultaun, to which, however unfavourable, he declares that he was induced to accede, from considering the short interval which remained for the recovery of Mangalore before the rains. The first of these articles affords a fair specimen of the taste and veracity of the royal author:—

“1. When the English garrison shall march

¹ *Cowlydroog*.—Kavale-durga, in Shimoga District, Mysore, ten miles south-east of Bednur; a hill in a wild inaccessible region, with a fort. It was a stronghold of the Bednur chiefs.

* Sultaun-û-Towareekh.

out, the holy warriors of Islam shall not ridicule them, nor call them by abusive names, nor throw stones at them, nor spit at them."

Two other articles however, appear to be correctly stated, and provide for the safe conduct of the garrison to the coast, and for the security of private, and the surrender of public property. Neither the well-known fate of former prisoners, the precarious aspect of their own destiny, nor yet those principles which regulate, under the worst misfortunes, a sense of what is due to individual and national character, could restrain a predominant passion.* For the purpose of appropriating the remaining public treasure, which by capitulation was the property of Tippoo, the officers were desired to draw for whatever sums they pleased, to be accounted for on their return to Bombay. The garrison marched out in conformity to capitulation on the 3d of May. There May 3 is abundant reason to believe, that Tippoo had pre-determined to seek some pretext for infringing its conditions; but, an empty treasury, together with the money (and as he states *jewels* public property) found on searching the prisoners, exempted him from the necessity of recurring to fictitious pleas; and it will not escape the reader's observation, that the probable sum so recovered reconciles in a satisfactory manner the apparent difference between the statement of treasure lost at Bednore, as furnished by Ayaz, the late governor, and by Tippoo's minister of finance. The breach of faith was speedily announced to the garrison, by their being marched off in irons to different destinations; and Tippoo, for the first time since his accession, gave public audience, seated on a musnud and ordered a salute to be fired for this his first victory, after which he proceeded in person and without delay, for the recovery of Mangalore.

Colonels Macleod and Humberstone, the two

* See Annual Register.

senior of His Majesty's officers, had some time before departed to Bombay, in consequence of the imputed malversations already adverted to, and the command of Mangalore had devolved on Major, now Colonel Campbell, of the 42d, whose memorable defence is well recorded in a little volume* before the public, which furnishes in a plain and unambitious journal of facts, an interesting and instructive military lesson, and developes the rare combination of professional talents and mental resource possessed by this lamented officer.

- Previously to the surrender of Bednore, Tippoo had dispatched a respectable force which was to appear before Mangalore with the intelligence of that event, in the hope of rendering his own approach unnecessary; this corps, however, was attacked and defeated with the loss of its guns, at the distance of twelve miles from the place, in consequence of which
- May 6. Tippoo marched with his whole army, in the expectation that the appearance of such an overwhelming
20. force would terrify the garrison into an early surrender. An outpost on an eminence commanding the principal access to the place, distant upwards of a mile, and although of some strength, requiring two battalions for its occupation, continued to be maintained three days after the place had been invested, and after positions had been taken which enabled the enemy to intercept the retreat of the troops. The consequences of this first and only error, were
- 23 perceived on the morning of the 23d, when a sudden and simultaneous attack commenced, of several heavy columns of infantry, supported by batteries previously prepared, and the discharge of an incessant shower of rockets: the sepoy appointed for the defence of the post, broke in spite of the efforts of their officers, and were driven in the utmost disorder

* Published in 1786; the author is also in possession of a manuscript journal of the siege, which accords with the printed narrative in all points of importance.

down the hill; a reinforcement consisting of the 42d, supported by a sepoy corps, was too late for the defence of the post, but arrested for a moment the progress of the enemy, and afforded time for the fugitives to escape; but the panic soon extended to the sepoys of the reinforcement also, and even the veteran 42d, did not altogether escape its influence. The casualties of this day amounted to four officers, ten European and two hundred native soldiers, including three officers, and two companies of sepoys, whose retreat was entirely cut off. All outposts not under the complete cover of the body of the place, were in consequence withdrawn, and all the arrangements adopted necessary for a long siege. Tippoo did not permit himself to doubt, that the impressions arising from this first success, would produce an immediate surrender; he had, however, the mortification to find opposed to him, a commander who viewed his mighty hosts with the most perfect composure, and considered the driving in of his outposts, however early and unfortunate in its circumstances, as an event in the ordinary course of the service. He dismissed, without condescending to give an answer, the flag of truce bearing a summons for the immediate surrender of the place as he valued his life and Tippoo perceiving a regular siege to be indispensable, and the thunder storms preceding the monsoon to have already commenced, thought proper to send above the ghauts and beyond the influence of its greatest severity, the whole of the stable horse; they were however overtaken at the bottom of the ghaut by its full violence, and not more than half the horses survived, to reach their eastern cantonments.

Kummer-û-Deen, with the troops composing the personal command of his late father *Meer Saheb*, was dispatched at the same time to his jageer at Kurpa, in consequence of one of the diversions in that quarter planned by the Government of Madras,

under the command, first of Captain Edmonds, and afterward of Colonel Jones. On the capture of Kurpa in 1779. Seyed Mahommed, a son of one of the principal religious persons at the tomb of the celebrated Gesoo Deráz at Culburga, and married to a daughter of the vanquished Patan nabob, was among the prisoners; and Hyder in examining and giving his orders for the disposal of his captives, ordered this fakeer as he contemptuously named him, to be liberated. This person, however considering the death of Hyder to be a favourable crisis for adventure, collected a force in the vicinity with which he had entered the province of Kurpa, supported by the English Government under the designation of *the Nabab of Kurpa*, and by an English corps which obtained possession of the fort of Cumnum, and some minor posts. Kummer-û-Deen's cavalry had suffered considerably though not in the same degree as the stable horse, whose riders had no direct interest in the preservation of the animals; he had therefore to encounter delay in recruiting his cavalry; but on commencing operations, the troops of Seyed Mahommed, a weak, inexperienced person were totally discomfited, and an English battalion in advance, during a parley to ascertain whether the enemy considered himself bound by the conditions of the armistice of Cuddalore, was treacherously charged and cut to pieces. The subsequent history of this diversion does not challenge much admiration of English diplomacy. Apajee Ram, charged with a mission to Madras, preparatory to a negotiation for general peace, had the countenance to propose, and the rare fortune to obtain, the intermediate exchange of the fort and fertile territory of Cumnum, for Chittapet in Coromandel, which, on being occupied by an English detachment, was found to be a heap of ruins.

In the middle of May 1783, the 2nd and 17th battalions of Madras sepoy's under Captain Edmonds marched from Ongole

Meanwhile the siege of Mangalore was pressed with all the virulent energy of the Sultaun, regulated by the professional science and experience of Monsieur Cisigney. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort, accessible by land the excess violence of the monsoon was unfavourable to rapid progress; but a proportion of the faces attacked instead of a few breaches, rather exhibited masses of continuous ruin mortars for projecting stones attached to plugs prepared for the purpose. although inferior in effect to a regular bombardment, produced constant annoyance and numerous casualties throughout the night; as operations advanced, a great extent of lodgement on the crest of the glacis, and of covered sap for filling the ditch, brought the assailants and defendants into incessant contact, and attempts to penetrate by assault were repeated and repelled in every quarter, until they became almost

in the Guntur District to Cumbum in the Kurnool District. After taking Cumbum in July, Major-General Jones arrived from Masulipatam with the 10th Foot, and Captain Edmonds returned to Ongole. Captain Montgomery, with eight companies of the 2nd and two 6-pounders, was directed to advance to Badvel in the Cuddapah District to support Syed Ahmed. On the 29th July General Jones sent orders that hostilities might cease pending the discussions of a treaty of peace. Kamar-ud-din appeared with a force of 6,000 horse, 2,000 infantry and 6 guns. During a parley with Captain Montgomery, he advanced his guns and cavalry and suddenly attacked the Madras troops. Three ensigns were killed with several Indian officers; Captain Montgomery was taken prisoner, about 270 men were killed, wounded or missing, the rest made their escape to Nellore. (Wilson *History of the Madras Army*, Vol II, pp. 95-96.)

The land round Cumbum is of extraordinary fertility. The tank at Cumbum has a circumference of 14 miles and an area of four square miles, and the town, though surrounded by land under irrigation, was formerly not unhealthy. About 60 years ago, however, a malarious form of fever appeared and almost decimated the population. It forms the richest area in the Kurnool District and a great contrast to the dry country round Settapetta (Chittapet). When in 1783 this place was given up by treaty in exchange for Cumbum, it was no doubt a very poor exchange.

an affair of daily routine. It is remarkable, that although the conduct of the sepoys was unsatisfactory in the first operation, and daily desertions occurred in the first part of the siege, the firmness and gallantry of the remainder was particularly prominent during its most trying periods, and was distinguished by the repeated and animated public thanks of their excellent commander.

On the 19th of July, after fifty-six days open trenches, Colonel Campbell having, on the preceding day, received advices which gave him reason to expect early relief, ordered at noon, guns well shotted and pointed, to fire a regular royal salute, and the garrison paraded on such parts of the ramparts as still afforded any cover, were directed to conclude the ceremonial with three hearty huzzas. The intimation thus conveyed to the besiegers, of some acceptable information, having reached the garrison, produced, on the same day at four o'clock, a letter signed "Peveron de Morlay, envoy from France, to the nabob Tippoo Sultaun," informing Colonel Campbell of the peace in Europe, the cessation of arms at Cuddalore, and his possessing a letter from the English commissioners to Colonel Campbell, which he had been enjoined by Tippoo to deliver in person. This letter from Messieurs Sadlier and Staunton had been delivered to Monsieur Bussy for transmission on the 2d of July; the commandant of Mysorean troops at Cuddalore was on the spot to transmit it at a moment's warning, and the author will venture to state a probability, little short of conviction, founded on his knowledge of the routine of the Mysorean post, that these dispatches had been in the camp before Mangalore at the least ten days before their existence was announced, during which ten days the most desperate efforts had been made to carry the place by assault, and were discontinued on finding that the garrison had obtained some intelligence unfavourable to the hopes of the besiegers, and which

they erroneously supposed to be no other than the stated intelligence from Cuddalore. Without venturing to conjecture at what time these dispatches had been delivered to Monsieur Peveron, or to question the inference that he might not have been at liberty to announce their arrival, it shall only be added, that no explanation appears to have been offered of any such impediment, and that the same Monsieur Peveron afterwards permitted himself to threaten Colonel Campbell with the continuance of the French aid to the besiegers if he should persevere in certain conditions connected with the observance of the capitulation of Bednore and this after he had been repeatedly admitted into the fort *not blindfolded* on his own positive requisition as an envoy, founded on the existence of a general peace, and after Monsieur Cossigny as a man of honour had quitted the posts which he occupied during the siege, and established himself in a separate encampment.

On first intimating the necessity of refraining from affording him any farther aid in the siege, nothing could exceed the Sultaun's rage and astonishment, and when even Lally and Boudenot were compelled by Monsieur Cossigny to follow his example Tippoo was incapable of understanding this conduct in any other light than that of base treachery, and an abandonment of the cause in which they were engaged. Boudenot well knowing the danger of continuing to serve a prince against whom he had conspired, resigned his command and retired with Monsieur Cossigny, whose retreat would apparently have been cut off as his subsistence was stopped, if he had not required and accepted the aid of his late enemy against his ally.

It is not intended to express surprise at the dark stupidity which could induce Tippoo Sultaun, however mortified and foiled, to think, that under such circumstances he could obtain an accession of military fame by determining to persevere by whatever

treachery and whatever sacrifice of men, of time and of honour, to obtain the fort of Mangalore, before concluding a peace which would give it to him without an effort and we can only explain this strange political suicide, by the miserable pride of attempting to shew that he could achieve by himself an exploit, which French troops could not accomplish. On all this political and moral darkness we have no astonishment to bestow. But it is mournful to observe the envoy of a civilized state lending* himself indirectly to such proceedings. Under cover of the arrangements made for the first reception of Monsieur Peveron, into the fort, troops were landed for the attack of a detached work which covered the entrance of the harbour in consequence of which it was taken; every operation was continued with augmented vigour, under the reiterated simulation of abstaining from hostility; and the admission of the French envoy, as a mediator, was generally the occasion of springing a mine in a situation not conveniently accessible at other times, or some other profligate treachery followed by the most childish explanations. Tippoo however, apparently convinced of the utter hopelessness of farther efforts to reduce the place by force, agreed to an armistice for Mangalore, Onore, and the

Aug. 2. English posts in Malabar, on the 2d of August. The only article (the 3d), which will require particular observation, provided for the establishment of a bazar, where the garrison might buy its provisions, to the limited extent of ten days' stock at a time, and stipulated that such articles as the bazar did not afford might freely enter from other places, to an amount not exceeding one month's supply at one time; and the whole spirit of the article obviously provided for the garrison remaining during the armistice, with regard to provisions, as in all other

The reader who may desire to examine the grounds of this inference, is referred to overt facts, from which it is drawn, as detailed in the published journal of the siege.

respects. in the same state as at its commencement.

In an interview with Colonel Campbell, which Tippoo requested soon after the armistice, he paid that officer the most extravagant compliments on his defence of the place. which it must be added, he always continued to hold up with unqualified admiration and applause, as an example to his own officers: but, on the very day preceding this interview he tried his first experiment, by the erection of a new work on the southern, as that which he had already treacherously obtained, covered the northern entrance of the harbour; an insolent and open violation of the 10th article of the armistice, which it is very remarkable that Colonel Campbell does not seem to have denounced. But this was less important than a systematic violation of the 3d article regarding provisions, which he commenced on the very first day of the armistice. and continued by a series of mean simulation and falsehood, which it would be disgusting to follow, and unnecessary to detail.

Fifteen days after this armistice, Brigadier-General Macleod now invested with the chief command, on the coast of Malabar and Canara arrived in the offing, and on the following day, appeared the Aug. 17 Bristol and Isis from Madras, with a detachment of Hanoverians, destined to reinforce Mangalore; but as the design of starving the garrison into surrender, had not yet been sufficiently matured, to infuse into the minds of General Macleod or Colonel Campbell, any suspicion of the gross falsehoods which were adduced to explain the successive delays, this reinforcement was ordered to land at Tellicherry, about a degree to the southward. On the 20th, General 20 Macleod landed and took up his residence in the town of Mangalore, where accommodations were prepared for him by Tippoo's desire. The record of some of his conversations with that personage in the presence of Colonel Campbell, contains, among other

matters, a prominent recurrence of the demand of reparation for the fraud at Trichinopoly in 1752, which, notwithstanding the peace of 1769, had also formed the basis of the last propositions made by his father. Tippoo, however, exhibited some knowledge of secret history, in adding that Mahommed Ali was the true cause of the war: that he had poisoned the minds of the English against his father and him, and had even deputed persons to England to injure them in the opinions of the king and people of that country: that he was equally false to the English and to him, and had even recently proposed to him a negotiation to unite for their expulsion from India: the French, he said, had mediated the armistice, but he would not have them or any other to mediate the peace. you shall make the peace, he added, and expressed surprize when General Macleod pleaded his want of powers. Why cannot the military officers make peace? they are the proper persons to do it. You shall go with me to Seringapatam, you shall send my propositions to Madras; you shall make the peace, and in the meanwhile I will gratify you and Colonel Campbell, by complying with your request for the release of all your prisoners; they shall be delivered into your own hands at Seringapatam. And all this was seriously believed by General Macleod and Colonel Campbell, to the extent of the latter,

Aug. 23. considering himself on the 23d, as having succeeded to the general command on the coast of Malabar, by the sudden departure of General Macleod, who, in the same confidence of immediate departure, had written to Bombay to avert this pretension.

Oct. 9. It was not, however, until the 9th of October that General Macleod appeared fully awake to the effects of the practice which had been in constant operation from the 2d of August, of affecting a liberal supply of certain articles, while of those essential to the native troops, the limitations were so managed as to compel Colonel Campbell to make frequent

drafts on the garrison stores, the necessity for each of which was in itself a distinct violation of the terms of the armistice and these stores were now so far reduced that Tippoo, conceiving the object to be secured, of compelling the garrison to surrender for want of food, threw off the mask, openly avowed the deception of his professed departure for Seringapatam, declared that the garrison should not be supplied with provisions, and finally told the General that he was at liberty to depart : a permission which, under all the circumstances of the case, the General would have been entitled to consider as the most fortunate result of his diplomacy. He accordingly sailed for Tellicherry to collect the means of relieving the garrison, which was now reduced to twenty days' stock. From this period forward, Tippoo was openly and actively employed in repairing his old works, and erecting new batteries in every direction, a proceeding which the garrison could not retaliate, on account, not only of their reduced numbers and declining health, but the necessity of employing as fuel, not only all the spare materials convertible to military uses, but even of demolishing, for the same purpose, the buildings which protected them from the inclemency of the weather.

By the simulation which Tippoo did not yet entirely abandon, and Colonel Campbell, in such extremity, did not think proper to reject, of permitting a few unimportant articles to enter the fort, the twenty days' stock had, by short allowance, been made to last forty-four days, when, on the 22d of Nov. 22. November,* two fleets appeared, one from the northward, the other from the south, both standing into the roads. After some preparation, "the ships of war took their stations so as to cover, in the most effectual manner, the boats employed on this service;

* Stated in the published journal the 24th, which must be an error of the press, as the remarkable letters in the text are dated the 23d.

the garrison lay on their arms; the signal was made that the troops would land to the southward; they were discovered in the boats; every moment promised a speedy attack. Confidence and joy appeared in every countenance; even the poor, weak, emaciated convalescent, tottering under the weight of his fire-lock, boldly stood forth to offer what feeble aid his melancholy state admitted of. But how great the change! The correspondence between General Macleod and Tippoo Sultaun, which terminated in this change, if not the most interesting, is certainly among the most remarkable in the history of diplomacy. The General's first letter complained, among other violations of the truce, of the Sultaun having stopped the messengers with letters to and from himself and Colonel Campbell. To this accusation the Sultaun answers, (in English, it should seem, written by a Frenchman,) "*It is a lie or mensonge, as I never see any letters from Bombay, Madras, or Tellicherry.*" The General, before noticing this part of the letter says,—"*You say you have supplied them from your bazâr; the signals from the fort say you have not; you will not permit an officer from the fort to inform me of its real situation; therefore I must believe Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's signals, rather than your assertions.*" "You, or your interpreter, have said, in your letter to me, that I have lied, (or made a mensonge,) permit me to inform you, Prince, that this language is not good for you to give, or me to receive; and that if I was alone with you in the desert, you would not dare to say these words to me;" and again, "You have said that I lied or made a mensonge; this is an irreparable affront to an English warrior. I tell you our customs; if you have courage enough to meet me, take 100 of your bravest men on foot, meet me on the sea shore. I will fight you, and 100 of mine will fight with yours," &c. These extracts are made from General Macleod's official

* Published narrative of the siege.

dispatches, entered on the records of Bombay which furnish no continuation of the chivalrous branch of this correspondence, nor have I been able, by other means, to trace its true termination.

The answer recorded in Tippoo's memoirs written by himself, and given at length in the preface to the first volume of this work as a specimen of his style, ought probably to be deemed a fable, of subsequent and more elaborate fabrication, destined to transmit to his successors, together with the evidence of his romantic prowess, the record of his wonderful polemic talents. The military results of the negotiation are more distinctly unfolded. It does not appear that General Macleod succeeded in the indispensable object of receiving a personal report through an officer, of the real situation of the fort, to which in the commencement of the negotiation he attached such reasonable importance. "It was agreed" says the journal, "that the garrison should have a supply of one month's provision, but on being examined, it was found to consist of no more than twenty days' rice no dholl, ghee, or salt, no refreshment for the officers allowed admittance; a great scarcity of fire wood, hospitals crowded, improper diet; and the whole of the troops in a weakly state." "In this situation most of the ships and vessels got under way on the 1st of December, and made sail to the southward." "Every officer spoke mutiny; every soldier was outrageous: the author of these observations appears to ascribe this ungenerous treatment exclusively to the Government of Bombay; if he should still be alive and should happen to peruse this narrative, he may presently see cause to qualify that opinion. "On the day" says the General "that the squadron sailed from Mangalore, Colonel Campbell was so impatient that he made the signal 1st, that he wanted to be succoured, though he received the provisions only the day before; 2d, that he could

Dec. 1.

hold out no longer which I disregarded as proceeding from the peevishness of disappointment; and on Dec. 2. the 2d. General Macleod's ship alone remaining, he repeated the signal "that he had not a month's provisions; this comforted me as much less desperate than his former signals;" "but these signals have planted a dagger in my breast."

Before proceeding in our narrative, it will be necessary to examine the reasons officially assigned for not executing, with a force which all representations concur in stating to be sufficient, the effectual relief of Mangalore. The preliminary articles of peace between the French and English, had stipulated that a term of four months should be allowed to the belligerent powers of Hindostan to accede to that pacification and the Government of Madras had notified to Tippoo's political agent, that if within four months from his reception of the invitation to peace (which they think proper to date on the 2d of August, twenty-four days after Tippoo's public acknowledgment of its reception, and thirty-four after its actual arrival) he should not have evacuated their territory, hostilities should recommence on the 2d of December, and the Government of Bombay had given corresponding instructions to their dependencies in Malabar "though," says General Macleod, "the 2d of December was so near, the ships and boats had not water to last to wait for the 2d of December was impossible, to make the attack before it, after he had consented to receive provisions, appeared to me to be contrary to good faith, to your instructions, and to the interests of the Company nevertheless, prompted by affection for the garrison, I was tempted, till Captain Mitchell (the officer commanding His Majesty's squadron) assured me, that by the Admiral's instructions he did not think himself authorized to assist me in any hostile measures, after the nabob's offer, and would act accordingly." Combining the whole of these

facts, and abstaining from remark on the unhappy combination by which water should be wanting on the precise day that it was deemed regular to commence operations, it is difficult, at this distance of time, to conceive on what grounds it could be deemed by officers of rank and experience, that a general armistice offered and observed by one belligerent during a period allowed to the other for determining whether he would or would not accede to certain conditions for *a general peace*, but notoriously broken by the party to whom it was so offered, by the flagitious, flagrant, and contemptuous violation of *a particular convention* and consequently of the general truce, could, by any construction, be deemed binding on the other, or restrain it from relieving a place reduced to the last extremity by the direct consequences of that violation and the grounds appear to be equally questionable of the impression conveyed by the tenor of this dispatch, that the spirit of a general instruction to avoid open hostility has ever been promoted by a connivance at open insult. This reasoning has been purposely confined to the subject of our previous narrative but there was another, and if possible a stronger because a more unmixed act of undisguised hostility of three hundred men who were coming from the northward to join Brigadier-General Macleod at Tellicherry in the beginning of November, two hundred were caught in a storm, driven on shore at Mangalore, and made prisoners by Tippoo, who distinctly refused to release them; and the naval and military officers thus openly insulted by a new, distinct and separate act of hostility assumed the merit of good faith in submissively sailing away although in retaliation for the similar detention of one hundred of the same number at the same time at Cannanore, the possession of a subject of Tippoo, that place was attacked and carried by Brigadier-General Macleod in the very same month, and his report to Lord

Macartney of this achievement contains, among other matter, the very curious admission, that Tippoo, at Mangalore, had "broken the cessation of arms in every possible manner."

- Dec. 2. The General sailed from Mangalore on the 2d, with the signal flying of "speedy succours arriving." In addition to the ordinary consequences of a siege, the sea scurvy now began to make great havoc among the troops, and the garrison was again on short
- 20, 27. allowance from the 20th of December. "On the 27th a vessel, with General Macleod's flag, with a snow and five boats, appeared in the road. On the 31st a supply of provisions was permitted to be landed, consisting nearly of the same quantity of rice and biscuit as before, but less beef and arrack: no refreshments were landed for the officers, nor the least intercourse allowed between the vessels and the garrison, the provisions which were landed being sent in Tippoo's boats, and under charge solely of his own people, who attentively examined each article before its admittance. The garrison, so far from conceiving this second supply as an alleviation to their sufferings, were highly dissatisfied and clamorous, and looked upon it as a most glaring
- Jan. 1. insult." "In the night of the 1st of January, Brigadier-General Macleod's vessel and boats went off. A very small part of the last supply of salt meat was eatable and the biscuit was full of vermin. The scurvy continued to rage many whose wounds had been healed, broke out afresh; and the hospital notwithstanding the sad decrease in numbers, was more
12. crowded than during the siege. On the 12th a vessel, with Brigadier-General Macleod's pendant flying, came to anchor off the bar from the southward on the return of a boat which she had dispatched on shore on the 10th, she weighed and made sail to the northward." On the 23d the crisis seemed to have arrived the hospitals were filled with two-thirds of the garrison; the deaths were from twelve to fifteen

a day a large portion of the sepoys doing duty were blind, a malady supposed to proceed from eating rice alone, without salt or any other condiment and the remainder so exhausted as frequently to drop down on parade in the act of attempting to shoulder their arms. It were equally painful and unnecessary to describe the loathsome food and cadaverous countenance of the Europeans, and the mixed aspect of resentment and despair which preceded the ultimate measure of a council of war for the surrender of the place. The articles, honourable in all respects, for the garrison, were agreed to on the 26th, but not signed until the 30th. The intermediate arrival of Colonel Gordon, second in command, with another month's provisions in two ships, made no change in conditions to which Colonel Campbell's faith was already pledged, but probably had some influence regarding their performance; for strange to tell, they were all most faithfully executed, and the remains* of the garrison reached Tellicherry. the fatigues of a tedious and harrassing service had exhausted all that was mortal of this brave and interesting officer. he was compelled by illness to quit the associates of his sufferings on the 15th of February and died on the 23d of March.

A place of contemptible strength had thus for nearly nine months from the capture of Bednore, locked up the services of the Sultaun's main army. He had, for nearly seven months of that time, wantonly and unnecessarily neutralized its efforts for the continuance of war, or the promotion of peace; he had, as we shall presently see, invited by the same means, the invasion of one of his richest provinces. The revenues of Canara, Malabar, and Coimbetoor, for the greater part of the year, were either totally lost, or

The numbers for duty, including officers, were on the 24th May, 1783, after the outposts were driven in, 412 Europeans, and 1438 natives; and on the 30th January 1784 235 Europeans, and 619 natives.

suffered great defalcation and all for the purpose of exhibiting himself to the world, foiled by a common country fort of the fourth or fifth order, and mending his military inferiority by the effects of famine. Such, it must be admitted, were the only inferences which an European reasoner would draw from these premises but Tippoo appeared to propose to himself the further object, and that eventually was not a small one, of shewing to the powers of India, in those and further transactions to be narrated, that he could dare to treat the English power with open contempt and derision ; and ultimately exhibit them as humble supplicants for peace, while suffering similar indignities, even in the persons of their ambassadors. The very respectable force collected at Tellicherry, after being withdrawn in the manner we have described, from the intended relief of Mangalore, had in the mean while been employed in the capture of Cannanore, the seat of an opulent Mahommedan chief, the acknowledged subject of Tippoo, in retaliation for the detention of some sepoy's shipwrecked on the coast ; an hostility at least as direct as the forcible relief of Mangalore could have been deemed, and in public opinion of very inferior public advantage ; and General Macleod had proceeded to Bombay, having looked into Mangalore on the 12th, as already noticed.

An incident exhibiting much of character which occurred during the siege, has for convenience of narrative, been suspended till its close. Rüstum Ali Beg, the officer who refused to give up Mangalore, to the order of Ayáz, his former superior surrendered it by a favourable capitulation, on the appearance of an adequate force under General Matthews ; and the apology of its being *an untenable post*, against a regular siege, was admitted by a committee of investigation, and not rejected by his sovereign. When, however that sovereign found himself and his French allies completely foiled by the garrison of

this untenable post, he began, very logically, to question the fact on which the apology was founded, and to declare his suspicion of the treachery of the kelledar : but when, after the expiration of six months, the appearance of relief, under General Macleod, on the 22d of November, seemed to give further proof, that this strange garrison was neither to be starved nor beaten, it was evident, that either Rûstum Ali Beg had been a traitor, or himself but a bungling soldier ; his rage exceeded all bounds, and he ordered the unfortunate kelledar, with all his principal officers, to be led out to instant execution.

Mahommed Ali, the same person whose name is familiar to the reader by the massacre of his wounded, by a signal victory achieved over the Mahrattas, and a variety of important services, was the ancient and intimate friend of Rûstum Ali. He had presided at the investigation of his conduct in the capitulation, had made the most favourable report regarding its expediency, and had repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, interposed his good offices to effect his restoration to favour. Mahommed Ali was considered by Hyder as one of the best officers in his army : he was a man of abrupt manners, described by his associates with whom I have conversed, as resembling those of the Mahomedan bigots, who, under the title of religious mendicants, and the mask of spiritual sanctity, may well be designated as rude and sturdy beggars : he was considered as a sort of privileged person, whose requests or demands, however abruptly conveyed, had scarcely ever been refused by Hyder. He was not, however, exempt from the suspicion of duplicity ; and in the war of Coromandel, he had certainly received some of the secret service-money of Sir Eyre Coote ; and had on discovery been suspended from his command. " You know," said he to Hyder, " that I am an extravagant fellow ; and as you won't give me the money I want, I take it from your enemies. If I had told you beforehand, you

have such an insatiable maw of your own, that I should never have seen a rupee of it." He was in arrest at the time of the battle of Pollilore; and after its close, while Hyder was seated to receive reports, came loaded with various trophies, which he had picked up on the field, and throwing them down, rather over Hyder than at his feet; "there," said he, "are the offerings of a traitor." Hyder smiled, and ordered his immediate restoration to command. He had with whatever design been carrying on a secret intercourse with Colonel Campbell for some time before the appearance of this relief; but this fact was unknown to Tippoo. Mahommed Ali was nearly as great a personal favourite with the son, as he had been with the father; and had presumed in a few cases to take the same liberties; and on the occasion of his friend being led out to execution, he adopted a mode which cannot be satisfactorily explained on the supposition of his having been serious in his negotiations with Colonel Campbell. Instead of marshalling his whole command, he merely paraded a single battalion, rescued the prisoner from the guard, and openly declaring that he would not suffer him to be executed, remained on the spot, crying out "justice, in the name of God!" instead of marching direct to the fort, which he might suddenly and safely have effected.

Tippoo on receiving this intelligence instantly put himself at the head of several battalions of Chélas and proceeded to the spot. Being unwilling on every account to proceed to extremities, he sent frequent messengers to *Mahommed Ali* to dissuade him from so absurd a proceeding, and among them *Booden Deen* the commandant of rocket men, one of his most intimate friends; some accounts insinuate that this person was intoxicated at the time; but it is certain, that instead of returning with the acquiescence of his friend, he remained with him: such is one of the statements of actual spectators, while another, on

the same authority, represents Mahommed Ali as having casually met the party proceeding to the place of execution; that Rústum Ali threw himself at his feet; that Mahommed Ali, the senior General in camp, desired the guard to halt, until he should explain matters to his sovereign; that while conversing on the subject in his usual rough manner, some hundred soldiers gathered round him, and it was reported to Tippoo that he was collecting his troops. However this may be, it is certain that Tippoo made a disposition for surrounding them, that only seventy-two persons remained to be surrounded, and that they were secured without the least resistance. Booden Deen was led on with Rústum Ali, and the other prisoners to public execution; which was distinctly seen from the English fleet. To execute Mahommed Ali in the presence of the army would have been too serious an experiment. Whatever may have been the amount of actual crime on this occasion, his eminent services pleaded for mercy, and almost every officer of reputation interposed the most earnest intreaties for the preservation of his life. Tippoo publicly declared his acquiescence in this request, and on the ensuing day he was sent off in irons to Seringapatam. Sheick Hummeed, a young, ambitious, and expectant officer of cavalry was charged with the escort of the prisoner; and before his departure, was called into Tippoo's tent of private audience, where he was furnished with a written order to dispatch Mahommed Ali on the road, and with verbal instructions for his farther guidance. On the second day he had the humanity to apprise Mahommed Ali of the order; and the victim, after a short period, employed in devotion, quietly acquiesced in the arrangements for strangling him without noise, by means of the common groom's cord for leading a horse. Sheick Hummeed returned in conformity to orders, surrendered his credentials, and reported that Mahommed Ali had destroyed

himself. Tippoo affected the most violent grief and indignation; accused Sheikh Hummeed of having connived at his taking poison, and ordered him into strict confinement, from which he was not released without the forms of powerful intercession after the lapse of some weeks. The latter part of the narrative is given on the personal authority in 1808, of a near relation of Sheikh Hummeed, who had died a short time before that period; and it affords some illustration of the state of moral feeling under a despot, that the narrator extolled the mildness and clemency of Tippoo in not having murdered his relation for the purpose of keeping his own secret. There was, however, a farther motive and a more important secret. Mahommed Ali had shortly before the invasion of Coromandel, conspired* with Tippoo himself for the dethronement of his father, and

* Stated on the authority of one of the conspirators.

[Kirmani (Miles: *History of the Reign of Tipu Sultan*, pp. 19-29) gives a different account of the end of Muhammad Ali. According to him Kasim Ali, Governor of Bednore, intrigued with Iyaz Khan to surrender that fort to General Matthews. On its recapture by Tipu, he was sentenced to death. Muhammad Ali interfered to prevent his execution. Tipu then sent for Muhammad Ali and argued with him, on which Muhammad Ali was disrespectful, whereupon Tipu repeated his orders. Muhammad Ali again interfered and took Kasim Ali with him on the road to Seringapatam. One Syed Humid was sent after him, and brought them back to Tipu, who ordered Kasim Ali to be instantly impaled and Muhammad Ali to be placed in a palankin and sent to Seringapatam. Tipu punished the followers of Muhammad Ali by mutilating them, and they then followed Muhammad Ali, reproaching him for having brought about their ruin. Muhammad Ali struck with remorse then killed himself by cutting out his own tongue or swallowing a diamond, and he was found dead in his palankin. Muhammad Ali is represented as having been universally known for his liberality, and having died a very poor man, having given away all his wealth to religious mendicants and numerous poor who lived on his charity. Wilks, who no doubt heard from many persons who knew the facts, gives what is more probably the correct version of what actually happened.]

although their plans had not been sufficiently matured, and were frustrated by the activity of the subsequent campaigns, the preservation of such a secret was very necessary to his own security.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Retrospect to the affairs of Malabar—Mr. Sullivan's communications with Colonel Humberstone—The talents with which he retrieved the affairs of the South—Extension of his views to an eventual invasion of Mysoor—frustrated by Sir Eyre Coote's disapproval of his plans—Consequent danger of Colonel Humberstone's operations—Mr. Sullivan opens a negotiation with Tremalrow, the supposed agent of the imprisoned Rdnee of Mysoor—Character and history of that person—Opinion of the Governor and Council—of General Stuart—Treaty ratified—its conditions—delays—Colonel Lang, accompanied by Tremalrow, besieges and takes Caroor—Hoisting the Mysoor colours deemed inexpedient—Tremalrow fails in his first conditions—Discussion of his probable means—Aravacourchy—Dindigul—Supercession of Colonel Lang—Colonel Fullarton invested with the command—receives contradictory orders from Government, and from the Commander-in-chief—takes a just view of the public interests, and risks the responsibility of disobeying the superior authority—marches on Cuddalore—On the cessation of arms ordered to return to the South—Financial difficulties—Receives intelligence of the treachery at Mangalore—moves west—takes Palgaut—communicates with General Macleod—Reasons for returning eastward—takes Coimbetoor—prepares to ascend the Ghauts—Confidence of disaffection in Tippoo's army, founded on the execution of Mahommed Ali, and a late conspiracy at Seringapatam—Account of that conspiracy—Shamia the reputed head—

Defective communications—The plot discovered on the night prior to its intended execution—Punishment of the conspirators—Discussion of the facts of the case—Colonel Fullarton influenced by these supposed proofs of disaffection, to prepare for the ascent of the Ghauts—stopped by orders from the English plenipotentiaries, proceeding to the court of Tippoo.

DURING the period of the wantonly protracted siege of Mangalore, a service which has occupied a more than usual portion of detail, as well from its peculiar character as from its direct connection with other more important events, it has seemed most convenient to suspend the narrative of those corresponding transactions which now remain to be described. We have seen that in the early part of 1782, Mr. John Sullivan,¹ political resident at Tanjour, charged with a general superintendence over the southern provinces, and unlimited powers of political communication with both coasts, had in the course of the confidential authority committed to him by his government, opened to Colonel Humberstone, recently arrived on the coast of Malabar, his views regarding that employment of the forces under his

¹ John Sullivan was one of three brothers who served in Madras. The eldest, Benjamin, arrived in India as a barrister in 1777, and was appointed successively Government Advocate, Attorney-General and a Judge of the High Court. The second brother, John, entered the Civil Service in 1765, at the age of 17, successfully tendered in 1771 for the erection of the Madras arsenal and new hospital, and afterwards served in Masulipatam and Tanjore. From 1801 to 1805, he was Under-Secretary for War in England and he survived until 1839. His younger brother, Richard Joseph, became a writer in 1768, was afterwards Secretary in the Military Department at Fort St. George and was created a Baronet in 1804. John Sullivan was appointed Resident at Tanjore in 1780. It was said he had made a large fortune at Tanjore by being concerned in providing grain, provisions and stores for the troops in the south. (Love: *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, pp. 29-354.)

command which would best promote the general purposes of the war; and there is in the whole of his extensive correspondence at that period, a manly, energetic, and enlightened grasp of mind, which leads us incessantly to regret its limited sphere of operation, and the inadequacy of his means to the accomplishment of his conceptions. The recent defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite's corps in Tanjour had produced the greatest degree of despondency in the southern provinces, and even considerable alarm for the safety of the provincial capital: but the ample authorities committed to Mr. Sullivan, were exercised on this occasion with so much energy and address, as speedily to revive the public confidence; he had even found resources for raising and equipping troops, to replace, at least numerically, the losses of the late disaster, and had reason to hope for the early organization of that force, which afterwards took the field under Colonel Lang. The plan proposed in the first instance, involved little more than the general views of the Governments of Bengal and Madras, officially communicated to him, for an efficient diversion on the coast of Malabar, which among benefits of a more general nature, would relieve the pressure and liberate the resources of the provinces committed to his charge: but on farther correspondence with Colonel Humberstone, these views extended to a combined operation by the route of Palgaut, to unite with Colonel Lang in Coimbetoor, and eventually to prosecute farther offensive operations. These ideas were approved by his own Government, and afterwards recommended to the adoption of that of Bombay, but the displeasure of Sir Eyre Coote, which has been already noticed, and his disappointment at Colonel Humberstone's landing in Malabar, gave to his opinions, if not an original bias unfavourable to the measure, at least the character of intemperate disapprobation; the landing therefore of Colonel Humberstone, approved by the Government of

Madras, but disapproved as we have seen in the first instance, by that of Bombay, and by Sir Eyre Coote, instead of being, as it might have been, rendered an efficient branch of an important combination, was left to assume the character of an insulated and eminently dangerous diversion.

Mr. Sullivan, who in consequence of the difficulty of communication, long remained ignorant of the opinions of Sir Eyre Coote, and the dissensions at Madras, sought to strengthen a plan approved by his Government, by means of such political support as circumstances might admit. For about six years past, a bramin named Tremalrow, had been residing in Tanjour, who gave himself out as "the son * of the minister of that Raja of Mysoor, who had been deposed by Hyder," that he had been deputed on a secret mission, from the imprisoned Rānee† to Lord Pigot in 1776, and on hearing of his revolutionary supercession, retired to Tanjour. In this situation he had ingratiated himself with the Raja, by whom he had been announced to Mr. Sullivan, through the medium of Mr. Swartz, whose knowledge of the languages, joined to his personal character, gave weight to every representation which he consented to convey. Tremalrow was a person of considerable talents and acquirement, and shewed himself to possess extensive information regarding the government and resources of Mysoor. It is known, that he had served in a subordinate capacity,

* A genealogy, with which I am furnished, traces the family of Tremalrow up to Govind Achāree, the Gooroo, (high priest,) of the Kings of Vijayanuggur: from him is said to have descended Tremalayangar, the minister of Chick Deo Raj. Vide vol. i. page 108, the alleged ancestor of Tremalrow. I have the authority of the brother of Tremalrow, for stating; that he is entirely unconnected with either of these families, and that the second is not lineally descended from the first, and is of a distinct subdivision of cast; but it is right to add, that these brothers were at variance.

† The personage described in vol. i, page 418.

in some of the departments of Hyder's government at first as a writer in the office of Assud Ali Khān, minister of finance, who died in 1772, and afterwards in the department of the post-office and police, under Timmapa, (the predecessor of Shāmia,) by whom he was patronized and employed on several missions; and it is understood in Mysoor, that while absent on one of these, he heard of the intended disgrace of his patron, and apprehensive of being involved in its consequences, fled from Mysoor. This person stated himself to possess political powers from his imprisoned mistress, and means of communication which enabled him to receive from her letters addressed to Lord Macartney, and Sir Eyre Coote, and political instructions for his own guidance. Original letters, addressed by Colonel Wood, Colonel Smith, and Mahommed Ali, during the war of 1767, to Madana,* Hyder's governor of Coimbetoor and Malabar, produced to support the authenticity of his present communications, were scarcely conclusive to that extent, although affording evidence of confidential access either to the supposed conspirators of 1767, or to the records of Hyder's police; and after a voluminous correspondence, Mr. Sullivan was authorised to conclude a treaty with Tremalrow, in behalf of the imprisoned Rānee; the main purport of which was, on the one part, the eventual restoration of the ancient family; and on the other, the payment of stipulated contributions, as the army should advance into the provinces of Mysoor; with other ulterior considerations reciprocally advantageous, but cautiously guarding the English Government against any inconvenient pledge. This treaty was sent for ratification to the Government of Madras, every member of which had entire confidence in the authenticity of the powers, and the reasonable prospect of success. Sir Eyre Coote, although originally inimical to the plan, had, before his departure to

* The person mentioned in page 610, &c. of volume I.

Bengal, encouraged Mr. Sullivan to persevere. General Stuart alone, after the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, a member of the Select Committee of Government, not only stated his opinion that the whole was a delusion, but converted into a source of festive merriment at his public table, this official proceeding of the secret department of the Government. The treaty was however ratified on the 27th November, 1782, subject to the confirmation of the Government-General.

We have already seen, that the death of Hyder and the recession of Tippoo, from his attack on the corps of Colonel Humberstone, to join his army in Coromandel, followed in early succession the date of these arrangements, and left an open field for the operations of Colonel Lang. The difficulty of efficient equipment, and delays of doubtful necessity, protracted the movements of this officer ; until, on receiving intelligence of the capture of Bednore, he was urged, by arguments drawn from that example, to contribute without delay to the farther distraction of the enemy's efforts : he accordingly marched, accompanied by Tremalrow, and on the 2d of April, 1783, obtained possession of the fort of Caroor, after a defence which cost about one hundred and thirty killed and wounded. The Hindoo colours of Mysoor were hoisted on the ramparts of this its frontier post in Coimbetoor, and the management of the district was committed to Tremalrow ; measures which Mr. Sullivan deemed to be premature, not only on account of giving unnecessary publicity to the connection, and thereby risking disclosures at Seringapatam, but because it had been his intention to exact the corresponding stipulation of the payment of one lac of rupees, which it appears that Tremalrow was unable immediately to accomplish. His individual private fortune might perhaps have enabled him to make this first pecuniary advance ; but independently of the evidence of this first failure, it is difficult to

conceive the existence of those secret funds, which he affirmed to be at his disposal, sufficient for the payment of the larger successive contributions, except such as he should derive from the resources of the countries to be occupied, in consequence of the advance of the army. Avaracourchy¹ was carried by assault on the 16th of April and Dindigul surrendered on the 4th of May.

At this period a promotion in His Majesty's army placed Colonel Lang below the two next officers serving under his command ; the announcement of this event was accompanied by orders for another destination, and the command was conferred on Colonel Fullarton, an officer who, although he had recently embraced the military life, exhibited an aptitude for that profession, which longer experience does not always confer, and political talents which had been improved by experience. His first operation after succeeding to the command was the capture of Daraporam² on the 2d of June, the capture of Bednore on the 3d of May was still unknown ; and the advance of Colonel Fullarton to draw off a part or the whole of the pressure on General Matthews, although with forces confessedly insufficient to encounter Tippoo's main army, was deemed of such vital importance as to justify the risk. The Government accordingly repeated their injunctions to General Stuart, to issue no orders to Colonel Fullarton except in the case of some urgent necessity, the nature of which necessity he was to explain to them, either before issuing the order, or on the date of its issue. These instructions

¹ *Avaracourchy*.—Aravakurichi, a town 17 miles south-west of Karur, in Trichinopoly District. The fort was built by a Mysore Raja. The fortifications were destroyed when the English occupied the place in 1790. It is situated on the road to Dindigul.

² *Daraporam*.—Dharapuram, 42 miles south-east of Coimbatore. It was a point of strategical importance, captured by Colonel Wood in 1768, but retaken by Haider in the same year. In 1792 the fort was dismantled. It is now a town of about 8,000 inhabitants.

were dated the 27th May, and on the 31st, General Stuart addressed to Colonel Fullarton a positive order to march towards him at Cuddalore, with the utmost expedition ; these orders obliged him to desist from farther operations and move in an opposite direction. At Trichinopoly, where the rivers were unfordable, some delay was incurred in the operation of crossing in basket boats. Arrived on the opposite bank, he experienced the full force of that miserable state of dissension, which paralyzed the public weal, in the receipt on one and the same day of farther instructions from General Stuart to march without delay to Cuddalore ; and orders no less explicit from Lord Macartney to recross the river and continue to the southward.* We have already noticed the tone of being abandoned by his own Government, which General Stuart assumed on the private receipt of this information, officially withheld from his knowledge ; but it is highly creditable to the memory of Colonel Fullarton, the personal friend of Lord Macartney, and placed by his Lordship's patronage in this honourable separate command, that he ventured to disobey. Intelligence had reached him that " Suffrein had anchored at Cuddalore after the action of the 20th of June, and that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended ; " he inferred that " the public safety could have no existence if General Stuart's army was defeated,"† and risked the responsibility of marching with every possible expedition towards Cuddalore. It is no disparagement to the merit of this public-spirited decision, that he would probably have been too late if the armistice had not intervened. On his arrival within three forced marches of the camp before Cuddalore, he received intelligence of the cessation of hostilities, the supercession of General Stuart, and his departure for Madras ; and it must be added in justice to the

* Fullarton's view, page 114.

† Ibid, page 115.

Government whose orders he disobeyed, that they afterwards expressed their approbation of his conduct.

The termination of the French war, the absence of Tippoo's army from Coromandel, and the ostensible accession to an armistice preparatory to peace, rendered disposable a large portion of the army assembled at Cuddalore, and Colonel Fullarton was ordered to return to the southward, reinforced to an extent which nearly doubled his numbers. Some intermediate operations against dependent chiefs who had exhibited a refractory spirit, during a period of public pressure, occupied the force under his command for some months ; and he had been ordered to abstain from farther hostility against Tippoo, unless a violation of the armistice or farther instructions should authorize the measure. The single fact of the native troops and their European officers under Colonel Fullarton, being at this time twelve months in arrear, and in other situations a still greater number, furnishes in itself the truest picture of public finance, and the allegiance of these troops received its highest eulogium, in the contrasted condition of His Majesty's regiments, whom an act of parliament required to be regularly paid : a ration of rice constituted the only means of subsistence to a sepoy, the very condiments necessary for rendering it fit for food, were procured on credit, from the native merchants of the camp bazars ; a class of men whose conduct during this trying war, was scarcely less meritorious than that of the troops. The personal responsibility of Mr. Sullivan, and the gentlemen charged with the superintendence of supply procured equipments not to be obtained on the broken credit of the Government ; and Colonel Fullarton, after exhausting the provisions of our own districts, in keeping his army together for future contingencies, was induced by necessity to "solicit a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractious should endanger the safety of the troops

so critically situated.”* At this exact period, (the 16th Oct. 16. of October,) an official letter from the members of the residency at Tellicherry informed him of the broad and insolent violation of the convention of Mangalore, which had induced General Macleod to depart from that place on the 9th of the same month, and determined him on moving to the westward. The topography of those countries was then imperfectly understood, and Colonel Fullarton, reducing the intermediate posts, moved on Palgaut, with the view of uniting his forces to those of General Macleod, and marching in force for the relief of Mangalore. After a difficult and tedious route, cut through the centre of a stately teak forest, which covers this immense break in the Alpine chain of the Peninsula, the army keeping close to the stupendous hills on their left, penetrated to Palgaut, and after a short but active and meritorious siege, carried the place on the 15th of November. The honourable Captain (now Nov. 15 Sir Thomas) Maitland, being on duty in the trenches, had taken advantage of a heavy fall of rain, to drive the enemy from the covered way which was not palisaded, and pursuing the fugitives through the first and second gateway, struck such a panic into the garrison, as to cause its immediate surrender.¹

* Fullarton's view, page 154.

¹ Colonel Fullarton, in his march to the south through Madura and Tinnevely Districts, had been successful in recovering arrears of tribute from the Sivaganga Raja, and almost one and a-half lakhs of rupees from the Panjalamkurichi Raja; the latter was distributed among his troops. He returned from the south and at Dindigul was met by two strong detachments from the main army. This raised his force to 13,600 men of whom 2,050 were Europeans. He then marched to Palghaut, through the Anaimalai forests. "We had to force our way through a forest, twenty miles in depth, extending thirty miles across the pass of Palghaut. . . ." "The frequent ravines required to be filled up before it was possible to drag the guns across them; innumerable large trees which obstructed the passage required to be cut down and drawn out of the intended track, and then the whole road was to be formed before the carriages could pass.

After communicating with Tellicherry, it was found that it was incapable of furnishing the expected provisions and stores, that the troops under General Macleod could not be provided with a field equipage in less than two months; and that the whole extent of 500 miles to be traversed, like every narrow stripe of low country, interposed between an elevated range of mountains and the sea, was intersected by a succession of rivers, ravines, and other impediments, which rendered hopeless a rapid advance in that direction. The possession of a respectable post of communication between Malabar and Coimbeetoor, was however in itself an important acquisition; provisions were furnished in profusion, by the zamorin and his Nairs, eager to be emancipated from Mahomedan tyranny; and not only on this account, but with reference to the alternative of ascending towards Seringapatam, by the pass of Gujelhatty, the occupation of Palgaut was, if not indispensable, at least of eminent utility: and, on a comparison of all the routes presented to Colonel Fullarton's choice, he assigned the preference to the last stated, and moved for that purpose to the capital of Coimbeetoor, on the 26th of November. Independently of a respectable field force, comprizing a total of 13,636 men, Colonel Fullarton had motives of confidence in the success of his enterprise, founded on the supposed state of the enemy's troops. The death of Mahommed Ali, and

The brigades were distributed to succeed each other at intervals, preceded by pioneers in order to clear what the advanced body had opened for the guns and stores that were to move under cover of the rear division. While we were thus engaged, an unremitting rain, extremely unusual at that season, commenced. The ravines were filled with water, the paths became slippery, the bullocks lost their footing, and the troops were obliged to drag the guns and carriages across the whole forest." The sum of one and three-quarters of a lakh of rupees were found in Palghaut, which was divided amongst the troops in consideration of their necessities. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, pp. 85-93.)

the executions before Mangalore, were reported and considered as the result of an extensive disaffection, and a recent conspiracy had occurred at Seringapatam, which will require a separate recital.

Whatever doubts may have been entertained of the authenticity of the documents produced, and the communications reported by Tremalrow, in 1782, while Hyder was still alive, there can be none of his correspondence with the members of this conspiracy, and of the having aided in promoting a crisis, which if well combined, might have produced the most decisive results. To trace with any certainty the secret history of a combination, every member of which who was discovered, or even strongly suspected, was put to death, and every subsequent mention of which was treason, would, in every instance, be an arduous attempt; and the difficulty in this case is augmented by other circumstances. On the restoration of the Hindoo dynasty in 1799, Tremalrow was one of two candidates for the office of minister, and the effects of rival pretension on the principals as well as their adherents, gave plain and abundant cause for distrusting the statements of each. Seyed Mahommed Khân, the kelledar of Seringapatam, who discovered the conspiracy, and directed the executions, became a pensioner of the India Company, and was totally independent of every influence but theirs. His written and personal narratives, the published journals, and oral information of English prisoners, and conversations with numerous witnesses of the overt facts, have been the principal checks on a secret narrative, obtained by the author under circumstances which precluded the ordinary means of scrutiny.

The advancement of *Shdmia* to be minister of the post-office and police in 1779 has been stated, and we have seen that the influence of this office had even a wider range, and more perfect organization than can readily be apprehended by the subject of a free state. The secret terrors of his active admini-

stration had even been felt by his colleagues, and produced a jealousy which sought for his removal. It was sufficient for this purpose to give obscure hints of the good fortune of his family, the means of accumulating wealth, and the power to expose every secret but their own; these insinuations were not long concealed from the emissaries of *Shâmia*; but at what period he began to contemplate revolutionary plans has not been ascertained. Shortly after Hyder's death, he perceived the early certainty of ruin, and veiled his projects with augmented zeal in the service of his sovereign, whom he of course accompanied to Mangalore. His brother *Rungeia* was at the head of the department at Seringapatam, and the name of the relation is mentioned, whom he sent from Mangalore to concert with his brother, the plans of proceeding. At the period of his arrival *Singeia* the provincial head of the department at Coimbetoor, was on business at Seringapatam, and with Narsing Row (Choukee Nevees) a sort of muster-master, pay-master, and town-major, was called to the secret consultations. The Hindoo Raja was to be nominally restored, and *Shâmia*, *Rungeia*, and *Narsing Row*, were to form the administration; the last named person was included, on the ground of his undertaking the actual execution of the plot, for destroying the kelledar, with Assud Khân, and the whole of his faithful battalion, and seizing the gates and the treasury. The communications with the English army which was to ascend at the period agreed, was left to *Rungeia*, through the medium of *Singeia* at Coimbetoor; all the Hindoo, and a few Mahommedan commandants of corps were gained, and sworn to secrecy; the English prisoners were to be released, and placed under the command of General Matthews; and *Rungeia* had for the first time visited the English prison, about ten days before the intended explosion; had enquired into their wants, and desired them to be of good cheer. It was

deemed necessary that an instrument should be prepared of sufficient authenticity to convince the English of the nature and extent of the conspiracy, and to this the seals and signatures were obtained of the persons already named, of the commandants of corps, and of *Souberaj*, ostensibly the representative of the imprisoned royal family, but in fact a descendant, by the female line, of the late Dulway Deo Raj.* It is not clear from the narrative whether this instrument ever reached the English army, but intelligence from *Singeia* at Coimbatore gave assurances of that army being ready to advance at the concerted notice whenever it should be given. The narrative states the attempt to have been premature, but that *Rungeia* considered farther delay to be hazardous, on account of the number of persons entrusted with the secret, and the danger of treacherous or accidental discovery: he therefore pressed *Narsing Row* to strike the blow, and every thing was prepared for nine o'clock on the 24th of July,† 1783. It was the pay-day of Assud Khân's and some other Mahomedan corps, he would be present to superintend its distribution to the corps in waiting and without arms at the Cutcherry,¹ where the kelledar always attended before the appointed hour; the treasury attendants, the corps of pioneers employed in moving the treasure, a body of jetties² who had the

* Stated on the authority of Seyed Mahommed Khân.

† Seyed Mahommed states eight months, (lunar,) after his appointment, which would bring it to about the first week in August. I take the date in the text, from the journal published in "Memoirs of the War in Asia, 1789;" but adverting to the restraints under which that journal was kept, it may not be exact to a day.

¹ An office of administration; a court house. Hindustani: *Kachert*.

² "The Jatti or Jetti, also called Mushtiga in the western districts, are professional athletes or wrestlers or Malla." A number are maintained in connection with the Palace. (Lewis Rice; *Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 257.)

guard of that part of the palace, were all provided with daggers, to commence the work with the destruction of the kelledar, and his attendants; while large bodies of Hindoo peons were ready to fall, in every direction, on the unarmed Mahommedans. Matters being thus arranged, Seyed Mahommed Khan on returning from the hall of business to his house on the night of the 23d, was accosted in a whisper by an obscure individual, who said he had something of importance to communicate; and on hearing his tale, he was enabled in the course of the night to seize a dispatch prepared for transmission to the English army; to secure the principal conspirators, and to adopt measures for defeating the intended explosion. Narsing Row made a full disclosure, in the hope of pardon, which he did not receive; and all the minor agents confessed to the degree of their actual information. As an example to intimidate, a considerable number of the conspirators were immediately executed, by the horrible process of being loosely tied to an elephant's foot, and dragged in that state through the streets of the town. Tippoo's orders were required for the disposal of the heads of the conspiracy, and on the arrival of these orders, *Narsing Row*, *Souberaj*, and the heads of corps, and of the jetties, were executed. *Shamia* was sent in irons from Mangalore, and with his brother *Rungeia* was exposed to every contumely in separate iron cages, where they are said to have persisted to the last in denying their participation in the crime; although the torture extracted considerable treasures. Many adherents of their family continue to this day to interpret all the overt facts, into a pretended conspiracy contrived by the other ministers; on which most improbable supposition, *Narsing Row* must be considered as the voluntary victim of the calumny. *Shitau*, the former kelledar of Seringapatam, superseded by Seyed Mahommed, was seized on the first alarm, simply on conjecture; and was released at the close of the

investigation on a perfect conviction of his innocence. Neither evidence, nor the unlimited use of the torture, had directed the slightest suspicion towards the imprisoned Rānee; it is just possible, that she might afterwards have been induced by the political rivalry to which we have adverted, to assume a disguise in her confidential conversations with the late Sir Barry Close, and with the author; but the absence even of suspicion, when so strongly excited by circumstances, added to her uniform and consistent assurances, convinced them both, of her entire ignorance of every part of the correspondence conducted in her name. But that conviction must not be understood to impugn the reality of Tremalrow's projects for the subversion of the actual government. Long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Hindoo prince had been kept in ignorance of acts purporting to be his own, as profound as was the ignorance of the imprisoned Rānee in 1783; and simulated authority had been the familiar habit of the court.

On a fair consideration of all the authentic facts which have been disclosed, we must ascribe to the conspirators at Seringapatam, a precipitancy rendered necessary by circumstances; and a more confident assertion for the encouragement of their friends, than they were justified in making, regarding the immediate advance of the English army; for we cannot ascribe to Tremalrow, the imprudence and impolicy of having encouraged that expectation, at the particular period when he knew the English to be restrained from action by the armistice of Cuddalore, when Colonel Fullarton was preparing to march from Trichinopoly, (as he did on the 4th of August,) in the opposite direction of Sevagunga. In what manner the conflicting pretensions of Tremalrow and Shāmia, might in the event of success have been adjusted, it may not now be necessary to conjecture.

Such, however, were the two circumstances, namely the execution of Mahommed Ali, at Mangalore,

and the detected conspiracy at Seringapatam, which induced Colonel Fullarton to infer a disaffection in Tippoo's army favourable to the success of his enterprise; but there may be ground for questioning the accordance of this inference with the opinion raised by some authorities to the dignity of an axiom, that every detected conspiracy, instead of weakening, has a direct tendency to strengthen the hands of a despot; and exclusively of these two examples, there was certainly no sufficient ground for crediting the existence of defection, sufficient to form the ground of political action. The confidence of Colonel Fullarton was better founded, in officers eminently distinguished for talents and professional experience, and troops of an excellent quality, although containing too large a proportion of young soldiers. He had arrived as we have seen at Coimbetoor, on the 26th Nov. 28 of November, and on the 28th, two days before his intended advance, he received instructions from plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, on their route to negotiate at Tippoo's court, directing him, not only to suspend his intended operations, but unconditionally to abandon all his conquests and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th of the preceding July.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Preliminary events which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries—Advances from Lord Macartney before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel—his messenger returns, accompanied by an envoy, at first without powers, and afterwards equivocally conferred—Conferences broken off—resumed in consequence of the peace in Europe, the armistice of Cuddalore, and the invitation of Monsieur Bussy—Tippoo sends Apajee Ram—His demand of Aydz as the slave and property of Tippoo—Discussion of the conditions of a treaty—Apajee skilfully suggests the deputation of English ambassadors to Tippoo's court, to obviate the delays occasioned by reference—Real intention—Messrs. Staunton and Sadlier named—Tippoo's pretended accession to the treaty of Salbey—Plenipotentiaries arrive at the camp of Seyed Sahab, at Arnee—Prompt order to Colonel Fullarton, to abandon his conquests and retire—Examination of its expediency—Colonel Fullarton, knowing the state of facts at Mangalore—waits farther orders before retiring—Seyed Sahab professing to be in full march on his return, stops—Negotiations—Proposed conditions inconsistent with these hasty orders—Plenipotentiaries differ in opinion—a third added to the number, Mr. Huddleston—Government of Madras review their situation—Erroneous conclusions—Direct Colonel Fullarton to obey the order of the plenipotentiaries, literally—he obeys at the moment that Tippoo's troops continued to occupy Coromandel—and furnishes Tippoo with direct excitements to persevere at Mangalore—Swartz the

missionary—his acute observations—The troops scarcely in cantonment, before the Madras government sees its error, and countermands the order—Journey of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary—by dangerous routes to prevent the stipulated communication with the prisoners—Contemptuous deceptions—Arrive near Mangalore a few days after the evacuation—Gibbets erected in front of their tents—General Macleod arrives in the offing—Communication prohibited—He considers them as prisoners—Alleged intention to escape—Mysterious silence—discussed—The escape prevented by the officer commanding the escort—Reasons of Tippoo for a separate peace with the English, independently of the treaty of Salbey—Conditions—Cautionary retention of two places on each side—Cannanore, one of these places, restored by Brigadier-General Macleod, in violation of the treaty and the orders of the Commissioners—Prisoners detained contrary to the treaty—Interesting fate of the boys—Contrasted conduct of the officer commanding the escort, and of the Commissioners—Two examples—Treatment of the prisoners—by Hyder—by Tippoo—General description of their condition—Europeans—Sepoys—THE GOOD SEYED IBRAHIM.

THE preliminary communications which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries, had commenced at so early a period as the 12th of February, before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel. Lord Macartney had, with the concurrence of his council, engaged a bramin, proceeding on his devotions to Conjeveram, to communicate with some of his friends in the Mysorean service, and endeavour to obtain, through their means, a better treatment of the English prisoners, and through the same medium to sound Tippoo's dispositions regarding a separation from his French allies, and a treaty of peace with

the English nation. It was obvious that nothing could divest this advance of that apparent anxiety for peace, so dangerous in Asiatic diplomacy, and so strongly deprecated by Mr. Hastings. The bramin (named Sambajee, an agent at Madras on the part of the raja of Tanjour,) was too full of self-importance to decline the consequent opportunity of appearing at Tippoos durbar in the character of English envoy; and that prince, glad of an opportunity to provide against unfavourable contingencies, and to ascertain the grounds on which he could command peace, directed a person, named Sreenowasrow, to accompany Sambajee on his return to Madras; at first without any written powers, but afterwards furnished with an equivocal letter, addressed to himself under Tippoos seal, authorising him to confer on the subject of peace. The conferences were opened by this man with the demand of reparation for the everlasting grievance of the fraud at Trichinopoly, in 1752; and answered by reference to the subsequent treaty of 1769. The principle of mutual restitution seemed likely to be the basis to which each would ultimately assent. The difficulty of Tippoos separation from the French, and abandoning them to be overwhelmed by the superior power of the English, was met by the proposition of returning them in safety to the Isle of France. In this state of the negotiation, Sreenowasrow returned to his master for further instructions; and these abortive advances were suffered by Tippoos to rest in contemptuous silence, until, on the occasion of the cessation of hostilities between the French and English at Cuddalore, on the 2d July, in consequence of the peace in Europe, Lord Macartney, in conformity to the tenor of his agreement with Monsieur De Bussy addressed a letter to Tippoos, inviting him to accede to the conditions provisionally fixed for his acceptance, and announcing a suspension of all hostility on the part of the English, until his answer should be obtained.

The Sultaun's reply, received on the 5th of October, was full of amicable profession, at the very moment that he considered his plans for starving Mangalore, to be approaching maturity. Apajee Ram, whose diplomatic talents have been already noticed,* was the envoy charged with this letter, and the customary credentials. His demands were as usual, at first extravagant, but gradually sunk into an apparent assent to the principle of mutual restitution of prisoners and places. Of prisoners the English had actually none, but a strenuous attempt was made so to consider *Aydz* the late governor of Bednore, who was specially demanded by the Sultaun not only as a prisoner, but as his domestic slave and private property. It would not have been difficult to satisfy the mind of such a man as Apajee Ram, that so gross a violation of faith and hospitality was a hopeless demand, but he could not decide, in opposition to official instructions, without reference. He next attempted the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, and this proposition was rejected on the ground of past experience, regarding the treaty of 1769, which was stated to have furnished to Hyder, a *pretence* for the present war. Difficulties purposely created, were made to prolong the time, until Apajee Ram suggested, with every appearance of frankness, that the frequent references which his master's habits of distrust compelled him to make, would continue to protract the negotiations, and that he saw no mode so likely to accelerate the conclusion of peace, as the deputation to the Sultaun's court of two gentlemen of character, sufficiently masters of the views of their government, to render reference unnecessary.

This proposition which the Government describe as "fully meeting their wishes" was certainly no less acceptable to the Sultaun, from whom it pro-

ceeded, and who had no object so much at heart, as to exhibit the English to the powers of Hindostan, in the posture studiously assigned to them in his work of *suppliants for peace*. Mr. Sadlier, second in council, and Mr. Staunton, private secretary to Lord Macartney, were the commissioners named, and they departed from Madras on the 9th of November, with Nov. 9.

prospects of success materially improved, by information received immediately previous to their departure, of Tippoo's declared accession to the treaty of Salbey, signified by himself in his letters to the Pêshwa and Sindea. On the 19th, they arrived in the camp 19. near Arnee, of Meer Saheb commanding the Sultaun's forces still in Coromandel: and the order to Colonel Fullarton already described to abandon his conquests and retire within the limits possessed on the 26th of July, was promptly dated on the succeeding day. It might be reasonably concluded, that a 20. British officer of some intellect would not recommence hostilities on doubtful information, but having commenced, it would seem to be sufficient for the purposes of amicable negotiation that they should simply cease; that their origin should be investigated, and if groundless that reparation should be promised; but unconditionally to abandon, without any investigation, the fruits of such hostilities, appeared like gratuitously throwing away, at the commencement of a negotiation, the best materials for bringing it to a successful conclusion. The commissioners however deemed themselves at liberty to act upon the assurances of Indian diplomatists, in opposition to the grounds of belief which have been stated, and assumed as the foundation of their orders "that the cessation of arms appeared to have been disturbed in partial instances by accidental circumstances, and without any authority from government on either side;" and these orders, so founded, reached Colonel Fullarton at a period (28th of November) when he 28. was in possession of official advices from Brigadier-

General Macleod, stating that he had actually sailed, for the purpose of forcing his way, at all events, into Mangalore, in consequence of the infraction which he had personally witnessed of the armistice and convention with Colonel Campbell. Colonel Fullarton treated these orders with a wise combination of military feeling and political prudence : he knew that they were founded upon gross deception ; and although he testified obedience by causing hostility to cease, he declared his determination to retain his conquests until he should be furnished with further orders. Meanwhile Seyed Saheb, who professed to be evacuating Coromandel, and to be in full march to Seringapatam, stopped ostensibly for the celebration of a festival, not twenty-five miles from the ground near Arnee, where the commissioners found him, at a place (*Calispalk*¹) which, although on the actual road to the pass of Changama, yet relatively to the provinces of Coromandel, is a more central position than that which he had left : a discussion intervened which it is difficult to reconcile with the hasty orders, of which we have ventured to question the propriety. The early release of the numerous English captives in the prisons of Mysoor was of course a main object of attainment ; and the commissioners desired to stipulate, that all places to the eastward of the ghauts should first be reciprocally restored, and both parties be satisfied on these points before ascending into Mysoor : that the release of all the English prisoners should then ensue, and finally that on the English being satisfied regarding the execution of this condition, the restoration of all places taken by the English on the western coast should close the process of reciprocal restitution. To this last essential condition the plenipotentiaries of Tippoo Sultaun, raised a variety of objections, they demanded

¹ *Calispalk*.—Kalasapakam, North Arcot District, 20 miles south of Arni, on the railway line from Villupuram to Vellore.

that the surrender of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offered "to pledge their faith that the delivery of the prisoners should immediately follow the evacuation of Mangalore." The first commissioner, Mr. Sadlier, declared his readiness to assent to this proposal, observing that he "deemed farther security to be unnecessary, beyond that pledge on which the commissioners themselves had committed their own persons, to the disposal of Tippoo Sultaun *without hostage*." The second commissioner, Mr. Staunton, feeling perhaps the improvidence of his first concession, and beginning more justly to appreciate this "pledge of faith," positively declined his assent to the surrender of Mangalore, and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner, to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the first commissioner in the form of an official message to Seyed Saheb. These adverse opinions could no otherwise be decided, than by reference to their superiors, who determined in favour of Mr. Staunton, and to provide against their probable recurrence, a third member, Mr. Huddleston, was added to the commission. Under these circumstances, and with this degree of information before them, the Government of Madras proceeded, on the 8th of December, to review their actual condition. Ruined finances, broken credit, and a supreme Government reposing no confidence, and supposed still to meditate their suspension, threw a gloom over all their deliberations: they had already determined that the release of prisoners should precede the restitution of Mangalore; and instead of considering whether an armistice had been violated, and by whom; and whether a national insult had been received or repaired, or retaliated; they declared, that in the distressed condition of their affairs, it was not worth while continuing the war for the possession of Mangalore; that a peace ought to be made with Tippoo, on the ground of each party retaining their

Dec. 8.

former possessions, and no more ; (a point which had been decided long before the appointment of commissioners; and apparently constituting no part of the question before them) and they determined that Colonel Fullarton should be required to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution, enjoined by the commissioners ; a conclusion apparently depending on the question which they had evaded, and not on that which they had considered. The Colonel, having received this determination, and the reiterated orders of the commissioners, evacuated the whole of his conquests, and retired within the prescribed limits, at the very time that Tippoo's troops remained in force in Coromandel, occupying to the southward a line of posts, north of the Coleroon, from Terriore to Arialore, and Palamcotta to the sea ; and in the centre, the main body of Seyed Saheb, instead of a pretended departure with the commissioners, continued to occupy all that he held on their arrival, with the exception of the ruins of Chittapet, already adverted to, without any part of its district. It were difficult for human ingenuity to devise more direct excitements than were thus held forth to Tippoo Sultaun, to persevere in his barbarian conduct at Mangalore. On Colonel Fullarton's first march from Coimbetoor, he was met by Mr. Swartz, the person whose mission to Hyder in 1779, has been related : he had consented to act as interpreter to the commissioners, and was proceeding for that purpose, by the route of Gijelhutty, with the view of joining them at Seringapatam ; but in conformity to the system of universal insult which Tippoo deemed requisite to his views, Mr. Swartz was soon afterwards stopped at the bottom of the ghaut, and was never permitted to proceed. On meeting Colonel Fullarton, and learning the orders under which he was acting, this excellent and venerable preacher of peace and christian forbearance, in spite of a simplicity in the ordinary affairs of life sometimes amounting to

weakness,* thus describes his astonishment. "Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these two rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast? The Colonel said, I cannot help it." Such, indeed, was the general tone of humiliation, that even Colonel Fullarton a few days before, had submitted to have a Captain and a small advanced guard cut off, and to be satisfied with a lame explanation: "this affair," says Mr. Swartz, "was quite designed to disperse the inhabitants, who came together to cut the crops, and to assist the English:" but Colonel Fullarton's distribution of his troops into cantonments, in obedience to these reiterated orders, were not yet completed, before the Government pronounced the most unqualified sentence on their own precipitation and credulity by ordering him "not only to retain possession of Palgaut, should that fort not have been delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation!!" Jan. 26. 1784.

In the meanwhile, the commissioners had been proceeding on their journey in a style exactly corresponding to the general character of those transactions; all preliminary principles having been fixed before their departure from Madras, they were considered as proceeding to the Sultaun's court, merely to adjust the definitive details; and conformably to this view, it was distinctly agreed, that in traversing Mysoor, they were to have personal intercourse with the English prisoners, and an opportunity of delivering to them, stores of clothing and other requisites, which were provided and carried for that special purpose; and arrangements were made for a regular

* See his praise of Hyder, for converting his young captives into slaves.

and speedy transmission of letters, to and from the commissioners, in all directions. They had scarcely passed the frontiers, before they discovered all communication to be cut off. Partly with the intent of avoiding the common route within sight of Bangalore, containing a considerable depôt of prisoners, and partly for the purpose of contemptuous exhibition, they were led over routes, impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden, in which several of the camels were destroyed. As they advanced farther, they were met by a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, assuring them that all the prisoners had, with a view to the arrangements for their liberation, been removed to the frontiers, from Seringapatam (from which place unhappily no prisoner had been removed, except for the purpose of assassination,) and inviting them to continue their route to his camp at Mangalore. Submitting to a violation of the preliminary evidence of sincerity, stipulated to be evinced in a free communication with the prisoners, they were permitted to proceed as fast and no faster than the progress of famine at Mangalore; when only twenty miles distant from that place, the evacuation took place, and they were met by a letter from the Sultaun, informing them, that at the earnest desire of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore. Arrived and encamped near the place, every successive interview with Tippoo Sultaun or his ministers, presented such various and contradictory views of his sentiments and intentions, that no judgment could be formed of the probable result of their mission, excepting that in a character, hitherto held sacred by the most savage nations, they were destined to fill the measure of his barbarism, by secret assassination, or open murder. Three gibbets were erected, opposite to the tent doors of each of the commissioners, and every species of indignity was studiously practised; a post dependent on Honour, (Onore,) was carried by surprise; another open hostility was committed, by

cutting up a subaltern's detachment from Colonel Fullarton's army, and even refusing to release the officer, who was desperately wounded. Distinct intelligence was received of the murder of General Matthews, and several other officers in prison, and nothing seemed wanting to the catastrophe, but the practical employment of the gibbets.

Shortly after the arrival of the commissioners at Mangalore, two Company's ships from Bombay, on one of which Brigadier-General Macleod was embarked, anchored in the roads, and the slight additional indignity was imposed, of interdicting all communication, with rare exceptions, so managed as to make the rule more insulting. General Macleod very reasonably declared, that until an unlimited intercourse was permitted, he would consider them as imprisoned men whose orders were of no force, and before his departure to assume the command of his troops, he sent on shore a messenger with a letter addressed to the Sultaun, and another to the commissioners, for the purpose of bringing this question to a decided issue: the messenger was detained—he had no answer, and he sailed. A letter dated 1st of March from the commissioners to the Mar. 1 commander of the Company's ship has the following passage, "the circumstance (the difficulty of sending a boat) will be made known by the signal to be settled with the bearer, as in the former case, and on such signal being made, you will please to order one of the Patamar boats to anchor about four miles to the northward of your present station, and as much in-shore as possible, in the hope that some communication may be effected by that means from the beach. The Patamar must have an intelligent European on board, and one of the ship's boats must accompany her, and must endeavour to come to the beach, on seeing a gentleman near it on horseback, holding as a signal a white handkerchief in his hand." "The adventure of the white handkerchief,"

says General Macleod in his observations on this Mar. 9. letter written on the 9th of March, "was an intended escape of the commissioners from Tippoo, leaving behind them their baggage, retinue," &c. It is remarkable that no intimation is to be found in the official record of the proceedings of the commissioners of the existence of an intention to escape, which is thus affirmed by General Macleod, who must have conversed with the bearer of the letter and the commander to whom it was addressed. It is not so much the question of propriety, as of apparent mystery, that has induced the author to institute farther enquiry, and the following narrative is founded on high and incontrovertible living authority.

It has been seen, that Mr. Swartz the interpreter provided for the commissioners, was forcibly prevented from joining them; neither they, nor any of their diplomatic suite, understood either of the country languages; and the native interpreter, *Vencaty Rangia*, was one day taken ill, and unable to officiate; under these circumstances, the commissioners had recourse to a menial servant of the officer commanding the escort, to be the medium between the two states in this important diplomacy. On the evening of the same day, this man came to his master's tent, in the greatest apparent alarm, said, that he had intelligence of the most urgent importance to communicate, and even begged that the candles might be extinguished, to prevent observation. These precautions being taken, he proceeded to relate, that after being kept standing for several hours, interpreting between the commissioners and Tippoo's ministers, finding himself much fatigued, he lay down without the tent wall; and after the dismissal of strangers, and the retirement of the senior commissioner, he heard the two other commissioners discussing and arranging a plan for removing on board ship, where they would have at least the advantage of personal safety in conducting their negotiations; the arrangements for embarka-

tion were to be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and to be adjusted on the ensuing day, by the surgeon, Mr. Falconer, by means of a pretext for getting on ship-board, which was also related; the first commissioner was only to be apprized of it, by their calling at his tent on their way to the boat, and giving him the option of accompanying them; the escort and attendants were to be left to their fate, and the only persons in the secret were to be the two commissioners, and Mr. Falconer, (the memory of the living narrator does not enable him to state whether the secretary was also included). A faithful service of many years, and a considerable portion of sagacity, gave weight to the statement of the servant, and his master retired to rest, and to reflect on what was proper to be done. The next morning, at breakfast, Mr. Falconer appeared to be suddenly taken ill; it was necessary that he should be sent on ship-board to be bled. A boat was applied for and obtained for this special urgency, and he embarked. All this minutely accorded with the plan reported by the servant on the preceding night. The officer distinctly saw the first part of the project in operation, and immediately after breakfast assembled the military officers of the escort, consisting of four besides himself, including the aide-de-camp of the commissioners. He apprised them of all the facts with which he was acquainted; stated his own determination not to desert his men; but observed to them, that the case was peculiar, and nearly hopeless; that they were all bound by ties of affinity or of friendship to one or other of the commissioners; and that in circumstances so desperate, he should exact no military obedience, but leave to each the free option of acting as he should think expedient. All instantly declared their determination to adhere to their duty, and obey his orders, whatever they might be. He awaited the return of the surgeon in the evening, and the following conversation ensued:—"Well, Falconer, how has the bleeding

answered? I hope you feel better?—*F.* Very much better; I was so sea-sick going on board, that bleeding was found unnecessary.—*Officer*, I am glad to hear that you are so much recovered; but when does the boat come on shore to carry off the commissioners?—*F.* (turning pale) What boat?—*Officer*, I could not have suspected you of active concurrence in a plan for deserting your friends.—*F.* In God's name how came you acquainted with it?—*Officer*, That is another affair: it is enough for you that I know it; (and then recited the particulars of the plan.)—*F.* It is too true, and I have arranged with Captain Scott, but I am not at liberty to tell you the particular time.—*Officer*, Then you may proceed, if you choose, to the commissioners, and report to them, as the sequel of your arrangement, that I am here to obey all their lawful orders; but also to do my duty to the troops committed to my protection. If there be any embarkation, I hope to see the last private into the boats; but my sentinels have orders to give me precise information, and I have a party saddled in the lines ready to seize as a deserter any and every person who shall attempt a *clandestine* escape.—The surgeon departed, and shortly afterwards the officer commanding the escort was sent for, and privately assured by the second commissioner, that "there was no intention of effecting an escape, or of any person going on board ship."

The negotiation, in the meanwhile, was assuming alternately every intermediate aspect from hope to despair. To the observations already noticed regarding the uniform impolicy of ostensible advances for peace to an Indian power, Mr. Hastings added the opinion, that the head of Colonel Fullarton's army would have been the proper station of the commissioners; and the same remark had, without communication, been made before their departure by Mr. Sullivan, whose public and private correspondence exhibits a steady and uniform reprobation of the

whole course of these disgraceful negotiations. Tippoo perceived, by the active military preparations in every quarter, that the Government of Madras had a poignant sense of the consequences of its errors. He knew, that in consequence of his feigned assent and practical rejection of the terms of the treaty of Salbey, arrangements between the English and Mahrattas, for a combined attack on his dominions were in forwardness, and; if commenced, could not terminate but in a joint peace; and even arrogance did not extinguish the reflection, that his designs against the Mahrattas would be most conveniently effected when they should be unaided. The terror of his name had been sufficiently established, by the submission of the English to every form of derision, humiliation and contempt; and at a period when imagination could scarcely picture an additional insult, he condescended, on the 11th of March, to Mar. 11 sign the long pending treaty of peace.¹

Treachery and infamy had removed from the arena the object which divided the opinions of the ambassadors in the commencement of their mission. Tippoo had almost every thing to concede, because on his side, every thing had been treacherously held; and on the other, almost every thing had been gratuitously abandoned; and a postponement in the mutual delivery of two places on each side, until all the other restitutions should be completed, was

¹ Barrow in his *Life of Lord Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 202-207, defends Lord Macartney in his dealings with Tipu. But he admits that the Governor was badly served by his Commissioners. "Yet honourable and beneficial as the terms of the Carnatic peace were, it was a general opinion that, had Mr. Staunton, with whom private considerations always yielded to the public interest, proceeded alone, his great abilities, temper, and firmness would have procured still more advantageous terms. In his colleague, Mr. Sadlier, he had to encounter much petulance, unsteadiness and a timidity which sometimes rendered him ridiculous, and which did not escape the observation of the ministers of Tippoo Saheb."

treated by him as a shew of theoretical reciprocity, proceeding merely from his lenity and compassion. The two places retained by Tippoo were Amboor¹ and Sautgur²; by the English, Dindigul and Cannanore; and it was the professed object to hold them until all the prisoners should be released, and all the captive inhabitants of Coromandel permitted to return. Cannanore had been an object of some discussion during the negotiations. Brigadier-General Macleod, had, without any powers, concluded a treaty with the Beebee (Dowager Chief,) and although the authority had been disavowed, and the instrument annulled, yet, as emancipation from Tippoo's authority, had been one of its provisions, it was deemed expedient to restore the place to the person from whom it had been taken, and Tippoo's scruples were satisfied, by stipulating, that the surrender should be made in the presence of one of his officers, without troops. A copy of the treaty was delivered to Brigadier-General Macleod for his information and guidance, and he was ordered to hold Cannanore, with a strong garrison, until he should receive information of the release of all the prisoners. On the 17th of April, however, without receiving any such information, and without complying with the express provisions of the treaty, the words "Cannanore is evacuated," is stated by the Government to be the only intelligence or explanation they ever received from Brigadier-General Macleod: the breach of faith was loudly represented by Tippoo, and the reparation was offered, of even recapturing the place, for the purpose of effecting its restitution

¹ *Amboor*.—Ambur, a town in the Vellore Taluq, North Arcot District, on the south bank of the Palar river. The fort commands a pass into the Carnatic. In 1749 Anwar-u-din was defeated here.

² *Sautgur*.—Satghur (seven hills with forts on them) in the Gudiyattam Taluq, North Arcot District. The Nawabs of the Carnatic had large gardens here famous for oranges and mangoes.

in terms of the treaty : great importance was attached on this occasion, to the security which it afforded for the liberation of the prisoners and inhabitants ; and the Government, on discovering abundant ill faith on this head, even announced to Tippoo Sultaun, that they would retain Dindigul, until the residue should be released. Exclusively of all artificers, without exception, and about two hundred other persons, who from terror or compulsion had submitted to be enrolled in his service, an account was officially rendered to Government of about fifty names, chiefly boys, who had been forcibly subjected to the painful rite* of an abhorred religion, and many of them instructed to perform as singers and dancers for the future amusement of the tyrant. Some of these unhappy beings had been occasionally placed in situations to observe and be observed by the English prisoners in Seringapatam ; the journal of an officer describes them as shedding a flood of tears, while attempting by gestures to describe their situation ; and imagination may revert to the story of a more ancient people for the picture of their sorrows : " They that wasted us, required of us mirth ; saying, sing us one of the songs of Zion : How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land ? " But neither the fate of these interesting captives, nor of the immense mass of a deported population, officially known to be forcibly detained, prevented the final humiliation of surrendering Dindigul.

Two of the commissioners returned to Madras by sea, the third by land, and the officer commanding the escort was officially charged with the arrangements for the reception of the prisoners to be released, in virtue of the provisions of the treaty. The spirit and decision of this officer obtained some liberations, and it is a relief from the prostration of spirit which has pervaded our late narrative, to record two in-

* According to the usual practice with their own children, the boys were compelled to partake of a soporific electuary, and in that state the operation is performed.

cidents for contrast and for reflection. Before leaving Mangalore, he caused proclamation to be made even within Tippoo's camp, that he was authorized to receive all inhabitants of Coromandel who chose to accompany him. The blacksmith of his troop discovered his son, long supposed to be dead, as the slave of a horseman, who blustered and brought his comrades. The officer gave the requisite explanations, placed the boy under his own guard, with orders delivered in the presence of the horseman to put to death any one who should touch him, and he accordingly returned in safety. At the last barrier of Pedanaickdoorgum he knew that an attempt would be made to stop the return of the deported inhabitants; and he was aware that in great and ostensible masses they might find impediments on the intermediate road, he therefore suggested dispersion and re-assembling at the passage of the barrier. A guard of 100 men was drawn up at the gate, to prevent the passage of any individual excepting those of whom an account had been rendered, as formally released. After all these had passed, the escort followed: the two companies of native infantry were suddenly drawn up exactly opposite Tippoo's guard, the detachment of cavalry was suitably placed, and the officer announced that any person who should stop or touch an individual in his train should be instantly put to death. About two thousand inhabitants passed, but at least one hundred times that number remained in captivity.

On the release of the prisoners,* an opportunity was afforded to all of comparing with each other the history of their sufferings, but the reader whose attention has been too long detained on objects of horror and disgust, shall be spared the recital of details, and

* Officers	180
Soldiers	900
Sepoys	1600

presented with the shortest possible abstract. Hyder had no scruples of delicacy regarding the safe and cheap custody of his European prisoners, and assigned as a reason for keeping them in irons, chained in pairs, that they were unruly beasts, not to be kept quiet in any other way. He had also little compunction in using severity, and sometimes direct force, to procure the services of gunners and artificers. But here terminated the sum of his barbarity; it was reserved for Tippoo Sultaun to destroy his prisoners by poison and assassination; and the infamy was heightened, by his selecting for this purpose all those who were observed or reported to have distinguished themselves in arms, and might hereafter become dangerous opponents: fortunately, his defective information spared many who were eminently entitled to this fatal honour. Colonel Baillie's death preceded Tippoo's accession. Captain Rumley who led the charge against Tippoo's guns on the morning of Baillie's tragedy, Lieutenant Fraser, one of that officer's staff, and Lieutenant Sampson, captured with Colonel Brathwaite, were the first victims of this policy of the new reign. Brigadier-General Matthews, and most of the captains taken at Bednore, were the next selections; and afterwards, at uncertain periods, other individuals in the several prisons were either carried away to Cabbal Droog, to be poisoned, or if that were deemed too troublesome, they were led out to the woods, and hacked to pieces; but with this savage exception, the treatment of the remainder was not materially changed. The prison fare was not exactly similar in different places of custody, nor even uniform in the same; in the best, it amounted to a bare subsistence; and in the worst, accelerated death: the bare earth was every where their bed, without distinction of rank; a seer of rice or ragee,* and a few small copper coins, capriciously varying in number, without any assigned cause, was the

* *Cynosurus Coracanus*. Ainslie. [Eleusine Indica.]

general scale of allowance, and the number of the coins, combined with the relative avarice of the jailor, determined whether a meal could be procured sufficient for average sustenance. In answer to petitions for medicine or medical advice, they were generally informed that "they had not been sent thither to live;" no medicines were procurable excepting by stealth; and the spratts* nut, cassia fistula, jaggery,† tamarinds, and a rude blue pill, formed by the trituration of quicksilver with crude sugar, constituted the whole extent of their materia medica and pharmaceutical skill; and a periodical contribution of a copper coin from each to what was called the doctor's box, provided a little store for general use. Blows were inflicted on the most trivial pretences; individuals were selected to be freed from irons, and without explanation again shackled, for no other apparent reason than to excite conjectures and agonize the feelings. The Europeans were deemed too unmanageable to be worth the trouble of superintending their labour, in the description of irons thought necessary for their safe custody; the sepoy's were kept at hard labour, and these faithful creatures, whenever they had an opportunity, sacrificed a portion of their own scanty pittance to mend the fare of their European fellow soldiers. A more cruel treatment was considered due, and was unfeelingly inflicted on those native officers who could league with strangers against their countrymen, and among them many sustained the severest trials with a fortitude which has never been surpassed in the history of any country: by an inexplicable caprice, the most respectable of these were, for a considerable time, confined at Seringapatam, in the same prison with the

* *Jatropha Curcas*. Ainslie.

† The crude sugar, combined with the treacle, as it comes from the boiler, in which state it is most usually sold; it is procured, not only from sugar cane, but from the sap of the cocoa nut and palmyra, (*borassus flabelliformis*.) Ainslie.

European officers ; and the *good commandant, Seyed Ibrahim*, the theme of their prison songs,* and the object of their veneration, continued, till removed for farther torture, to animate the despondent, to restrain the rash, and to give an example to all, of cheerful resignation and ardent attachment. When removed from the prison he mildly bespoke attention to his family, if his fellow-prisoners should ever return, and some years elapsed after their release before accumulated sufferings brought him to the grave. On the extinction of the dynasty of Hyder, a mausoleum was erected over his remains, and endowed by Lord Clive on behalf of the East-India Company, with a view to perpetuate the remembrance of his virtues, and the benefit of his example.

* In most of the prisons, it was the custom to celebrate particular days, when the funds admitted, with the luxury of plantain fritters, a draught of sherbet, and a convivial song. On one occasion, the old Scotch ballad ; " My wife has ta'en the gee ;" was admirably sung, and loudly encored. The " haute police," had a particular cognizance of all that was said and sung, during these orgies ; and it was reported to the kelledar, that the prisoners " had said and sung, throughout the night, of nothing but *ghee*," (clarified butter) ; this incident occurred but a short time previously to their release, and the kelledar certain that discoveries had been made regarding his malversations in that article of garrison store, determined to conciliate their secrecy, by causing an abundant supply of this unaccustomed luxury to be thenceforth placed within the reach of their farthing purchases.

[At the end of *The Life of Hyder Ally* by Francis Robson, 1786, is given a " Narrative of the treatment of the prisoners taken with Brigadier-General Richard Matthews, by the Nahob Tippoo Sultan Bahauder, April 28, 1783." The story gives a graphic account of the sufferings of the prisoners.]

CHAPTER XXX.

Tippoo's own account of his long detention at Mangalore—The defection of the French—Treachery of Mahommed Ali—Delicacy regarding his treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali—delayed the English vakeels on various pretences till his allies should declare themselves—Abject conduct of the Commissioners—Ridicule of the prisoners—Return to statements of fact—Horrible expatriation and forcible conversion of the Christians of Canara, related in his own words, highly characteristic—Army marches through Bullum into Coorg—State of that country during the war—Capture of the late Raja's family, and among them the future Raja—Tippoo's recital of his own adventures—His moral harangue to the inhabitants—Return—Progress to Bangalore, where he establishes his harem—New insurrection in Coorg, from the forcible violation of a woman—Zein-ul-abu-deen sent to command—his history and character—fails—Tippoo again enters Coorg—Plan for seizing all the inhabitants—succeeds in a great degree—Driven off to Seringapatam—and circumcised—Separation of the adscripti glebæ—to be slaves to the new landholders—The design fails—Intermediate proceedings—Tippoo's views in the peace of Mangalore—Early pretensions of superiority over Nizam Ali—who tries to propitiate Tippoo, but leagues with the Mahrattas who have a separate ground of quarrel with Tippoo—Circumstances connected with Neergünd—Interference of the Mahrattas resisted—Tippoo sends a force against the place under Burhân-u-Deen and Kummer-u-Deen—Opposed by Perseram

Bhow—Raise the siege and defeat him—Carry the advanced post of Ramdroog, and resume the siege—Absurd distraction of authority—Tippoo's ferocious and unprincipled instructions—Premeditated infraction of the capitulation—Imprisonment of the Chief—Infamous violation of his daughter—Mahrattas and Tippoo each procrastinate—Force of Kummer-u-Deen destined to make a treacherous attack on Adwānee—countermanded to Seringapatam—Suspicious route and supposed connexion with Nizam Ali—Report of the Sultaun's death, propagated for the purpose of inveigling Kummer-u-Deen—succeeds—He comes post to Seringapatam, and is seized—Erroneous conception of his influence and authority.

BEFORE proceeding to other matters, it may gratify the curiosity of many readers, to contemplate the colour assigned by the Sultaun himself to his long sojourn at Mangalore. In consequence of a peace treacherously concluded at Cuddalore, without the participation of his commander, between the English who had been uniformly victorious over the French alone, and the latter people, for whose preservation he had been induced to afford aid, at an enormous expence; Cossigny, who had been permitted as a favour to accompany him with 300 men, not as an aid, (for the addition of 300 men to his countless host, was as the load of an ant to the army of Solomon, but merely that the refusal might not break his heart,) this said Cossigny refused to fight, and still more strange to relate, the other French, who had been in the service twenty years, withdrew also from the trenches. In one page, this conduct is stated to have prevented the immediate capture of the place; and in another, the aid of the French is represented as contemptible and useless. He calls them into his presence; he reproaches them; and he

philosophizes ; and they have no reply to his unanswerable arguments, but downright refusal. He resumes the siege, and had made all his dispositions for a general assault, when at the repeated solicitation of Monsieur De Bussy, he spared the garrison out of pure mercy. Mahommed Ali had intrigued with General Macleod, while permitted to reside on shore, as he had formerly corresponded with Coote and the Christian ;* the accursed Macleod went to Tellicherry, for troops to execute their treacherous designs, and on his return, finding the treason to be discovered, he retired in dissatisfaction and disgrace, after writing the recited challenge, and being confounded and alarmed at the Sultaun's answer. There was yet a longer delay to be accounted for. Although he knew that the Mahrattas had concluded a separate peace with the English, he declined, from a scrupulous and delicate observance of his own engagements, to withdraw from the triple confederacy, until he should receive from themselves, as well as from Nizam Ali, an official intimation of the fact. This detained him six months, during which time " he had delayed the English vakeels in their journey, on a variety of pretences." Considerable skill and flimsy ingenuity are displayed, in weaving together these several causes for his detention before Mangalore, which miserable post is described as an impregnable fortress, surrendered to the English by the treachery of its former commandant. He had been anxiously intreated by Colonel Campbell to take possession of Mangalore, and allow him to depart ; and had long resisted, until the commissioners should arrive, from the same delicate attention to even the appearance of good faith, and the apprehension of injurious construction of his conduct ; but at length he yielded to the entreaties of the garrison. On the occasion of the signature of the treaty, the English Commissioners stood with

* See preface, page xxxii.

their heads uncovered, and the treaty in their hands, for two hours, using every form of flattery and supplication to induce his compliance. The vakeels of Poona and Hyderabad united in the most abject entreaties, and he at length was softened into assent. The prisoners, on being released, were found unable to march, and for want of other conveyance, begged the asses of the salt merchants, and marched in this procession, to the great amusement of the people of Mysoor!!

From fiction we return to fact; and the first material fact in the history of the new reign, after the return of the army to the upper country, is so peculiar, and the narrative given by the Sultaun himself, contains so unusual a portion of truth, and where defective in that quality, is so full of character, that it shall be given nearly in his own words.*

“Among the memorable events of this wonderful year, was the making Mussulmans of the Nazarene Christians. Now, *Christian*, in the language of the Franks, is applied to designate a new convert to the religion of Jesus, (on whose race be benediction and peace;) and as a compound word, it is synonymous with *Eesovian*, (persons of the religion of Jesus) for in the language of the Franks *Chris*—is a name of the Lord Jesus; but to proceed with our subject. The Portuguese Nazarenes, who for a long period have possessed factories on the sea coasts, obtained, about three hundred years ago, an establishment of this nature, on pretence of trade, on the coast of Soonda, at a place situated midway in the course of a large river and† estuary; and in process of time, watching their opportunity, obtained from the raja, a country, yielding a revenue of three or four lacs of rupees. They then proceeded to prohibit the

In his own work it is placed after the expedition to Coorg, in my other manuscripts before that event.

† Goa is intended

Mahommedan worship within these limits, and to expel its votaries : to the bramins and other Hindoos, they proclaimed a notice of three days, within which time they were at liberty to depart, and in failure to be enrolled in the new religion. Some, alarmed at the proposition, abandoned their property and possessions ; and others, deeming the whole to be an empty threat, ventured to remain ; and on the appointed day, the Nazarenes enrolled them in their own foolish religion. In process of time, and by means of rare presents, and flattery, and pecuniary offerings, they prevailed on the senseless rajas of Nuggur, Courial, (Mangalore), and Soonda, to tolerate their farther proceedings, and began gradually to erect shrines and chapels, (Keleesha—eclesia), and in each of these *idol temples*, established one or two *padrès*, that is to say monks, who, deluding the weak and pliant populace, by a fluency of tongue, alternately soothing and severe ; and by liberal and munificent gifts, led the way to their *abolished** religion ; and in this manner made a multitude of Christians, and continued to that day the same practices. When His Majesty, the shadow of God, was informed of these circumstances, the rage of Islam began to boil in his breast : he first gave orders, that a special enumeration and description should be made and transmitted, of the houses of the Christians in each district : detachments, under trusty officers, were then distributed in the proper places, with sealed orders, to be opened and executed, on one and the same day, after the first devotions of the morning : and in conformity to these instructions, sixty thousand persons, great and small of both sexes, were seized, and carried to the resplendent presence : whence, being placed under proper guardians, and provided with every thing needful, they were dispatched to the royal capital, and being formed into

* By abolished he means merged, in the subsequent revelations of Mahommed.

battalions of five hundred each, under the command of officers well instructed in the faith, they were honoured with the distinction of Islam*: they were finally distributed to the principal garrisons, with orders for a daily provision of food, apparel, and other requisites; and the year of their reception into the pale of Islam, is designated in the following distich, each hemistic of which contains the date.† The firmament is enlightened by the sect of Ahmed—God is the protector of the religion of Ahmed; and, as a distinctive appellation for this race, they were thenceforth called Ahmedy.” A proceeding of this horrible nature, recorded in his own words, and sung by the laureat of the court, as one of the exploits of his reign, gives an authentic impress of mind, which no professed delineation of character is capable of conveying: the true numbers were about thirty thousand: the murderous consequences of thus wantonly driving off the peaceful and unoffending inhabitants of his own country into captivity and agony, were not so fatal as in some subsequent cases when the captives were exclusively from the sea coast; but as far as could be ascertained from conjecture, one third of the number did not survive the first year.¹

In returning to the upper countries the route through Bullum afforded an opportunity of quelling,

* Actually the males of every age!

† Dates for inscriptions, are always recorded in verses, the powers of whose numerical letters amount to the required numbers. Ahmed and Mahommed are from the same root, which signifies, praise, not generally, but exclusively *the praise of God*. The Chélas of the western coast received the name of *Ahmedy*, in the manner described in the text: those from Coromandel were named *Assud Ullah*, Lions of the Lord.

¹ Kirmani, in his *History of Tipu Sultan* (Miles, 1864, pp. 81-82) does not mention this raid on the people of the west coast, but he states that Tippu carried off eighty thousand men, women, and children from Coorg, who were made Mussulmans and styled Ahmedees, and formed into eight risalas or regiments.

for a time, the long protracted rebellion of these mountaineers : and thence the army proceeded, for a similar purpose, into the adjacent hills and forests of Coorg. The brave and unconquerable natives of this country, yielding occasionally to overwhelming force, had never failed to re-assert their independence, whenever the pressure was removed ; and held in a perfectly impartial repugnance the Mahommedan faith, and the braminical code, to which it had succeeded in Mysoor, as well from religious abhorrence, as from the common invasion of all the rights of landed property practised by the professors of both religions. We have seen that early in 1782 Hyder had made a considerable detachment under Woffadar to the woods of Coorg, where a fort (Mercara) which he had built for overawing the natives, had been invested soon after his descent into Coromandel, and provisioned with difficulty by the provincial troops. Woffadar was so far successful as to capture the family of the Raja recently deceased, among whom was a youth aged fourteen, afterwards Raja, the author of the historical tract noticed in the preface ;* but had entirely failed in tranquillizing the country, or possessing any portion of it beyond the ground actually occupied by his military posts. When Tip-poo entered it with his whole army, the inhabitants yielded, as usual, to necessity, and apparent quiet was restored. The Sultaun, after reciting, in a style worthy of the thousand and one nights, his adventures in a cave† of several leagues in extent in pursuit of the head of the insurgents, Oootè Naig,‡ who escaped and died at Tellicherry, relates his having called together the inhabitants to harangue them on the subject of their moral and political sins. " If " says he, " six brothers dwell together in one house,

* Page xxix.

† Ghâr, divested of fable, it was probably a deep glen.

‡ The person, whom he nicknames Cootè Naick, Captain Dog ; see preface.

and the elder brother marries, his wife becomes equally the wife of the other five, and the intercourse, so far from being disgraceful, is familiarly considered as a national rite;* not a man in the country knows his father, and the ascendancy of women, and bastardy of children, is your common attribute; from the period of my father's conquest of the country, you have rebelled seven times, and caused the death of thousands of our troops; I forgive you once more, but if rebellion be ever repeated, I have made a vow to God, to honour every man of the country with Islâm; I will make them aliens to their home, and establish them in a distant land, and thus at once extinguish rebellion, and plurality of husbands, and initiate them in the more honourable practices of Islâm."

A considerable period intervened between this pacification and the next revolt, in which (independently of Mahratta affairs and the regulation of his government, to both of which subjects we shall return) he made a progress to Bangalore, accompanied by the whole of his harem, which he established in this salubrious spot, and did not remove until the siege of 1791. A person named Zeen-ul-ab-u-Deen-Mahdavee was left as foujedâr of Coorg, and in the exercise of a power too customary among Mussulmans, forcibly carried off the sister of a person named *Mummatee*, who being enraged at the indignity, incited the inhabitants, who sought but an ostensible motive, and a leader, to rise in a general revolt; and the foujedâr soon found his possessions limited to the walls of Mercara. Among the Sultaun's officers, was a person of the same name, as the foujedâr, sirnamed Shusteree † (from Suza, the birth-place of his ancestors) who had entered his service in Coromandel; in the interval between his father's death and his departure for Bednore, this person had, with a view to his

* Perfectly true.

† The person noticed in the preface, page xxx.

future fortunes, made himself well acquainted with the English system of tactics: he had travelled into most of the European settlements, and had observed in an acute, but superficial manner, the institutions which might be introduced as improvements among his countrymen, and his taste for innovation coincided with the ruling passion of his new master; he would any where in India be deemed a man of letters, and **at Tippoo's court** was decidedly at the head of the few who possessed any literary pretension. Among the improvements already introduced was a repudiation of the infidel words of command in the exercise of the infantry, and the substitution of terms adopted from the Persian language, which, with a corresponding treatise on tactics, Tippoo had distributed as his own for the guidance of his officers. Among the most masterly branches of this performance was esteemed the instructions for military operations in a close country; and the Sultaun thought he could not do better than send the author who held the rank of brigadier, attended by a suitable reinforcement, to suppress the rebellion. The military flame did not seem to blaze with much lustre in the breast of the man of letters; no progress was made; he wrote to the Sultaun that nothing but his own presence with the main army would terminate the war, and Tippoo answered with the bitter taunt of wondering why he could not execute his own theory. He did, however, move late in October, and entering Coorg in two columns, burned and destroyed the patches of open country, and compelled the inhabitants to take refuge in the woods, where they, as usual, refrained from any decisive operation. Some delay was necessary in making strong detachments to the frontier, in every direction, with a view to his ultimate measures for the future tranquillity of Coorg; but every thing being ready along the whole circumference, his troops began to contract the circle, beating up the woods

before them as if dislodging so much game,* and by these means closed in on the great mass of the population, male and female, amounting to about 70,000, and drove them off like a herd of cattle to Seringapatam, where the Sultaun's threats were but too effectually executed. The proprietors of land constitute the greater portion of the military population of Coorg; the labours of husbandry are chiefly performed by a perfectly distinct race (*adscripti glebæ*) conjectured to be the aboriginal possessors, and their masters to be descended from the conquering army of the Cadumba Kings. These slaves were separated from the other prisoners, and assigned to new Mahomedan settlers, who were to be encouraged to remove thither from various parts of his possessions; but this scheme, at first attended to, and soon afterwards falling into neglect and abuse, from the prevalence of some newer project, shared the common fate of a large portion of his abortive designs.

In the interval between these two expeditions to Coorg which convenience of narrative has drawn together, operations were in progress which ended in more serious hostility. The peace of Mangalore was evidently concluded to avert an impending confederacy with a distinct view to the separate subjugation of its members: at the very moment of signing this peace, and at every subsequent period of his life, the Sultaun openly avowed to his own subjects, and to his French† allies, the determination

* The description of Aurungzebe's field sports, in Somerville's Chace, is a true picture of the actual Eastern hunt.

† Kirkpatrick's Tippoo's letters; a performance to which I acknowledge great obligation in fixing a variety of dates, from the early part of 1785, to the beginning of 1787. I have carefully compared the translation in Colonel Kirkpatrick's work of the manuscript memoir of Tippoo's life, in his possession, with the corresponding passages in the Sultaun-u-Towareekh, and find little or no variation, excepting that the latter appears to have been much better written: the reader has had the opportunity of appreciating the small portion of truth contained in either.

of waiting a more favourable opportunity to unite with them for the destruction of the English power; and any European interference being for the present effectually removed, he was at liberty to begin with either of his other enemies, the Mahrattas or Nizam Ali, the latter of whom had certainly been unfaithful to the confederacy against the English, whatever the original merits of that confederacy may have been. Immediately after the Sultaun's return from Mangalore in 1784, he had tried the effect of terror on this prince by asserting claims of sovereignty over Vijayapoor, and the consequent royal right (whence derived over the successor to the kingdom of Golconda does not appear) of enforcing the adoption of his newly invented measures of length and capacity, and other novelties, sealed standards of which were transmitted for the purpose. In what manner this absurd insult was received does not distinctly appear, except in the early arrival at Seringapatam of an envoy from Nizam Ali; and the very obvious consequence of his seeking a closer union with the Mahrattas against these alarming pretensions of the Sultaun, with whom they were known at the same time to have a separate ground of quarrel.

When Hyder, in consequence of his negotiations with Ragoba, possessed himself of the Mahratta territory, between the Kistna and Toombuddra, he felt the expediency of conforming to the suggestions of Ragoba's envoy, in leaving certain of the forts and territories in the hands of their Mahratta possessors, satisfied with the usual loose profession of allegiance to the state of Mysoor: among these was the Dêshaye of Neergoond, a hill fort of considerable strength, situated between two branches of the river Malpurba.¹ This chief was connected with the family

¹ *Malpurba.*—*Malprabha.* This river lies to the north of Nargund, in the Dharwar District, Bombay. Nargund is situated thirty-two miles north-east of Dharwar town. It was taken by Sivaji from the Sultans of Bijapur. The *dessai* was a Brahmin

of Purseram Bhow, of Meritch, a leader of considerable power, by a double intermarriage of their respective sons and daughters; and his refusal of certain demands made by Tippoo, was followed by an intimation from Poona early in 1785, that an arrear of three years' tribute* was due by Mysoor. The debt was not denied, but evaded; in order that by the previous possession of Neergoond, and other similar places, he might have a stronger hold of this new line of frontier, before the commencement of a Mahratta war: and the Mahrattas, who did not on the other hand question his claim of customary tribute from Neergoond, declared that they would not suffer the exaction of the larger demand made by Tippoo, founded on the allegation of plunder and misconduct. Tippoo for once argued reasonably, that there was an end of his authority, if a foreign power were at liberty to dictate his conduct to his own subjects; and dispatched a respectable force under his cousin and brother-in-law Burhân-u-Deen. Kummer-u-Deen (his cousin german) who had previously been ordered from Kurpa to Seringapatam, was directed to change his route and proceed in the same direction. Burhân-u-Deen appears to have commenced the siege late in February or early in March; Kummer-u-Deen did not join before the 10th March or 12th of April; and immediately afterwards the April forces which had been collected by Purseram Bhow, 12. for the purpose to which they were sufficient, of relieving the place when besieged by only one of the corps, were attacked by the combined force which raised the siege for that purpose; there was little serious fighting, and the superiority was claimed by both, but the result was clearly testified, by the forward movement of the Mysoreans, which enabled

of the Bhawe family, who held the village and some surrounding country. (Edwards: *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 166.)

* Eleven lacs a year; see page 762, of volume i.

May 5. them to reduce on the 5th of May, the fort of Ramdroog, beyond the northern or true Malpurba, an acquisition which covered and facilitated their subsequent operations against Neergoond. The siege of that place was accordingly resumed; but the absurd arrangement of ordering the two divisions to co-operate, instead of vesting the command in one superior officer, soon produced its natural effects: no dramatic representation can exceed the childishness of their reciprocal complaints to the Sultaun, or his simplicity in desiring them to be good friends, and follow the advice of three excellent old officers, assigned to them as a sort of military council, either of whom would have finished the siege in half the time. In spite of these blunders, the place was reduced to such extremities, that Kāla Pundit (or Kallapa), the Dêshaye, was induced to capitulate: this extremity had been deemed imminent very long before it actually occurred; and the Sultaun's ferocious and unprincipled mind was abundantly unfolded in his orders "*to put to the sword in the event of assault, every living thing, man, woman, child, dog, or cat; with the single exception of Kāla Pundit (of course, for future torture); but to employ every contrivance of truth or falsehood* which may induce the besieged to surrender the fort.*" The unhappy Dêshaye demanded for his security the sanction of oaths;—"But what," said the Sultaun, "*is the use of oaths on this occasion? You must conjointly by every possible artifice and deceit persuade the besieged to evacuate the fort.*" The possession of his own letters gives a picture of premeditated atrocity, which, however practised by other tyrants, has seldom been established by evidence of equal authenticity; and the sequel can excite no surprise. The Dêshaye descended under the escort of a select guard of his own men, on the faith of personal security, and free

* Such is the literal translation of the words rendered by Colonel Kirkpatrick; *means, fair or foul.*

permission to depart ; he was detained under a variety of pretences, and the vigilance and desperate aspect of his little guard, was such as to restrain Burhân-u-Deen for nearly two months from overpowering them by open violence, the object however was effected on the 6th of October. The unfortunate Kāla Pundit Oct. 6. was dispatched in irons to Seringapatam, and thence to the well known fort at Cabaldroog, with his family, one individual excepted, a daughter, who was seized for the harem of the Sultaun. Kittoor¹ the residence of another Dēshaye, was next seized by a similar treachery, and Burhân-u-Deen cantoned in the neighbourhood of Darwar.

The Mahrattas being foiled in their purpose of saving Neergöond, and being desirous before undertaking a serious invasion of Mysoor, to insure the co-operation of Nizam Ali, and if possible, of the English; postponed, until the ensuing year, the execution of their designs; and Tippoo's envoys at Poona, continued by a series of deceptions to prolong their stay; the mind of the Sultaun seeming to fluctuate between the alternative of paying the money due, or attempting by a war to relieve himself from past and future claims.

Meanwhile, the force under the separate command of Kummer-u-Deen was ordered to return to Seringapatam. The Sultaun had originally planned the seizure, by surprise, of Adwānee, the jageer of the late Bazālūt Jung, and now the possession of Nizam Ali, with whom he was at peace, by directing this force, on the pretext of returning to Kurpa, to cross

¹ *Kittoor*.—Kittur is in Belgaum District, Bombay, twenty six miles south-east of Belgaum town. For a fuller account of Tippu's action and how the Mahrattas met it, see Edwards: *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 167-169. Tippu forcibly circumcised many Hindus who came from the south of the Krishna river and two thousand Brahmins are said to have destroyed themselves to avoid this outrage. For the engagement at Nargund, see *Malet's Diary*, June 30, 1785. (Forrest: *Selections, Mahratta Series*, Vol. I, pp. 517-28.)

the Toombuddra at the ford of Comply,¹ to the eastward of Vijayanuggur, a direct route which would lead him without suspicion within reach of his enterprise; but the state of affairs in Coorg requiring at this juncture a large portion of his disposable force, he directed the route to be changed for the more direct road to the capital. Kunmer-u-Deen, however, continued the eastern road for the alleged convenience of forage, and was reported at court to have sent an envoy to Hyderabad, and to have shewn direct indications of a design to join Nizam Ali with the force under his command, and to place himself and his jageer under the protection of that prince. While the Sultaun was engaged in the arrangements preparatory to entering Coorg, the second time, the death occurred of a person of some eminence, Serâj-u-Deen Mahmood Khân, formerly Mufti at Arcot, and afterwards the chief officer in Mysoor of the department of Justice. The Sultaun ordered his remains to be placed in a palankeen, and conveyed, with all the circumstances of honourable distinction, to be interred at Seringapatam. As the procession drew near, the rumour was spread, that the Sultaun was dead, and his corpse approaching. This report circulated with the utmost rapidity over all India, including the European settlements, and was so entirely and steadily credited, that Mr. Macpherson,² then Governor-General of the English possessions, actually dispatched from Bengal an embassy * to the

¹ *Comply*.—Kampli, a village in the Bellary District, on the Tungabhadra river, about thirty miles north-west of Bellary town.

² John Macpherson, originally a purser in one of the Company's ships, was sent to England in 1768, by the Nawab Walajah, to seek the king's protection against the Company. He was then appointed by the Directors to a writership in Madras. In 1776 he was dismissed from the service by Lord Pigot, but reinstated by the Directors, and in 1781 returned to India as a member of the Bengal Council, and succeeded Hastings as Governor-General in 1785.

* The error was discovered before they could leave Madras.

successor, or rather the Lord Protector, in behalf of the infant heir; an office which the same rumour assigned to Kummer-u-Deen. The designed propagation of such a rumour was, in all subsequent times, so steadily denied at court, that the general opinion in Mysoor refers it to the accidental circumstance above related: but any other foundation than design would involve an early anxiety to contradict the rumour, and Kummer-u-Deen, for whom it was evidently designed, deceived by reiterated assurances of the fact, acted as might reasonably be expected on the supposition either of good or of bad intentions; he left orders with his troops to follow by forced marches, and proceeded post to the capital, where he was instantly placed under arrest; stripped of all his jageers and offices, and the troops which had hitherto been subject to his immediate authority, were dispersed and incorporated with the other divisions of the army. For two years after this event, Kummer-u-Deen remained in disgrace, and without any provision for his maintenance; at the expiration of that time, a monthly pay of five hundred rupees, or 750l. a year, was assigned to him, and such was the highest amount of personal provision ever made by Tippoo, for a chief who, in the opinion of the English Government, held the first place and the highest influence at his court. In effect, Kummer-u-Deen, together with the troops of his immediate contingent, had immediately after his father's death in 1781 been placed by Hyder under the orders and particular protection of Tippoo; and the former, an enterprising and indiscreet young officer, was in the habit of treating with levity both the commands and the military pretensions of his relation: on Tippoo's accession to empire he was not of a disposition to be scrupulous in finding pretexts, if they did not exist. The overt precipitation of Kummer-u-Deen in seeking to avail himself of his sovereign's supposed death, formed a sufficient ground for the indulgence of avarice as well

as resentment : and it is no novelty in the history of oriental despotism, that in a predicament to quench the ardor and shake the allegiance of a native of the west, he was afterwards employed on occasions of difficulty, to execute particular services; but although exercising occasional command, he never did, after 1785, possess any other influence or authority than what might eventually arise from the good opinion of the troops.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Negotiations of the Poona Mahrattas, for the eventual conquest of Mysoor—Sindea's experiment on the new Governor-General, Mr. Macpherson—Demand of Choute—Forced apology and disavowal—Nana Furnavese persuades himself, that he may consider the English as a reserve at command, in case of danger, but is unwilling to allow them a participation of advantage—Begins the war confederated with Nizam Ali only—Tippoo assumes the rank of King—Circumstances attending the ceremonial—Reasons—Confederates open the campaign with the siege of Baddamee—Burhan-u-Deen acts defensively—The Sultaun makes his first marches in that direction—but deviates to Adwānee—Reasons for this line of operation—Siege pushed with precipitation—Assault repelled with great slaughter—A second assault repulsed—Confederates approach—Tippoo raises the siege—Reasons for evacuating the place—Operation covered by a partial action—River fills immediately after they had retired across it—Tippoo returns to resume the siege—but the garrison march out at the opposite gate, and he takes quiet possession—Removes the stores, and dismantles the place—Determines to remove the seat of war across the river—A daring attempt, which succeeds from its great improbability—Confederates arrive too late—Operations—Tippoo's junction with Burhan-u-Deen—Hostile armies encamp in view of each other, near Savanoor—Night attack, and cannonade in the morning, favourable to Tippoo—Confederates assume a position near Savanoor—Dislodged—Tippoo enters the town—The Nabob

takes the protection of the Mahrattas, in preference to that of his son-in-law—Cause of the disagreement—Demands exacted in a manner ruinous to the country—and consequent resentment—Quiet celebration of an annual festival in both armies—Negotiation—Tippoo's challenge to Holkar—and his reply—A more successful night attack—Corps mounted on camels—Tippoo moves to Behauder Benda—Siege and capture—Infraction of the capitulation—Subsequent movements—Night attacks—Reasons of each for severally desiring peace—Conditions ultimately settled—Cessions—Pecuniary payments by Tippoo—Instances of bad faith and inhumanity—Confederates retire—Tippoo instantly re-occupies one of the ceded places—Sultaun's account of his night attacks—Seizure and murder of the poligars Raidroog and Harponelly, and assumption of their territory.

IN the meanwhile Nana Furnavese, the minister at Poona, was employing all the arts of Indian diplomacy, to frame such a confederacy as should ensure, not only the exaction of the unpaid tribute, but the recovery of the territory between the rivers, lost in the civil war of Ragoba. To the moment of the ratification of peace with Tippoo, Mr. Hastings had not only encouraged his advances, but actually urged their execution; and when he had given his reluctant assent to the treaty of Mangalore, which he greatly disapproved, he was deemed by the Mahrattas to have considered it as a truce of short continuance. Mr. Macpherson succeeded him early in 1785; and Sindea, who had paid to the talents and energy of Mr. Hastings the homage of a very sincere desire to preserve the relations of amity, considered the nerve and intellect of the new Governor-General the fair object of a decisive Mahratta experiment, the requisition of choute. A mere refusal did not seem to

the new Governor-General to meet the character of the demand; and he declared without hesitation, that if Sindia should decline to apologise for the insult, and instantly to disavow all claim of choute, on any and every part of the British possessions, his refusal or his silence should be considered and treated as a declaration of war. The disavowal was prompt; and this incident was considered by Nana as direct evidence of a disposition to give effect to an opinion known to be nearly universal among the English, that the peace of 1784, was a history of indignities incompatible with that character which formed the basis of their power. There is ground for believing, that a construction to this effect was annexed by the envoy to some observations which fell from Mr. Macpherson in conversation on the subject, and the communications of Mr. Anderson at Sindia's court, did not at any time discourage such opinions. On the occasion of the supposed death of Tippoo, the avowal of the Governor-General of his wish to improve the alliance with both Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas appeared to them an indirect advance for an offensive treaty; and it is supposed that the Mahratta envoy at Calcutta stated his own conviction, that English co-operation was attainable, on such conditions as they should deem advantageous to themselves. This was the precise issue which Nana desired; for he believed that the object might be attained by the union of every branch of the Mahratta confederacy with Nizam Ali; and excepting in the case of urgent necessity, he did not seek the participation of the English in the expected advantages of the war, which extended in prospect to the entire partition of the Mysorean dominions. All the preliminary conditions, including the previous exaction of a considerable sum by way of choute from Nizam Ali, were adjusted; and the armies assembled for field operations, early in 1786; and soon after-1786. wards formed a junction near the Kistna, where a

personal conference was held between Nana and Nizam Ali, for the purpose of digesting the plan of the war; after which they returned to their respective capitals, leaving the command of the Mahratta contingents of all the chiefs to Hurry Punt, and of Nizam Ali's to Tohuvver Jung.¹

Tippoo Sultaun's return from Coorg to his capital took place early in January, when the question of peace or war was still undecided. Previously to the act of circumcision, on one and the same day, of the great mass of the Coorgs, it was necessary to fix on an auspicious moment, and none could be so proper for proclaiming the royal dignity which he had now determined to assume, as that on which so great a number of infidels should be converted to the true faith: the services of all the astrologers were accordingly put in requisition. The whole intention does not seem to have been publicly announced, but all Mahommedans were summoned to attend the reading of the Khutba, at the mosque of the Lall Baugh. Rumour had announced that something extraordinary was to occur, and an immense croud was assembled. The officiating priest does not even seem to have been intrusted with the secret, and Ali Reza (the person afterwards known to the English as one of the guardians of the hostage princes) ascended the mimber (pulpit;) when he came to that part of the Khutba in which prayers are offered up for the reigning sovereign, instead of the name of *Shah Aalum*, as then customary over all the mosques of India, he substituted that of Tippoo Sultaun, to the entire astonishment of the great body of the auditors:

¹ Nana Furnavis met Nizam Ali twice, first in June 1784, at Etgir near the junction of the Bhima and Krishna rivers, when a general treaty of alliance was arrived at, and secondly, near the same spot, in 1786, when it was decided to reduce the whole of Tippu's territories and divide the conquests between the Nizam, the Peshwa, Sindia and Holkar. (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 154-173.)

the reason assigned by the Sultaun, in one of his official letters, is sufficiently conclusive, that Sha Aalum was "the prisoner or servant of Sindea, and none but an idiot could consider him as a sovereign." From that day forward, the chôbdars and attendants were ordered, in announcing the salutations of persons who entered the durbar, to observe the formalities of the court of Delhi, and proclaim the presence of a king, by which title (Padsha) he was ordered to be addressed and designated by all his subjects; and it was during the march to Bangalore for the Mahratta war, that the change of title became universally known to the army.

The confederates opened the campaign with the siege of Bâdamee,¹ a place of strength possessed by the Sultaun, near his northern frontier; the town was carried by a general assault on the 20th of May, May 20 and the citadel soon afterwards surrendered. The Mahratta horse spread themselves over the country, while the regular troops were employed in the reduction of the fortresses, in order that they might ultimately advance in strength, having nothing hostile in their rear. On the part of the Sultaun Burhân-u-Deen although reinforced by the disposable troops of Bednore under Budr-u-Zemân Khân his father-in-law, an able and experienced officer, was too weak for offensive operations, but continued to hold the army in check, prudently keeping within a moderate distance of the woods of Soonda and Bednore, as a security for his eventual retreat. The

¹ The two forts, which were both dismantled about 1845, are named *Bavanbade* (fifty-two rocks) and *Ranmandal* (battle field). Badami is now a village in the Bijapur District, and a station on the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway. It was captured by General Munro in 1818. In 1840 a band of 125 Arabs from the Nizam's territory, headed by a blind Brahmin, seized the village, plundered the government's treasury and market, and carried the booty into the Nizam's territory. (*Indian Gasetteer*, Bombay, 1909, Vol. II, p. 44. Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 178, note.)

Sultaun, instead of moving as expected by the enemy in the direction of the confederate army, to form a junction with Burhân-u-Deen, as indicated by the early direction of his march from Bangalore, suddenly diverged to the right, and proceeded by forced marches to Adwânee, (Adoni), the strong frontier post of Nizam Ali, south of the Toombuddra; and the fact of its containing the family* of his late brother, and his nephew, Mohabbut Jung, is the reason expressly assigned by Tippoo for attacking it: if the confederates should march to oppose him, he would give them battle, and an open field would be left for Burhân-u-Deen; if they should persevere in their actual line of operations, he would take Adwânee, and carry off the harems of the brother and nephew of Nizam Ali. The operations of the siege were pushed, not only with vigour, but precipitation; and an assault was ordered before the breach was deemed practicable, in any opinion but that of the Sultaun. Mohabbut Jung who commanded, knowing the insufficiency of the garrison, and feeling like a Mussulman, the delicacy of his charge, had on Tippoo's arrival, offered a large sum to purchase his forbearance, and the widow of the deceased had addressed to him a letter of the utmost humility, imploring his commiseration. To both of these propositions, the most coarse and contumelious answers were returned, and having determined that the assault should be given, and would succeed, his orders were less directed to those combinations on which its success must depend, than to the subsequent security of the treasure and captures; and his mind seemed to be far less occupied with the possibility of failure, than with obscene jests, regarding the future destination of the inhabitants of the harem. But Mohabbut Jung, on the rude rejection of his first offers, had made the most manly and determined arrangements for a

June.

* "Nâmoos," the honour;—meaning the females of the family.

desperate defence, and repelled the several columns of assault, at every point, with great slaughter, and soon afterwards a similar assault of another breach, was repulsed with the same energy and effect. The approach of the confederates had probably contributed to this premature attempt, for not only their united army, but a separate force from Hyderabad, were in forced march to save the place.—In about ten days, therefore, after this failure, he necessarily raised the siege, having previously removed all his guns and stores from the batteries, and occupied a position a few miles to the southward of the place.

The period of the annual swelling of the rivers had arrived, it was therefore for the confederates to decide on transferring the seat of war to the south of the Toombuddra, on this new line, where no depôts or communications had been previously established, or after removing the women, to leave Adwānee to its fate; and they adopted the latter alternative. Moghul Ali Khān, youngest brother of Nizam Ali, made a forward movement, with a large division of the army, and brought on a partial action, while the remainder June 27 manœuvred to impress on the enemy the intention of a combined attack on the ensuing day, but in effect to compel a concentration of his force, and restrict his intelligence of the actual evacuation of the place, which commenced on the instant of their arrival, and was completed in three days, a degree of haste which proved to have been fortunate, as regarded the plan of operations actually adopted, for they had scarcely recrossed the river when it filled, and rendered it impracticable for Tippoo to follow them, if he had been so disposed. And this inconsistent reasoner, who incessantly bestows on his enemies epithets to designate their being the objects of divine wrath, ascribes their escape on this occasion to the aid of the Almighty. The arrangements for retreat, however precipitate, must have been conducted with ability, as the nearest ford of the river is distant

twenty-five miles, and the Sultaun had no opportunity of molesting even their rear-guard. The filling of the river left him free, as he supposed, to resume the siege; but on his return, he found this labour unnecessary. Such were the miserable combinations of the confederacy, that this strong and important frontier fortress was not provided with the stores deemed requisite for a siege; and whether by order, or through fear, the garrison left for its defence, marched out by the west face, while the Sultaun's troops entered it by the south, without an attempt at dismantling the place; the guns were found mounted on the works, the arsenal and storehouses, the equipage of the palace, down, as Tippoo affirms, to

July 11. the very clothing of the women, was found in the exact state of a mansion ready furnished for the reception of a royal establishment. The Sultaun, however, foresaw the probability of being obliged to relinquish the place on the conclusion of peace, as he immediately removed the guns and stores to Gooty and Bellary, and effectually destroyed the fortifications.

The confederates deemed themselves secure, during the season in which the rivers should be full, of an unmolested scope for their operations to the northward of the Toombuddra, and moved to the more western line on which they had commenced their operations, and where little was to be apprehended from the inferior force of Burhân-u-Deen. The Sultaun affirms that he determined to remove the seat of the war to the northward of the river, contrary to the opinion of a council of his generals, who predicted the destruction of the first division which should pass, before it could be supported; but it is certain that the actual operation was founded on the remote distance of all means of effectual resistance; the greater portion of basket-boats required for the passage of the river were constructed in the province of Bednore, and floated down the river, to various

points higher up the stream than the intended scene of operation: an arrangement indicating not much respect for the vigilance of an enemy, who could allow their unobserved descent. On the 23d of August a ^{Aug. 23.} detachment of a thousand men crossed in the night at a place named Kurrucknaut,* and seized a small village fort which commanded the passage. In the morning of the 24th, the infantry and guns commenced passing in basket-boats and rafts, and on the 30th the whole army and all its equipments had gained the northern bank without any opposition, during those seven critical days, that amounted to more than mere skirmishing. The operation had really succeeded from its great improbability; for the confederates had never reckoned on an attempt so daring and dangerous among the grounds of calculation. They approached however when too late, and encamped within a few miles of the Sultaun; the ground was found to be unfavourable to the employment of their superior cavalry, and after examining the position, they moved in the direction of Savanoor with the view of drawing the Sultaun into the plain country. He followed, keeping the river as close on his left as the ground admitted, drawing his subsistence from the opposite bank; and determined to avoid a general action until he should be joined by Burhân-u-Deen who was descending by the left bank

* I have omitted to make any written note of the exact situation of this place, and cannot supply the defect, either from memory or a reference to any of the maps.

[Grant Duff calls the place Gurkghaut, but cannot state its situation. The fords across the river are numerous, and probably the name has disappeared. There is no village of that name in the Bellary District at the present time. Kirmani, in his *History of the Reign of Tippu Sultan*, mentions that Tippu marched through Sandur and then marched towards "Kopli" and on to "Huspunth" and pitched his tents on the river at the ford of Guruknath. The crossing must have been east of Sandur. "Huspunth" may be Hospet, and the ford may be the one near Bellahusi, about ten miles east of Hospet.]

of the Werda,¹ pressed by superior numbers. Two night attacks were attempted by the Sultaun as he Sept. 11. approached Savanoor, the first on the 11th of September, and the second a few days afterwards; neither was attended with any decisive effect. On ascending towards the confluence of the two rivers, a considerable bend occurs in the united stream, and a plain is to be crossed to attain the point on the Werda most favourable for effecting the junction; but before attempting this combined movement, he detached by a circuitous route a reinforcement for Burhān-u-Deen of two brigades, and some irregulars under Ghāzee Khān, the Sultaun's earliest military preceptor, and esteemed by Hyder the best partisan in his army. Every thing succeeded. The junction was formed, without serious impediment; the confederates encamped some miles in front of the fort of Savanoor, and the Sultaun occupied a strong position in full view of their camp, with the river Werda, then fordable, in the rear of his right.

For two or three days, Tippoo made every afternoon demonstrations of a serious attack, and after driving in the outposts, returned to his position. On the third or fourth night, when he expected the enemy to reckon on no more than a similar bravado, he made his dispositions for a serious attack, of which his own narrative corresponds in all material circumstances, with more authentic information. He divided his force into four columns, the left centre of which was commanded by himself; and after retiring from his afternoon's bravado, and merely giving the troops time for their evening meal, he moved off by a considerable detour of the two right columns, for the purpose of a combined attack on the enemy's left and centre, about an hour before day-light. It was concerted, that on the head of his own column reach-

¹ *Werda*.—The Varada river, which rises in the hills, in the north of Shimoga District, Mysore, and runs northwards into the Dharwar District, Bombay, south of Savanur.

ing its destined point of attack, he should fire a signal gun, (a strange branch of an attack by surprise,) which was immediately to be answered by the heads of the other three, in order that each might ascertain the position of the others, and instantly afterwards commence the attack. On approaching a small outpost, his own column was challenged; and the Sultaun, as if determined on communicating information of his approach, personally gave orders for the discharge of a few platoons of musquetry. He then advanced, and when near the camp fired the signal gun, but looked and listened in vain for reply : after much delay and anxiety he fired another signal, which was answered by one only. He however moved on, and entering the camp a little before the dawn, he Oct. 1. actually found himself accompanied by no more than three hundred men. A dark and rainy night had caused the heads of all the columns, excepting his own, to lose their way, and each column had, from the same causes, been broken into several divisions, each pursuing at random separate routes; fortunately, as the light became more perfect, all were within view, and he was enabled to make a disposition; but the camp was empty, and the hostile army appeared regularly drawn up on a height which overlooked their late ground: a cannonade ensued, and according to the Sultaun's account, he ordered no return to be made from his guns of good calibre, for the purpose of encouraging the enemy to advance* in the confidence of their being left in camp; the deception is said to have succeeded and the enemy to have been repulsed with heavy loss; and there can be no doubt of the day having terminated unfavourably for the confederates, who fell back to a position resting its left on the fort of Savanoor.

* The peculiar phraseology of the Sultaun has been noticed in the preface; a particular term for describing the *movements of the enemy*, was there omitted; *hurrekut-e-musbooky*; "the convulsive motion of a slaughtered animal."

From this position they were dislodged after an interval of two days, and the Sultaun entered without opposition into Savanoor, which had been evacuated by the nabob Abd-ul-Heckeem, who placed himself at the mercy of the Mahrattas, in preference to the protection of the person whom he had been accustomed to address as a son. We have seen* that on the occasion of a double marriage between the families in 1779, one of the conditions of enlarging the possessions of Savanoor, was the maintenance for Hyder's service of a body of two thousand select Patán horse, to be commanded by one of his sons, and this body had joined Hyder for the invasion of Coromandel. The hardships of the service, and particularly Tippoo's improvidence in marching cavalry into the low countries of Canara in 1783, had destroyed great numbers of horses, and the same cause had induced individual horsemen, mounted and dismounted, to abscond and return to their homes. On the Sultaun's return from Mangalore, in 1784, he ordered a muster of this contingent, and 500 men and horses only were forth-coming. He therefore commanded the ministers of Savanoor, to repair to Seringapatam, and settle the account of deficiencies, and he made out a balance in his own favour, of 21 lacs of rupees, for which the ministers gave the conditional engagement of two soucars, (bankers) who had the usual collateral security of the revenues, and the sanction of a guard of the Sultaun's troops, to enforce the collection. Abd-ul-Heckeem, who had debts, and not treasures, gave up, in the first instance, all his family jewels, estimated at only three lacs, and desired his ministers and soucars, to levy the remainder on the country, in the best manner they were able. It is only for readers unacquainted with the details of Mahommedan finance, that it may be requisite to relate the ordinary consequences of anticipated revenue, put into such a train of liquidation.

These harpies, exclusively of the regular receipts, found pretexts for seizing and putting to the torture, all landholders suspected to possess money; an amount superior to the balance was supposed to be levied, but the ministers and bankers taking into their joint consideration, how large a portion was due by ordinary usage, for their own trouble, allowed about one-half the amount to reach the Sultaun's treasury, and represented the impossibility of raising the remainder. One of the bankers paid the debt of nature, in the midst of his iniquities, and the other was remanded to Seringapatam. According to precedent, he ought to have been able to compromise this bad debt, for a small sum, but he actually remained in prison, and was murdered (perhaps contrary to intention) in the general massacre of prisoners in 1791. Abd-ul-Heckem continued to be goaded and threatened for the balance, up to the very opening of the campaign, when the Sultaun began to relax and endeavour to deceive: but this unfortunate and improvident chief, disgusted to the last degree, by the harshness and cruelty inflicted on himself and his country, determined to join the confederates with the handful of men he was still able to keep together, and on this occasion, the retreat of his friends, leaving his capital at the Sultaun's mercy, he fled to their camp, and thence as a fugitive, a wanderer, and a pauper, he was advised for the present to take refuge behind the Kistna. Oct. 29.

After these movements, neither party seemed desirous for some time of coming into serious contact, the confederates moving eastward for better forage, and the Sultaun establishing his head quarters about nine miles from Savanoor; in which situations both the Mahommedan armies quietly proceeded to perform the ceremonies of the Moherrem, during which period no attempt was made on either side beyond the desultory skirmishing of Hindoo partisans and foragers, and on the Sultaun's the uninterrupted

Nov. 4. plunder of every thing of value left in Savanoor. From this ground he dispatched a diplomatic messenger, really to treat of peace, but according to his own statement for a very different purpose. The incident of Brigadier-General Macleod's challenge in 1783 was too rich and original to be dismissed with one specimen of eloquence and prowess. He accordingly relates, that the herald was charged to deliver to Tuccajee Holkar (in the absence of Nizam Ali to whom the precedence was due) a speech to the following effect. "You have obtained experience in feats of arms, and are distinguished among the chiefs for superior valour. Now that war has commenced its destructive career, and thousands are doomed to fall; why should we longer witness the causeless effusion of human blood? It is better that you and I should singly descend into the field of combat, let the Almighty determine who is the conqueror and who the vanquished, and let that result terminate the contest. Or if you have not sufficient confidence in your own single arm, take to your aid from one to ten men of your own selection, and I will meet you with equal numbers. Such was the practice in the days of our prophet, and though long discontinued, I desire to renew that species of warfare. But if prudence should dictate your declining the second proposition also, let the two armies be drawn out, select your weapons, and let us, chief opposed to chief, horseman to horseman, and foot soldier to foot soldier, engage in pitched battle, and let the vanquished become the subjects of the victors." This speech (not more fictitious perhaps than parallel records of classical literature, but presenting an efficient contrast to the taste and intellect of those admired productions) is represented to have caused Holkar to tremble for his life, not a very consistent effect on an individual distinguished for rash fearlessness. But the reply exhibits a nearer approach to the national character; "the passion for fighting

(he is made to say) had not descended to him from his ancestors, but rather the hereditary trade of flying, plundering, burning, and destroying, and the petty warfare which involves but little danger." The warlike herald of romance was however the real harbinger of peace, he was charged with separate instructions to propitiate some of the chiefs by bribery: and with assurances of a pacific nature to the confederates at large. Under cover however of the negligence and security which he expected these demonstrations to produce; the Sultaun moved on pretence of forage, and by a forced march from his new ground he made another and more successful night attack, in which, without encountering any serious opposition, he got possession, among other booty, of the splendid camp equipage of Tohuver Jung,* and the camels which conveyed it; variously estimated, in different manuscripts, but in none at less than five hundred animals; a vain impediment which caused the capture of nearly the whole of the useful stores of that army: the Mahrattas, who on all occasions are entitled to the praise of vigilance, lost neither animals nor stores; and the retreat of both was conducted with so much rapidity, as to produce no other military consequences of importance. It is probable that the number of camels captured, considerably exceeded five hundred, for that exact number was immediately formed into a corps of 1000 men, each camel carrying two foot soldiers armed with muskets, who in the spirit of contempt for established practice which marked all the Sultaun's theories, were also charged with the care and feeding of those delicate animals,† a business which every child in his army knew to be the trade, and not an

* He commanded the forces of Nizam Ali.

† Hardy, as regards thirst, but in every other respect requiring great care to keep them in working condition: this remark is confined to the south of India, the only situation to which the author's means of personal observation have extended.

easy one, of a particular class of men ; and few of the animals survived that single campaign.

From the ground thus precipitately abandoned, the confederates moved north-east towards Gujjender Ghur,¹ and Tippoo, in a more easterly direction towards Copul, and Behauder Benda, two little forts near to each other, which had (treacherously as he states) been surrendered to the confederates in the early part of the campaign. After a short siege, of which a long and inflated account is given, the latter place surrendered by capitulation ; the Arabs, composing a portion of the garrison, were suffered to depart with their arms, but in violation of the terms, the Hindoo match-lock men, formerly of Tippoo's garrison, who had transferred their allegiance to the Mahrattas, were punished by the excision of their noses and ears, and Hamaumut Naig their chief, by the amputation of both his legs.

The subsequent movements, which, on the Sultaun's part had chiefly for their object, the disturbance of the enemy's night-quarters, were generally unfavourable to the confederates, and particularly to the ill organized troops of Nizam Ali who had reason to be weary of the war. On the part of the Mahrattas the confidence had been such at its commencement as to keep back a large portion of their contingents, and particularly the respectable infantry of Sindea. We have stated the grounds on which Nana Farnavese had hoped for the eventual support of the English, but Lord Cornwallis, who had in this year succeeded to the Government-General, had anticipated the question, by directing all equivocal expectations to be extinguished, and a distinct avowal to be made, that the English would engage in none but defensive wars. A gratuitous declaration ; of dubious expediency ; uncalled for by any demand of

¹ *Gujjender Ghur*.—Gajendragarh, a village in the Dharwar District, Bombay, about 20 miles due north of Kopal (Gopal).

explanation; and exclusively advantageous to his expected enemy.

There is reason to conclude that Tippoo believed in the original expectations of his adversary, and distrusted the pacific intentions of the English, whose military establishments, directed for the first time by military governors,¹ were at this period organized with a degree of care, which seemed to indicate the expectation of war; for on any other grounds it would be difficult to explain his open anxiety for terminating a contest in which he had uniformly triumphed. However this may be, on the return of answers to the letters which he had *really* addressed to Holkar and Rastia,² through whose mediation the advances were made, he sent a public deputation of two persons of the highest rank in his service, Budr-u-Zemân and Ali Reza Khân, a measure of Indian diplomacy liable to the construction of inferiority. The negotiations however were drawn to a considerable length, chiefly by reciprocal subterfuge, but at length were terminated on the following principles. Tippoo was indebted in the whole sum of four years' tribute, which, previously to the war of Coromandel, Hyder had stipulated to pay, on the condition of being acknowledged as the undisputed lord of every thing south of the Kistna from sea to sea. The annual

Mr. Alexander Davidson became provisional Governor of Madras on Lord Macartney's resignation in June 1785, and in April 1786, Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell arrived in Madras as Governor. He had been in the Royal Engineers. He saw service in America in the 71st Foot and had been Governor of Jamaica. When in Madras, he united in himself, after General Sir John Dalling went home in 1786, the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Before that time, the Governor had held the office of Commander-in-Chief within garrison limits only. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 319-20.)

² *Rastia*.—The Raste (Rastia) family, Brahmins, were connected by marriage with the Peshwas. They had estates in Bundelkand, Khandesh, Nasik and Satara, and members of the family were influential in Mahratta affairs. (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, *passim*.)

sum was twelve lacs of rupees tribute, and three lacs durbar expences, total sixty lacs, from which a deduction was obtained of fifteen lacs in compensation of damages* sustained by the war; of the remaining forty-five lacs thirty were actually paid, and fifteen were promised at the expiration of a year. The cession of Badâmi and the restitution of Adwânee, Kittoor, and above all of Neergoond, the original cause or pretext of the war, completed the indications of submission, and confirmed the existence of some motive more powerful than the apparent state of the campaign. Of the payment and restitutions not a word is to be found in the King of histories, excepting that on adjusting the conditions, the Mahrattas begged, for the gratification of their prince, who was an infant, something to buy sweetmeats, and one or two villages as a jageer dependent on the Sultaun. On his ill faith and inhumanity, it may be received as an illustration, that on the very day that the conditions were finally settled, he ordered his commandant at Adwânee, "to collect with the utmost expedition, all he could from the country, to encompass completely two or three towns, and getting together five or seven thousand people, report the particulars, *as men are wanted for the Assud Illahee corps.*" The Mahrattas were too well aware of character to move before all the conditions were completely fulfilled; but this accomplished, they had scarcely re-crossed the Kistna before Kittoor was re-occupied by the Sultaun's troops.

The success of his night alarms, in the late campaign, had been really considerable, and he is diffuse in his description of various stratagems, by which he kept his enemies perpetually awake, and made them spend their nights "like the owls of ill omen, in the mountains and forests:" of his sending sixteen rocket men in four detachments, to represent the four columns in which he usually moved, and by the dis-

* "Pai-mâulee;" what is trodden under foot.

charge of a signal rocket each, to put the confederate army into motion ; at length, he says, it became the enemy's custom, to load the baggage after sun-set, and change their ground, in order that he might not know where to find them * : an universal practice of the Indian partisan cavalry, from which he borrowed the tale or they the imitation ; and it is certain, from the impression produced in every part of India, by the events of this campaign, that it must have been conducted, on the part of the Sultaun, with a degree of energy and enterprize which established a general opinion of his military superiority.

On his return by a route passing nearly midway between Harponelly¹ and Raidroog,² he made detachments, on the pretence of dispersing his army in cantonments, of two brigades, with secret instructions to each of those fortresses ; and having previously removed all grounds of suspicion, by repeated personal acknowledgments to the poligars of those places, for the distinguished services they had rendered in the late campaign, he seized their chiefs and their prin

* Among the royal jests, is one regarding Hurry Pundit, the Mahratta Commander-in-chief, who, on the occasion of a night attack, called to his valet for his drawers, and in the dark thrust his two legs into the place intended for one : "you rascal," he exclaimed, "you have given me a bag ;" and groping about, found the under garment of his wife, with which he adorned himself, to the great amusement of the beholders, when day light enabled them to discover the mistake.

¹ *Harponelly*.—Harapanahally, a town in the Bellary District, 67 miles W.S.W. of Bellary. It was the seat of a powerful Poligar of the Boya caste. One of his descendants married a daughter of the Poligar of Chitaldrug. The Poligars at different times paid tribute to the Nizam, to Morari Rao of Gooty and to the Peshwa. In 1786 Tippu took the place. But one of the followers of the Poligar escaped and joined the Mahrattas and was set up as Poligar. He was expelled by Tippu, but returned during the Second Mysore War, and eventually surrendered to General Harris in 1800. The fort is now deserted and in ruins.

² *Raidroog*.—Raydrug, a town in the Bellary District, 30 miles south of Bellary. A rock 1,200 feet high, overlooks the town—a rugged granite mass, connected by low hills with Chitaldrug in

oipal officers in camp on the same day and hour that the brigades overpowered the unsuspecting garrisons. The cash and effects of every kind, not excepting the personal ornaments of the women, were carried off as royal plunder, and the chiefs were ultimately sent to the accustomed fate of Cabaldroog. The Sultaun relates with complacency the success of his arrangements for the annexation of these dependencies to the royal dominion; their allegiance to his father had been precarious; and on every invasion, they had shewn more attachment to the enemy than to him. In the late campaign, they had concurred in a conspiracy for the assassination of the Sultaun, and the time of retribution had at length arrived! On reading this statement to one of the Sultaun's most zealous advocates, he uttered an involuntary exclamation of its absolute falsehood; and declared, that no two officers, Mahomedan, or Hindoo, had given more distinguished proofs of allegiance to his father and himself than these unfortunate men.

Mysore: About 1517, the fort was given by the Vijayanagar Raja to a Boya chief. It became tributary to Bijapur after the fall of Vijayanagar. It was afterwards taken and occupied by a Telugu Raja of the Balji caste. Haidar took the fort, but reinstated the chief. When Tippu took the fort, the Poligar was sent to Seringapatam, where he was assassinated in 1791. Lord Cornwallis took the fort in that year. But in 1799, a nephew of the Poligar attempted to get hold of the fort; he was taken prisoner by the Nizam's troops and sent to Hyderabad. He was afterwards surrendered to the English and sent to Gooty, where he died and pensions were given to his descendants. The family is now extinct. (Dr. Maclean: *Madras Manual of Administration.*)

CHAPTER XXXII.

The Sultaun destroys Mysoor—Curious example of vicissitude—Descends to Malabar—Extract from his own work, descriptive of the singular habits of the women—Discussion of that subject—Habits of the ancient Britons—Impolitic demolition of Calicut—The monsoon—Impious pretensions—The word prophet—Arrival at Coimbetoor—Suspected madness—French physician—Influence of European politics—Visits Dindigul—Alarm of the Raja of Travancore—Tippoo returns to Seringapatam—Arrangements—Coorg and Malabar in general rebellion—caused by the supercession of Arshed Beg Khán, and the crude measures of his successor—That respectable man disgraced—Died of grief—Tippoo proceeds to Malabar—hunts the Nairs—Alternative of circumcision or deportation—Opinion of the spontaneous appearance of small-pox without contagion—examined and discussed—Nair Raja Chercul is received with distinction—Reciprocal suspicions of treachery—Killed—The corpse treated with base indignity—Destruction of the temples—Marriage of the Sultaun's second son, to the daughter of the Beebee of Cannanore—Astrology—Arrangements for forcible and universal conversion—Reconnoissance of the Travancorean frontier—Returns to Coimbetoor—End of the King of histories—and specimen in its concluding page—Embassador from Nizam Ali received—proposes a strict and solemn alliance—rejected except on condition of a previous intermarriage in the families—which Nizam Ali declined.

WHATEVER may have been the Sultaun's motives for concluding the late peace, they had certainly no influence in diminishing the arrogance of his subsequent pretensions. On returning to his capital, some months were employed in the enlargement of those numerous innovations in the interior, which will be most conveniently described in a subsequent part of this work. The town and fort of Mysoor, the ancient residence of the rajas, and the capital from which the whole country derived its name, was an offensive memorial of the deposed family, and he determined that the existence, and if possible the remembrance of such a place, should be extinguished. The fort was levelled with the ground, and the materials were employed in the erection of another fortress on a neighbouring height, which he named Nezerbâr *: and it is a curious example of that vicissitude in human affairs, which history so often preaches in vain, that the very same stones were re-conveyed to rebuild the same old fort of Mysoor, in 1799. The town was utterly destroyed, and the inhabitants were ordered to remove at their option, to Gunj-aum on the island of Seringapatam, or to the Agrâr (bramin village) of Bumboor, now to be named Sultaun-pet, a little to the southward of that island.

When the season was sufficiently advanced to make the march convenient, the Sultaun, at the head of his army, proceeded by the route of Tamburcherry,¹ to visit and reform his possessions in Calicut. "The country of Calicut," as he informs us, "is situated

* I have been assured by two of his secretaries, that he meant to intimate by this name, "the place visited by the eye of the Almighty;" an evidence, as I apprehend, of his imperfect knowledge of the language in which he wrote. The name, however, gives the date, and the numerical power of the words may have been considered more than their grammatical import.

¹ *Tamburcherry*.—Tamarassheri. The Pass leads from Gundlupet in Mysore, over the hills of Wynaad to Calicut. There is now a good road from the top of the Pass at Vayittri down the side of the valley into Calicut.

on the coast of the ocean, and is named Malabar : its breadth does not exceed twenty-three coss,¹ and its length is nearly two hundred. The Mahomedan inhabitants are called Pilla (Mapilla) and the infidels Naimars; and as the rainy season lasts six months, and mud continues throughout the year, the roads are excessively difficult, and the inhabitants prone to resistance, dividing their time between agriculture and arms. Such is the excess of infidelity, that if a Mussulman touch the exterior wall of a house, the dwelling can only be purified by setting it on fire. From the origin of Islâm in Hind, to the present day, no person had interfered with these practices, excepting the revered,* who is in paradise, after the conquest of the country, in the manner which has been narrated †; and during the twenty-five years that the country of Calicut had belonged to this dynasty, in as much as twenty thousand troops were maintained for its occupation, and the revenues never equalled their monthly pay; the balance, to a large amount, was uniformly discharged from the general treasury. Notwithstanding all this, the actual circumstances of the country were never properly investigated, until his Majesty, the shadow of God, directed his propitious steps, &c. &c. and remained three months in that country. He observed that the cultivators (instead of being collected in villages as in other parts of India) have each his separate dwelling and garden adjoining his field; these solitary dwellings he classed into groupes of forty-houses, with a local chief and an accountant to each, an establishment which was to watch over the morals and realize the revenue; and a Sheickh-ul-Islâm ‡ to each district for religious

¹ Indian league. One coss = 2½ miles. In Mysore, the Sultauny coss is about 4 miles. (Dr. Maclean: *Madras Manual of Administration.*)

* Hyder Ali.

† It will be recollected, that this part of the Sultaun-u-Towareekh, although referred to, was never written; see preface.

‡ This is the title of the chief of Medina.

purposes alone; and addressed to the principal inhabitants a proclamation to the following effect. "From the period of the conquest until this day, during twenty-four years, you have been a turbulent and refractory people, and in the wars waged during your rainy season, you have caused numbers of our warriors to taste the draught* of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. Hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner; dwell quietly, and pay your dues like good subjects; and since it is a practice with you, for one woman to associate with ten men, and you leave your mothers and sisters unconstrained in their obscene practices, and are thence all born in adultery, and are more shameless in your connexions than the beasts of the field; I hereby require you to forsake these sinful practices, and live like the rest of mankind. And if you are disobedient to these commands, I have made repeated vows, to honour the whole of you with Islam, and to march all the chief persons to the seat of empire. Other moral inferences, and religious instruction, applicable to spiritual and temporal concerns, were also written with his own hand, and graciously bestowed upon them."

The account here given of the manners of the women of Malabar, corresponds in its principal features, with the narratives of all the voyagers, and this inversion of the usual acceptation of polygamy, has produced strange theories, founded on very questionable facts. In hot climates, according to Montesquieu, females are marriageable at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and they are old at twenty: when beauty demands the empire, the want of reason forbids the claim; when reason is obtained, beauty is no more: polygamy is therefore the natural effect of the climate: this enlightened author does not seem to have been aware that the great mass of the Indian population are monogamists; with the

* "Sherbet;" literally drink.

modification of being enjoined a second marriage after the first has ceased to augment population. "That the law of polygamy is an affair that depends on calculation," is the title of one of his chapters. According to the calculations which he quotes, in some countries there are born more boys than girls,* as in Thibet, where there is a plurality of husbands, and in others the proportion is inverted; and with a lubricity and reserve which shews the weakness of his ground, he treads lightly on a theory which would make the will of God to depend on the vices of man. In a work which professes to deliver the theory of every fact, and generally, it must be admitted, with eminent success, we must expect to find some failures; and in the very next chapter, forgetting the theory of the last, he explains the plurality of husbands in Malabar, by adverting to the military spirit of the Nairs, which makes it inconvenient to be shackled with a wife. The facts without theory, are described in the official report of the first commissioners for Malabar, after its cession to the English Government in 1792, to the following effect. The rajas are generally of the second Hindoo cast, some are of the fourth: but in all, the line of succession is not (as in other countries) in favour of their own sons, but those of their sisters; who do not marry according to the acceptation of that term in other countries, but form connections of a longer or shorter duration, with a race of bramins named Nambouries; who thus provide heirs for all the principalities of Malabar.—The same line of succession prevails among the Nairs, (soldiers and husbandmen of the fourth class); and their women (in the southern parts, however, more than in the north,) indulge with more or less freedom in fugitive connexions with various men of their own or of

* Ten women to one man in Bantam. In Meaco, according to Kempfer, 182,072 males, and 223,573 females.—Spirit of Laws, book xvi. chap. 4.

higher casts ; and strange to tell, the same rule of succession extends to the Mapillas, the descendants of Arabs, settled in Malabar, long before even the Christian æra, and converted by their countrymen to the new religion of Mahommed, after these domestic habits had been so fixed, as not to be shaken even by the positive law of the Korân. The rule of direct filiation is only observed by foreign Hindoos, and by the indigenous tribes, inferior to that of Nair, among whom prevails the custom, as if to discredit the influence of climate, common to the two extremes of Coorg and Thibet, of several brothers having one and the same wife. The account, thus officially rendered, of which the above is an imperfect abstract, is however qualified by the explanations of several highly enlightened correspondents, who have favoured the author with the result of their personal observations, after a long residence in Malabar, and who bear honourable testimony to the respectable conduct of the Nair ladies of Northern Malabar; it is however admitted, that the wife, if such she may be named, usually continues to reside in the paternal mansion, where she is visited by her lord, or sallies forth to visit him; and that the natural marks of tenderness and affection to children, are lavished by the men on nephews and nieces, and scarcely ever on reputed sons and daughters; the statement indeed which most strenuously denies a plurality of husbands, admits the occasional prevalence of lax morals, and a tendency to various intercourse, but states the practice to be deemed disreputable. Not so, however, in the south, the parties are betrothed in childhood, and united at the age of puberty, but if after a short cohabitation, the lady disapproves the choice of her parents, she is at liberty to make her own, by accepting a cloth (a dress) from the man of her own selection, and declaring in the presence of four witnesses that she discards her husband, and accepts the donor of the cloth; and this she may repeat as

often as the donor of a new cloth can be found, but never without the declared dismissal of her old companion, *who of course must be deemed equally free to form a new connection.* In a condition of morals which acknowledges so wide a licence, it must be inferred, that the privileged line is frequently overstepped: but, however this may be, it is obvious that no departure from those general laws of nature, which regulate population, is necessary for the production or continuance of a state of society, which, as far as regards the question of relative numbers, may as correctly be deemed a plurality of wives, as a plurality of husbands. With regard to the marriage of one wife to a family of brothers, an ingenious friend long resident in Malabar, whose attention had been drawn, after answering my first enquiries, to Cæsar's description of the manners of Britain, at the period of the Roman conquest, declares his belief in their general coincidence with the actual practice of Malabar,* not only in the lower, but the higher classes, with the exceptions regarding filiation, which have been recited; the original passage is inserted at the bottom of the page, and Sir William Temple,† who has some curious observations on these associations of ten or twelve families as practised by our ancestors, relates the apology made on the subject by a British lady, who had been admitted to some intimacy with Julia Augusta in the time of Severus. "We do that openly with the best of our men, which you do secretly with the worst of yours."

For a similar reason to that which induced the demolition of Mysoor, the Sultaun ordered the

* *Uxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes, et maxime fratres cum fratribus, et patres cum liberis. Sed qui sunt ex his nati eorum habentur liberi a quibus primum virgines quæque ductæ sunt.*—Cæsar, lib. v. cap. 14.

Sir William Temple deviates a little from the sense of the original, which he probably referred to from memory. Henry doubts Cæsar's accuracy.

† Temple's Works, vol. ii. page 532, folio edition, 1720.

entire destruction of Calicut, and the erection at a few miles distance of another fortress, with the new name of Ferruckhee, a fancy which afterwards nearly proved fatal to his troops, by leaving them the choice of a ruin, or an unfinished work, as points of retreat and rendezvous; and while loitering over these and other equally fruitless projects, and rioting in imagination over bigoted schemes of converting the infidels, he was apprised by men of cooler heads, that the monsoon had commenced: he determined to march through the depth of it to Coimbatoor, answering those who attempted to dissuade him, that he would *order the clouds to cease discharging their waters, until he should have passed*. It may be difficult to determine whether this was intended as an impious jest, or a blasphemous pretension; but it is certain, that about this period, he frequently placed his own exploits in the cause of religion, particularly in the number of his converts, above those of Mahommed; the word *Peighámber* he said signified no more than a bearer of tidings (to the uninstructed,) and that Mahommed was but such a man as Tippoo Sultaun: on which subject it may not be out of place to remark, that neither this nor any other term by which Mahommed is distinguished in Mahomedan writings conveys any meaning approaching our word *prophet*, the customary translation* of those terms. But pretensions of this nature gave great offence to the orthodox, and if the Sultaun's arrogance had not been checked by the subsequent English war, there is abundant reason to conjecture, that, drunk with flattery, and uncontrolled dominion, he would have openly claimed the apostolic character, and as his followers believe, a still more impious assumption. However this may be, the clouds were not controlled, and the army suffered

* "Russool," an apostle:—"nubbee," a person who awakes or admonishes:—"peighámber,"—a bearer of tidings, but nothing approaching *prophet*, a person who predicts future events.

the greatest hardships, in their tedious march through the swamps, the floods, and the unceasing torrents of rain, until their arrival at Coimbatore.

A variety of incidents occurred in this and the succeeding year, which confirmed in general opinion the inference that an intellect too weak for such a giddy height occasionally tottered on the verge of insanity; and among them a tale is related, the accuracy or incorrectness of which may possibly be ascertained by persons still living in France. The Sultaun's letters shew that he had written to Louis XVI. to send him three medical persons, a physician, a surgeon, and an apothecary, and on the return of his embassy, which we shall presently notice, two of these gentlemen were presented to him at Coimbatore. The physician after being introduced, demanded his dismissal, but however strongly vouched, I cannot venture to determine whether the tale be founded, of his having assigned as his reason, to Heckeem Wasil, the native physician in waiting, that he perceived in the Sultaun symptoms of incipient madness, nor whether it be an embellishment of Heckeem Wasil, that the Sultaun overheard some of the conversation which ensued, and called a council to deliberate on the case, which council gravely and unanimously determined that it was the physician, and not the patient, who was mad.

Among the causes which had influenced the Sultaun in the decided measures which he had executed, and was preparing in Malabar, was a combination of European politics, deeply and deliberately planned, but ultimately never executed.

The faction in Holland, inimical to the house of Orange, and leaning on France for support, had, as the price of that support, and the means of effecting their own objects, secretly consented to a plan suggested by the French for their own aggrandizement, for surrendering to that power the port and fortresses of Trincomalee, to be employed as a naval station, in

furtherance of those operations necessary for the restoration of the affairs of France, on the continent of India; and the combined and determined efforts of France and Holland, were at a proper time, and immediately, if necessary, to give effect to these projects, which were studiously concealed from the knowledge of the Orange party.

General Conway, Governor of Pondicherry, was charged with the execution of this measure, and sailed from Pondicherry, ostensibly for the Isle of France, with a suitable armament, comprising nearly the whole of his garrison; in the confidence of obtaining the unresisted possession of the place, and occupying it in force, before the English, who were expected to consider the transaction as little short of a declaration of hostility, should have any intimation of the design.

The original machination, however, did not entirely escape the vigilance of the Government of Holland. Secret instructions were sent to the Governor of Ceylon, to provide against the attempt; and when General Conway arrived at Trincomalee, he found the means of defence so perfectly prepared, by a staunch adherent of the house of Orange, that he felt the necessity of desisting from the attempt, and returned to Pondicherry.

Sir Archibald Campbell, on receiving the first intelligence of the object of General Conway's departure, determined, without waiting for any authority, to counteract a proceeding so decidedly hostile, by immediate preparations for the siege of Pondicherry; but General Conway's failure at Trincomalee, caused the whole of these designs reciprocally to subside. The Sultaun was for the present left to his own measures on the continent of India, without the co-operation of his French allies; and the interior distractions of the Government of Holland, of which the affairs of India formed no more than a subordinate branch, had in the meanwhile assumed a new aspect,

through the co-operation of Prussia and England; and the celebrated expedition of the Duke of Brunswick into Holland; and an amicable explanation between the courts of France and England, produced the abandonment of those preparations, by sea and land, which appeared to threaten an early and general war in every part of their respective possessions.

From Coimbetoor the Sultaun made a progress to visit Dindigul, a jageer conferred by himself on his relation Seyed Saheb, (Moyeen-u-Deen), by whom he was splendidly entertained, and it was soon after this period, that the raja of Travancore entertained the first serious alarm, which he communicated to the Government of Madras, of being invaded at one and the same time from the east and the north, in consequence of the minute investigation of routes on each of these frontiers.* Before leaving this quarter, he laid waste with fire and sword, the countries of such of the poligars dependent on Dindigul and Coimbetoor, as had recently failed in obedience, and returned by August. the route of Gujelhutty to Seringapatam, where, according to his own statement, four months were exclusively devoted to the operation of embodying all the seyeds of his infantry into separate brigades, and the sheicks into others, leaving for the present the Patâns and Moguls † to be intermixed with the Hindoos. He had scarcely accomplished these

* The difficult pass of Goodaloor, at the bottom of the vale of Dindigul, and the access by the coast of Malabar.

[Gudalur at the extreme south-west of the Madura District, on the border of Travancore.]

† A stranger, on making enquiries, will find the four divisions of Mahommedans mentioned in the text, considered by the multitude as so many sects. In fact, Patan and Moghul are merely national appellations. The only original distinction of a general nature, being that of Seyeds, descendants of Mahommed, and men of Arabian family, not so descended, who, in India, are usually named *Sheickhs*. The numerous religious sectaries, who have subsequently arisen, are to be found in every country and every race.

separations before he received intelligence, that all Coorg and Malabar had risen in simultaneous rebellion, and even, according to his own statement, were every where pressing his troops with the most desperate valour.

Arshed Beg Khān, as we have seen, had been appointed by Hyder, shortly before his death to the office of civil and military governor of Malabar; he was a Mussulman of rare talents, humanity, and probity, and by adapting the scheme of his government to the actual circumstances of the country, had brought the province into a state of comparative tranquillity and contentment. But the Sultaun had composed rules and regulations, to which all circumstances must bend, and they must be equally applied to all his dominions. Among these was the separation of authorities, and the consequent supercession of Arshed Beg Khān in the civil, while he retained the military powers. On the arrival of his new coadjutor, (Meer Ibraheem, a relation of the secretary for the department of innovation,) this excellent servant distinctly perceiving the inevitable consequences of the new system, wished to retire; and in 1786, requested that permission to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, which in Kirkpatrick's notes on Tippoo's letters is ascribed to another cause. The new Asoph (civil and fiscal governor) broke through all his cowles, (written engagements,) substituted new exactions, and set the inhabitants in a flame. Arshed Beg Khān employed the influence which his virtues had commanded, in the maintenance of quiet, and attempted in vain to impress on his colleague the duty of maintaining inviolate the public faith. His urgent intreaties to his master to avert the destruction of Malabar by his own presence had caused the Sultaun's visit to that country in the beginning of 1788. He found the conduct of Meer Ibrahim to have really placed the province on the verge of rebellion, and he removed and confined him;

but he also removed and disgraced Arshed Beg Khân, and invented other novelties for the misgovernment of Malabar. The Sultaun's arrogance could not contemplate the possibility of his having himself created the rebellion by changing the order of things which was already as successful as could reasonably be expected, for in spite of his assertion, Arshed Beg Khân had uniformly realized a surplus revenue. This venerable man, whose name alone would have commanded the tranquillity which an army could not achieve, was still in prison, not with the hope of extorting money, for calumny acknowledged he was poor, but because calumny and injury, when inflicted by a tyrant, constitute in the sufferer an unpardonable crime; and he soon afterwards died of grief and disgust.

The Sultaun, however, who simply observes, 1789. that the infidels of Malabar had disregarded his Jan. preaching, and had risen in rebellion, pitched his tents, and marched with his whole army, and after some delay in traversing Coorg, and restoring a temporary quiet, descended by the pass of Tambercherry into Malabar. The report of the arrival of the whole army, caused the Nairs to retire as usual into their woods and mountains; and Tippoo divided his troops into numerous detachments for the purpose of apprehending them. While the detached divisions were conducted with various success, his own took the direction of a place named *Gootipoor*, where about two thousand Nairs with their families, occupied an old fortified position, which they defended for some days, but finding it untenable against the superior number and means by which they were invested, they were ultimately compelled to surrender at discretion. The alternative was signified to them of a voluntary profession of the Mahommedan faith, or a forcible conversion, with deportation from their native land. The unhappy captives gave a forced assent, and on the next day the rite of circumcision

was performed on all the males, every individual of both sexes being compelled to close the ceremony by eating beef. This achievement being completed, it was held out as an example to the other detachments of the army, and it is certain that great numbers of Nairs incessantly hunted out of their places of concealment, at length came forth to be circumcised, as the only mode which remained to them of avoiding a more cruel fate.

It has been stated, that this alternative presented to the imaginations of the Nairs, the apprehension of death as well as banishment; and it is necessary to explain, that the very singular opinion was entertained at that period, and prevails in Mysoor at the present day, that small-pox is generated without contagion, by the mere act of a crowded deportation from Malabar to the upper countries. The fact appears to be incontestable that former emigrations were followed by the appearance of small-pox, and the death of a large portion of the population, and in some instances of nearly the whole. The earlier could not be traced by the same means of personal enquiry, as some of the later deportations, in which the precaution is stated to have been taken, of moving in smaller divisions, with express orders to avoid all possible communication which could risk the conveyance of infection. Officers who have been charged with this service, have assured the author, of the exact execution of these precautions, and of the spontaneous appearance of the disease, soon after passing from the summits of the hills into the plain table land. It is not intended to attach importance to the opinions and inferences of men, who are confessedly careless observers, and frequently inaccurate narrators; but it does appear of importance to the human race, that a fact, which can scarcely be deemed an unfit subject of philosophical enquiry, should be watched and examined by more competent observers, in that country where the disease is stated to have

originated : not only as the investigation may regard small-pox, (whose destructive powers have been happily arrested in every part of the habitable globe,) but as it may relate to all those diseases, which are referred by general opinion to contagion alone.

It is evident that small-pox was either coeval with the creation, or had a subsequent beginning; and it is an inference deducible from the first principles of reasoning, that *the same causes which originally produced may re-produce it without contagion.* A late author* who has combined the most profound and interesting historical research, with the story of a loathsome disease, thinks that it has been known in China and India for at least three thousand years: there are reasons which shall presently be discussed for assigning to it a more modern origin, but the general proposition is not affected by comparative antiquity. It is now familiarly known that the small-pox was without a name in the ancient languages of Europe; and Mr. Moore has established, in the most satisfactory manner, that it was equally unknown in Arabia, in Persia, and in those Asiatic countries which are deemed to be the cradle of the human race, before A. D. 569, † when it was first introduced into Arabia by vessels trading with India. During the latter part of the 6th and the whole of the 7th century, it was spread over the remaining portions of Asia, and all that part of Africa which is washed by the Mediterranean sea. In the 8th century it accompanied the conquests of the Arabs into Spain, Sicily, Italy, and France; Saxony, Switzerland and England received it certainly in the 10th and probably in the 9th century; and lastly it travelled into Hispaniola, and soon afterwards to Mexico, in the beginning of the 16th century.‡

The early antiquities of Ohina and India have

* Moore's History of the Small-pox.

† Ibid. p. 110.

‡ Moore, *passim*.

become nearly synonymous with fable. In China* the first appearance of small-pox, is fixed by one authority with suspicious accuracy, at 1122 years anterior to the Christian æra, before which period it was unknown; and at least as remote an origin is claimed by the legends of India. In that country, we find apparent indications of long experience in the treatment, rather than the legendary history of the disease. That the presiding deity is a low bred goddess, whose temples are never approached by a bramin, and are frequented exclusively by the outcasts, furnishes little ground of inference; but the immemorial practice of the bramins of Orissa near Ganjam, of inoculation by means of a sharp steel instrument, of exposure to the cool open air, to prevent the confluent disease, and even of the cold † affusion for a day or two before the eruptive fever is expected—although indicative of successful experience, affords no evidence of antiquity beyond the 6th century.

Mr. Moore ascribes to the deserts, which separate India from Persia, the long exemption of the latter country from infection; and assigns satisfactory reasons, why contagious diseases should rather follow the irruption of an invading army than its return. He seems, however, to lean to the opinion, that the eruptive disease mentioned by Quintus Curtius, which carried off great numbers of Alexander's army, at the mouths of the Indus, may have been an ill described small-pox; and was prevented by the intervening deserts from making its way into Persia. Now the fleet, with which Nearchus navigated the Persian gulf, was not built by Alexander, but chiefly found ‡ upon the Indus; the facts of the voyage shew, that these vessels were equal to the coasting trade, and even to a communication with the

* Moore, page 22.

† Doctor Ainslie.

‡ Vincent's Voyage of Nearchus, page 11.

opposite and not distant shores of Arabia ; a country which, from the earliest periods of history or tradition, possessed the productions of India. The neighbourhood of the Indus near its mouths, and particularly the northern vicinity, is shewn by the historians of Alexander to have possessed a considerable population ; which must have received from Alexander's fleet and army, the contagious disease described by Quintius Curtius ; or the small-pox, at an earlier date, if it had previously existed in the interior. And it is difficult to conceive its being arrested at that spot without extending northwards into Persia by land, or coastwise, by means of the Arabian trade. The hardships sustained by the army of Alexander in its march through Gedrosia were unquestionably severe, but the daring travels of Lieutenant Pottinger have recently established the existence in that route of the ruins of cities and palaces, which now half-covered by the encroaching sands, must in the days of Alexander have sustained a population at least sufficient to receive and transmit a contagious disease, by its shores, or inland, although producing too little surplus food to meet the wants of the Grecian army. The Arabian trade is described by the earliest authors as a coasting* voyage, more likely perhaps than a direct one to afford the means of successive infection ; and other authorities supply the intermediate links of an unbroken chain, extending from the earliest to the latest periods of authentic history, to support the uninterrupted existence of an intercourse between India and Arabia, sufficient for the propagation of an infectious disease. Moses † specifies the appropriation to religious uses, and in large quantities too, of cinnamon and cassia, the productions of Ceylon and Malabar ; which shews that a communication of some kind or other was open between India and

* Vincent's Periplus, page 45.

† 30th, Exodus, verse 23, 24.

Egypt, even in that early age. From that period until about two centuries before the Christian æra, the aromatic productions of India were supposed in the west to grow in Arabia; whether the chintz and other fabrics introduced into Media may have been referred to their proper country before the age of Alexander does not distinctly appear*; after that period the information becomes more precise. Agatharcides, who wrote 146 years after the death of Alexander, and 177 A. C. tells us, not only that the Sabeans possessed the trade from India to Arabia, as the Egyptians monopolized the same trade from Arabia to Europe; but is the first to relate that ships from India were met with in the ports of Sabea,† that the mariners of Sabea sail in very large vessels to the country where the odoriferous productions grow,‡ *and plant colonies there* (the progenitors of the Mapillas of Malabar). The embassies of Porus and Pandion to Augustus; the incident of the freedman of Plocamus being blown off the coast and carried by the monsoon to Ceylon; his return from that island accompanied by ambassadors from its king to Claudius: the voyage of Hyppalus consequent on that discovery, in the first century of the Christian æra, and the more direct communication which ensued, are so many links in a chain of incessant and immemorial intercourse: and even before the discovery of Hyppalus, the direct proof of the arrival at Rome of bales of muslin from Bengal in the earliest part of the first century, (and probably long before) is furnished by the reproaches of a licentious poet addressed to the Roman matrons for their public semi-nudity in garments of “woven §

* Vincent's Periplus, page 17.

† Ibid, 35.

‡ Ibid. 32.

§ Quo Margarita cara tribacca Indica ?

An ut matrona ornata phaleris pelagiis,

Tollat pedes indomita in strato extraneo,

Smaragdum ad quem rem viridem pretiosum vitrum ?

wind," or "a texture of cloud." Excluding then the abundant proofs of earlier date, we find that for seven centuries at the least before the introduction of the small-pox into Arabia from India, the ships of each country were received into the ports of the other; and for upwards of five centuries before that period, we have testimonies of an intercourse in its first stage, exclusively between India and Arabia, which brought into Italy the productions of Bengal: the whole exhibiting authentic evidence of an unceasing intercourse apparently sufficient for the transmission of infectious disease. The inference therefore appears to rest on something more than probability, that in the 6th century the small-pox was a new disease in India, and according to a similar chain of probability in China also: and in reverting to our first proposition, that *the causes*

Quo Carchedonias optas ignes lapideos
 Nisi ut scintillent? Probitas est carbunculus.
 Æquum est induere nuptam ventum textilem?
 Palam prostrare nudam in nebula linea?

Petronius, page 53. London, 1711.

This is the true muslin, *the shebnum*, the dewy vesture, the gossamer of Dacca. That cotton, and not flaxen is intended, is evident from the following description, in the same century of the plant which produced the *Xylina lina*. "Superior pars Egypti in Arabiam vergens gignit fruticem, quem aliqui Gossipium vocant, plures *Xylon*, et ideo *lina* inde facta *Xylina*. Parvus est, similemque barbatae nucis defert fructum, cujus ex interiore nuce lanugo netur, nec ulla *lina* sunt iis candore molliave preferenda." Pliny. Hist. Mund. 19. 1. The term *Xylon*, was certainly not derived from the Arabs, who name it *Kuttun*, cotton, but it bears a close resemblance to the common Indian pronunciation of Ceylon, (*Cylon*, with the accent on the first syllable,) as muslin from *Moosul*, and calico from *Calicut*, the emporia from which these substances became known in the west. The above passage, in the feast of Trimalcion was pointed out to me for purposes totally unconnected with the present subject, by Doctor Kay, one of the most enlightened men, and accomplished scholars of the age in which he lives; whose elegant mind has been lost to the literature of his country, by a residence of nearly half a century in the island of St. Helena.

which originally produced, may reproduce it without contagion, I am persuaded that the members of a liberal and estimable profession will distinguish between the suggestion of a new and interesting subject of research, and those dreams of planetary* influence, or medical theory equally visionary, which disgraced the literature even of the 17th century.

Although the particular condition and change of atmosphere, supposed to generate small-pox, be vaguely indicated in the apprehensions of the Nairs, the opinion of its spontaneous appearance is not peculiar to Malabar and Mysoor, but may be traced in many provinces of Decan and the south. Its periodical disappearance and return would seem to be the necessary consequence of the periodical exhaustion and accumulation of subjects, but its sudden appearance in the centre of a district, without introduction from abroad, although an impression on minds little distinguished by habits of accurate investigation, will not be treated with levity by men who really possess those habits; and who will at least find an apology for the error, if such it be, of men habituated to observe the disease named *the hill (or jungle) fever* invariably contracted by the inhabitants of the shore who visit particular hills, and the very same disease contracted by the inhabitants of those same hills, in consequence of visiting the shore, and named by them the *sea fever*: an error, of men accustomed (with whatever inferiority of science) to consider in these reciprocal predispositions to a fatal endemic, not only the quality of the air to be breathed, but the previous condition of the person who is to breathe it.

The Nair raja of Chercul¹ had been induced, by the most sacred promises, to pay his personal respects

* Moore's History of the Small-pox, page 198, and *passim*.

¹ *Chercul*.—Chirakkal, now the most northern of the taluqs in Malabar, adjoining the district of South Canara. The Raja, formerly a powerful chief, belonged to the Kohattiri family, and

to the Sultaun, and was, for several days, treated with considerable distinction, and dismissed with costly presents to his little principality. Immediately after his departure, real or pretended information was received, of his being engaged in a secret conspiracy to revenge the cruel indignities of his countrymen; and Tippoo detached two brigades to effect his destruction, or ascertain his obedience, by directing him instantly to return to camp. His attendants, justly alarmed at these appearances, prepared for defence, and before any explanation could be given, a skirmish ensued, in which the raja and some of his attendants were killed, and a few prisoners secured: and Tippoo, considering the accusation to be established, ordered the most base and unmanly indignities to be offered to the corpse,* and that the dead and the living should afterwards be hanged on the same tree. These indignities recounted by the Sultaun himself, although free from his usual obscenity, are too brutal for translation; and he relates, among the incidents pertaining to this raja, that he had, during their personal intercourse, offered 400,000 rupees, and the plates of gold with which a particular temple was roofed, on condition of sparing the temple itself; to which proposition the Sultaun is made to reply, that he would not spare it for all the treasures of the earth and the sea. He states the

it was with that family that the Portuguese adventurers first entered into relations. Chirakkal, the former headquarters of the Raja, is a village four miles N.N.W. of Cannanore. The descendants of the family still live in the neighbourhood. (Dr. Maclean: *Madras Manual of Administration*.)

* Another account says, that he was accompanied by a detachment, to aid in seizing the insurgents, under the command of a confidential officer, charged with instructions to use the raja as an instrument, till the purpose was accomplished, and then to seize himself; and that the raja having obtained information of this design, sent forward secret instructions to his family to escape by Tellicherry; when he heard of their safety, he attempted his own escape, and finding that impossible, shot himself.

destruction in the course of this holy war, of eight thousand idol temples, many of them roofed with gold, silver, or copper, and all containing treasures buried at the feet of the idol, the whole of which was royal plunder : but when crimes are deemed to be virtues, we may infer that their amount is much exaggerated. Before leaving Malabar, he paid a visit to Cannanore, and solemnized the first ceremonies of a marriage between the daughter of the dowager chief, and one of his sons, Abd-ul-Khâlic. A minute detail is given of the fortunate conjunctions of the planets, and the astrologers unanimously pronounce, that such an auspicious hour would not return for 120 years. From this place, he made a progress along the coast, as far south as Chawgaut,¹ for the purpose of making the local investigations, and instituting the intrigues, necessary to the attack on Travancore in the ensuing season ; and in returning to Coimbatore for the rains, made yet another change in his plans for propagating the faith and plundering the country. Six divisions, consisting of two brigades each, were left in Malabar, with distinct establishments of officers, spiritual, civil, and military, charged with the three-fold duty of surveying the lands, numbering the productive trees, and seizing and instructing the remaining Nairs. All that related to the fiscal management was put into bad hands, and was ill executed ; the joint duties of the spiritual and military officers were performed with horrible precision.* The Sultaun had, during the two last years, been gradually encreasing his infantry, and in

¹ *Chawgaut*.—Chavakkat, a village 98 miles S.S.E. of Cannanore, half way between Cochin and Calicut.

* Palgaut was captured by the English in the ensuing year, and an officer of the staff, in searching the records of the place, for military intelligence, found one of the circular orders for conversion under the Sultaun's seal and signature, which was at that time deemed a curiosity of the highest order. It directed, "that every being in the district, without distinction, should be honoured with Islâm, that the houses of such as fled to avoid

preparation for the war which he now evidently contemplated as near, made a further augmentation, while at Coimbetoor, of two cutcherries* of infantry, amounting to 11,376 men. At the same place he employed himself, as he informs us, in a profusion of "new inventions and creations of the mind," among which the example which he selects, closes all that was written of the King of histories,† and as it affords a fair specimen of the subjects which occupied his thoughts, and exhibits his ostentatious lore in judicial astrology, we take leave of a guide which has demanded incessant suspicion, by presenting an abstract of his concluding page.—"Aurengzebe, from the commencement of his reign, which happened on a Sunday, ordered the sounding of the noobut (royal band) five times on that day of the week; and for want of due consideration, the practice had since continued. His Majesty, the shadow of God reflecting

that honour should be burned, that they should be traced to their lurking-places, and that all means of truth and falsehood, fraud or force, should be employed to effect their universal conversion."

* Four appears to have been the fortunate number; four companies, (yeuz,) one battalion, (teep,) four teeps, one cushoon, (which I have generally rendered brigade,) four cushoons, one cutcherry. The establishment of these cushoons, with their artillery, was only 1422, and a cutcherry of course 5688; but these numbers fluctuated with the Sultaun's caprices, and at one time a cushoon with its cavalry attached, was a legion of about 3000.

[Kushun was a term which was affected by Tippu Sahib in his military organisation, for a brigade, or a regiment in the larger continental use of that word. His *Piddah 'askar*, or regular infantry, was formed into 5 Kacharis composed in all of 27 *kushuns*. A manuscript note on the copy of Kirkpatrick's *Letters* in the India Office Library says that *kushoon* was properly, Sanskrit *kshuni* or *kshauni*; "a grand division of the force of an Empire, as used in *The Mahabharata*. But the word adopted by Tippoo appears to be Turki." (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*, p. 492.)]

† The memoirs of the Sultaun's reign found in the palace, and written in the first person, is supposed by Colonel Kirkpatrick

on this subject, ordered the substitution of Friday for this ceremonial. Because, Sunday is appropriated by the Nazarenes; Saturday, by the Jews; and Friday is the festival of the Mussulmans; and the excellence of that day is impressed on every mind by numerous traditionary texts. The Almighty, on that day created the heavens; on that day occurred the martyrdom of the heads of the church; on that day commenced the flood of Noah; besides other holy coincidences. Therefore, in a propitious hour, when the moon was in the mansion of Taurus, Mercury and Venus in the mansion of Virgo, the Sun in Leo, Saturn in Aquarius, and Venus in opposition to Libra;—the royal mandate descended, directing the noobut to be performed in the royal hall, and by all Mussulmans entitled to that distinction, five times on every Friday.”

It is evident, from the insolent letters of the Sultaun to Nizam Ali, shortly after the peace of Mangalore, in 1784, that he contemplated the early subjugation of that chief. The termination of the war of 1786-7 had induced some amicable communi-

to be the rough draft from which the Sultaun-u-Towareekh was prepared by Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen by the Sultaun's command: but if his opinion (page 32, preface) be correct, that the rough draft bears internal evidence of having been composed subsequently to the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, the supposed relation of the manuscripts is more than doubtful, as the last page of the Sultaun-u-Towareekh appears to me to have been written in 1789, and it contains no allusion throughout to any subsequent event. I am not aware of the nature of the internal evidence relied upon; and if it had not been so strongly stated, I should have been disposed to conjecture that Colonel Kirkpatrick's manuscript which terminates in 1787 was put into Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen's hands at that date, from which period he became the historian instead of the Sultaun, who, although an incessant writer, was an exceedingly bad scribe; however this may be, they entirely coincide in substance in those portions which have been published by Colonel Kirkpatrick. I find on referring to my notes, that one of my copies was in the hand writing of Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen.

cations, in consequence of which Nizam Ali had dispatched an ambassador, named Hâfiz Fereed-u-Deen Khân, who, in conformity to directions previously sent to Seringapatam, waited the Sultaun's arrival at Coimbetoor. This envoy was charged with the proposal of a strict and indissoluble union between these only remaining Mahommedan powers of Decan and the South. A splendid Korân was sent for the Sultaun's acceptance ; and the return of a similar pledge, was to establish the most sacred and solemn obligations of friendship and alliance. To this proposition, the Sultaun distinctly replied, that he was ready to return the pledge, and establish an offensive and defensive treaty, on the condition of an intermarriage in the families, but not without this preliminary alliance ; but on this subject the envoy had no orders, and could give no reply. The forms of ordinary courtesy did not admit of his suggesting objections from himself ; and the Sultaun, foreseeing no impediment, sent an embassy in return, consisting of Kuttub-u-Deen and Ali Reza, who accompanied the envoy in his return to Hyderabad. Nizam Ali, however, distinguished between political union, and the degradation which he attached to the proposed alliance ; and it seems extraordinary, that so acute a courtier as Ali Reza should not have been able to ascertain Nizam Ali's intentions, and save his master the awkwardness of a public refusal. "We are desirous," said Ali Reza, "of partaking of the Sheker-Bhât," the dish of rice and sugar sent as the first preliminary ceremonial of marriage ; to which intimation Nizam Ali made no sort of reply, and there the negotiation and the embassy terminated

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Tippoo's designs for indirectly conquering Travancore, through the instrumentality of the Samorin, had failed through his own persecutions—He now attempts to employ the raja of Cochin—this also fails—Threatens to seize him in Cochin—Intervention of the Travancorean lines—History of transactions which led to the disputed question regarding these lines, and produced the war of 1790—Geographical position of Travancore—to the north-east fixed—in Malabar fluctuating—Notices of these variations—chiefly from Valentyn—Anquetil-de-Peron—and Stavorinus—Records—and other manuscript authorities—Hyder's designs—his war with the Dutch in 1776—State of the Travancorean lines—Peace with the Dutch—Guarantee of 1784—Tippoo nevertheless pursues his father's designs—Representation by Sir Archibald Campbell—His own grounds of apprehension in 1788—Lord Cornwallis's demand and occupation of Guntoor, in virtue of the treaty of 1768—Nizam Ali's demand of the execution of the other conditions, involving the conquest of Mysoor—Barbarous incident in elephant hunting—Previous correspondence with Sir Archibald Campbell—Purchase of Cranganore and Ayacota by the raja with his concurrence as asserted by the raja—denied by the Government—discussed—Tippoo's complaint of protection given to his rebellious subjects, by the raja and by the English at Tellicherry—discussed—Governor of Madras proposes to send commissioners—Tippoo attacks the lines—turns the flank, and had apparently carried his point, when he is repulsed with great

loss, and personal danger—Sends for reinforcements and guns—Pause of three months and a half of preparation—Notice of embassies received at that period.

THE measures of conversion in Malabar had been obstructed in the north by the escape of the Nairs to the English settlement of Tellicherry, whence they embarked for Travancore, and in the south by the connivance for a similar purpose of the raja of Cochin, the acknowledged tributary* of Hyder and Tippoo, although bound by more ancient ties to the Dutch and the raja of Travancore. Tippoo was particularly anxious to achieve the conquest of Travancore, without appearing himself as a principal in the war; and in 1788 had actually adjusted with the Samorin of Calicut, the restoration of a part of his former territories, on the condition of his acting for the Sultaun, but in his own name, in rendering some antiquated claims the ground of the conquest of Travancore. These projects, like many others, were foiled by the Sultaun's precipitation in beginning the work of general circumcision, which the Samorin resented, and joined in the general insurrection; and Tippoo was now desirous, as a last indirect resource, of employing the services of the raja of Cochin, as his instrument to effect the same object. On returning from his late visit of inspection, he sent an order to the raja of Cochin to repair to his camp; this raja had obeyed a similar summons in the preceding year, and had seen little cause for aspiring to a repetition of that honour: he accordingly wrote a submissive reply, stating that he paid his peshcush (tribute) regularly, and was ready to obey any other order, but assigned the best pretences he was able, for intreating to be excused from appearing at court. The Sultaun temporized, and sent an envoy to the raja with a letter acquiescing in his apology, but desiring that he would

* Vol. i. page 533.

August. send his son, or minister, whom he would not detain more than two days, intimating that he wished to purchase from the Dutch the fort of Cochin, and hoped to accomplish it by the raja's means. A second disobedience roused the Sultaun's indignation, and he openly declared, that "if they did not attend his summons, he would come and fetch them by force." But to reach Cochin it was necessary to pass the wall of Travancore, and for the purpose of making intelligible the grounds of the subsequent English war, of which the attack of this wall was the immediate cause, it will be necessary to revert to circumstances within the scope of this work, which have been purposely omitted in the order of their date, and to touch lightly on some earlier occurrences in the revolutions* of Malabar.

The principality of Travancore occupies the southern extremity of the Indian peninsula. Its shores to the eastward of Cape Comorin and opposite to Ceylon, afford an easy communication for small vessels, between that island and the main, with the whole coast of Coromandel. Against the hostility of the southern province of that country, (Tinnevely), a double line of works, facing from north to north-east, aid the natural defence of the tremendous range of mountains which terminate near the southern cape; but from the period of the occupation of Tinnevely, by the disjointed authority of Mahommed Ali and the English, and the establishment by that people, of a commercial factory at Anjengo,¹ on the western coast,

* They would make a curious volume, commencing with Vasco de Gama, and the materials are easily accessible in the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English authors.

Anjengo, a small sea port, 18 miles north-west of Trivandrum. In 1673 the Company established a factory here. The factor was second in Council in Bombay. In 1810 the commercial resident was abolished and the station made subordinate to the Political Resident at Trivandrum. Robert Orme was born here in 1728, and Eliza Draper was the wife of a chief of Anjengo.

the relations of amity had been uninterrupted; the raja was acknowledged on various occasions as the ally of the English nation, and was specially so recognized in the treaty of 1769 between Hyder and the English, and in that of 1784, with the Sultaun himself. On the coast of Malabar, the boundaries of Travancore had followed the fluctuations of its fortunes.

In 1662 and 3, the Dutch obtained, in open warfare from the Portuguese, various possessions on the coast of Malabar, among which we find enumerated* Cochin and Cranganore; and of course Ayacotta,† situated on the northern extremity of a narrow stripe of land called the island of Vipeen, extending nearly twenty miles, the whole distance from the estuary of Cranganore, to that of Cochin, and insulated by an inland connexion of those estuaries. In the same year 1663, the Dutch and the raja of Cochin on the one part, concluded a treaty with the raja of *Porca* on the other, by which it is stipulated, that the latter should pull down two hundred cubits of the wall built towards or against the country of Cochin.‡ Now *Porca* is about forty miles to the southward of Cochin, and we must suppose that distinct principality to have been then interposed between Cochin and Travancore; the Dutch by another treaty, stipulate with the raja of Cochin, to build a fort at Cranganore,

* Valentyn.

[Valentign's Oud en Nieuw Oost. Indien, several volumes.]

† Official letters of the Dutch Government of Cochin and Columbo, to the English, in the year 1790.

[*Ayacotta*.—Ayikotta, a village on the northern branch of the Periyar river, 2 miles south-west of Cranganur; according to local tradition St. Thomas landed here.]

‡ *Porca*.—Porakad, a village on the coast 42 miles south of Cochin. It was formerly a separate principality, and passed to Cochin in 1678 and to Travancore in 1746. Both the Dutch and Portuguese had settlements here, and the remains of the Portuguese fort is still in existence.

‡ Valentyn.

(one of the contested points.) Anquetil-de-Peron in 1758, states the bounds of Travancore to have been formerly beyond or south of *Kalicoulan*,¹ (which would have confined the principality to the very apex of the peninsula,) but for some time they had been at *Porca*. In 1759,* the Samorin of Calicut over-ran the territories of the raja of Cochin, and possessed himself of nearly the whole. In this extremity, the raja had recourse to his southern neighbour, the raja of Travancore, who aided him with an army, under his celebrated General Rama; and after a variety of sanguinary conflicts in 1760 and 1761, the Samorin was completely and finally expelled. As the stipulated price of this important service, the raja of Cochin formally ceded certain portions of territory to the raja of Travancore, and among others a stripe of land extending from his own recently acquired possessions near the hills, to the branch of an estuary which separates the narrow island of Vipeen from the sea, on which ceded territory and former possession, he immediately commenced the erection of a line of works, as a northern boundary towards Calicut, running east and west from a point of the hills deemed inaccessible, chiefly behind, or south of a river which discharges itself into the estuary. On the southern bank of the entrance of this estuary, was situated the military post of Ayacotta, belonging to the Dutch, and on the northern bank of the same estuary, on a point projecting southward, and about three miles farther up, was the Dutch fort of Cranganore; such is the origin of the lines of Travancore, and such the relative position of the contested points of Cranganore and Ayacotta; and to complete this topographical sketch, it is only necessary to add, that the territory of Cochin extended in front, or to the northward of these lines, from

¹ *Kalicoulan*.—Kayankulam, a village on the coast 14 miles S.S.E. of Porakad In 1745 the Raja of Kayankulam submitted to Travancore.

* Manuscript authorities.

ten to thirty miles, the remaining portion of the principality being in the rear, or to the south of these lines. When Stavorinus visited Cochin in 1776,* he found the Dutch Company at war with Hyder, and adverts with tolerable accuracy to the nature of these transactions, by stating that "the lands of Travancore had from time to time, been suffered to be extended to the eastward, behind the lands of Cochin, as far as the river of Cranganore, so that the King of Cochin has but a little space of ground left to him." We have seen, that on Hyder's re-conquest of Malabar in 1773, he appointed to the Government *Sree Nowas Row Berkée*, one of his oldest officers, in whose talents and attachment he placed the most implicit reliance, assisted in the military department by *Sirdar Khân*, a name which Stavorinus transforms into *Cha-Dergam*. In 1775, Hyder desiring to possess himself of Travancore, a valuable possession, which would place him as it were on the left flank of his enemy's line of defence, in his meditated invasion of Coromandel, requested of the Dutch company a free passage for his troops through their possessions to Travancore. The refusal of this request, and the delay of a reply to his letter to the Supreme Government of Batavia, enraged him; and Sirdar Khân, with about ten thousand men, ravaged the country with fire and sword, and laid siege to the Dutch fort of Chetwa,¹ about ten miles to the northward of Cranganore; and it was at this time that the raja of Travancore, made an actual purchase from the Dutch, of a stripe of land, near the north point of Vipeen, on which he continued the lines across that island, a breadth of about 1,500 yards, and in the rear of the

* Stavorinus, cap. 12 & 13.

¹ *Chetwa*.—Chetuvayi, a village in the Ponnani Taluq of Malabar District, Madras, 41 miles N.N.W. of Cochin. In 1715 the Zamorin of Calicut permitted the English to build a factory here; in 1717 it was taken by the Dutch; in 1776 it was taken by Hyder. It became an English possession at the peace of 1792.

Dutch Fort at Ayacotta. Reinforcements from Ceylon, in November 1776, induced the Dutch to attempt the relief of Chetwa, which failed: the place fell, and they confined themselves to the strong occupation of Cranganore and Ayacotta,* *whilst the kings of Cochin and Travancore threw up strong and fortified lines on the opposite side of the river, in order to defend their lands from an irruption on that side.* The lines, if actually commenced fourteen years sooner, were probably now constructed on a new plan, as both parties seem to refer to 1775, as the date of the construction of the works existing in 1789; for the context does not seem to apply to the lines across Vipeen, actually constructed, for the first time, in 1775. After the capture of Chetwa, Hyder's general, considering the attack of the lines as an enterprize beyond his strength, remained inactive; and seemed to be satisfied with the possession of the district of Cochin, situated north of the lines. Mr. Moens, the governor of Cochin, for the purpose of trying the disposition of the two rajas, proposed to them a plan of offensive operations, to which the raja of Travancore gave a distinct negative; declaring that his engagements with Mahommed Ali and the English, assured to him their aid in the defence of his own possessions if attacked by Hyder, but not if he were himself the aggressor. In January, 1777, the letter and presents from Batavia arrived, and Mr. Moens thought it best to send them with an envoy to Hyder, who graciously accepted this advance, and affected to attribute the late hostilities to mutual misapprehension. Stavorinus ascribes this unexpected facility, 1st, to his war with the Mahrattas, 2d, a revolt of the Nairs, as well as Mapillas, and 3d, the *improved state of the Travancore wall*, including in that line of defence the fortifications of Cranganore and Ayacotta, constituting a system of defensive means, which, in his opinion, Hyder could not attack with much hope

* Stavorinus.

of success. The lines however, although very sufficient with regard to the dimensions and construction of the ditch and rampart, were really more imposing than effectual, as throughout the dangerous extent of thirty miles, few points were closed in the rear and those imperfectly, so that nearly the whole would fall on carrying a single point.

From that period, although no specific question had been raised regarding the lines, and although a special article in the treaty of 1784 included the raja of Travancore (of course as his territory then stood) among the friends of the English, on whom the Sultaun stipulated that he would not make war; he had nevertheless not ceased to appreciate the original policy of his father, nor to undervalue the advantage of a possession which would enable him to make the first step from his own frontiers at once on Tinnevely and Arcot. The Sultaun's investigation of the routes, and the still more alarming attempt to induce the raja of Cochin, to claim the ground on which the lines were erected, had suggested the fears and the hopes, which in the preceding year, the raja of Travancore had conveyed to the Government of Madras; and Sir Archibald Campbell, in frankly communicating to the Sultaun the representations of the raja, added, that any aggression on that ally, would be considered by the English as a violation of the treaty of 1784, and equivalent to a declaration of war. The answer of the Sultaun was not at that time understood, although it now abundantly unfolds his subsequent pretensions; it stated that the interposition of the territories of his dependent, the raja of Cochin, prevented the possibility of collision between him and Travancore, and professed, in terms of sufficient courtesy, his desire for the maintenance of the relations of amity with the English state. In fact his measures and preparations were not then sufficiently matured. The character of Sir Archibald Campbell, the first military Governor of Madras, had

unquestionably influenced the prudential tenor of his correspondence, and checked the precipitation of his measures; that distinguished officer had returned to England in February 1789, the levies were nearly completed, and independently of his own designs against the English, which were at no time doubtful, he had reasons which we shall endeavour to explain, for apprehending that he might be anticipated by that power.

On the death of Basalut Jung, the reversionary right of the English Government to the province of Guntoor, was no longer doubtful, and Lord Cornwallis, after some prudential delay, deputed in 1788 a political resident (Sir John Kennaway) to Nizam Ali, for the double purpose of adjusting all accounts regarding the peshcush of the other circars, and demanding the cession of Guntoor; and the military preparations which accompanied the demand were efficient in securing compliance. Nizam Ali, who had recently obtained sufficient experience of his

¹ On March 5, 1787, Cornwallis wrote to Dundas as follows.

"The business of the Guntoor Circars is a very delicate one, and requires the most mature reflection. There are several reasons which make it very doubtful whether this would be a proper time for us to call on the Nizam to settle accounts and deliver it up. I am by no means clear that upon a fair investigation, setting the revenues of the Guntoor Circars received by the Nizam, against the peshcush due to him from us, there would not still be a considerable balance due to him from us, which we could not easily make good. Our demand of the Circars from the Nizam in the hour of his distress, would not only appear ungenerous, but would undoubtedly hurt him in the negotiations for a peace with Tippoo."

After a year's contest, peace was concluded between Tippu and the allies. The prospect of a war with France had passed away. On June 16, 1788, Cornwallis laid a minute before the Board in which he discussed the material difference in the political situation of affairs between the present period and the last year when the claim of Guntoor was under discussion. He proceeded to state that: "The pacification, established in Europe between the Courts of England and Versailles, has removed the principal grounds of apprehension formerly entertained, on account of the

inferiority to Tippoo Sultaun, and was mortified at the necessity arising from a similar feeling, of ceding Guntoor which he anxiously wished to retain, determined on sending special embassies, both to Tippoo Sultaun, and the English, with the apparent view of forming, with one or the other as circumstances might dictate, such an intimate alliance, as should secure him not only against the eventual hostility of the other, but should afford that sort of general protection, which he could not but feel to be necessary to a feeble and declining state. The sacred pledge offered to Tippoo Sultaun, affords strong evidence of his preference to that Mahomedan alliance, and his lofty rejection of the conditions by which that alliance might have been secured, rendered his connection with the English, an affair of necessity rather than of choice. Meer-Abd-ul-Kasim, the envoy to Lord Cornwallis, opened his negotiation by adverting to the recent demand of the cession of the Guntoor sircar, in virtue of the treaty

intrigues of the French with Tippoo and the Nizam, and of their interference with a view to promote or assist hostilities.

He pointed out that their knowledge of the views and situation of the different powers of Hindostan were also more perfect and satisfactory, and the intermediate time which had elapsed had afforded them an opportunity of improving their friendly intercourse with the Mahratta State. The Nizam, he told the Board, was certainly ill prepared for war, and with respect to Tippu, the Board had no reason to conclude that he was either better prepared, or more inclined to hostilities now than he was at the close of the last year.

Every movement of a formidable power naturally creates alarm in those whose situation exposes them to danger from it. And it is upon this principle alone, that the apprehensions suggested in the correspondence now under consideration, particularly by the Rajah of Travancore, must be accounted for."

The Board came to the following cautious conclusion "The Court of Directors have decided upon the recovery of Guntoor; and the Board, being convinced that no period can occur in which the claim can be asserted with less risk to the interests of the Company than at present, do not deem themselves authorised to suspend that determination. It is only

of 1768, and by demanding the execution of the remaining provisions of that treaty, which it will be recollected, extended the full length of the conquest of Mysoor. By the peace of 1769 with Hyder, the English recognized his sovereignty over the territories he then possessed, and thus virtually abrogated every part of the treaty of 1768, with Nizam Ali, which related to the conquest of these territories. The confederacy of 1780, of which at one time Nizam Ali did not scruple to avow himself to be the author, might be deemed a second abrogation of the spirit of that treaty; and the termination of that contest by the peace of 1784 with Tippoo Sultaun, constituted, on the part of the English, a third abrogation of the treaty of 1768. The act of parliament prohibiting the Governor-General from declaring war, or entering into any treaty for making war, against any native state, except when hostilities had commenced or impended, and the express orders of his sovereign and the India Company to the same effect, were so many

incumbent upon them in the execution of the measure, to act with caution and moderation."

In the meantime Captain Kennaway, "a gentleman well acquainted with the country, languages, and customs" had left Calcutta in the beginning of May for Hyderabad to make demand from the Nizam for an immediate surrender of Guntoor. The virtuous Cornwallis, who was also a diplomatist, writes of the Nizam to the Secret Committee: "the duplicity of his character and his talents for intrigue being likewise generally admitted, I considered myself as called upon by public duty to take every precaution of your Government against the disgrace of disappointment, and I thought it therefore equally prudent and necessary to leave him but a very short time after making the requisition for consulting with any of his neighbours on the means of opposition, and to direct that a good body of troops should be assembled near the Circar under other pretexts, to be ready to act if necessary in support of our demand of his performance of the terms of the treaty." The Madras Government, acting according to the instructions of the Governor-General, conveyed under various pretexts a body of troops to the neighbourhood of the Guntoor province.

arguments in bar to the execution or renewal of the offensive engagements proposed. But in a letter to Nizam Ali, dated the 1st July, 1789, which may be deemed the final result of Abd-ul-Kasim's mission, and which is expressly declared to be *equally binding as a* treaty*, after reciting these prohibitions, and explaining the grounds of the demands regarding Guntoor, his Lordship proceeds, not to announce the annulment of the treaty of 1768, but to declare his "intentions that it should be carried into full effect ;" to explain one of its articles, which regulates the demand of a subsidiary force to be furnished by the Company to Nizam Ali, and to enumerate the powers against whom that force *shall not be employed*, which enumeration recites by name every power of Decan and the South, *with the single exception of Tippoo*

While Captain Kennaway was on his journey, Lord Cornwallis received advice from Sir Archibald Campbell, Governor of Madras, that the Raja of Cherika had commenced hostilities on the Company's possessions at Tellicherry by order of Tippu. "Sir Archibald appears likewise to be decidedly of opinion," Cornwallis wrote to Kennaway, "that Tippoo will immediately attack the Raja of Travancore. This may, however, I think, be doubtful." The appearance of hostile designs which Sir Archibald Campbell perceived in Tippu led Cornwallis to consider again the advisability of laying aside for a time the claim to Guntoor. Alive to the necessity of not offending the Nizam and making him an ally of Tippu, he told the British Envoy to act with diplomatic prudence. "Unless this alarm should be blown over, previous to your arrival at Hyderabad, of which you cannot fail of having certain information, you will, of course, recollect that part of your instructions, and, instead of declaring the real object of your mission, confine yourself to the general expressions of friendship and assurances of our earnest desire to cultivate a good understanding between the two governments." The alarm blew over. Kennaway, on his arrival at Hyderabad, obtained a prompt and peaceful cession of the Guntoor Circar. (Forrest: *Selections from State Papers*; Cornwallis, Introduction, pp. 35-37.)

It was afterwards so pronounced by a resolution of the House of Commons.

[Forrest: *Selections from State Papers* Cornwallis, pp 38-43.]

Sultaun The letter further goes on to state that "circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles of the treaty of 1768, which relate to the Dewanny of the Carnatic Balagaut; but should it hereafter happen that the Company, with his Highness's assistance, should obtain possession of the countries mentioned in those articles, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of his Highness and the Mahrattas." It is highly instructive to observe a statesman justly extolled for moderate and pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law enacted for the enforcement of these virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance, which, although the effective revival of the abrogated conditions of an old treaty, was certainly neither a declaration of war, nor that technical instrument named a treaty for making war, executed subsequently to the prohibitory act of parliament; and his Lordship's observations on the same restrictions, written eight months afterwards, in his dispatches to the resident at Poona, not only furnish the best comment on their inconvenience, but seem to intimate an unconsciousness of the evasion which has been noticed. "Some considerable advantages," his Lordship observes, "have no doubt been experienced by the system of neutrality which the Legislature required of the governments of this country; but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies:" "for some years past we have been almost daily obliged to declare to the Mahrattas and the Nizam, that we were precluded, &c. &c. &c."

¹ The powers mentioned in the treaty were—Pundit Pirdhan Peishwa, Ragojee Bhonsla, Madajee Sindia, and other Mahratta Chiefs, the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab Vazier, the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore. (Aitchison: *Treaties, Engagements and Sunnads*, Vol. IX, p. 44.)

It may not perhaps be necessary to examine, whether the direct violation of that article of the treaty of Mangalore, which most sensibly affected national honour and individual feeling by the brutal detention of native British subjects, as well as the population of Coromandel, were not at all times, since March 1784, not only a legitimate, but an imperious ground of war, of which the time was fairly and honourably in the hands of the British Government; nor is it necessary to recite the innumerable minor insults to which our frontiers had been incessantly exposed, in consequence of experienced impunity; but adverting to the course of transactions which have been described, it was not to be expected that Tippoo Sultaun should view, as a slip of the pen, the exception of his name from the enumeration of friendly powers not to be attacked; or misapprehend the eventual arrangements dependent on the conquest of his dominions. The early occupation of Travancore which he contemplated as an easy achievement, was certainly, the most efficient preparation he could make for such a contest, and he commenced his march from Coimbetoor with a force* abundantly sufficient for the service.

In passing the woods of Animallee, he took the diversion of elephant hunting, a field sport sufficiently remote from the objects of history, but forced into that province by the circumstances of characteristic brutality which it developed. The elephant suggests to the mind of the Hindoo, associations which render it in some degree a sacred animal,† and to kill a female elephant is among the worst violations of the law which prohibits the extinction of animal life. It was this very reason that influenced the Sultaun's

* Regular infantry, 20,000; efficient spearmen and matchlock-men, 10,000; horse, 5,000; field guns, 20.

† *Ganesa*, represented with an elephant's trunk, corresponds to the *Janus*, and in some respects to the *Terminus* of western mythology.

selection, for the performance of a common military exercise, to prove the temper of the blade, and the skill of the swordsman, which is usually practised on a sheep; the expert swordsman being he who can completely separate the animal into two distinct parts by a single cut across the back. The female elephant was chained to the ground by her four feet, and the chiefs of the army being assembled for that purpose, the Sultaun made the first cut, the example was followed with reluctance even by the Mahomedans; but this barbarian had the cruelty to insist, that even many of the bramins present should cut in their turn; and it is to this enormity that they continue until this day to ascribe his subsequent repulse from the wall of Travancore.

Long before his departure from Coimbetoor, his intentions were of public notoriety, not only in his own army, but in every part of the south; and on his approach, the Dutch governor of Cochin, Mr. Von Anglebec, called on the raja of Travancore, to perform the conditions of a treaty of thirty-four years standing, which obliged him, in the event of an apprehended attack, to reinforce the posts of Cranganore and Ayacotta; which was accordingly done. The Government of Madras, to whom the raja earnestly applied for assistance, did not contemplate these Dutch posts as the left flank of a line, which, if carried, must necessarily be followed by the abandonment of the whole position; and did not propose arrangements to the Dutch, for combining the defensive means in which the two nations were equally interested. An aid of two battalions had been sent in consequence of Sir Archibald Campbell's previous negotiations, but they were now expressly prohibited from being employed on any other than the particular part of that line of defence, which was built on the raja's own territory while the Sultaun very plausibly argued, that the line actually intersected the country of his tributary, and was built *on*

his property, and not on that of Travancore ; and that the raja of Travancore had no right to build a wall on the territory of Tippoo Sultaun, nor to exclude him from going to every part of his own territory of Cochin, on either side of that wall. The raja thus terrified, at being refused aid from the Government of Madras, for the protection of his line of defence because one part of it was not his own, renewed a long pending negotiation for the purchase of Cranganore and Ayacotta. A transfer of territory by two parties, which changes the political relations of a third, is certainly liable to be questioned ; unless, as in this instance, where the transfer is clearly and indispensably necessary to the political existence of the state ; but from the moment of its occurrence, this transfer was brought into the front of the Sultaun's grievances : he represented to the Government of Madras, that these posts were built on the lands of his tributary the raja of Cochin, for which lands the Dutch paid a rent, in the same manner as any other of his ryots, for the field which they tilled ; and Mr. Hollond, the Governor, declared in his reply, that if on investigation these allegations should be substantiated, he would compel the raja of Travancore to return them to the Dutch. The Sultaun was incapable of comprehending the value of truth, even as a virtue of convenience : and the independent possession of those places by the Dutch as a conquest from the Portuguese a century before the existence of his own dynasty, so completely established the absolute falsehood of this assumption as to overturn along with it, the reasonings founded on rigid truth, by which he might have contended with better success for the right of passing to every part of his tributary possessions.

Mr Hollond took the line of decidedly disapproving these purchases without the previous concurrence of the English Government : the raja broadly affirmed the concurrence of Sir Archibald Campbell,

communicated to him through Brigade Major Bannerman, deputed on a political mission to his court in 1788. Mr. Hollond denied the existence of such concurrence, *on the public records* : but did not refer to Major Bannerman for farther information regarding the grounds on which this assertion was supported. In this state of public information regarding the alleged concurrence of Sir A. Campbell, the subject was taken up in the British Parliament; the Court of Directors was required to investigate; a reference was made to Sir A. Campbell, then in England, who did not recollect the existence of such a sanction, and inferred that Major Bannerman must have overstepped his authority if such sanction had been intimated to the raja. The Court of Directors followed up the investigation, by ordering the proper enquiries to be made at Madras. Sir Charles Oakley, when acting as Governor during General Medows's absence in the field, in 1791, demanded from Major Bannerman an explanation of the contested fact; and the following is the result of that correspondence

It will be recollected, that the only part of the lines really built on the territory of Cochin, was that which crossed the island of Vipeen in the rear of Ayacotta. If the raja of Cochin, or Tippoo, his

General William Medows, who had entered the army in 1756 and served in Germany and in America in 1782, arrived at Madras with transports. He was present under Admiral Sir Edward Hughes in the naval actions against Suffrein, and after returning to England was appointed in 1788 Governor of Bombay and two years later transferred to Madras. He assumed office in Madras on the 20th February 1790. Owing to his absence in the war with Mysore, Sir Charles Oakley, who entered the Madras service in 1767 and was Second in Council in 1790, acted as President during Medows's absence on field service, and on 1st August 1792 when General Medows resigned, assumed office as Governor. He resigned on grounds of health in 1794.

² In the "Errata" Wilks remarks as regards this passage: "There is an error in the reasoning regarding the lines across Vipeen, from my having omitted to modify the passage to con-

sovereign, should conquer or purchase from the Dutch the post of Ayacotta in their front, the right of the raja of Travancore to prevent his passing through that part of the lines to the territory of Cochin would at least be questionable, and could only be grounded on the imperious plea of self-preservation. The Dutch had shewn a disposition to part with Ayacotta and Cranganore; and it was feared that they might even sell them to Tippoo, rather than incur the risk and expence of defending them. Major Bannerman, whose mission had a direct reference to the means of defending Travancore, perceiving that in the event of an attack, the raja would have the alternative of defending lines built on the territory of the Sultaun's tributary, or of abandoning their whole extent by laying open their left flank, *strongly urged him to make the purchase of Ayacotta.* The raja entered warmly into the measure, but the negotiation could not be *concluded* without a reference to Batavia; and Major Bannerman, independently of the considerations above stated, deeming Ayacotta beyond competition the most eligible post for the British troops about to be subsidized by the raja, suggested to Sir Archibald Campbell the expediency of his writing to the Dutch Government to hasten the transfer. In answer to this proposition, Sir Archibald Campbell states his doubts regarding the eligibility of Ayacotta for the intended purpose. "The troops," he adds, "ought to be stationed in the place from whence they could with the greatest ease and expedition invade Tippoo's country; and unless the benefit likely to arise from

form to the fact of the purchase stated in page 341 which was ascertained, and in that page corrected after the narrative had been written."

The passage referred to is as follows "and it was at this time that the Raja of Travancore, made an actual purchase from the Dutch of a stripe of land, near the north point of Vipeen on which he continued the line across that island, a breadth of about 1,500 yards, and in rear of the Dutch Fort at Ayacotta."

possessing the island of Ayacotta should be made to appear greater than I as yet consider it from your description, it would be *unnecessary* for me to apply to the Dutch Government on the subject." If (as Major Bannerman argues, Sir Archibald Campbell's Government had disapproved the proposed purchase, it was incumbent on them to say so; but Sir Archibald merely declined interference, not because the measure was impolitic in itself, but because he deemed his own interference for its accomplishment to be *unnecessary*. The envoy therefore considered such an answer regarding a measure strongly urged by himself, to do much more than *imply* sanction, and did state that inference to the raja. He goes on to relate, that in July, 1789, after being relieved by Mr Powney, and on returning to Madras, he did, in repeated conferences with Mr. Hollond, the Governor, distinctly apprise him of the raja's intention to make the purchase; of the steps that had been taken with the Dutch Government, and of the great importance of the measure that no disapprobation was expressed to him on that occasion, or conveyed to Mr. Powney; although the Governor did long afterwards express great disapprobation at the actual completion of the measure thus previously explained. It is therefore clear, that the raja of Travancore stands fully absolved from the charge of making the purchase, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and that Major Bannerman stands equally absolved from the imputation of overstepping his authority in conveying the sanction of his Government, or of erroneous judgment in the importance which he attached to the possession of Ayacotta, which in point of fact was selected as the best position on the coast by the able officer who soon afterwards arrived with reinforcements from Bombay.

The island having Ayacotta at its northern extremity, is usually named from *Vipeen*, at its southern end.

† 12th August, 1788.

It is affirmed moreover in this correspondence, that the Sultaun himself recognized the right of sale, by offering to the Dutch double the sum contracted to be paid by the raja.

The protection afforded by the raja of Travancore, to the Sultaun's rebellious subjects, was a branch of complaint which touched more intelligible ground; but this ground was not defended by the Governor of Madras, although rudely assailed by the Sultaun's coarse assertion, that the English chief of Tellicherry had taken bribes for the protection of fugitive Nairs, and for permitting them to embark for Travancore; a permission which would probably have been tacitly accorded by any Englishman, without a bribe: and if the facilities unquestionably afforded to this cruelly oppressed people, might, under other circumstances, be deemed imprudent, the broad fact of Tellicherry having been placed, in all respects, excepting open hostility, in a state of blockade, by a cordon of the Sultaun's troops, during the whole period from the peace of 1784, till the war of 1790, absolves the public authorities at that place, from every obligation of delicacy, regarding these unhappy fugitives. The charitable aid and protection afforded to them by the raja of Travancore, rather belonged to the class of moral duties, than political rights. The Governor of Madras, however, required him to discontinue the hospitable asylum which the unhappy Nairs had hitherto found in Travancore, and that chief adopted the alternative of disavowing, and endeavouring to conceal a fact which he did not feel to be disgraceful. These discussions were protracted till the month of December; Mr. Hollond had proposed the appointment of commissioners for the investigation and amicable adjustment of all the points in dispute, but the Sultaun had determined on a different issue. His camp was established at about six miles to the northward of the principal gate of the lines; and on the night between the 28th

and 29th of December, he ordered the following disposition ;

Two cushoons of regular infantry, all the cavalry and irregular infantry, accompanied by the spearmen of the royal retinue, to indicate his own presence, were ordered to manœuvre at day-light in front of the principal gate, and at ten o'clock at night he marched with 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers, by a circuitous route, discovered to him by a native of the country, to turn the right flank of the lines which terminated at a precipice supposed to be inaccessible. The demonstrations in front drew the attention of the enemy as had been expected ; and he found himself soon after day-light in possession of a considerable extent of rampart on the right flank almost without opposition. It was his object to gain the gate about nine miles from the point of entrance ; to open it to the division manœuvring in its front, and to establish his whole army within the lines in one day. Although the opposition was feeble, it was near nine o'clock before the whole of the troops had entered, and were prepared to advance in force. After he had advanced between two and three miles, some distant movements were perceived, and the Sultaun thinking it possible that he might not fully accomplish his object on that day, and be obliged to take post and bring up his guns, ordered the pioneers to throw down a certain portion of the rampart into the ditch (about 16 feet wide and 20 feet deep), and to make a wide and solid road, and easy communication with the camp. The pioneers had been marching nearly twelve hours, and were not much disposed to vigorous exertion : the berm as well as the ditch was overgrown with thorny shrubs and bamboos, and the work proceeded very tardily. In the meanwhile the troops advanced in one column along the rampart, the Travancoreans retreating from each successive tower ; the resistance at each successively encreasing, until the column approached a building within the

works, constituting a square enclosure, made use of as a magazine, storehouse, and barrack. The fugitives knew that support was at hand, but were not as yet in sufficient strength to maintain themselves; they however made a stand at this square, and drew into it a small gun, and some grape from their now useless lines, which did good service against the head of the column; the casualties of the day had fallen heavily on the leading corps; and the Sultaun ordered up a fresh and select one, with orders to carry the building at the point of the bayonet, the corps relieved being directed to fall into the rear. The order, besides being ill-executed, was misapprehended; and at the moment this corps was about to retire along the flank of the column, a party of about twenty men, which the Travancoreans had sent into the thick cover which here approached within a few yards of the rampart, threw in a regular platoon on the flank, which killed the officer commanding, and threw the corps into inextricable disorder and flight. The relieving corps, awkwardly advancing along the same flank, was met and checked by an impetuous mass of fugitives; the next corps caught the infection, the panic became general, and the confusion irretrievable. The Sultaun, himself, was borne away in the crowd; the rear, now become the front, rushed into the intended road across the ditch, which had been no farther prepared than by cutting down the underwood, and throwing a part of the rampart on the berm; the foremost leaped or were forced into the ditch; and such was the pressure of the succeeding mass, that there was no alternative but to follow. The undermost, of course, were trampled to death; and in a short time the bodies, by which the ditch was nearly filled, enabled the remainder to pass over. The Sultaun was precipitated with the rest, and was only saved by the exertions of some steady and active chélas, who raised him on their shoulders and enabled him to

ascend the counterscarp, after having twice fallen back in the attempt to clamber up ; and the lameness, which occasionally continued until his death, was occasioned by the severe contusions he received on this occasion. His palankeen remained in the ditch, the bearers having been trodden to death, his seals, rings, and personal ornaments, fell as trophies into the hands of the enemy ; and the fortune of a day, which was turned by 20 men, cost the Sultaun's army upwards of two thousand. The English dispatches of that period describe the ditch to have been filled with bales of cotton by the Mysoreans, for the purpose of passing in, and that the accidental inflammation of that substance, had compelled them to seek another passage. All the Mysoreans with whom the author has conversed, deny the existence of a bale of cotton in the army ; but all affirm, that the mass of bodies in the ditch were consumed by fire after the retreat ; fuel, as they suppose, having been added for the purpose by the Travancoreans. But when the mass of wood felled for clearing the road, the cumbustible materials of their dress, and the contents of their cartouch boxes are considered, an accidental spark, near the close of the retreat, may furnish a sufficient explanation of the fact to those who have witnessed similar scenes.

The Sultaun on clearing the ditch, made the best of his way on foot towards camp, but was soon furnished with the conveyance of a common dooley, to bear him unperceived to his tent. In a mixed paroxysm of rage and humiliation, he swore that he would remain fixed on that encampment until he should carry this contemptible wall. He accordingly ordered the recal of Burhân-u-Deen from Coorg, and of nearly the whole of his detachments for the conversion of the infidels from Malabar. Battering-

The mass of fugitives who choaked the Mysoor gate of Bangalore, after the assault in 1791, was a horrible example, without any fuel, but the dress and the cartouch boxes.

guns were to be brought from Seringapatam and Bangalore; and three months and a half of ostensible negotiation and real preparation for attack affords a pause, in which we shall first advert to the issue of some prior embassies destined to strengthen his means of aggression, of which his envoys made their personal reports during this interval; and we shall then proceed to relate the influence on the English councils of the abortive attempt which has just been described.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Mission and subsequent embassy to Constantinople and eventually to Paris—Embassy arrives at Bussora, and after some delay at Constantinople—Negotiation somewhat ludicrous—Fabulous genealogy—The plague—Loss of 565 of the suite—Embark for Alexandria—where they hear of the embassy to France by sea, and prepare to return—by Cairo—Suez—Jedda—Mecca—Medina—Exaction of the Shereef of Mecca, evaded by a singular device of Gholāum Ali—Arrive at Calicut on the day of the Sultaun's repulse from the lines—Out of eleven hundred, bring back sixty-eight—Expence of the embassy—Value received—Joke of the man-eaters—Effect of the intelligence of the attack of the lines of Travancore on the Government of Madras—and Lord Cornwallis—Explicit instructions to Madras, in the preceding November—They animadvert on the orders instead of obeying them—Last and most instructive example of the defective constitution, abolished by the powers committed to Lord Cornwallis—Sultaun's tardy notice of the attack of the lines—Singular history of his own defeat—Resumes the attack by regular approaches—assaults and succeeds—Conduct of the officer commanding the English detachment—Reinforcement under Colonel Hartley—unequal to any but defensive operations—No contact with the Sultaun's troops—Cranganore taken—Tippoo overruns the plain country—Example of mortality from small-pox—Public ceremony on destroying the lines—Visit of Macnamara—who admonishes him regarding the preparations of the English—and receives a letter to Louis the XVI.

demanding aid in such event—In fact he was unprepared for war—Explanations—Lord Cornwallis relieved from legislative restraints—negotiates offensive and defensive treaties at Poona and Hyderabad—Nizam Ali professes apprehension of Mahratta treachery—accepts an indirect guarantee—Observations on the character of Lord Cornwallis.

IN 1784 the Sultaun sent an embassy to Constantinople, under Othmân Khân, formerly his valet, apparently for the purpose of obtaining some preliminary information. The intelligence transmitted by this envoy of certain conferences then in progress, between the English ambassador, and the Grand Seigneur, appears to have hastened the second and principal embassy to that power, consisting, according to the Sultaun's usual spirit of suspicion, of four* persons who departed in 1785; and on their arrival at Constantinople, Othmân Khân returned. The second embassy was instructed, after finishing the business committed to their charge at Constantinople, to proceed on a special mission to the court of France: but the Sultaun, on hearing the personal report of Othmân Khân, changed this resolution, and deputed, by the more expeditious route of a sea-voyage, from Pondicherry, a direct embassy to France, consisting of three† persons including Othmân Khân, in the beginning of 1787; and these envoys, after executing the objects of their mission, had returned and joined him at Coimbetoor. It were superfluous to describe the objects of this embassy, or its courteous reception: or the ridicule and contempt excited by its combination of splendid pretension, miserable avarice, and

Gholaum Ali Khân; Lutf Ali Beg; Sha Noor Ullah, and Mahommed Hunneef. Sha Noor Ullah had been formerly employed on a mission to Persia.

† Mahommed Derveish Khân, Akbar Ali Khân, and Othman Khân.

mean rapacity. The ambassadors returned in a state of feud, originally excited on the occasion of receiving some valuable presents by order of Louis XVI. when the two seniors had unfolded the former avocations of their junior colleague, with a view to obtaining the largest shares for themselves; and in retaliation for this secular injury, Mahommed Othman assuming the fervour of religious zeal, informed against his colleagues, for being indecorously captivated by the beauty of female infidels, and even accepting presents of forbidden liquors; and they were accordingly disgraced.

The probable objects of an embassy to Constantinople are not so obvious as those of the French mission; and similar means do not exist, of checking by European information, facts which may seem too ludicrous to be received without suspicion. Such as they are, they must rest on the memory and authority of Lutf Ali Beg, one of the ambassadors, and Seyed Jaffier the secretary, whose journal of the embassy was found in Seringapatam in 1792, and transmitted with other documents to Calcutta. where it is still supposed to be accessible.

This second embassy to Constantinople, embarked in 1785 on four ships, carrying among other presents, four elephants, which all died before their arrival at Bussora, and one of the ships was destroyed by fire in consequence of shewing a blue light when leading up the *Shât-ul-Arab*, the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris. At Bussora, the envoys were hospitably received by the governor, Soliman Pasha; but were detained nearly three months, until orders should be received regarding the arrangements of their journey to Constantinople; for including the escort, which Tippoo's letters state at upwards of five hundred, the suite of every description, is estimated by the secretary at eleven hundred persons. During their detention at Bussora, the envoys visited the holy shrines of Nejeff and Kerbela and when leave

arrived, they were conveyed by water to Baguad, and thence overland by Moosul and Diarbeker, to Constantinople, on the route so often trodden by the Roman legions. Some months elapsed after their arrival before they could be presented to the Grand Seignor: he was seated in a balcony, and they made their obeisance from below. To the question, "Are you well?" addressed in a low tone to an officer near him, and repeated through the medium of three others before it reached the ambassadors, the customary answer was returned "praying for your prosperity." "You have sustained much fatigue?" Answer, "It is transformed into delight:" the signal of taking leave instantly succeeded, and they departed after performing the Indian *Tusleemât* (three low salams, the hand each time touching the ground). After nine months, they had their audience of leave, at which not one word was uttered, and the *Tusleemât* began and concluded the ceremony. Their first audience of the Vizeer, was of course limited to the delivery of credentials, and a formal speech.

The proceedings of the interview of business are thus described, the Vizeer and Reis Effendi being present, and Ratib the secretary being the interpreter in the Persian language,—*Vizeer*, "Open your business."—*Gholaum Ali*, "Our master is anxious for the establishment of a direct intercourse between the two countries, and offers as a nezer, the fort and territory of Mangalore."—*Vizeer*, "It shall be considered; proceed."—*Gholaum Ali*, "He wishes in return, to be favoured with the port and territory of Bussora."—*Ratib* (before translating to his superior) "Bethink yourselves of where you are, and whom you are addressing, and speak with discretion."—*Sha Noor Ullah*, "Why, what mighty affair is a sea port? When I was on an embassy to Persia, Kurreem Khân, the king, offered me two sea-ports as a personal present."—*Reis Effendi* (after hearing the interpretation), "And

pray, Sir, who may you be? and where have you left your senses? Who is your king Kurreem Khān? and before whom do you speak? Kurreem Khān was a black-guard.”—Gholaum Ali finding that matters were going wrong, interposed to explain away the proposition, into a request for the Sultaun’s ships being hospitably received at the port of Bussora. The fate of this first proposition deterred him from adverting to the second in their instructions, as an alternative in the event of the first being rejected, namely, the establishment of a commercial factory at Bussora, with exclusive privileges; and Gholaum Ali proceeded to the third—the demand of permission to dig a canal for the purpose of bringing the waters of the Euphrates to the holy shrine of Nejef. On this proposition being translated, the vizeer smiled, and spoke Turkish to the Reis Effendi, stating (as was understood) that if the thing were proper, it would be effected without the aid of the mighty Tippoo Sultaun, but he had the civility to answer, through the interpreter, that the application must be made to Soliman Pasha. In fact, they had sounded him regarding this proposition while waiting at Bussora; and the Pasha, who appears to have been a man of wit, as well as courtesy, replied with suitable gravity, that the suggestion had once been made in days of yore, but had been forbidden in the dream or revelation of a saint, and that without some communication of assent from the invisible world the project could not be resumed.

There was no other professed interview of business, and this could scarcely be deemed propitious; but during their residence at Constantinople they were treated with courtesy and distinction and entertained with a variety of public spectacles, at one of which they exhibited the evolutions of their sepoy escort; before departing, conversations ensued of a general nature, in which the vizeer made some enquiries regarding the Sultaun’s ancestry and empire.

Whether Gholaum Ali was prepared for such a question is uncertain, but he recited with promptitude and fluency a very plausible genealogy, utterly destitute of truth, which the Sultaun, on the return of the embassy, actually ordered to be inserted in his history, and is the second edition noticed in page xxxi of the preface to this work. But the political ills of the mission were greatly exceeded by their physical misfortunes. The plague commenced its ravages, and before their departure from Constantinople five hundred and sixty-five persons had fallen victims to that horrible disease. Their orders to proceed to France were unrevoked, but they had expended a large portion of their money, and the funds were insufficient for that ulterior purpose. The plague had alarmed them beyond all discretion, and they desired to be expedited home by whatever route: they accordingly embarked for Alexandria; but the plague continued its effects during the voyage and after their arrival. Here however they received private but certain intelligence of the embassy by sea to France, and took care to note it in their journal as the cause of their return to India. From Alexandria they sailed up the Nile to Cairo and thence crossed to Suez. Gholaum Ali, (afterwards known to the English by the epithet of *silver chair*, from his being carried in a sort of stool covered with that metal,) had some years before lost the use of his lower extremities, and had performed the journey from Bagdad to Constantinople in his palankeen. Of his twelve bearers the plague had left him but one, and he was conveyed across the isthmus in a camel cradle. From Suez they sailed to Jedda, and thence performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

While at Mecca, the shereef finding that a portion of the diplomatic funds still remained untouched, gave a friendly intimation of his requiring a loan to that amount, and Gholaum Ali escaped this

robbery by a singular device. He forged a letter which he caused to be brought in by an express camel courier in the night; the messenger was of course stopped by the guards of the shereef, one of whose officers was ordered to accompany him to the quarters of the embassy, and the dispatch was read aloud in his presence. It contained intelligence of a great victory over the last of the Sultaun's enemies in India, and the preparation of a numerous fleet for the purpose of occupying the holy cities with an army capable of renewing the first triumphs of Islâm. Discreet rejoicings ensued at the quarters of the embassy, and secret terrors in the councils of the shereef. The loan was no longer wanted, and the embassy hastened to its port of embarkation, whence it arrived at Calicut, on the very day of the Sultaun's repulse from the lines of Travancore, and shortly afterwards in camp, just five years after taking leave at Seringapatam, bringing back alive to the Sultaun's territory exactly sixty-eight of the eleven hundred who had arrived in safety at Constantinople. The secretary estimated the total expence of this embassy, including the pay of the escort, the value of the ship lost, and the merchandize embezzled at Muscat, at twenty lacs of rupees; and silyly observed, that the only value received in return was a firmaun from the Sultaun of Room, and sixty-five half quires* of journal, worth, at the highest estimation of the two articles, in rarity and in waste paper, about five rupees. But the Sultaun attributing no part of this result to his own folly and ignorance, ascribed the whole to the unskilfulness or dishonesty of Gholâum Ali Khân, who was divested of all his employments, and ordered to confine himself to his house. It was in the course of the investigation which preceded this result, that the Sultaun one evening directed one of the officers in waiting to *call the man-eaters*. The officer stared;

Jus, it is less than half a quire, but that was the nearest translation.

and the Sultaun explained, by desiring him to "call the men who had lately returned from Room (Constantinople), after eating their companions." The royal joke became current, and as long as its novelty lasted, the ambassadors were distinguished by the nick name of the man-eaters.

The intelligence of the actual assault of the lines of Travancore, had in the mean while produced very different impressions on the Government of Madras, and the Supreme Government of Bengal. At an early period of the correspondence, Lord Cornwallis, influenced by the misapprehensions which have been stated, had expressed his regret and disapprobation of the conduct of the raja of Travancore, in concluding political negotiations without the previous sanction of the power on which he depended for support; but on receiving from Mr. Hollond farther intelligence regarding the raja's purchase of Cranganore and Ayacotta, and Tippoo's claim of sovereignty over these places, which he now intelligibly threatened to enforce, transmitted on the 13th November, 1789, for the guidance of the Government of Madras, a broad and well explained consideration of the serious consequences of war on the one hand, and the fatal policy of a tame submission to insult or injury on the other, with corresponding instructions, which were certainly couched in terms sufficiently explicit. If on investigation it should appear that those places had belonged to the raja of Cochin, subsequently to his becoming a tributary of Mysoor, the raja of Travancore was to be compelled to restore them to their former possessor; if they had not belonged to the raja of Cochin within the specified period, the raja of Travancore was to be supported in the possession, as a legitimate right derived from actual purchase. If Tippoo should be in actual possession of these places, before the arrival of these instructions, a negotiation was to be opened for the purpose of effecting an amicable adjustment on the

principles explained ; he was not to be forcibly dispossessed without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government, unless he should have attacked also the other territories of Travancore ; but in the event of such attack, the Government of Madras was positively ordered to deem it an act of hostility, and the commencement of a war which they were to prosecute with all possible vigour and decision.

The Government of Madras, on the 3d of January, 1790, in reply to an order which they were expected to obey, proceeded to animadvert on the reasonings by which it was supported. As well (say they) might the Dutch dispose of Paliacate and Sadras to the French, without offence to the English, as sell Cranganore and Ayacotta to the raja of Travancore, without offence to Tippoo Sultaun : and reasoning from these parallel cases, they deprecated the policy of committing the honour of Government by taking part in the defence of places furtively obtained ; a harsh construction under every possible view of the actual occurrences. The prescribed communication to Tippoo Sultaun, of the fixed determination of the Supreme Government to resist any attack on those places, was made ; but a letter, addressed to the raja of Travancore, even after the attack on his own lines, not only discouraged the expectation of support in the defence of the two contested places ; but expressly disclaimed the sanction of Government to a purchase, the validity of which was still undetermined by Lord Cornwallis. The Governor-General in council had ordered the commercial investment to be stopped, and the whole resources of the state to be applied to effective military preparation ; but these instructions remained unexecuted. The military preparations were expressly withheld, even after the attack of the lines, for the avowed purpose of saving expence * ; and the provision

Mr. Cassamajor dissented from this improvident economy. On the point of investment, the Governor-General after-

of a large proportion of the commercial investment diverted the public treasure from the objects positively prescribed by superior authority.

This is the last and among the most instructive examples of the influence of that discordant and disjointed constitution of the three presidencies, which more resembled the debating councils of three independent states, than the branches of one consistent government: the Company's servants had been educated in the practice of treating all requisitions from another presidency, as subjects for the exercise of discretion, or the display of talent. Lord Cornwallis was the first possessor of a direct, efficient, and coercive power, over all the presidencies, not only independently of their opinion, but in opposition to the judgment of his own council: and the intellectual habits of youth, and mature age, confessedly the creatures of circumstances, in all but the higher orders of mind, seem, in this instance, to have travelled unconsciously in their accustomed course, without reference to the radical change of constitution, which exacted obedience instead of argument.

The Sultaun's conception of the probable influence of the events of the 29th of December, on the councils of the English Government, was tardily developed and clumsily executed. Seventeen days elapsed before he took any measure: and he then prepared a letter, ante-dated fifteen days, in which he gives a singular account of his own defeat. His troops were employed in searching for fugitives: the raja's people fired, his troops retaliated, and carried the lines; but on the first intimation of the affair, he ordered them to desist and return; and finally, he requests, that the raja may be ordered *to observe the treaty*. In reply to all which, the governor of Madras

wards retracted his censure, as it was explained, that nothing more had been done than what was necessary to fulfil the contract with the Philippine Company." (Miles: *History of Hydur Naick*, Vol. III, p. 187 note.)]

actually proposed the appointment of commissioners for the adjustment of the points in dispute, and on the occasion of his approaching departure for England, declared to the Governor-General his conviction of Tippoo's amicable intentions. "I think," says Lord Cornwallis, "the late Government of Fort St. George were guilty of a most criminal disobedience of the clear and explicit orders of this government, dated the 29th of August and 13th of November, by not considering themselves to be at war with Tippoo, from the moment that they heard of his attack, &c."

"So far am I from giving credit to the late Government for economy in not making the necessary preparations for war, according to the positive orders of the Supreme Government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation, I think it very possible that every cash* of that ill-judged saving, may cost the Company a crore of rupees: besides which, I still more sincerely lament, the disgraceful sacrifice which you have made by that delay, of the honour of your country, by tamely suffering an insolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the raja of Travancore, which we were bound by the most sacred ties of friendship and good faith to defend." This letter,

March. written on the 30th March, so far from considering the delusion of Tippoo's amicable intentions to be worthy of an answer, actually anticipates as accomplished, the devastation of Travancore, which did not take place till the ensuing month.

Cannon and equipments of every description, suited to the siege of a regular place of strength, slowly arrived for the reduction of this miserable wall; before the Sultaun would repeat the assault, a series of approaches were carried to the counterscarp, the ditch was filled, and a practicable breach effected nearly three quarters of a mile in extent; the raja

Cash, or *cass*, is an Indian money of account, of which eighty are equal to two-pence-halfpenny.

attempted to supply by numbers what he wanted in skill and discipline, but these very numbers contributed to spread panic; the resistance was contemptible; and the Sultaun's army entered Travancore. April. He next appeared before Cranganore, which the garrison actually abandoned, but were compelled to return by putting to death the leading fugitives. Two battalions of English sepoys¹ sent for the service of Travancore, in consequence of the raja's application for aid, and of Major Bannerman's mission in 1788, had arrived in 1789, shortly before Tippoo's departure to Coimbetoor, and before the transfer of Cranganore and Ayacotta. While Tippoo was in that neighbourhood, in May 1789, sounding the rivers, obtaining intelligence, and even attempting by menaces to induce the Dutch to surrender Cranganore, Major Bannerman, acting in the spirit of the late governor, by whom he had been originally deputed, ordered the English colours to be planted on a conspicuous part of the lines, and a flag of truce to be sent to the Sultaun's army, to announce the presence of English troops on those lines, to defend them if they should be attacked. We have noticed the impressions produced on the Sultaun's mind, by the change of government: and these impressions had been confirmed by his receiving no similar intimation on his return in October 1789, nor at any subsequent period. The officer commanding those troops, perceiving also that the raja's military means were unworthy of confidence, instead of occupying any particular part of the lines, took a central position of reserve; and finding immediately after the assault, that nothing remained to be supported, crossed over to Ayacotta.

At this critical juncture a force of one regiment of Europeans and two of sepoys under Colonel Hartley, arrived from Bombay, and landed at the same place; but the united corps were unequal to

¹ The 10th and 13th Madras Battalions under Captain Knox. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 190.)

May.

offensive operations, and the fort of Cranganore being deemed untenable, Colonel Hartley withdrew the raja's garrison in the night of the 7th of May, and the place was occupied by the Sultaun on the ensuing morning. The English troops, separated by their insular position, and the Sultaun's disinclination, came for the present into no contact with the troops of Mysoor. Every thing north of the estuary, and all the territory of Travancore and Cochin was now open to the invader; the island of Vipeen was alone untouched, because he had still the confidence of practising on English credulity; the plain country was a scene of merciless devastation; the inhabitants were hunted and sent in immense numbers to the usual fate of captivity and death. Among the varied enquiries of the author, the circumstantial details were brought to his notice of the fate of a small division of these unhappy beings, namely, eighty young women who were selected for the service of the royal kitchens, to grind corn, and perform other menial offices: one individual of the eighty arrived in safety at Seringapatam, all the rest had died of small-pox the fact is stated as an example of mortality, and not of the absence of contagion, for they had accompanied the return of the army, and the means of very special separation were of course impracticable.

The Travancoreans had meanwhile retired to their fastnesses, in the south, and independently of the season, which rendered it necessary that the Sultaun's army should leave the coast before the commencement of the monsoon; the military preparations of the English had begun to indicate the design of disturbing his route. Before leaving Travancore, the effectual demolition of the lines was rendered a sort of public ceremony; the whole army off duty was regularly paraded without arms, and marched in divisions to the appointed stations; the Sultaun, placed on an eminence, set the example of

striking the first stroke with a pick-axe ; the ceremony was repeated by the courtiers and chiefs, the followers of every description, bankers, money-changers, shopkeepers, and the mixed crowd of followers were all ordered to assist the soldiers, and the whole was razed to the ground in six days. Shortly before the Sultaun's departure from Travancore, a French officer named in the Mysorean manuscripts, Macnamara, who is represented as making a tour of inspection of the settlements of that nation in a frigate, touched at this part of the coast, and took the opportunity of paying his personal respects to the Sultaun, by whom he was suitably received. Tippoo affected to treat with levity the serious admonitions of this officer, regarding the formidable preparations of the English, in consequence of his proceedings in Travancore ; and invited him to a review of the Assud-Illahce, who were to drive before them the British grenadiers. Monsieur Macnamara spoke with distinguished courtesy of the appearance and performance of the troops, but it was specially observed by those present, that his politeness did not go the full length of assenting to the Sultaun's proposition. The repeated assurances of this officer, that the English considered the war as actually commenced, somewhat quickened his departure from Travancore, and he took the opportunity of committing to the charge of Monsieur Macnamara, a letter addressed to Louis XVI. stating his confidence of immediate aid, if these apprehensions should be realised.

In plain fact he was unprepared for war. He had calculated on possessing every part of Travancore in December 1789. If this expectation had been realised, the option would have been in his hands, of a sudden invasion of the southern provinces at once from Travancore, Dindigul, and Caroor, and of being ready by the time an English army could be assembled to commence the war, with the Caveri as his northern frontier towards Coromandel (with the exception

perhaps of one or two places), a boundary anxiously and incessantly desired by the ruler of Mysoor since 1751; or if that people should prove humble and acquiescent, he would have the alternative of waiting to consolidate his power in Travancore before he should proceed to ulterior objects. He was disappointed in both of these expectations; it was
 May. already May 1790; he had not reduced the whole of Travancore; the English were not humble and acquiescent; his cumbrous train of trophies were still on the road to Seringapatam; he was distant from his regular arsenals, all the equipments of his army required revision, before he should be in a condition to begin an active campaign, and every consideration of prudence or necessity required that he should revisit the capital.

We have seen that so early as 1788, Lord Cornwallis must have contemplated as inevitable an early war with Tippoo Sultaun; and being now relieved by the actual hostile aggressions of that prince on the 29th of December 1789 from the restraints under which he considered himself to be placed by act of parliament, he proceeded without the loss of a single day to issue corresponding instructions to his political residents at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona; the result of these negotiations had long been anticipated by the repeated advances of those courts, and his Lordship was enabled from the first to direct the measures of all the presidencies with a reasonable confidence in their successful issue. The treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded with those powers, provided that measures should be

	Executed.	Ratified.
With the Peshwa, ...	1st June. ...	5th July, 1790.
—Nizam Ali, ...	4th July. ...	29th July.

[The treaty with the Mahrattas, which contains fourteen articles, will be found at pp. 580-2 of Forrester's *Selections* (Mahratta Series), Vol. I. For a full account of the negotiation with the Nizam and the Mahrattas, reference should be made to Miles: *History of British India*, Book VI, Chap. III.]

immediately taken to punish Tippoo Sultaun, and deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity; that each should vigorously prosecute the war; that Nizam Ali, and the Mahrattas should each, if required, send a contingent of ten thousand horse to act with the English army, and to be paid by that state; and that an English detachment should act in like manner with each of their armies; that an equal division of conquests should be made at the conclusion of the war, with the exception of such forts and territories as should be reduced by the English previously to the commencement of war by the other parties; and that the territories of particular zemindars and poligars named in the* treaty and formerly dependent on the Mahrattas, should, if conquered, be restored to them in full sovereignty by which-ever of the allies they might be reduced; an article, apparently extorted from the unacquaintance of the English with local and historical facts, by which the war commenced with a broad inequality of claim, in the gratuitous cession, without an equivalent of an immense extent of territory acquired by the house of Hyder at successive periods, and by different events, and some of great importance, so far back as 1762.† This treaty was executed by the peshwa, on the 1st of June; but the reasonable apprehensions of Nizam Ali that the Mahrattas would invade his territories while his army should be absent on service, and his earnest endeavours to introduce in a specific article, the previous guarantee of his own dominions, protracted the final execution of that instrument until the 4th of July. Lord Cornwallis could not without defeating the objects of the confederacy, proclaim in the act of confederation

* Chittledroog.
Annagoondy.
Harponelly.
Bellary.

Raidroog.
Kenchengood.
Cannagherry.
Kittoor.

Havanoor.
The district of Abd-ul-
Heckem Khan, the
chief of Savanoor.

† See vol. i. page 500.

an offensive suspicion of one of the contracting parties; but, during and subsequent to the negotiations, while he avoided any demonstration which should afford ground of jealousy to the Mahrattas, he desired the resident "to assure Nizam Ali of his disposition, whenever a proper opportunity should offer to take such farther steps for drawing the connexion closer between the two Governments, as may be consistent with good faith, and a due attention to the subsisting engagements with the other allies:" and, these assurances produced the intended effect of a firm confidence in results equivalent to a formal guarantee.

If in the endeavour to trace with accuracy the causes of the impending war, the duties of historical truth have exacted the recital of measures, adopted at an early period by Lord Cornwallis, more calculated to produce a war with Tippoo Sultaun, than an open defensive alliance, for the avowed purpose of limiting his ambition; we have not failed to accompany the recital, with a description of legal impediments, and technical difficulties, which arrested the direct course of his honourable mind; nor have we neglected to revive the recollections confirmed by new evidence in every successive year, of the lawless captivity of our countrymen, and of the national honour prostrated and continuing prostrate since 1784. If the established forms of that international practice usually called the law of nations, which constitutes perhaps rather a code of precedents, than of principles, may be brought to impugn one branch of his Lordship's proceedings, we should, at most, arrive at the conclusion—not that he had ultimately done wrong—but that he had assumed wrong grounds for doing right; and the opinion of an eminent man* who, at a period when political dissension may be deemed extinct, denied to his

* Mr. Fox, on the occasion of voting a testimony to his memory.

revered memory, the character of a *great statesman*, may be left to the judgment of posterity. But whatever may be the decision of that tribunal, with regard to particular *measures*, the praise of a plain, ingenuous, and enlightened conception of the *objects* fit to be attained by a great statesman; of stern rectitude; illustrated, not obscured, by that unaffected kindness, which fixed the attachment of all who approached him—of humanity perhaps too sensitive, which brought the virtues of private life upon the public scene—such praise will not be denied by the future historian, who shall attempt a faithful portrait of this venerable statesman.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Lord Cornwallis's early orders for preparation disobeyed—the season lost—prepares to assume the direction of the war in person—remains at Bengal on hearing of General Medows's appointment—he arrives—takes the command of the army at Trichinopoly—Plan of the campaign—Central force under Colonel Kelly—Letter from General Medows to Tippoo—The Sultaun writes after the army had marched—Singular and instructive contrast—The General's reply—Tippoo unprepared, ascends to his capital—Capture of Caroor—The season—The sick—Imperfect commissariat—Colonel Stuart sent to Palgaut—Ignorance of the seasons—returns with difficulty—detached to Dindegul—Colonel Oldham to Erood—Colonel Floyd placed in advance towards the ghaut—compels the enemy under Seyed Sahab to ascend the ghaut—Tippoo's anger at this weak measure—Colonel Stuart's siege of Dindegul—assault—repulse—capitulation—ordered to Palgaut—Siege—capitulation—Remarkable resources obtained from the country—Important events during his absence—Description of the line of depôts from Trichinopoly to the ghaut—of the three distant corps into which the army was divided—Topography connected with Colonel Floyd's position—Tippoo descends the ghaut—Colonel Floyd suggests falling back on the head-quarters—ordered to maintain his position—Tippoo crosses the river—Success of the English cavalry does not arrest his approach—Cannonade of the 13th of September—Casualties—Council of War—Retreat—Critical situation—Erroneous belief in the

arrival of General Medows, aids in the final repulse of the enemy—He had marched by another route, and was distant twenty miles—Colonel Floyd crosses the country, and after being three days without eating, ultimately forms the junction—General Medows's epigram—Casualties—March to Cheyoor—thence to Coimbetoor—Junction of Colonel Stuart—Advance of the united army—by the Bhavani to Eroad—Proof of its unfitness for a depôt—Tippoo's surprise at the rapid movement of the English army—Capture of Daroporam—General Medows marches to Coimbetoor—thence again to Eroad—Tippoo crosses the Caveri to attack the centre army—General Medows follows.

IF in 1788 Lord Cornwallis appeared to have contemplated the strong probability of an early war: if, in his own words,* “we had dissembled our sense of Tippoo’s failure in the performance of several stipulations in the last treaty of peace, as well as of many insults and injuries that he has offered to us in the course of the last three or four years;” and if the deliberate judgment of his honourable mind patiently expected the opportunity which should justify to the national authorities efforts “to curb his insolence, and exact signal reparation for the many injuries that we and our allies have sustained from them †;” symptoms of impending war, not to be mistaken, were much augmented in 1789. On the 29th of August of that year his Lordship issued special instructions to the Government of Madras regarding the measures to be adopted by themselves, and the communications to be made to the other presidencies, and to the envoys at Poona and Hyderabad, in the event of being forced into a war; and on the 23d of September those instructions were extend-

* 15th August, 1790.

† Ibid.

ed in nearly as ample detail as if the period was fixed for opening the campaign. If these orders, repeated in still more forcible terms in November, had been strictly obeyed by the Government of Fort St. George, immediately on receiving intelligence of the attack of the lines of Travancore on the 29th of December, 1789, a formidable army would have been assembled in the best season for military operations, and allowing sufficient time for the best attainable equipment, that army might (if the Sultaun had chosen to wait their arrival) have been in contact with the rear of his position before the lines, long before he was enabled to carry them. The season was lost, and Lord Cornwallis had prepared to repair these errors in person, when he received intelligence of the appointment to the government of Madras of General Medows, then governor of Bombay, in which situation he was succeeded by General R. Abercromby; the presence of experienced officers to command the resources and lead the armies of those presidencies thus seemed to render unnecessary the execution of his first intentions, and left him more at liberty to draw forth and combine the financial and military means of all the presidencies, for the general and vigorous prosecution of the war.

- Feb. 20. General Medows arrived at Madras late in February, when the indignant gloom of reflecting men began to disperse, on perceiving in every direction marks of efficient preparation. A small encampment was formed by the 18th of March, at Conjeveram, which may be deemed the very commencement of
- May 24. efficient military measures. On the 24th of May, General Medows took the command of the principal
26. army assembled near Trichinopoly, and on the 26th, made his first march with an army of about fifteen thousand men.¹ The plan of operations resembled in

¹ The army was brigaded as follows:—

Cavalry Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons.

its principal features that in Colonel Fullarton's contemplation in 1783—4. This principal army, after reducing Palgaut and the forts of the province of Coimbetoor, was to ascend by the pass of Gujelhutty; while a force under Colonel Kelly,¹ deemed to be capable of making a respectable defence if necessary against the Sultaun's whole army, and to be formed chiefly of the troops expected from Bengal, was to penetrate from the centre of Coromandel into

His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Native Cavalry.

Artillery.—Lieutenant-Colonel Geils, Madras Army.

Three and a half companies Bengal Artillery. 1st Battalion, and one company 2nd Battalion, Madras Artillery.

Right wing.—Colonel Nixon, Madras Army.

1st European Brigade.—Major Skelly, His Majesty's 74th Regiment.

His Majesty's 36th and 52nd Regiments.

1st Native Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Oldham, Madras Army.

1st, 6th and 16th Battalions of Sepoys.

3rd Native Brigade.—Major Cuppage, Madras Army.

4th, 9th and 23rd Battalions of Sepoys.

Left wing.—Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, His Majesty's 72nd Regiment.

2nd European Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, Madras Army.

His Majesty's 71st and 72nd Regiments and 1st Madras Regiment.

2nd Native Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Trent, Madras Army.

2nd, 7th and 20th Battalions of Sepoys.

4th Native Brigade.—Major Dupont, Madras Army.

5th, 14th and 25th Battalions of Sepoys.

The Company of Guides and a detachment of Pioneers, Colonel Musgrave commanding the whole line. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 191.)

¹ Colonel Kelly's army was formed into three brigades at Arni:—

First Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, His Majesty's Service.

His Majesty's 74th, the 3rd, 13th and 26th Bengal Battalions.

Baramahal, and the operations of the two divisions were to be determined by the future events of the war; but for the reduction of Palgaut as a preliminary measure of the campaign, the season had been thrown away.

Although General Medows had thought it incumbent on the dignity of his station to return no answer to a letter addressed by Tippoo Sultaun to the late Governor, and received the first week in March, repeating in more direct terms his assent to Mr. Hollond's suggestion of appointing commissioners; it appears that on the 5th of April he addressed to the Sultaun one of those letters of form announcing his appointment and arrival, usually written by new governors to the rulers of neighbouring states; a measure sufficiently intelligible, when combined with his silence on other subjects. The Sultaun's reply did not arrive till the army had marched. It was full of pacific professions, and complained of "the representations, contrary to fact, of certain short-sighted persons, which had caused armies to be assembled on both sides, an event improper among those who are mutually at friendship." In answer to Mr. Hollond's proposition for appointing commissioners, after the attack of the lines of Travancore, the Sultaun had haughtily replied, "that he had, himself, ascertained the facts; after th's, what was the use of commissioners? Nevertheless, if Mr. Hollond wished it, he might send

Second Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, Bengal Army.

His Majesty's 76th, the 7th, 14th and 28th Bengal Battalions.

Third Brigade.—Major Russell, Bengal Army.

1st Regiment, Madras Native Cavalry.

4th Madras Europeans, and the 21st and 27th Madras Battalions.

Colonel Kelly died on the 24th September and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 199.)

commissioners to the presence." * His altered tone is remarkable and instructive. On perceiving the adoption of a policy consistent with the dignity of a great nation, he asked, with considerable urgency that the General *would receive an envoy from him*, "that the dust which had obscured his upright mind might be removed," and begged that he would *quickly* signify his approval, and order the ambassador (a person of rank) to be passed at the frontier. On the day on which the army passed that frontier, General Medows replied, that "the English, equally incapable of offering an insult as of submitting to one, had always looked upon war as declared, from the moment he attacked their ally the king (raja) of Travancore." The Sultaun received this letter at Coimbatore, and if any evidence were wanting that the united effect of the measures of the late Government, and of his own bad military combinations, found him unprepared for immediate war, that evidence may be traced in his instant departure on the receipt of this letter, with his main army, for the capital.

It was the 15th of June before the arrangements June 15 of the commissariat enabled General Medows to occupy the frontier posts of Caroor, distant only fifty miles from Trichinopoly, which was abandoned without resistance. The south-western monsoon, which at this season pours its torrents on Malabar, sheds a mild and salubrious moisture over the upper countries, and continuing its course over the arid eastern plains, is accelerated by their rarefaction. A powerful wind from the west, raising clouds literally palpable, of pulverized red earth, had utterly obscured the early part of the route, and tainted the respiration with more than the ordinary dust of a camp. In India to open a campaign at a good season, is to enable the troops to sustain the worst; and the disadvantage of commencing operations at this period was evinced by the return of upwards of twelve

* 7th February, 1790.

hundred subjects for the hospital of Caroor before a shot had been fired.¹ The army did not quit this spot before the 3d of July, and after occupying without resistance the weak forts of Aravacourchy² and Daraporum,³ the former was delivered to its

July 3. primitive Hindoo possessor; the latter was occupied

5. by an English garrison for the reception of a farther
10. body of sick: and leaving in that vicinity a brigade to cover the heavy stores, and some expected convoys,
17. the army marched without impediments, expecting to meet the Sultaun at Coimbetoor at a period when he was actually above the ghauts: and it is perhaps
22. unnecessary to observe farther on the dates recorded in the margin, than to shew that the departments of the army had not yet attained that rare maturity which foresees and provides for all wants before they occur.

23. An advanced force under Colonel Stuart was immediately detached to prepare for the siege of Palgaut, or receive possession if it should surrender, but there was still much to learn regarding the local influence of the seasons. The town and immediate vicinity of Coimbetoor receiving from the mountains which tower over it to windward, a sprinkling of the south-west monsoon, charged with the temperature of that elevated region, may be deemed comparatively cold, and had received from the Sultaun a sounding name, signifying the abode of health. A traveller passing twenty miles to the east, approaches the

¹ The fort at Caroor was taken possession of on the 15th June, having been evacuated by the enemy without opposition. This being a strong well-built place, it was retained as a depôt for stores and provisions, and also as a station for sick and convalescents. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 192.)

² *Aravacourchy*.—Aravakurichi, 17 miles south-west of Karur. The fort had been built by a Mysore raja. The walls were destroyed and the site made over to the Poligar of Andipatti, in the Madura District.

³ *Daraporum*.—Dharapuram in Coimbatore District, 42 miles south-east of Coimbatore town. The fort was destroyed in 1792.

burning temperature of Coromandel ; Colonel Stuart passing twenty miles to the west, met the full force of the rains of Malabar, and after crossing with difficulty a mountain torrent, and getting entangled between it and another, which placed him for a day in a situation from which he could neither advance nor retreat, was glad to avail himself of the first possibility of returning to head-quarters, after having with great difficulty obeyed the order for summoning the place. The error being thus practically ascertained, the same officer was immediately afterwards detached in a retrograde direction for the reduction July 31. of the important fort of Dindigul, distant one hundred Aug. 5. and twelve miles ; and another detachment under Colonel Oldham was appointed for the capture of Erood, in the best line of communication from Caroor to the ghaut.

At the same period that Colonel Stuart had been ordered to Palgaut, Colonel Floyd with the cavalry of the army, afterwards reinforced with a light and efficient brigade of infantry, was advanced in consequence of the appearance of greater numbers, and a better order of cavalry than had yet appeared. These were commanded by the Sultaun's kinsman Seyed Saheb, who had joined him at Coimbetoor with his division from Dindigul, and on the Sultaun's ascent to the capital, was left in command of the Silladar and Pindaree horse, to hang upon the English army and disturb its communications. Colonel Floyd with very inferior numbers, commenced against this corps a series of well-combined and active operations, creditable to his professional address, and to the spirit and energy of the European and native cavalry ; and Seyed Saheb, incessantly kept on the alert, found it expedient to place his corps to the northward of the Bahvany, a river running from west to east, and occasionally fordable at a few points ; but finding himself exposed in that situation also to the enterprise of the English troops, and

restricted for space between that river and the hills, ultimately ascended for safety above the ghauts. Tippoo was justly enraged at this weak and unskilful proceeding. Seyed Saheb, as he observed, ought never to have crossed the Bahvāny, but on Colonel Floyd's approach, to have dispersed into small bodies, to have ranged round his rear and flanks, to have occupied in a desultory warfare every detachment on the line of communication with Trichinopoly, and to have straitened the supplies of those appointed to distinct services, and particularly that which afterwards reduced Dindigul and Palgaut, and subsisted exclusively on the country through which it marched; and the Sultaun concluded his angry harangue by declaring that Seyed Saheb had no business with the parade of fighting, and that any one officer under his command would have conducted himself with greater address.

- Aug. 16. Colonel Stuart arrived before Dindigul, in consequence of these errors, without seeing an enemy, except in some posts of minor importance, which either surrendered to him, or to special detachments. This place erected on the summit of a smooth granite rock of limited extent, had within the last six years been rebuilt with excellent masonry, on a new line of defence, not in conformity to the exact principles of European science, but with a better attention to flanking defence: it mounted fourteen good guns, and one mortar, but its best defence was a rampart of natural precipice, except at one point of ascent. The allotment of ordnance for its reduction was calculated on the expectation of finding the place as it was left in 1784; two 18-pounders, two 12-pounders, and two mortars of the smallest size, constituted the whole battering train, and the equipments for these pieces were more insufficient than their number: two batteries (one of field-pieces chiefly for 20. enfilade and ricochet) opened on the 20th. To add to the insufficiency, two of the embrasures of the

breaching battery erected in the preceding night, were found to have been lined out, so as not to bear on the intended breach, and it was necessary to reform them in open day; this being effected the enemy's fire began to slacken after noon, and was silenced before night; by the evening of the 21st, a very indifferent breach was effected, the defences of the works which flanked it being imperfectly taken off, and some of the most important remaining uninjured; but as shot only remained for about two hours firing, and a week would elapse before a fresh supply could arrive, Colonel Stuart, estimating the value of time, and the disadvantage of remaining passive, determined on risking the assault, on the evening of the same day, under all the disadvantages which have been stated. The slope of the breach, although accessible over the steep ascent of the rock, yet left upwards of ten feet of the interior revetment of rather a thin rampart, quite entire; the ascent by the flanks of the breach was rendered impracticable, and a mass of pikes from the foot of the interior revetment, received every man as he ascended the summit of the breach; the assault was given with spirit, and continued as long as any prospect of success remained, but was ultimately repulsed with loss. Fortunately the cause of this premature attempt was unknown to the garrison, and early the next morning a white flag appeared, and the kelledar capitulated, on the usual conditions of security for persons and property, including under the latter head, an article which would seem strange in European warfare; the pikes and matchlocks of the irregular foot, which like the horse and sword of the Indian cavalry, are the personal property of the individual; but Colonel Stuart had judiciously ordered the officer charged with negotiating the capitulation, to make no difficulty that should impede for a moment the surrender of the place.

After retracing his steps to Coimbetoor, this

officer was, without joining head-quarters, ordered with augmented means to proceed to Palgaut. Officers who had served in the siege of 1783, spoke in high terms of the strength of the works, as being composed of long blocks of granite, so built as to present the end instead of the side to the shot, and thus resisting the ordinary means of effecting a breach; the ordnance was therefore prepared on a respectable scale, and placed under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Moorhouse, an officer of distinguished reputation. The preparations were made with corresponding Sept. 21. care, and at day-light on the 21st of September, two batteries opened at distances under 500 yards, one for enfilade, and the other for breaching; the latter consisting of eight 18-pounders, dismounted at their first discharge six of the guns opposed to them. In less than two hours the fort was silenced, and before night a practicable breach was effected: the opinion above stated appears to have arisen from attempting a breach in a circular tower, and the reflection of shot from indirect incidence was ascribed to direct resistance. In the present instance, the breach was made in the curtain, and the error was practically discovered. Among the recent improvements was the completion of the ditch across that causeway which led the assailants of 1783 to the gate; but although the covered way had been improved, it was still without palisades, and in a considerable extent immediately opposite to the breach, the glacis was so imperfectly finished as to leave cover immediately under its crest: of these defects the proper advantage was taken the same night. On reconnoitring the covered way, it was found, that the besieged retired every night into the body of the place, drawing after them a rude wooden bridge, which was replaced every morning: the defective spot was immediately seized, a circular place of arms, in a salient angle of the covered way, was next occupied, and its defences reversed; the musquetry, from the crest of the glacis, opposed that of the fort, the gate

of the sortie was converted into a battery for two 18-pounders; light mortars were brought up to the position first seized, and were served with decisive effect; the ditch, however, was still to be filled: the advanced position must, on the ensuing day, have remained insulated, until it could be connected, in the usual manner, with the trenches: but all these labours were rendered unnecessary, by the impression produced on the garrison, who, before day-light, called out that they desired to capitulate. The terms were soon adjusted, in conversation across the ditch, and soon after day-light, the rude bridge was launched, which enabled the besiegers to occupy the place; which was found to mount sixty guns, of various calibres. The chief condition of surrender was effective protection against the Nairs, who had joined Colonel Stuart, and were employed in the blockade; but on the fire of the place being silenced, crowded the trenches and batteries, anxious for sanguinary retaliation, which it required very exact arrangements to prevent.

Colonel Stuart arrived before Palgaut, with two days' provisions, and without a shilling in his military chest; the sympathy which he evinced for the sufferings of the Nairs, and the rigid enforcement of a protecting discipline, had caused his bazar to assume the appearance of a provincial granary: the fort was ill stored, but, after depositing six months' provisions for the garrison appointed for its defence, he carried back to his Commander-in-chief one month's grain for his whole army: the confidence which his conduct inspired in this short intercourse, having enabled him to pay for these supplies, with written acknowledgments, convertible into cash at the conclusion of the war.¹

¹ After the capture of Dindigul, Colonel Stuart was reinforced by the flank companies, His Majesty's 71st and 72nd regiments and eight companies of the 14th battalion. When it was discovered that the enemy had retired from the covered way it was occupied by the grenadiers of the 2nd battalion, who

During Colonel Stuart's absence on this service events had occurred of the most serious importance. Sattimungul,¹ on the north bank of the river Bahvany, had been reduced and occupied by a battalion from Colonel Floyd's corps,² whose general operations were confined to the south of that river, looking to that depôt as his main object; and he had been joined, after the reduction of Eroad, by the greater part of the troops appointed for that service under Colonel Oldham. A chain of depôts commencing with Tanjore and Trichinopoly, and including Caroor, Eroad and Sattimungul, were thus in the possession of the English, in a good line for advancing provisions and stores to the pass of Gujelhutty, which General Meadows still expected to ascend early in October; but unfortunately, even Caroor could scarcely be deemed a good depot; Eroad was better qualified to contain than protect stores, and Sattimungul was ill adapted to either purpose. Exclusively of minor detachments, and a respectable corps of cavalry and infantry employed, with all the spare carriage, in escorting provisions and stores, to be successively advanced, the army might be considered as separated into three divisions, very different in their composition, but not far from equality in actual strength: the division sixty miles in advance, under Colonel Floyd

were reinforced, when the firing began, by three more companies of sepoy and half a company of the 52nd. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 193.)

¹ *Sattimungul*.—Satyamangalam, a village in the Coimbatore District, 40 miles N.N.E. of Coimbatore town, and 35 miles W.N.W. from Erode, on the Bhavani river, which is here about 100 yards wide. The fort here commanded the fords at the foot of the Gajalhatti pass into Mysore.

² Colonel Floyd's corps consisted of His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons and the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Native Cavalry, a detachment of Bengal Artillery, His Majesty's 36th regiment and the 1st, 5th, 16th and 25th battalions of Native Infantry. The 16th battalion occupied the fort, while the rest of the force encamped on the south of the river opposite to it. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 194.)

—the head quarters of the army at Coimbatore, and the division under Colonel Stuart, thirty miles in the rear, engaged in the siege of Palgaut; making a distance of about ninety miles between the extreme corps.

About fifteen miles farther up the river than Sattimungul, is the fort of Denaickencota,¹ still in the Sultaun's possession. This fort is about seven miles south from Gujelhutty, the foot of the pass, which by the most direct road does not exceed eighteen miles from Sattimungul. About four miles below Denaickencota, is the ford of Poongar, now occasionally practicable; and at a greater distance below Sattimungul, a better ford at Gopalchittypoliam.² The river was every where passable in basket-boats, of which a considerable number was collected at Denaickencota and other points. The Sultaun, early in the month of September, leaving his heavy stores and baggage Sept. at the summit of the ghaut under Poornea, commenced the descent of this most difficult pass of the whole eastern range. The horse, which had last ascended, were first made to descend; and the English cavalry, recognizing their former antagonists, drew no particular inference from their return, but attacked and defeated them wherever they approached a patrol or a detachment. Colonel Floyd, however, had early intelligence of the Sultaun's proceedings: it was indisputably confirmed by the desertion of a native officer, formerly in the English service, who gave a circumstantial account of the number of guns which had descended, and the number still to descend. This successive intelligence, and this individual to be examined, were dispatched, express,

¹ *Denaickencota*.—Danayakkankottai, now almost deserted: a village 30 miles north of Coimbatore, 13 miles W.S.W. of Satyamangalam.

² *Gopalchittypoliam*.—Gobichettipalaiyam, a village on the Bhavani river, 45 miles north-east of Coimbatore, 13 miles E.S.E. of Satyamangalam.

to head-quarters; with a suggestion founded on the dispersed state of the army, which has been described, that the advanced corps should fall back upon the head-quarters of the army: but there the intelligence was disbelieved, and the Colonel was ordered to maintain his advanced position. His encampment, consisting of His Majesty's 19th dragoons, of six troops, sixteen troops of native cavalry, His Majesty's 36th foot, and four battalions of sepoys, including the garrison of Sattimungul, and eleven* guns, was exactly opposite that post.

Among his arrangements of precaution was a daily examination of the ford of Poongar and its vicinity. On the morning of the 12th, after the return of one of these detachments, Tippoo commenced the passage of the river, at the ford, and in basket-boats above it; and before night, had passed a large portion of his army, and encamped some miles to the south of the ford; the remainder was ordered to descend by the north bank, to operate by cannonade across the river, to seize Sattimungul, and eventually to cross by the lower or upper ford, or by boats, according to circumstances. The intelligence and appearances of the two preceding days indicated that the descent had been nearly accomplished; on the 13th, an hour and a half before day-light, three troops of the 19th were sent in advance, to reconnoitre the ford, and a regiment of native cavalry was ordered out at day-light to support them. There are two roads to the ford, one winding by the river side, and another more direct; the advanced body, after charging and driving into the river some cavalry they had met, returned by the river side; the native regiment was meanwhile moving by the direct road, and had only proceeded a few miles, when it was suddenly met by larger bodies than had hitherto been observed. The country is intersected by high and generally impenetrable inclosures, chiefly composed of various

* Cavalry 1,100; infantry 1,700; total 2,800, and 11 guns.

kinds of euphorbia and opuntia. The regiment instantly charged, and overthrew its immediate opponents, but perceiving heavy bodies of cavalry in every direction, the officer commanding, determined to take post in a favourable spot, which presented itself, formed partly by these fences; and to send intelligence to Colonel Floyd, in order that time might be given for the requisite dispositions, as well as for his own support. It was rather a position for infantry than cavalry, but if he had attempted retreat, the consequences must have been more unfavourable. Nearly an hour elapsed before support arrived, during which time he was surrounded, and hard pressed in every direction; and had expended his carbine ammunition. His earliest support was another regiment of native cavalry, which in the first instance relieved him, in the defensive post, and left his regiment free, to the use of their swords, in conjunction with the 19th, which regiment, including the returning detachment attracted by the firing, and the remaining four troops of native cavalry, immediately followed the supporting regiment.

The Mysoreans in surrounding the regiment which had taken post, had very improvidently entangled themselves among the inclosures; in one of these, from which there was no retreat, between four and five hundred of the Sultaun's stable horse were charged by two troops of the 19th, and every man put to the sword; in other directions the charges of the European and the native cavalry were perfectly successful; the field was completely cleared of every opponent, and the whole cavalry returned to camp. They had scarcely dismounted; however, before a large body was perceived descending the northern bank of the river, and about ten o'clock, opened some guns on the grand guard, which was immediately ordered to join the line; the Sultaun's columns were at the same time perceived rapidly approaching from the west, in a direction which threatened to turn

the left, and a change of front was promptly executed, which placed the infantry in a position difficult to be out-flanked, and the cavalry imperfectly covered by a low hill. The Sultaun's army drew up in a corresponding order, seeking but failing to obtain an enfilading fire, and opened a distant, but efficient cannonade from nineteen guns, besides those to the north of the river; this was answered by the English eleven, but not with great vivacity, as well on account of the distance as the limited store of ammunition. At distances much exceeding point blank, a few discharges are generally necessary to ascertain the range; when this was found, every shot carried off a file, and to distract the enemy's aim, the corps frequently receded or advanced a short distance; these movements were executed by the sepoy's with the most perfect steadiness. Colonel Floyd in passing along the line when the casualties were most frequent, expressed regret to the native officers, and cheered them with the hope of retaliation in due time: the answer was nearly uniform, "We have eaten the Company's salt; our lives are at their disposal, and God forbid that we should mind a few casualties." The cannonade only terminated with the day.

Of the English guns, two 12-pounders and a six were disabled; the casualties had been serious among the troops, the horses, and the draught oxen; and this last equipment had suffered still more severely in the desertion of most of the drivers during the cannonade. A council of war determined on retreat, and although the two twelves had been restored soon after midnight, by the active and intelligent exertions of an officer of his staff,* the causes which have been noticed, compelled him to leave on the ground one 18-pounder, one 12, and one six. After some blame-

* "Brigade Major Dallas, who is always active and fertile in expedients, got timber from the fort, &c., &c." Colonel Floyd's letter. He had been foremost in every charge by day, and acted the artifice by night.

able delay, in executing the orders for abandoning the untenable post of Sattimungul with its provisions, the battalion crossed in basket-boats, and the whole corps commenced its march at eight in the morning; the infantry and cavalry in separate columns, and the baggage in a third. For about twelve miles, an open country admitted that order of march; but at Oocára,¹ a country intersected by inclosures, compelled the adoption of a single column, the cavalry with Colonel Floyd leading; and the infantry from that period, entirely conducted by his second, Lieutenant-Colonel Oldham.

Tippoo had, on the preceding night, drawn off his army at the close of day, to a position distant six miles, which he had previously appointed, but the army, overtaken by the night, and by torrents of rain not felt in the English position, unable to find their places in the line, were scattered over the country without order or connexion: if this state of things had been known to Colonel Floyd, there can be no doubt that even with his inferior numbers, and after the fatigues of such a day, he would have attempted and probably succeeded in a decisive enterprise by night. There was no indication of movement until the English troops were in actual march; and it was of course between eight and nine before intelligence could reach the Sultaun, whose arrangements were prepared for a renewal of the cannonade with an augmented artillery about noon. He instantly ordered the great drum to be beaten, and verbal orders to be circulated for immediate march, and he hastened with such cavalry as was ready, to reconnoitre, and to send back instructions regarding the route to be pursued. The Sultaun's sepoy had in general fasted a day and night, and were busily employed among the hedges in dressing their food. It was the custom of the army on ordinary occasions

¹ Oocára.—Ukkaram, a village seven miles south of Satyamangalam.

to beat two preparatory sounds of the great drum, and march on the third: a portion of the dispersed army was really unacquainted with the orders for *immediate* march, another portion did not choose to understand them; the officers were directed to move without a moment's delay, and did so with whatever men they could collect; but it is supposed that the whole force of every arm really collected for action on that day did not exceed fifteen thousand men,* and certainly did not amount to twenty thousand: they were however flushed with the intelligence of the abandoned guns, and the elation of pursuit, and behaved with considerable firmness and spirit.

It was past two o'clock before Tippoo could bring any of his infantry into action. The column of English infantry marched on the main road, which was now in most places bounded by thick hedges; and the enemy's cavalry, infantry, and guns, bore directly on the rear, and diagonally on both flanks, compelling the column occasionally to halt and return the cannonade with various success, making as much progress as was consistent with the successive means very skilfully employed, for keeping the pursuers at a distance. In these operations, three more guns were disabled and abandoned, the number remaining being reduced to five six-pounders. About five o'clock, the Sultaun had advanced his whole force so close, as to compel Colonel Oldham to halt, and form the whole infantry in a strong position; a select body of cavalry made a rapid detour, and charged with considerable spirit, the rear of the position, while the infantry in front, was prepared to take advantage of the expected confusion; the English line, only two deep, faced about to receive the cavalry, and repulsed them with great loss, many of the horsemen falling by the bayonet. The English cavalry had by this time

* The more general estimate is 10,000, but we must consider that it is the calculation of disappointed men.

advanced near to the village of Shawoor,¹ (or Cheyoor) about two miles in front, the small portion of baggage that remained, was ordered into the village, ground was selected for the encampment, the cavalry had begun to forage, and a troop which had been ordered to examine and make the detour of the village, appeared on its opposite side, on the road leading from Coimbetoor. Some of the followers called out that it was General Medows's personal guard, and the head of his column: and Colonel Floyd, who had at the same moment received from Colonel Oldham a report of his situation, seizing the fortunate error, caused it to be announced to the cavalry, who, throwing down their forage, formed and returned to the scene of action, proclaiming with three huzzas, the arrival of Medows, which was instantly greeted by a similar cheer, along the infantry ranks. It was almost at the same critical period, that the Sultaun's army had rushed to the close of a fancied triumph, with a general shout, but were checked in the first instance, by the admirable conduct of the infantry, and in the next, by the exulting intelligence of succour; in this state of wavering, they were charged by the British cavalry, who pursued on both flanks of the position, and completely cleared the field.

The Sultaun received at once the report of the death of his favourite kinsman Burhân-u-Deen, (who had fallen in a gallant attempt to force one of the fences which have been described,) and of the supposed arrival of the English General: authentic information had placed his division on a different route, but believing for an instant his intelligence to be erroneous, he drew off his army, in disappointment and indignation at the escape of a prey deemed to be within his grasp. Ascribing this disappointment chiefly to the inclosures which we have mentioned, he

¹ *Shawoor*.—Sevur, a small village twenty miles south of Satyamangalam, and about twenty-five miles north-east of Coimbatore.

some years afterwards ordered them to be entirely levelled over the whole face of the district; and it is a curious fact, that he was materially aided in this operation by an almost invisible agent. The prickly pear or "straight-thorned opuntia,"* is the chief material of these fences, and the *Silvester* cochineal insect, introduced into Coromandel shortly after the order had been given, devoured not only the leaves, but the root of that plant with such avidity as nearly to have terminated its existence in the south eastern provinces: while the "Cactus Tuna" or awl-thorned opuntia, remained untouched by the insect.¹

On the disappearance of the Sultaun's army, Colonel Floyd, about seven o'clock occupied the ground near the village which he had previously examined. He had, during the action, received a

* *Cactus ficus Indica*, Lin.—Ainslie.

[*Opuntia Dillenii*.]

¹ In 1786 Dr. Anderson of Madras sent to Sir Joseph Banks specimens of a dye-yielding coccus which may have been a form of cochineal, and this seems to have determined the East India Company to endeavour to introduce the true insect. Accordingly in 1795 Captain Neilson (Royle: *Prod. Res. Ind.*, 1840, p. 60) brought from Brazil some opuntia leaves with the insects still adhering. This was apparently, however, the *grana sylvestris*. There is no knowledge of the acclimatisation of the *grana fina* (?) in India. . . . It thus seems possible the sudden extermination of the opuntias of certain districts (such as that mentioned in Wilks: *History of Mysoor*, Vol. II, p. 398, in connection with Tippu Sultan) might be accomplished by the parasite mentioned, ["a parasitic scale insect (possibly a species of *Wiaspis*) found on most Indian opuntias at Kew"] without supposing the sudden appearance and disappearance of a form of cochineal.

Dr. Bourne (Report, July 26, 1897) obtained *grana ayloctus* (?) insects from Ganjam and found these on the yellow flowered opuntia; they lived for a short time, and only a little longer on the red. He accordingly inferred that, as a measure of extermination of opuntia, the rearing of any form of cochineal was attended with so much difficulty that it was a failure. But it may be asked, would similar failure necessarily result with all the other species of scale insects seen on the opuntias? (Watt: *Commercial Products of India*, p. 347.)

dispatch from head-quarters, dated on the preceding day; it related to promotions and matters of detail; and a postscript was added, stating that the General would march on the 14th for Velladi; a piece of intelligence which he had carefully concealed. This measure appears to have been adopted by the General, on the tardy persuasion that the reiterated intelligence of the Sultaun's descent was not entirely unfounded. Velladi is on the nearest road from the pass by Denaickencota to Coimbetoor, but the direct road to the same place from Sattimungul, fifteen miles lower down the river, is that on which Colonel Floyd was marching and had been invariably used by every convoy and detachment for the last month. To cross from Cheyoor, his present ground, to Velladi, was nearly twenty miles: the Sultaun, as soon as he had time to examine his intelligence at leisure, caused a report to be circulated, that he had moved to an intermediate position, towards that place; in the hope that Colonel Floyd might be induced to pursue his route to Coimbetoor, and leave General Medows's division without support: but this intelligence had an effect exactly the reverse of that it was intended to produce, by impressing on the mind of Colonel Floyd the absolute necessity of attempting, at all risks, to force the junction, as the only chance for the ultimate preservation of the army; and if the report were true, it afforded the farther hope of entangling the enemy between two fires. He accordingly moved at two o'clock; at daylight he heard and answered three signal guns: General Medows had also heard the firing of the preceding day, and three guns fired at eight at night, to indicate the situation of the detachment; but distant sounds are referred with little accuracy to their true directions, and had not enabled him to determine the situation of his detachment.

Colonel Floyd pursued his march, and arrived at Velladi, at eight at night, without seeing an enemy,

the troops having been three days without eating. In the course of the march, however, he had met two native horsemen of the General's body-guard, who, in the anxiety produced by the firing, and the uncertainty of its direction, had been sent as a sort of forlorn hope, on the preceding evening, to endeavour to discover the detachment, and communicate the requisite intelligence. From them he ascertained, that General Medows had marched that morning through Velladi to Denaickencota; and a reciprocal anxiety was excited on his account. The two men and their horses were quite exhausted, it was obvious that no fresh horse or man was to be found in the detachment; but the vital importance was still more obvious of stopping the farther advance of the General; and Brigade-Major Dallas volunteered and executed alone this essential service. He found the army ten miles in advance of Velladi, and reported the existence and the wants of the detachment. The most urgent was that of surgeons for the wounded, (two surgeons having been killed,) and an immediate refreshment of biscuit and spirits for the Europeans, the sepoy being already occupied in dressing the rice which they always carried on their backs; these wants were supplied in the course of the night, and the next morning the General retraced his steps to Velladi. His reception of Colonel Floyd was a noble example of candour: "My dear Colonel! your's is the feat, and mine the defeat." The General was fond of epigram, and it was usually well pointed.

The casualties of the 13th and 14th amounted to 436 men killed and wounded, 34 horses, and six guns. Of the killed and wounded, the Europeans, including artillery men, were 128; the natives 308. Sept. 16 The 16th and 17th were employed in arrangements for the care of the wounded and dispatching them to the hospital at Coimbetoor. On the 18th the united corps made a short march in the direction of Cheyoor,

and on the 20th, encamped in its vicinity: the first Sept. 20. intention of this movement appears to have been to offer battle to the enemy; but from Cheyoor the General returned to Coimbetoor, where he was joined by Colonel Stuart's division after the capture of Palgaut. The junction of the two corps had in the meanwhile disappointed the Sultaun's expectations, and he retired north of the river, not so much in the expectation of attack, as to be enabled to keep the anniversary of ten days, of the martyrdom of the son of Ali; originally a ceremonial of mourning for that sect exclusively, afterwards of exultation to their opponents, and finally in India, a frantic exhibition without an object in which both unite. Colonel Stuart found the ceremonial observed with the customary phrenzy by the garrison of Palgaut during the siege, and under restriction had even allowed a similar indulgence to the Mahomedans of the besieging force, without the slightest impediment to the operations of the siege.

The army, with the exception of its minor detachments, and the corps appointed to escort the convoys, was now re-united at Coimbetoor, and marched in pursuit of the enemy: the draught and 29 carriage cattle had become well practised, and generally in excellent condition, from the superior forage* of this district. To restore the condition of cavalry once over-worked, is known to be a slow and difficult process; but the infantry and artillery, with the equipments of the army in every department, were in the best marching order; and with equal intelligence would have forced the enemy to action. In six marches, General Medows, pursuing the route of the enemy, round by the Bahvany to the Caveri, found Eroad, successively abandoned by his own garrison, and by its captors after emptying the store-houses. Its unfitness for a dépôt, was illustrated by the first orders issued after the Sultaun's descent had

* Chiefly the *Holcus Saccharatus*, and *Holcus Spicatus*.

been fully ascertained, by his attack of the advanced division; the battalion which constituted its garrison, was ordered to retire to Caroor, leaving one company under a native officer, who, on the appearance of the Sultaun's army capitulated, and the condition was actually observed, of permitting the company to march to Caroor.

Oct. From Eroad, the Sultaun proceeded due south closely followed by the English army; measuring its capacity for marching, by his former experience of the tardy movements necessary for protecting convoys, he had on the day the English army left Eroad, marked out his encampment, about sixteen miles from that place, intending to push at the convoy advancing from Caroor, or move to Daraporam or Coimbetoor, according to the direction which might be taken by General Medows. Most of the tents were pitched, and the foragers were out, when his light troops brought intelligence that the English advanced-guard would soon be in sight. The great drum immediately beat, and the army, overtaken at once by the night, and a severe fall of rain, was kept from dispersion by the light of the Sultaun's personal flambeaux. He marched all night, and if the circumstances had been known to General Medows, he could with certainty and advantage, have brought him to action on the ensuing day. He halted however after a short march, to receive his convoy from Caroor, while the Sultaun rapidly pursued his course southward.

It had been his original design to avail himself of an expected delay in the junction of the English convoy from Caroor, to double back upon Coimbetoor, and possess himself of the field hospital, valuable stores, and battering train deposited, not mounted, in that untenable post, and he made his next march in that direction; but the place had been opportunely reinforced by three regular battalions of the

Madras establishment,¹ and one corps of Travancoreans, sent by Colonel Hartley, who had arrived at Palgaut, in conformity to the general instructions he had received in September: on receiving this intelligence, the Sultaun took the direction of Daraporam. The garrison of that place was chiefly composed of convalescents, about one hundred Europeans² and two hundred sepoy, unprovided with cannon; three batteries erected just beyond musquetry, would level the miserable thin rampart in a few discharges; approaches were pushed to the ditch, and the garrison surrendered on a capitulation, which was Oct. 8. unexpectedly observed.

The General, after receiving his convoy, returned 15. to Coimbetoor: recent events had shewn the expediency of making this weak place more capable of defence, before the departure of the army, and orders to effect the same object, were soon afterwards sent to Caroor and Dindigul. These objects being provided for at Coimbetoor, to the extent that was practicable, he again put the army in motion to seek the enemy, in the direction of Eroad. Farther stores were wanting from Caroor, and a detachment was made on the route, covered by the march of the 20. army, which waited its arrival at Eroa, whence a 25. supporting corps was sent to meet and facilitate its Nov. 2. arrival. On approaching Eroad, a large mass of the

¹ Colonel Hartley on arrival at Palgaut from Bombay with a detachment of the Bombay army released the Madras troops there and sent them on to Coimbatore,—the 10th, 13th, and 14th Regiments of the Madras Army under Captain Knox. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. III, p. 197.)

² Details of His Majesty's Foot, 62 non-commissioned rank and file.

Details of Company's infantry, 74 non-commissioned rank and file.

Ensign Blackall, 2nd Battalion, and 173 men. Captain Evans and three officers, Madras Europeans. Captain Fotheringham, 20th Battalion (sick). Lieutenant Wardrop, His Majesty's 52nd Regiment (sick).

Wulsa was met proceeding from the westward of Eroad, whence they had been compelled to depart by the Sultaun's command, in order that no population should remain to give intelligence of his movements, in a country covered by his light cavalry for the same purpose; the object was much canvassed, but not understood in the English army. In the neighbourhood of the camp, the usual straggling scouts were seen, but whenever a patrol was pushed to the westward, it met with increasing numbers. A

- Nov. 7. strong corps under Colonel Floyd was at length sent to force a more extensive reconnoissance, and discovered that the Sultaun's whole army had crossed several days before, above the confluence of the
8. BahvAny and Caveri, and had proceeded to the northward. General Medows began to cross on the ensuing day, at a ford below Eroad, so deep as to make it necessary for the cattle to swim over, the stores and ammunition to be carried on men's heads, and the tumbrils crossing under water to be opened and dried in the sun on the opposite side, before it
10. could be re-packed. And he followed with all expedition, to check the mischief in the Sultaun's contemplation.

Tippoo had heard when last passing Sattimungul of the actual invasion of Baramahal, and proceeded with about three-fourths of his army in that direction, leaving the remainder to watch the motions of General Medows, under the orders of Kummer-u-Deen, now first restored to military command since 1787, by transferring to his charge the elephant and insignia of Seyed Saheb, who was thus tardily disgraced for his flight up the pass of Gujjelhutty.¹

¹ General Medows left the 1st Battalion of Europeans, and the 14th, 16th and 20th Native Battalions behind. The Europeans were stationed at Dindigul and Caroor, the 14th Battalion at Coimbatore, and the 20th at Caroor. The 16th was distributed between these garrisons. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 198.)

CHAPTER XXXVI.

English centre army under Colonel Maxwell—composition and strength—enters Bāramahāl—movements—cavalry drawn into an ambuscade—Tippoo shews his whole army—draws off at night—Renewed demonstration—Departure in consequence of the approach of General Medows—his movements—mistakes the Sultaun's army for Colonel Maxwell's—Junction—Relative movements—Both point at the pass of Tapoor—Ineffective operations of the English—Tippoo escapes—marches by Caroor to Trichinopoly—followed by General Medows—His opinions and plan of operation—resolves to ascend the ghauts by Caveriporam—Lord Cornwallis determines personally to assume the conduct of the war—General Medows ordered to lead the army to Madras—Striking influence of the seasons—Tippoo's progress into Cōromandel—Tiagar—commanded by Flint—beats off two attempts to carry the town or petta—Trinomalee—Negotiations at Pondicherry, and embassy to Louis the XVth.—English army arrives near Madras—Tippoo's advances to negotiation during the campaign—Results of the campaign—Recurrence to the operations in Malabar—Colonel Hartley's victory over Hussein Aly, and its important consequences—General Abercromby arrives—takes Cannanore, and reduces the whole province—Proceedings of the confederates—engaged in two sieges—Copol and Darwar—Ten thousand horse ready to join Lord Cornwallis—Advantages with which he opened the campaign—Unfavourable

anticipations of the Sultaun—Lord Cornwallis's selection of a new line of operations, with its reasons.

THE respectable corps of native infantry¹ which had made a march of twelve hundred miles from Calcutta, reached Conjeveram on the 1st of August. The exertions recently made in the equipment of the main or southern army had emptied the arsenals, and caused some delay in the equipment of the centre army, as it was named, which, by the addition of three regiments of European infantry, one regiment of native cavalry, and a formidable artillery, was augmented to nine thousand five hundred men, and assembled at Arnee. Colonel Kelly, its commander, died, and the command devolved on Colonel Maxwell on the 24th of September. In conformity to orders from General Medows, that officer entered Baramahal on the 24th of October, in pursuance of the original plan of the campaign. On the 1st of November he approached Kistnagherry, the capital and strongest post of the district²: the natural strength and improved defences of this tremendous

¹ This division from Bengal left Berhampur on the 27th February, reached Outtack on the 7th April and Conjivaram on the 1st August. It was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, and was made up as follows:—

Detachment of artillery under Captain Montagu.

Company of Artillery under Captain Barton.

3rd Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Balfour.

7th Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Battray.

13th Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Macleod.

14th Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Archdeacon.

26th Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Scott.

28th Battalion of Sepoys, Captain Sorymgeour.

The strength of the infantry on arrival at Conjeevaram has not been ascertained; but when at Ellore, in June, the total number of privates was 4,069, of whom 387 were sick. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 198.)

² The whole force was formed into three brigades.—

First Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, His Majesty's Service.

rock rendered it of some importance to determine whether a regular siege should be attempted, and several days were expended in a close and minute examination of its whole circumference. Colonel Maxwell then established his head-quarters near the central position of Caveripatam, intending, as was supposed, by making demonstrations towards the pass and the fort in its vicinity, to return and attempt Kistnagherry by surprise. On the 9th, the presence Nov. of considerable bodies of light cavalry indicated the Sultaun's approach, and on the 11th the only regi- 11. ment of cavalry, allowing themselves to be inveigled in pursuit through a defile, were attacked by about six times their number, and driven back with considerable loss. On the 12th the Sultaun shewed his 12. army in full force, and attempted, by a variety of evolutions, to find the means of attacking Colonel Maxwell with advantage; but the strong position assumed by that officer, his admirable dispositions, and his promptitude in anticipating every design, frustrated these intentions; and the Sultaun drew off at night without any serious attempt. Similar means on the 13th, varied so as to compel an entire change of position, terminated in the same manner: on the 14th, numbers farther augmented made similar demonstrations, but these were actually

His Majesty's 74th, the 3rd, 18th and 26th Bengal Battalions.

Second Brigade.—Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, Bengal Army.

His Majesty's 76th, the 7th, 14th and 28th Bengal Battalions.

Third Brigade.—Major Russell, Bengal Army.

1st Regiment, Madras Native Cavalry.

4th Madras Europeans, and the 21st and 27th Madras Battalions.

When beyond Vellore the army was joined by a body of men, armed with matchlocks and pikes furnished by the Poligars of North Arcot, Vencatagiri, Kalahasti and Bomrayapalyam, (Karvetnagar) about 1,750 men in all, under a native officer. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, pp. 199-200.)

intended to conceal his meditated departure on the ensuing day.

General Medows, as we have seen, had commenced his march from the Caveri on the 10th. On Nov. 14. the 14th he encamped at the southern extremity of the pass of Tapoor, and on the 15th was enabled, by the improvement of the road effected by the Sultaun a few days before, to clear the pass and the range of hills, and encamp on their northern face, on an elevated ground overlooking Baramahâl, and distant about twenty-nine miles from Colonel Maxwell's position at Caveripatam. On the arrival of the advanced-guard at the intended ground, a camp was observed gradually to arise, flags to be erected, and troops to take up their ground on the plain, distant about six miles. Nearly three weeks had elapsed since any direct intelligence had been received from Colonel Maxwell. No doubt was entertained that the English army beheld their comrades, and three signal guns were fired to announce the event. In five minutes, every tent was struck, and heavy columns were seen in full march to the west, in the vale of the great pass of Policode.* It was soon understood to be the Sultaun's army. He had drawn off some miles south from Colonel Maxwell's position on the preceding evening, and calculating on General Medows requiring another day to clear the pass, had marked an encampment which he found it prudent to abandon. General Medows moved on the 16th fifteen miles farther in the direction of Caveripatam; and on the ensuing day the important junction was formed by Colonel Maxwell. The united army was now twenty miles from the head of the pass of Tapoor, and twenty-six from its southern extremity. Kishen Row, the treasurer, was alone admitted to the

* Tippoo encamped at Santa Marunhully.

[Marandahully, now a station on the railway between Hosur and Dharmapuri, which runs up through the pass of Palakodu.]

Sultaun's councils on this occasion. He had no fixed opinion regarding the plan of future operations intended by the English after the disruption of their chain of depôts; but he inferred, that wherever the Sultaun should go, they would follow, and that he ought accordingly to carry the war into their own country, keeping also in view such a line of operation as might enable him to avail himself of any favourable opportunity to recover the places he had lost. If he should be followed up the vale of Policode, the nature of the ground left him no alternative but to ascend the ghaut; and he determined to double back through the pass of Tapoor. His cattle had been much over-worked on the 15th, and it was deemed necessary to give them two complete days' rest. His intelligence stated the intention of the English General to halt on the day ensuing the junction; but if such an intention existed, it had been changed. The two armies were accordingly in motion on the 18th, both pointing to the pass of Tapoor, and both intending to clear it in two easy marches. Nov. 18.

As the quarter-master-general's department was preparing, under the protection of the advanced-guard, to mark out the new encampment; they perceived a few tents pitched three or four miles in front of their right; it was Tippoo's Pesh Khana, or tents always sent on for his personal accommodation with the advanced-guard. The circumstances were reciprocally reported; and the Sultaun, confident in the powers of his equipments, rashly decided on continuing his march through the pass. By the time that the head of the main column of the English army had reached the intended encampment, thick clouds of dust in front, indicated the entrance into the pass of a long and heavy column, while a considerable body of horse made a demonstration on the right, and was supposed to mask a movement of infantry, indicated by columns of dust in the rear of their left,

which seemed, however, to accurate observers, to be returning to the westward. The General, with a brigade of infantry and the cavalry, moved out to examine this body, while the head of the column of march was ordered to regulate its advance by that of the corps which the General directed. Colonel Stuart, who commanded the right wing of the army, and led the column, perceiving soon afterwards from a commanding ground the probability of being able by a rapid advance to cut off a considerable body of the Sultaun's infantry, and attack the remainder to advantage, while entangled in the pass, reported his observations and asked permission to attempt it, with his own wing of the southern army, as an advanced corps, to be supported as occasion might require. This proposition was not approved, and the corps on the right under General Meadows impeded by ravines was making slow progress. The demonstrations were continued, and the effect of a more rapid advance was sufficiently evinced by the fact of three battalions of infantry of the rear of the main column being intercepted under all these disadvantages of delay, and forced to make a straggling retreat through the ravines and woods in the opposite direction. The remainder of the Sultaun's army, astonished at their good fortune, completely cleared the pass, with the loss of only one tumbril, which had broken down, and some unimportant articles of military store: the cavalry disappeared about sun-set, a small body taking the route of the pass; and the remainder in a circuitous direction by Pinagra¹: and the English army, after a tedious march of twenty miles in about fifteen hours, and firing a few shot, encamped at night near the summit of the pass of Tapoor.

¹ *Pinagra*.—Pennagaram, a village in the Dharmapuri Taluq of the Salem District, to the west of the Toppur pass, 18 miles south-west of Dharmapuri, an unhealthy village close to the forests, which run westwards to the Cauvery river. The fort, now in ruins, was a border fortress of some importance.

On the Sultaun's part the discovery of the English advanced-guard was made in sufficient time for the baggage, camp equipage, and rear-guard to return, separated from the army by the intervention of the whole of the British forces, and the dust of their retrograde movement contributed to the hesitation of the English General. The Sultaun was personally present with the cavalry which made the demonstration on the right, and went off with a slight escort through the pass shortly before it disappeared. The Pesh Khana was the only cover in the whole army ; and they were equally destitute of provisions, until joined by Kummer-u-Deen and his small bazar two days afterwards. Tippoo however made no delay, his army supplying themselves by the plunder of his own villages; and first pointing to Caroor, and giving out that he would cross the Caveri below that place, he descended by the northern bank of the river, and made no halt until opposite Trichinopoly. Against that place he made various demonstrations, but they had no material result beyond the plunder and devastation of the island of Seringham.

Meanwhile the English General closely following his steps, and for two days having a distant view of the rear of his columns, arrived at the bank of the Caveri, opposite Caroor, on the 27th of November ; Nov. 2 and believing that the Sultaun had passed to the southward, ordered a strong detachment under Colonel Oldham across the river, with reinforcements for the places which he considered most vulnerable. Deeming the Sultaun's views to be chiefly directed to fixing the seat of war in the low countries, the General declared his opinion,* "that the most determined measure, the likeliest to bring him to action, and drive him out of this country, is boldly to go up the ghauts ourselves, which I mean to do by the Caveriporam pass, and taking post at the head of the

* Letter to the acting Governor in Council at Madras.

- Gujelhutti, and opening that of Tambercherry, preserve our communication with Coimbatore, Policherry (Palgaut) and the other coast;" a plan of operation which it is not intended seriously to discuss; but which it were scarcely liberal to criticize by the test of posterior information. He added, that he hoped to be able to set out for the Caveriporam
- Dec. 8. pass by the 8th December, and expressed his belief, that if he were once up the ghauts, the enemy would either fight or treat. Before that date, however, he was in full march in the opposite direction, in consequence of the Sultaun's demonstrations before Trichinopoly, which threatened that most important, but weak and extensive dépôt, opposite to which the
14. General arrived on the 14th of December.

Considerations belonging to illustration of character, to distinguished enterprise, or to results of essential importance, have on various occasions extended our narrative into greater detail than accords with the general plan of this work, and the principal features of the campaign of 1790, have insensibly expanded, for the purpose of illustrating the degree in which they may be supposed to have influenced the Governor-general, to resume his original design of assuming in person the direction of the war, for motives of great force existed independently of all reference to the conduct of that campaign. "His presence in the scene of action was considered by our allies as a pledge of sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common* enemy." His Lordship arrived at Madras on the 12th of December, having previously dispatched two confidential officers of his staff, to prepare the requisite information regarding a variety of local details.¹

* Minute of Council, Fort William.

¹ General Medows reached Trichinopoly on 14th December 1790. On 12th December Cornwallis reached Madras on H.M.S. *Vestal*, a frigate commanded by Sir Richard Strachan.

General Medows appears to have received intelligence of his Lordship's intentions when near Caroor, and now determined to remain in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, until he should receive his orders: "but if no orders should be received, or if his Lordship should be prevented by any unforeseen circumstances from taking the command of the army in person, it was still his intention to commence his march for the upper country on the 1st of January." Orders, however, did arrive, in consequence of which he commenced his march to Madras on the 30th of December.¹

Dec. 30.

The difference of a few days in descending to the eastward from the vicinity of Caroor, had brought the Sultaun's army into the depth of the rains of the north-east monsoon, which usually fall in Coromandel from the 15th of October till near the middle of December, while the English army, placed a little beyond their western verge, entirely escaped their injurious effects; but in following the Sultaun's track they had occasion to observe the havoc it had made among his cattle, and to hear of its serious influence

¹ On April 1, 1790, Cornwallis wrote to Dundas: "Medows has adopted Musgrave's plan of operations, which is to invade Tippoo's country with one very considerable army from Trichinopoly, and leave all the rest of the Carnatic force on the defensive. I am not quite sure that I perfectly approve of this; for although our army will, by this means, possess the rich country of Coimbatoor, yet as they cannot pass the ghauts which divide that part of Tippoo's dominions from the Mysore country, until the rains cease in the latter (for you must understand that in Coimbatoor they have the rains at the same time as in the Carnatic, and in Mysore at the same time as on the Malabar Coast), I cannot help apprehending that during the period in which our army will be detained in Coimbatoor, the Carnatic will be greatly exposed to the incursions of Tippoo's cavalry. But it was too late, even if I had been convinced of its imperfection, and had possessed sufficient local knowledge to have proposed a better, to have rendered it prudent for me to attempt to alter it." (Ross: Vol. II, p. 8; quoted by Forrest: *Selections from State Papers, Lord Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 51.)

on the troops who were chiefly destitute of cover. On leaving Trichinopoly, Tippoo had proceeded in a northern direction into the heart of Coromandel, marking his route by the accustomed train of plunder, conflagration, and ruin; but perceiving that the military chest would be better replenished by imposing contributions on the towns and villages, he latterly adopted that plan; and, with numerous exceptions where his demands were not satisfied, these places only were destroyed which had been deserted by their inhabitants. On approaching Tiagar, a hill fort with a weak and extensive town at its foot, distant about eighty miles from Trichinopoly, where at length he was joined by the baggage and bazar of his army, he found that the whole of the surrounding population had taken refuge under its protection; attracted by the well known character of its commandant Captain Flint, the defender of Wandewash. The seizure of this multitude would enable him to extort large sums, and he anticipated no difficulty in forcing the town. The demonstrations were made for a regular siege, and the attempt to protect the town incurred from the relative localities the risk of its defenders being cut off from the body of the place. Captain Flint however, confident in his sepoy garrison, and anxiously sympathising with the sufferings of the population, determined that they should not be sacrificed; and beat off with considerable loss two successive attempts to carry the town. Recollections of former years probably contributed to the Sultaun's abstaining from a third.

The inhabitants of Trinomalee, 35 miles farther north, a town adjoining an ancient temple in a lofty square enclosure, animated by the intelligence received from the weaker town of Tiagar, collected the arms of the vicinity, and prepared to defend the temple, in the hope of holding out till the arrival of the English army; their behaviour was at first

respectable, but batteries erected across the streets of the town, and a position on the neighbouring hill, overlooking the square, induced an unconditional surrender, which was accompanied with circumstances of cruelty and outrage too horrible for description. From this place, the Sultaun, making a circuit of the rich plain country, took the direction of Permacoil, which had been dismantled and blown up in the preceding war. It was kept as a post of observation, with one company and an officer, who had directions to retire on the enemy's approach; but the place being unexpectedly surrounded through the treachery of the native officer, his second in command, retreat became impracticable; and the Sultaun, on its surrender, proceeded nearer to Pondicherry. Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen was deputed to the governor of that place, and was accompanied in his return by a gentleman whom the Mysorean manuscripts, without specifying the name, designate as the second in command. It is stated, that he agreed to undertake the office of the Sultaun's ambassador extraordinary to the King of France, on the condition of being reimbursed for the injury done to his private affairs, by his sudden departure from Pondicherry; that this sum was fixed at a lac of Sultany Pagodas, 48,000l.; that he was furnished with an order to that amount on the revenues of Mangalore; that the payment was delayed on various pretences; that the gentleman was ultimately cheated out of his promised remuneration, and that the embassy produced no result.

But we are indebted to the work of Bertrand de Moleville, for a more distinct account of these transactions. According to that authority the negotiation with M. de Fresne, Governor of Pondicherry, was conducted through the medium of M. Leger, "Administrateur Civil" of France in India, who understood the Persian language, who became himself the envoy to Louis XVI. and who wrote

the dispatches dictated by Tippoo relative to this embassy. Tippoo demanded of the King the aid of six thousand French troops ; he offered to pay for their transportation, clothing, and maintenance, and with this assistance he engaged to destroy the English army and settlements in India, and ensure their possession to France. M. Leger, on his arrival in Paris, necessarily addressed himself to Bertrand de Moleville, minister of marine, who informed the King of Tippoo's proposals ; but notwithstanding their advantages, and although as the minister observes, the insurrection at St. Domingo would furnish a good pretext for the unsuspected embarkation for India of the six thousand men demanded, the natural probity of the King's mind would not permit him to adopt the measure : " This resembles," said he, " the affair of America, which I never think of without regret. My youth was taken advantage of at that time, and we suffer for it now ; the lesson is too severe to be forgotten."*

- Jan. In the meanwhile, the English army pursuing the Sultaun's route as far as Trinomalee, took the direction of Arnee, where the heavy stores and guns
 12. were left under the second in command, Colonel Musgrave, and the remainder of the army proceeded by Conjeveram to the encampment of Vellout, eighteen
 27. miles from Madras, where it arrived on the 27th of January ; and Lord Cornwallis accompanied by a reinforcement of artillery and native troops, by various important branches of equipment and conveyance, and by a heavy military chest, assumed the
 29. command on the 29th.¹

* In the midst of his distresses, the King was amused with the shabby finery of Tippoo's miserable presents to himself and the Queen, "trumpery to dress up dolls," which he desired M. Bertrand to give to his little girls.

¹ Owing to untoward accidents, the first intelligence he (General Medows) received of his (Cornwallis's) coming to supersede him came, unfortunately, from the Madras Board. But Medows was too strong and noble a man to nourish a

Some advances to negotiation with the English in the course of the late campaign, are chiefly remarkable for their awkward indirectness, and a deviation from the customary formalities of respect. Early in December, three persons intimating that they were the vakeels formerly nominated to attend General Medows, addressed to him a letter from themselves, stating "the facility of adjusting all differences, if they should be received, and their conviction of their master's assent, if he should be referred to." The General with becoming dignity, ordered the letter to be immediately answered by his aid-de-camp, Captain Macaulay. The unequivocal release of every Englishman in Mysoor, and the possession of some person or place of importance as a cautionary pledge, were stated to be indispensable preliminaries to negotiation. From the neighbourhood of Tiagar, one of these persons addressed a reply to Captain Macaulay, professedly by the Sultaun's command, going over the old ground, and proposing the immediate dispatch of ambassadors; and the requisite answer, "that the preliminary measures had not yet been adopted," terminated the correspondence.

Although the operations of this first campaign had not fulfilled the public expectation, objects had been accomplished of great importance to the commencement of a second. Caroor and Dindigul materially facilitated the protection of the southern provinces. Coimbetoor and Palgaut were two additional points of eventual support to the operations of a field corps, and to an intercourse with Malabar;

personal grievance. Cornwallis wrote to Dundas: "I hope you will give Medows full credit in England for his generous and noble conduct on the trying occasion of my superseding him in his command. I knew the excellence of his temper and of his heart, but he has really in this instance surpassed my expectations." (Forrest: *Selections from State Papers, Lord Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 65.)

and above all the cattle of the army had received a training, and its departments an organization, which in the absence of previously existing establishments, nothing short of a campaign could have effected.

Colonel Hartley,* deprived of the Madras troops after the fall of Palgaut, was left to operate with a field force of one regiment of Europeans, and two battalions of sepoys, with their usual field artillery, against the Sultaun's troops, left under Hussein Aly in Malabar, which, when collected in the neighbourhood of Calicut, were variously estimated at from six thousand to nine thousand men, besides a large body of Mapillas. The universal hostility of the Nairs prevented the employment of this body in the desultory warfare of detachments which could most effectually frustrate Colonel Hartley's views. Partly therefore from necessity and partly from confidence, Hussein Aly assumed a strong position close to Calicut, and waited the result of a fixed action: this was the exact issue from which the diminutive numbers and superior quality of Colonel Hartley's troops could have any hope of success: the attack was made on the 10th of December, 1790, with distinguished skill and gallantry, and eminent success: the route was complete; Hussein Aly Khân and nine hundred men were taken; the loss in killed and wounded being about a thousand, while the casualties of the English corps amounted to fifty-two. Colonel Hartley lost no time in pursuing the fugitives to the unfinished fort of Ferrockhee,¹ where 1500 men laid down their arms, but the commandant had made a timely retreat with the public treasure up the pass of Tambercherry.

General Abercromby, the Governor of Bombay had arrived at Tellicherry with a respectable

* He never joined General Medows, as stated in the Annual Register, nor left the province of Malabar in the campaign of 1790.

¹ *Ferrockhee*.—Feroke, a village about 7 miles south of Calicut. Tippu projected making a fortress here.

force a few days previous to this action, and on the 14th appeared before Cannanore. The enemy was dislodged with loss from a strong position intended to impede his approach, and retired within their works; but a vigorous and successful attack on the most advanced of these on the ensuing day, caused the unconditional surrender of the remainder. These operations were followed up with spirit and decision by the capture of every remaining possession of the Sultaun's, or his dependents in Malabar; and the unquestioned occupation of the whole province.

The allies on the other hand had cautiously, perhaps judiciously, abstained from any determined irruption from the north into the centre of the Sultaun's possessions; and, however tardy and timid in their proceedings, were at length engaged in two sieges, conducted by the English contingents respectively serving with each. The forces of Nizam Ali against Copul, a tremendous rock a few miles to the north of the Toombuddra, and about twenty miles west of the ancient ruins of Vijayanuggur; and the Mahrattas against Darwar,¹ a strong fort on the plain, about sixty miles north-west from Copul. Nizam Ali had prepared a body of ten thousand horse ready to act with the English army, and to join at any point that should be indicated. Lord Cornwallis thus opened the second campaign with advantages which nothing short of a first campaign could have achieved, but with none that could be placed in competition with the inestimable advantage now to be exhibited for the first time in the history of British India, of a Commander-in-Chief uniting in his own person the undivided exercise of all the civil

¹ For the operations of the Mahrattas under Parasuram Bhau with the English force under Captain Little, Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 197-201, should be consulted. The fort of Dharwar fell on the 4th April 1791, Parasuram Bhau and his troops having begun the siege on the 18th September 1790.

and military powers of the state, and the exclusive direction of all the resources of the three Presidencies.

The Sultaun had hitherto failed in his intrigues with the allies for dissolving the confederacy, or even procuring the reception by the English of an envoy to excite in the other confederates the jealousy requisite to his views. He perceived the encreasing means by which he was to be assailed, and the hopelessness of a fortunate issue, without the assistance of the French; and although he was encouraged to indulge the most flattering hopes for the ensuing year, he opened the present campaign without very sanguine expectations.

The plan of a southern campaign was liable to the fundamental objection of separating the seat of war from its great magazine and depôt Fort St. George, and trusting to a new chain of posts, which could not be left for a few days without trembling for their fate. Advanced eighty-eight miles, in a line nearly direct from Madras to the enemy's capital is Vellore, a post which experience had shewn to be well adapted to all the purposes of an intermediate depôt. Amboor, on the same line, was thirty miles farther advanced, and about ninety remained between that post and Bangalore, the place second in importance of the Sultaun's possessions, and distant about seventy-five from Seringapatam; a line of operation which had been rejected in the campaign of 1790, on account of its reputed infertility. To undertake the siege of Bangalore, with the intervention of the ghaut, and a distance of ninety miles between the besieging army and its nearest depôt, was an arduous enterprize: but Lord Cornwallis preferred this hazard to that of trusting to a weak intermediate post.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Lord Cornwallis marches to Arcot—Skilful demonstrations on the direct passes—By an unexpected circuit ascends that of Mooglee without opposition—Unfortunate licentiousness of the first march—Progress of the army—First appearance of the Mysorean horse—Indecision and weakness of Tippoo's measures—Lord Cornwallis arrives without molestation within ten miles of his object—Description of this encampment—Tippoo's presence—Annoyance by night—Able disposition of Lord Cornwallis—Attempt at assassination—Takes up his ground before Bangalore—Reconnoissance covered by Colonel Floyd—Perceives and attacks the rear of Tippoo's army on the march, contrary to instructions—but with a fair prospect of success—till he fell severely wounded—Disorderly retreat—covered by the advance of Major Gowdie, contrary to orders—Observations on this affair—Description of the fort and petta—Attack of the petta—Tippoo's feint for its recovery, did not deceive Lord Cornwallis—Lengthened struggle—Tippoo finally driven out—Colonel Moorhouse—Forage—Grain—First error in the siege—Subsequent operations—Novel and peculiar character of the siege—Operations of the 20th and 21st—determine Lord Cornwallis to give the assault—Description of that operation and its success—Tippoo was distinctly informed of the intended assault, and his whole army was drawn up within a mile and a half—Consequent consternation—Effects on the prospect of the belligerents—Reflections.

ON the 5th of February Lord Cornwallis commenced his march from Vellore, and on the Feb 11. 11th, the army was concentrated near Vellore. Hitherto every demonstration indicated the intention of ascending by the passes near Amboor, or those of Baramahal. The Sultaun had been delayed by his negotiations at Pondicherry, until he heard of Lord Cornwallis's first march, when he proceeded rapidly by the passes of Changama and Palicode, and would have been in time to oppose the ascent of any of the passes threatened. The demonstrations of the English General were continued till the last moment, by a battalion, apparently the advanced guard, moving up the vale to reinforce Amboor, at the same instant that the first division of the army (followed at a proper interval by the second, on account of the close country to be passed) was in full march to the north, and thence turning to the west, through the

14. easy pass of Mooglee,¹ had, in four days, and a circuit of fifty-one miles, completely surmounted every local

17. impediment, and occupied the summit of the pass, with a complete brigade, before it was possible for the Sultaun to have disturbed its ascent. In four days more, the battering train, and every the most minute article of equipment (including sixty-seven elephants from Bengal, which opportunely joined at this place) and provisions for forty-five days, was on the table-land of Mysoor, 90 miles from Bangalore, but still within his own territory, without having fired a shot: a few days more were however occupied in mustering and arranging the departments of store and supply, preparatory to crossing the frontier.

¹ *Mooglee*.—Mugali, a hill about 18 miles west of Chittoor in the Chittoor District, 35 miles north of Ambur, near Palmanair. This pass forms an easy route to the table-land of Mysore. An old tradition alleged that Mugali is connected with Satghur by a subterranean passage. Cornwallis let it be widely known that he intended to advance by the pass leading from Ambur, and then marched by Chittoor, Palmanair and Mugali, to the neighbourhood of Bangalore.

The eyes of an army are turned with sharp Feb. 21. scrutiny towards a new commander: this early evidence of military skill inspired a just confidence; and the first day's march into the enemy's country gave an unfortunate opportunity for estimating a branch of character equally estimable. The protecting discipline which usually accompanies an English army, is among its national distinctions; one example of its useful effects in the late campaign has already been noticed, and another had occurred more remarkable for its coincidence, than its value, or its rarity; during the whole of those two days, on which the English batteries at Dindigul were firing for a breach, several ploughs were quietly at work within a thousand yards of the battery, as if to realize those fables of the golden age, which represent the Indian husbandman as uniformly undisturbed by contending armies. The practice was so well understood that a repetition of the usual injunction was deemed unnecessary, but by some unexplained occurrence, a village on one of the flanks was set on fire on the first march; and the ignorant and licentious followers, imagining that retaliation was intended for the outrages practised by the Sultaun, followed the example, and the whole country was quickly in a blaze. The most active exertions failed to arrest the evil on that day, but nine of the most forward incendiaries were selected for execution; and the following short order exhibits an unaffected picture of the habitual feelings of this excellent nobleman. "Lord Cornwallis has 26. too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public spirit of the officers of the army, to doubt for a moment that every individual among them felt the same concern and indignation that he did himself, at the shocking and disgraceful outrages that were committed on the last march. His Lordship now calls in the most serious manner for the active assistance of every officer in the army, and particularly those commanding flanking parties, advance and

rear guards, to put a stop to this scene of horror; which, if it should be suffered to continue, must defeat all our hopes of success, and blast the British name with infamy." It is scarcely necessary to add that this was the first and the last example; the construction indeed of the villages (walled round, and generally farther protected by a cavalier turret) gave peculiar facility to the arrangements of protection; and a corps was organized for the express purpose of furnishing safe-guards.

Mar. 4. No incident occurred worthy of observation, (except the singular conduct of the small garrisons of Colar and Ooscota, who refused to surrender, but made no resistance,) until the 4th of March, when the cavalry of the Sultaun's army appeared in some force. He had exhibited a strange indecision of character, in suspending every military movement of importance, during his protracted negotiations at Pondicherry, and singular imbecility in permitting the approach of the English army, within ten miles of its object, without the smallest molestation. To have impeded its front, and harrassed its rear in every possible route, was practicable with better dispositions; but in Coromandel, he was absorbed in the contemplation of his six thousand French, and on finding the defence of the ghauts frustrated by Lord Cornwallis's able movement to the north, he was next absorbed by the care of his harem; which, as we have seen, had been lodged in Bangalore soon after his return from Canara in 1784. An escort of five hundred men, with a subordinate agent, would have accomplished the removal of the women and valuables with equal efficacy, but he chose, personally and at the head of his army, to superintend these arrangements, instead of meeting and harrassing Lord Cornwallis, as after all previous procrastination he still might have done, on the day of his entering the territory of Mysoor. On this day's march his cavalry attempted, without the slightest success, to

break through the excellent disposition of the columns, for the protection of the immense mass of stores and grain provided for the siege, added to the ordinary camp equipage and baggage, and Lord Cornwallis reached his ground, scarcely deigning to notice their presence.

The encampment rested its left on a broken range of rising grounds, running at right angles with its general direction: beyond that rising ground, and close at its foot, was a swampy but not impassable hollow, and these features extended several miles in the front and rear of the left: the Sultaun's army was reported to be distinctly visible from the height, distant about five miles beyond the hollow, and some time after the camp was pitched, movements were reported, which induced Lord Cornwallis to go out with the cavalry, supported by a body of infantry, to reconnoitre, and he remained out till after dusk; the Sultaun's sole intention was to harrass, and this object, as related to the cavalry, was somewhat inconveniently effected, as we shall have occasion to observe. The same purpose was evinced on the ensuing night, and continued throughout the siege, by adopting a mode resembling that described in the Mahratta campaign of 1786-7. Rocket men crept in silence, to positions within range of the line of encampment, and discharging their missiles, suddenly eluded pursuit, and after an interval, returned to other points; the practice was suited only to the annoyance of an irregular encampment, and after the first attempt, excited little notice in the English army, except when the rockets fell in the cavalry lines, or near the artillery stores.

On the ensuing morning the Sultaun made a demonstration in force which was distinctly penetrated by the English General. Lord Cornwallis drew up in order of battle on the heights fronting the enemy, the portion of his army which was destined to form the rear of his principal column of march,

and veiling his real intention under this demonstration, by a simple and able movement, his columns of troops, heavy ordnance and baggage, favoured by the nature of the ground glided in the rear of this formation, and had made considerable progress towards Bangalore before Tippoo was aware of the deception. The line on the heights, after offering battle for some time, broke into column, soon after the last corps of the column of march had passed its right, and moved on in a parallel direction covering the rear according to the movements of the enemy. A distant cannonade on the rear, (instead of a vigorous attack on the baggage as had been intended by the Sultaun,) terminated the business of the day in that quarter; the efforts of the horse on the front and opposite flank were equally unsuccessful : not one shot was returned by the English, and the army took up its ground

Mar. 5. before Bangalore, late in the day, without the loss of any portion of its stores, and only five casualties, after a simple and masterly movement which fixed the confidence of the army.

During the ineffective cannonade which has been mentioned, and while Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by General Medows and their respective staff, was viewing from a gentle eminence the movements of the Sultaun, three horsemen were seen to approach rather closer than usual ; but as these troops are remarkable for their skill and boldness, in examining an enemy's movements, and are usually scattered over the country in all directions, they excited no attention, till they were seen to dash at speed for the person of Lord Cornwallis. Two were killed, and the third, who was secured and spared, appeared stupified, and could give no intelligible account of the enterprise : conjecture was divided between assigning to them the character of ferocious drunkards, or hired assassins. The fact as related in the Mysorean army, appears to be, that on the preceding evening one of them had upbraided the other two with cowardice in

the business of the day ; after some discussion, they retorted that on the next they would go where he durst not follow, it was agreed that their valour should be put to this issue : each prepared himself with an intoxicating dose of bang,* and the quarrel ended in the frantic attempt which has been noticed.

On the ensuing day Lord Cornwallis moved his Mar. 6. encampment to stronger ground, a large portion of the cavalry was employed in the morning, in covering the reconnoissance of the engineers, to the north-east, and at three in the afternoon, the whole cavalry under Colonel Floyd, with the brigade of infantry, attached to the same command, moved for a similar purpose to the south-west. The object was satisfactorily accomplished, and the troops were preparing to return, when a body of less than a thousand horse appeared. Tippoo had on this day made a circuitous march, concealed by the undulatory face of the country, to a position west of Bangalore, his own tent being pitched upon the esplanade of the fort, and his line of encampment marked out at a greater distance to the south-west. He had just alighted : a large part of the army had already taken up their ground, when reports were brought of the approach of the English cavalry, in a direction to intersect the column of march ; and the command of Balajee Row, the only part of the cavalry that was not already out foraging, was ordered to check their approach. Colonel Floyd moved at this body with the 19th, supported on his right by a native regiment, and followed by the whole cavalry in columns of regiments ; the infantry had been left at a low ground, a continuation of the same swampy hollow mentioned in the operations of the 4th and 5th, with orders to wait at that spot the return of the cavalry.

The retreat and pursuit of the horse discovered the rear of the enemy's infantry and guns with large masses of baggage on elephants and camels, and

* The leaf of the Cannabis Sativa.

although the orders specially prohibited any enterprise, the temptation was irresistible; in a short period the guns, deserted by their infantry, were passed: the ground became strong and irregular, full of ravines, and rocky hills, the regiment on the right had charged and dislodged a body of infantry, which retired to one of these as deemed inaccessible to cavalry: some other charges were also made on the left, with similar success, and Colonel Floyd, at the head of the 19th, was advancing to dislodge the largest body of the enemy on an eminence, when a musket ball entered his cheek and passed through both jaws; he fell as if struck by a cannon shot, his second in command was on the extreme left, orders could not be immediately received, and a retreat commenced; the native regiment on the right, continuing uninformed of that movement, and actively engaged in advance and on the right. In the meanwhile Colonel Floyd who had been left on the field, supposed to be killed, was remounted by the care of his orderly dragoons, and a troop of the regiment being sent back to escort him, he rejoined it retreating at half speed. At this moment, Brigade Major Dallas who had been with the regiment now left unsupported, perceiving what occurred, came up from the rear to represent the necessity of halting; this was accordingly ordered by Colonel Floyd, who wheeled the 19th towards the enemy; which movement together with the efforts of the skirmishers of the columns of regiments checked the enemy for an instant, but the disorder had become too general to be easily retrieved; the fugitives of the enemy's infantry and rocket men rallied on the different heights; the works of the fort, and the recovered guns, opened a cross fire, the English cavalry retreated precipitately from eminence to eminence across ravines, and the confusion was extreme; when they perceived the brigade of infantry, left under Major Gowdie at the swamp, advanced, with its guns in a position on an eminence, which commanded the

only access for retreat or pursuit, and enabled the cavalry to rally in its rear, when he opened a fire which soon cleared the field.

The latter part of these transactions was distinctly visible from the encampment, and Lord Cornwallis was quickly in motion with a division of the army; he proceeded as far as the swamp from which Major Gowdie had advanced without orders, when he met, considerably after dark, the cavalry now formed, followed by the infantry and guns, and the whole returning in perfect order to camp; the casualties in men were not numerous, amounting only to seventy-one, but two hundred and seventy-one horses in the opening of a campaign, was a loss the more serious in the small body attached to the English army, because it was irretrievable; the reader will perceive that this cavalry had been almost constantly mounted for the last three days, and those acquainted with the details of feeding in the south of India, will be aware that the greater portion had within the same period received, some one, and few, indeed, more than two regular feeds. It will therefore excite no surprise, that under the circumstances described, the horses had not strength to clear the ravines, and still less, that the greater portion of those who escaped, were rendered nearly useless for the remainder of the campaign. Men of sound military judgment have questioned the claim of Lord Cornwallis to the praise of understanding the practical use of this arm; but whatever may be the general grounds of such an opinion, a misfortune produced by the disobedience of his orders, is not liberal evidence in its support. Of that disobedience also, the judgment might have been different if Colonel Floyd had not fallen at a critical moment; if the infantry had been ordered up, and if ten guns had been brought in as trophies. Major Gowdie, who was guilty of as distinct a disobedience of orders, received and deserved nothing but praise. Although the affair terminated favour-

ably for the Sultaun, he did not think proper to continue on the ground now known to the enemy. His greatest apprehension was a night attack on his camp, which throughout the siege, was never two successive nights on the same ground. On this night he moved six miles farther west to Kingeri,¹ leaving the garrison of 8,000 men, appointed for the defence of the fort, under the new kelledar * Behauder Khan, and for the petta, 2,000 regular infantry, and 5,000 peons.

The complete examination which had been effected of every part of the fortress to be attacked, determined Lord Cornwallis to commence the siege from the north-east, where he was already encamped. The fort of Bangalore, entirely rebuilt with strong masonry by Hyder and Tippoo, is nearly of an oval form, with round towers at proper intervals and five powerful cavaliers: a faussebray, a good ditch and covered way without palisades, and some well finished places of arms, but the glacis imperfect in several places: no part was entirely destitute of the support of reciprocal fire, but in no part was there a perfect flanking defence. There were two gateways, one named the Mysoor, the other the Delhi gate; the latter, opposite the petta, overbuilt with the projection of traverses common to Indian forts: the petta or town, of great extent to the north of the fort, was surrounded by an indifferent rampart and excellent ditch, with an intermediate berm, if such it may be called, of near one hundred yards wide, planted with impenetrable and well grown thorns; and this defence was only intermitted exactly opposite the fort, where there was a slight barrier, and an esplanade of insufficient

¹ *Kingeri*.—Kengeri, a village in the Bangalore Taluk, nine miles south-west of Bangalore, on the Bangalore-Mysore Railway. It was destroyed by Tippu to prevent its giving shelter to the army of Lord Cornwallis.

* Seyed Peer, the former kelledar, had expressed doubts regarding the ultimate result of the siege, and was removed.

extent: the petta had several gates, protected by a sort of flèche at the end of each sortie outside the ditch. Neither the fort or petta had draw bridges.

The part of the fort opposite the town was certainly not in itself the weakest; but the possession of the town, besides the hope of supplies, would furnish also some security in carrying on the operations of the siege. A disposition was accordingly made for attacking one of the gates with a regiment of Europeans, and one of native infantry, supported by an equal reserve, under Colonel Cockerel, with the usual field artillery and six battering guns under Colonel Moorehouse; for every thing within the ditch was rendered invisible by the thorny defence, and the nature of the point to be attacked was imperfectly understood. The flèche was carried at the point of the bayonet; the winding way, crossing the ditch, and over the planted berm, was scarcely of sufficient breadth for the column of half companies. The application of a field piece was expected to force the gate, but it was built behind with masonry. Iron eighteen-pounders, prepared for the purpose, were then brought up; and during a very considerable period of resistance, the turrets of the gateway, lined with musquetry and rockets, poured a destructive fire on the column of troops. Two ladders would probably have saved many lives, but there was not one in camp; and after a long delay in making a practicable opening * in the gate. Mar.

* General Medows, whose presence on such occasions, always dispelled gloom, watched with anxiety for a sufficient opening; the fragments of the gate were torn open after each discharge, until a small man, (Lieutenant Ayre, of the 36th,) made his way through. "Well done," said the General, "now whiskers, try if you can follow and support the little gentleman;" addressing the grenadiers of the same regiment; a winding sally-port was found from within, by the first who entered; a respect for the 18-pounders kept clear the direct line of the gate; but neither pikemen nor any other troops had been placed on the flanks of the terreplein to provide against a passage being forced.

which the troops bore with the greatest steadiness and patience, the place was at length carried: but its great extent, and the difficulty of acquiring sufficient knowledge of all the localities, protracted the occupation of the whole.

The Sultaun astonished and indignant at this event, moved from Kingeri with his whole force, for the recovery of the petta; a long but thin column with numerous guns, moved in sight of the English army, in a direction to turn its right, the cavalry made a concealed detour, to a position where it was well placed to take advantage of any forward movement: but the main strength of the infantry under Kummer-u-Deen, moved by a route concealed from view into the petta, with positive orders to recover its possession at all risks; Tippoo himself being on the western glaxis to inspect and animate their exertions.

Lord Cornwallis was not deceived by the demonstrations which he saw, but distinctly anticipating what he did not see, strongly reinforced the petta, and changed his disposition on the right: a distant cannonade was not returned, but in the meanwhile efforts for the recovery of the petta were made on a great scale, and for some time with considerable spirit. So long as the English troops continued to fire, the Sultaun's were not inferior*; but this mode was soon abandoned, by the Europeans for the never-failing bayonet. In a contest for the possession of streets and roads, this mode could neither be evaded nor withstood, and after a prolonged contest, in which the Mysoreans were successively driven from every

* It may, perhaps, be stated, without exaggeration, that the fire was superior, the musquet balls were cast in molds intersected by two divisions, at right angles with each other, and the shank was left, by which the bullet was fastened to the cartridge; the bullet accordingly separated into five parts, or if very close, a large spreading wound was inflicted; in either case the wounds were difficult of cure, but particularly in the latter.

quarter of the town in which they took post, and even pursued across a part of the esplanade, with a loss in killed and wounded of upwards of two thousand men, they ultimately evacuated the petta.

The casualties of the English on this day amounted to 131, but no loss made so deep an impression as that of Lieutenant-Colonel Moorehouse, who was killed at the gate.* He had risen from the ranks, but nature herself had made him a gentleman; uneducated, he had made himself a man of science: a career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect; and his amiable character universal attachment: the regret of his General, and the respect of his Government were testified by a monument erected at the public expence in the church at Madras.

A hasty attempt had been made with partial success to burn the magazines of forage collected in the petta; the quantity saved prevented the total ruin of the cavalry and cattle, who afterwards prolonged a feeble existence on the sooty thatch of the poorer houses. The most valuable property had been

* He received two wounds, but did not discontinue his animating exertions, till two other musquet balls in the breast terminated his existence.

[In 1780, Lieutenant Moorehouse obtained sanction, when he was Commissary of Stores, to raise two companies of pioneers to replace the "*Momaty men*" (men who carried the "*momaty*" or digging implement used by all the labourers in S. India). In 1787, he was appointed one of the committee for the "institution for the relief of orphans and other distressed male children of the military." In 1791, March 22, the Government resolved "as a Testimony of Respect to the memory of an officer who has served the Company many years with distinguished zeal, spirit and ability, that his Remains, with Permission of the Ministers and church wardens, be publicly interred in the Church of Fort St. George at the Company's Expense and a Marble Tablet fixed over his grave with a suitable Inscription in commemoration of his merits." (*Madras Courier*, 23rd March 1791). His body was placed close to the spot where Sir Eyre Coote was buried. He was a free-mason, and the Grand Lodge of Madras attended the funeral with the Acting Governor, Sir Charles Oakeley. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*. Vol. III, pp. 173, 403.)]

removed on the approach of the English army; but bales of cotton and cloth in every direction indicated a great manufacturing town; and the private hoards of grain of the opulent merchants and inhabitants, could alone have prolonged the existence of the public followers till the termination of the siege.

With the exception of the lamentable error of the engineers in erecting the first battery without previously ascertaining its exact distance, and the loss of inestimable time in discovering its fire to be inefficient, the mere operations of the siege, skilful and highly honourable in all its subsequent progress, present no events within the scope of our general plan. Few sieges have ever been conducted under parallel circumstances: a place not only not invested, but regularly relieved by fresh troops; a besieging army not only not undisturbed by field operations, but incessantly threatened by the whole of the enemy's force. No day or night elapsed without some new project for frustrating the operations of the siege; and during its continuance, the whole of the besieging army was accoutred, and the cavalry saddled, every night from sun-set to sun-rise. Among the most serious of these projects, was an unexpected cannonade, within good range, from guns brought to their positions during a thick fog, on the rear of the park of artillery, containing all the ammunition for the siege: happily the steadiness of the artillery-men, and the ready aid of the next corps, enabled them to remove the whole behind the crest of a hill, without

Mar. 20. a single explosion. By the 20th the Sultaun perceived distinct indications of an early assault, and in the morning of the 21st, drew up his army on the heights to the south-west, to protect an advanced body with heavy guns, who had, on the preceding day, been observed opening embrasures in an old embankment, which, resting its left on an unfinished part of the south glacis, extended in a direction, and at a proper distance, to enflade and destroy the whole of

the trenches and open sap, now advanced near the crest of the glacis, and no longer covered by the works of the petta.

On perceiving these preparations, on the clearing up of a fog, about eight o'clock, Lord Cornwallis Mar. instantly struck his camp, and commenced a very imposing demonstration of serious attack on the enemy's right: the guns, nearly prepared to open from the embankment, were soon perceived to be in motion to support the position on the heights, which the Sultaun determined to defend, and Lord Cornwallis had not the slightest intention to attack, unless compelled to it by a resumption of the serious danger which threatened his approaches: the guns did return late in the evening to resume these preparations, and the crisis arising from this and other causes determined Lord Cornwallis to give the assault on the same night, under circumstances not sanctioned by ordinary practice.

The intention was concealed from his own army, until the last moment, but it was confidentially made known at an early hour to the senior artillery officer on duty, who accumulated every possible means to perfect the breach, and take off the defences of all works which commanded it: the breach intended for the assault was made in the curtain, to the left of the projecting works of the gateway and part of the adjoining tower. The ditch, according to rule, was still to be filled, but a narrow causeway along the bottom of these projecting works, used as a communication by the troops employed in the faussebray had been observed and was trusted to. This however was eventually found to be cut across, but the assailants were provided with ladders of every dimension, and the duties allotted to the several flank companies and corps, were so judiciously arranged as to prevent the possibility of confusion. It was bright moonlight—eleven was the hour appointed, and a whisper along the ranks was the signal appointed for

advancing in profound silence : the ladders were nearly planted, not only to ascend the *faussebray*, but the projecting work on the right, before the garrison took the alarm, and just as the serious struggle commenced on the breach, a narrow and circuitous way along a thin shattered wall, had led a few men to the rampart, on the left flank of its defenders, where they coolly halted to accumulate their numbers, till sufficient to charge with the bayonet. The gallantry of the kelledar who was in an instant at his post, protracted the obstinacy of resistance until he fell ; but the energy of the assailants in front and flank at length prevailed. Once established on the ramparts, the flank companies proceeded as told off, by alternate companies to the right and left, where the resistance was every where respectable, until they met over the Mysoor gate : separate columns then descended into the body of the place ; and at the expiration of an hour, all opposition had ceased.

On ascending the breach, a heavy column was observed on the left, advancing from the embankment described, to attack the assailants in flank and rear ; but this also had been foreseen and provided for, and they were repulsed with great slaughter, by the troops reserved for that special purpose ; a similar column lodged in the covered-way on the right, had been dispersed at the commencement of the assault, by a body appointed to scour it, and draw off the enemy's attention from the breach ; and at the moment the flank companies had met over the Mysoor gate, another column was perceived advancing along the sortie, to enter and reinforce the garrison ; but a few shot from the guns on the ramparts, announced that the place had changed masters. The carnage had been severe, but unavoidable, particularly in the pressure of the fugitives at the Mysoor gate, which at length was completely choked : upwards of one thousand bodies were buried, but the number of the wounded was not ascertained : the mere casualties of

the English army in the whole siege, did not amount to five hundred¹; but the other consequences of the service, had prepared subjects for a crowded hospital.

With whatever care Lord Cornwallis concealed his intentions, it is certain that they were distinctly known to the Sultaun, who warned the garrison that they were to expect the assault on that night; and with a similar intimation appointed two heavy corps to fall upon both flanks of the assailants. His camp was at a place named Jignee,² about six miles to the south-west, and at night-fall he moved his whole army within a mile and a half of the Mysoor gate, to support the place and avail himself of circumstances. The first circumstance on which he had to exercise his judgment, was the intelligence brought by crowds of fugitives that the place was actually carried: the column which approached the Mysoor gate had been sent to ascertain the fact, and attempt what should be practicable; but on their return in dismay, he remained in silence and stupor on the same spot until the dawn; when he returned to camp, and had leisure to reflect on the causes of this unexpected disaster. He had on every successive day of the siege drawn up an army of very superior numbers to the whole of the besiegers, sometimes in their view, and at others in concealed positions, with the intention, on each successive day, of serious attack; he had as often returned without attempting any thing

¹ The casualties reported from the 8th March to the 21st inclusive were—

	Killed	Wounded	Total
European troops (officers included)	30	86	116
Bengal native troops ...	9	34	43
Madras ...	32	35	67
Total ...	71	155	226

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 206, note.)

² *Jignee*.—Jigani, a village 12 miles south of Bangalore on the road to Anekal.

of importance, on finding every plan foiled, exactly because none of his plans extended to closing in earnest with the enemy; and finally a storming party inferior in numbers to one-fourth of the ordinary garrison had surmounted obstacles deemed impassable, and carried the place in the presence and in spite of the efforts of his whole army fully apprized of the intended enterprise.

If the event were fatal to the Sultaun's hopes, it was of importance no less vital to the prospects of Lord Cornwallis. The forage and grain found in the petta had long been consumed, the neighbouring villages had all been effectually destroyed, and the resource of digging for the roots of grass within the limits of the piquets, had been so exhausted, that scarcely a fibre remained. The draught and carriage cattle were daily dying by hundreds at their piquets; and those intended for food scarcely furnished the unwholesome means of satisfying hunger. Grain, and every other necessary, including ammunition, were at the lowest ebb; and the most favourable result of raising the siege, under such circumstances, would have been the loss of the whole battering train, a retreat upon the depôts of Coromandel pressed by all the energy with which such an event could have inspired the Sultaun's army; and the resumption of offensive operations under such circumstances, balanced even by the advantages enumerated at the close of the campaign of 1790, might well be deemed a more serious undertaking than the actual commencement of a new war, with unbroken resources, whether the alternative be considered as a political or a military question. Past experience had not accumulated sufficient information for the complete guidance of Lord Cornwallis in the arduous enterprise with which he opened the war; and even with more perfect information, it is more easy to shew the existence than the remedy of defective means. But the siege having actually advanced to the point

which has been described, it is indisputable that the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war, was necessarily cast upon a single chance, and that chance was successful.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

March from Bangalore northwards—Hostile armies unexpectedly cross diagonally each other's route—Tippoo retires—Lord Cornwallis's object in this movement—A junction with the corps of horse provided by Nizam Ali—Cruel fate of the garrison of Little Balipoor—Junction with Nizam Ali's horse—Sketch of their appearance—and conduct—Character of its commanders—Lord Cornwallis's motives for hastening the attack on Seringapatam—Unusual means of equipment—Influence of the capture of Bangalore on the allies—on Tippoo—Evidence in the latter case—Letter from his mother to the wife of Nizam Ali—Paintings at Seringapatam—Horrible butchery of prisoners—Intercepted letter—Execution of the minister Kishen Row—Lord Cornwallis marches for the capital—Disappearance of the population—Increasing difficulties—Tippoo determines to risk a general action—Battle of the 15th of May—Move to Caniambaddy—Destruction of the battering train—Perilous detachment across the river—Return of General Abercromby to the coast—His loss—Departure of Lord Cornwallis before he knew of his safety—Dreadful state of the army—Unexpected appearance of the Mahratta army on the first march—Description of a Mahratta camp—mercantile police—bazar—trades—tanners—Rejoicings at Seringapatam—United armies move slowly to the north-east—Holooordroog—Incident descriptive of Mahratta Character—Move towards Bangalore—Plan of intermediate operations—English loan to the Mahrattas.

AFTER this important capture, the most urgent want was that of forage for the preservation of the surviving cattle; but Lord Cornwallis could not quit the vicinity until such temporary repairs had been made at the breaches, as should place the fortress beyond the immediate risk of a coup-de-main. He moved, however, at day-light on the 22d, from Mar. 22. the exhausted and horribly offensive* encampment which he had occupied during the siege, to the west of the fort, near to the scene of operations on the 5th, where it was just possible to affirm, that some patches were not entirely destitute of grass. After effecting the repairs above stated, depositing the battering guns, and organizing an arsenal and artificers' yard to prepare for the siege of Seringapatam; he moved on the 28th, in a northern direction 28. on the route of Deonhully,¹ dispatching on the preceding night, a battalion, to prevent, if possible, the destruction of forage, in the village adjacent to the intended encampment. The Sultaun had moved on the same morning from the ground occupied by the English army on the 4th, in the direction of Great Balipoor;² the roads on which the hostile armies were marching, crossed each other diagonally. The battalion had been misguided to a village on the right of the intended route, and at day-break the officer commanding perceived the Sultaun's columns of march crossing his front; he had no alternative but to take post; and the Sultaun, conceiving that he

* The best police had been observed in burying the carcasses, but their numbers rendered all precautions ineffectual.

¹ *Deonhully*.—Devanahalli is 23 miles north of Bangalore. The town was taken in 1749 by Mysore from Chikkappa Gouda of Chik, Ballapur. Hyder distinguished himself at the siege and Tippu was born there. The site of Hyder's house is still pointed out. The fort was being re-built under Tippu and was not completed, when invested by the army under Lord Cornwallis. (Rice: *Mysore Gazetteer*.)

² *Great Balipoor*.—Dod-Ballapur lies about 11 miles due west of Devanahalli.

saw the English advanced-guard, quickened his pace to clear it. In the meanwhile, the real advanced-guard, pointing farther to the left, on ascending an eminence, saw the greater part of the Sultaun's army in nearly the same relative position, crossing diagonally at the distance of three miles, and also took post. On ascertaining these circumstances, Lord Cornwallis advanced with all possible expedition. The cattle, reduced to skeletons, were scarcely able to move their own weight; the soldiers, European and native, every where spontaneously seized the drag-ropes, and advanced the guns frequently at a run. The Sultaun personally covered his retreat with his horse. The English artillery successively dispersed them at every stand they attempted: the infantry continued the pursuit until the Sultaun was compelled to break into several columns, on different roads, to effect his retreat, losing only one brass nine-pounder and some ammunition; and the English army halted after a march of twenty miles, being double the distance it had been deemed possible to drag the cattle along, and pitched their camp in a situation surrounded with excellent dry forage.

This advantage continued as they advanced to the north, and the oxen recovered with the most surprising rapidity; the physical constitution of the animal prevented a similar improvement in the cavalry, and orders issued at this period for regulating the distribution of forage, were considered by that branch of the army, to have retarded the amendment of their condition. The Sultaun meanwhile collected his scattered columns near Great Balipoor on the same night after a march of twenty-six miles; but not considering his position about eleven miles from the English encampment, to be sufficiently distant, he resumed his march, after a few hours refreshment, towards Sevagunga,¹ in a north-west direction.

¹ *Sevaguuga*.—Sivaganga is a hill about 20 miles south-west

The object of Lord Cornwallis's movement was a junction with the corps of cavalry prepared by Nizam Ali, to serve with his army: in passing the forts of Deonhully and Little Balipoor, which surrendered without opposition, the poligars of the latter territory, resuming the military spirit which they had opposed to Hyder's earlier career, undertook the occupation of the place; a premature and unfortunate determination! for the actual garrison: the place was soon afterwards retaken by surprise and escalade, and the garrison, as rebels, suffered the horrible punishment of amputation of a leg and an arm each. Tippoo's activity against the English army was skilfully displayed in the dissemination of false intelligence: after a march of about seventy miles north, Lord Cornwallis remained stationary for five days; deceived by reports which induced him to abandon the hope of forming the junction, and to move south for the purpose of joining a convoy, advancing by the passes near Amboor; but on the evening of his first retrograde march, he received more correct information, which caused him to resume the northern route,¹ and the junction was formed on the second day afterwards, 13. when the united bodies moved in the direction of the convoy, which was itself escorted by a reinforcement of nearly four thousand men. Tippoo projected a great effort to strike at this convoy, but was foiled in his preparatory movements, by the superior skill of his opponent; and the united bodies moved to Bangalore.²

The short period of fifteen days' marching, without any serious occurrence, afforded to the English

(not north-west) of Dod-Ballapur. The hill rises 4,559 feet above the sea level. It is a sacred hill covered with sacred buildings.

¹ The junction with the Nizam's troops was effected at a village, Kottapalli, in the Anantapur District, Madras, 84 miles north of Bangalore.

² Cornwallis arrived at Bangalore on April 28, 1791.

army a sufficient opportunity for estimating the probable value of their new allies. They were rated at 15,000, and really amounted to ten thousand men, well mounted on horses in excellent condition; and to those who had never before had an opportunity of observing an Indian army, their first appearance was novel and interesting. It is probable that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe, contains any weapon or article of personal equipment which might not be traced in this motley crowd; the Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia,* sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, and matchlocks of every form, metallic helmets of every pattern, simple defences of the head, a steel bar descending diagonally as a protection to the face; defences of bars, scales or chain work descending behind or on the shoulders, cuirasses, suits of armour, or detached pieces for the arm, complete coats of mail in chain work, shields, bucklers, and quilted jackets, sabre proof. The ostentatious display of these antique novelties was equally curious in its kind. The free and equal use of two sword arms, the precise and perfect command of a balanced spear 18 feet long, of the club which was to shiver an iron helmet, of the arrow discharged in flight, but above all the total absence of every symptom of order, or obedience, or command, excepting groups collected round their respective flags; every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory; scampering among each other in wild confusion. The whole exhibition presented to the mind an imagery scarcely more allied to previous

* *Gurs*, intended to destroy the defensive armour of the head, a handle like that of a sword, joined to a bar, about two feet long, and surmounted at the end with a globular knob, not entirely solid, but indented by eight or ten deep hollows, leaving a corresponding number of strong angular projections, radiating from an axis in continuation of the bar.

impressions of reality, than the fictions of an eastern tale, or the picturesque disorder of a dramatic scene.

The impossibility of relying on such a body for the execution of any combined movement was sufficiently obvious; but the most moderate expectations looked to an enlargement of the limits of observation, the relief of the regular cavalry from the duties of the light troops, and an extended command over the resources of the country to be traversed: two thousand of the most select were attached to the reserve under Colonel Floyd, and placed under the immediate management of Brigade-Major Dallas, in the hope that his skill, and conciliation, and example, might render them efficient. These fifteen days were sufficient to shew the total disappointment of the most meagre hopes. The enemy practised upon them in every successive day some enterprise or stratagem, always successful. They soon shewed themselves unequal to the protection of their own foragers on ordinary occasions; and after the lapse of a few days from leaving Bangalore, they never stirred beyond the English piquets, consuming forage and grain, and augmenting distress of every kind, without the slightest return of even apparent utility: their prowess was indeed exhibited at an early period, in plundering the villages to which Lord Cornwallis had granted protection; but when it was understood that his Lordship disclaimed such proceedings, but could not controul them, the villagers undertook their own defence; and the march would produce exhibitions of attack and defence, in which the wishes of the army were uniformly adverse to their allies, and an English safeguard would frequently appear protecting their enemies against their friends. The contemptible state of this cavalry may, in some degree, have arisen from the effeminacy and decline which marked the general character of the government to which they belonged; but its more immediate causes were referred to a commander, (Tédjewunt

Sing, a Hindoo) of no respectability or military pretension, who was said to have risen to command by court intrigue; and was deemed better qualified to render his master a good commercial account of the profits of the subsidy, than a splendid report of military glory. His second in command, Assud Ali, and the ostensible military leader, had some reputation for that precarious valour which depends on interested motives, or animal excitement and depression; but, like his principal, was incapable of command, venal, rapacious, and unfaithful to his trust.

The critical situation of public affairs in Europe, consequent on the portentous events of the French Revolution, added to the powerful motives of local policy and public economy, produced on the mind of the Governor-General an anxiety to hasten the conclusion of the war, by attempting the siege of Seringapatam, at a period which, under other circumstances might be deemed precipitate. The department of carriage for provisions, camp equipage, ordnance and stores, the most embarrassing branch of a General's care, had suffered during the siege of Bangalore, in a degree which required supplies from some of the most distant provinces, through the medium of the public contractors. Individuals had in some degree replaced their losses in the northern movement. To throw the greater part of the camp equipage into Bangalore, was a matter of public regulation; but Lord Cornwallis farther called forth the spontaneous exertions of the officers of the army, in a mode equally honourable to both, by requesting every individual to apply whatever means of carriage he had in his power to command, for the carriage of shot to the place of destination: and exclusively of the greatest practicable sacrifice of the means of conveying personal supplies, which it was obvious would totally cease after advancing from Bangalore, many officers were enabled by their influence among

the natives, to hire, on their own account, carriages, which the proprietors would not consent to submit to the control of a public department. Followers of various kinds, chiefly the relations of sepoys, were also prevailed on to undertake, for remuneration, carriage proportioned to their means; even women and boys carrying each an 18 pound shot; and by these extraordinary expedients, the English General, with all his public departments in the most crippled state, was enabled to advance towards his object, with an equipment ample in every respect, excepting the reduced condition of his draught and carriage cattle.

The beneficial influence of the capture of Bangalore on the progress of the confederates, will hereafter be noticed. The agitation produced in the Sultaun's mind, and the guilty terrors by which he was haunted, will best be understood by a simple recital of his measures. After the easy success of an assault on Bangalore, which he had affected to consider as a mad and impracticable enterprise; his first impression was that of fear for the immediate fate of the capital, from a coup de main, without a regular siege; he accordingly dispatched two confidential officers, Kishen Row the treasurer, and Meer Sadik the dewan, to make immediate arrangements for the removal of the treasure, the harem, and the families of his officers, (the uniform pledge exacted by this dynasty) to Chittledroog. As a measure of military policy, if well timed, and judiciously executed, the question of its expediency would be suspended between the certain advantage of a protracted war, and the fatal impression to be produced on the minds of his troops and subjects, by overt demonstrations of despondency; and the latter consideration, strongly represented by his mother, whose opinions he habitually respected, induced him to countermand that branch of the orders. The demolition of the bridge over the northern bank of the Cavery, opposite

the western angle of the fort, was continued as a measure of prudence under all circumstances; and the leading features of his mean and merciless character, are marked with great precision by his other instructions. We have noticed, but have been restrained by decency from describing the terms of his offensive answers to the ladies of Nizam Ali's family at Adwāni; the impression of altered fortunes is strongly described in a letter which he caused his mother to address to the favourite wife of Nizam Ali, in which she supplicated compassion for an unfortunate Mússulman, her son, who in the pride and intoxication of youth, had given offence to her family, which he sincerely regretted; and the Mysoreans believe in the influence of this application over the measures of the worthless cavalry we have described.

The walls of the houses in the main streets of Seringapatam, had been ornamented by the Sultaun's command, with full length caricatures of the English. In one it was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another it was a horseman cutting off two English heads at a blow; in a third it was the nabob, Mahommed Ali, brought in with a rope round his waist, prostrating himself before an Englishman, seated on a chair, who placed one foot upon his neck; but the more favourite caricatures are necessarily excluded from decorous narrative. The anticipation must have been acute, which suggested the obliteration of all these favoured triumphs, and a positive order for carefully white-washing the whole of the walls.

The removal of these foolish indications of triumphant hostility and contempt, was perhaps a more conclusive testimony than any other of his considering the capture of the place highly probable; but conscience suggested more serious terrors, in the mass of living evidence at Seringapatam and elsewhere, of his detention of prisoners, in direct violation of the treaty of 1784. Of the English boys, educated

as singers and dancers* twenty still remained; a secret order was dispatched for the murder of these unhappy youths as the first victims, and an imperceptible succession of most of the other prisoners of the preceding war. It was difficult to obtain precise information regarding details in which no individual would acknowledge instrumentality, or even ascribe it to another: the bodies were carried out at the first opening of the gates, by the common scavengers, to places of distant sepulture, and the assassination was supposed to be perpetrated by Abyssinian slaves, by the well understood practice of a sudden and violent twist to dislocate the vertebræ of the neck. The orders to the outposts were executed according to local circumstances, and the English army had afterwards direct evidence even to exhumation, of murders so committed, on persons who carried with them the anxious sympathy of the inhabitants; the order was extended to native state prisoners; and the horrible butcheries of this period exemplified, in the most impressive manner, the natural connexion between cruelty and fear.

Although the admirable efficiency of the Mysorean cavalry in the interception of intelligence, had tended to mislead the English General in his northern route, his Lordship, attaching the highest importance to this branch of the service, had on the first day of his joining the army, given an unlimited command of means to the officer charged with the department of intelligence, who repaid the confidence, by obtaining the best possible information, at the most moderate expence.† One of his emissaries was unfortunately detected at this period, with a letter

* Their instruction, performance, and dress, was precisely that of an Hindostanee dancing girl.

† Captain William Macleod, who, in 1790, required but the same confidence to have commanded the same success. The whole charge, under Lord Cornwallis, amounted to the incredibly small expenditure of about 200*l.* a month.

in the Canarese language, concealed in his hollow bamboo or walking stick. The Sultaun, as we shall hereafter perceive, in reviewing the measures of his reign, had reasonable cause for distrusting all bramins, and such were all his secretaries for the languages of the south. A relation of his own (the brother-in-law of Seyed Saheb) who read the Canarese language, was entrusted with the examination of the letter, and the writer was seized; formerly a bramin, but forcibly circumcised, and now named Mahommed Abbas. The name of Sheshgere Row, brother of the treasurer Kishen Row, was implicated, and before he could be seized, he had heard of the accusation, and fled to his brother at Seringapatam; the treason seemed alarming and extensive, and Tippoo ordered the writer of the letter to be brought into his presence; Abbas perceived his death to be inevitable, and he resolved that it should be exemplary; he denied no part of his own imputed guilt, but boldly declared that no torture should compel him to implicate others. "And how long," said Tippoo, "have you been a traitor?" "From the period," replied he "that you began to circumcise bramins and destroy their temples." He was put to death, by being publicly dragged round the camp, at the foot of an elephant; but the treasurer, Kishen Row, with three brothers, including Sheshgere Row, were privately tortured and dispatched. With whatever mystery these affairs were conducted, the acknowledged execution of one of the most able and intelligent officers of the state, could not but excite very general observation, and one half of the community continues under the impression, that as the letter was never submitted to the inspection of a bramin, the imputed participation of Kishen Row in any act of treachery, was a calumny invented by Seyed Saheb, in revenge for retrenchments made some years before, in the accounts of Dindegul.*

* I could never get Póornea, his colleague, to give an opinion.

These executions took place before the departure of Lord Cornwallis from Bangalore.¹ The Sul-taun, joined by the division from Gooty of Kuttub-u-Deen, (which had some time before been defeated by Assud Ali, and, according to his gasconade, utterly destroyed,) took a strong position in the main road to Seringapatam, usually named the Cenapatam road, supported by the hill forts of Ramgerry and Sevengherry,² where he professed the intention of

He kept aloof from enquiry ; and of course from interposition, from the natural dread of consequences ; and professed to have had no opportunity of forming a judgment.

¹ Cornwallis left Bangalore on May 3, 1791. "Our success at Bangalore has tended to establish, in the general opinion of the natives, the superiority of the British arms ; and it has, in particular, made an impression on the minds of our allies, which I am persuaded will contribute to induce them to use vigorous exertions in prosecuting the war to an honourable conclusion. At present we can only look for the speedy accomplishment of that desirable object, by proceeding to attack the enemy's capital, which I clearly foresee, will, from the near approach of the season of the periodical rains and the danger of a scarcity of provisions and forage for the large bodies of troops that are to be employed, be attended with so many difficulties, that, upon any other occasion, I should have thought it advisable to have deferred the attempt to the end of the ensuing monsoon. Having however been informed of the critical situation of political affairs in Europe, and being sensible that the finances of the Company require the adoption of those measures that are the most likely to bring the contest to an early decision, I have thought it my duty to hazard the undertaking ; and having received the strongest assurances of exertions from the chiefs of the Nizam's cavalry that are now with me, and the Mahrattas having also promised an hearty co-operation against the common enemy, I am encouraged to entertain sanguine hopes that all obstacles will give way to our efforts, and that the enterprise will succeed." (Earl of Cornwallis to to, the Right Honourable W. W. Grenville, April 21, 1791. Forreast: *Selections from State Papers. Cornwallis*, Vol. I, pp. 81-82.)

² *Ramgerry and Sevengherry*.—Ramgiri and Sivangiri, two hill forts, the former on the left bank and the latter on the right bank of the Arkavati river, three miles north of Closepet and twenty-four miles south-west of Bangalore.

making a serious stand.—The English General had correct intelligence of the advantages of this position, and of the industry with which forage and grain had been destroyed on that route; and hoped to avoid some of those inconveniences, by adopting the more circuitous route of Caunkanhully¹ nearer the Cavery. It was only on his first march, however, that he benefited by this unexpected determination; from that period forward, not only was every march preceded by a wide conflagration, but every human being on the route was so completely removed beyond the reach of the English army, that they appeared to be traversing a country of which the population had been utterly destroyed by some recent convulsion of nature; and in deprecating the cruelty of such measures, we cannot refuse the tribute of extraordinary efficiency to the light troops, who could execute such orders with such precision. It was of great importance to the department of intelligence, that some inhabitants should be found, and twice in the course of this route, detachments were sent in the direction of the river, for food, forage, and information; in the two former, the success was unimportant, but they failed to descry a single human being: in fact they were all collected with their cattle and moveables on the island of Sheven Summooder,² the place afterwards so frequently visited by English travellers, on account of the magnificent falls of the Caveri.

The road was much intersected by rivulets and ravines, and the thunder storms in the evening, and by night, were accompanied by torrents of rain. The army marched as usual before day-light, and from

¹ *Caunkanhully*.—Kankanhalli is a town on the right bank of the Arkavati, seventeen miles south-east of Closepet, and about thirty-six miles south of Bangalore.

² *Sheven Summooder*.—Sivasamudram. “Though over the present boundary line of Mysore, this romantic spot is intimately associated with that country. It is on the south border of the

local circumstances always by the left; and some idea may be given of the slow progress of a long and heavy train, by stating that the officer commanding the right wing, who had the care of supporting the rear guard, never reached camp until after sun-set. The exhaustion of the cattle daily encreased, and the quantity daily augmented, of stores destroyed, because they could not be carried on, although a large and encreasing proportion was dragged by the troops, and the pressure of the enemy on the rear was rather active than powerful. In this state, the followers, already in the greatest distress for grain, the army reached Arikera, about nine miles east of Seringapatam on the 13th of May; the quantity of May 13. water in the river was already perceived to be discouraging to the prospect of any effective operation against the capital. One of those dams of masonry built across the river for the purposes of irrigation was near the encampment, the passage of the river below the dam was rocky and impracticable, and it was supposed that the rupture of the dam would lower the water and facilitate the passage of the river; but such was the solidity of the work, that the pioneers of the army contributed little to the intended effect, and the object was abandoned, in the expectation of finding a better ford at Caniambaddy, about eight miles above Seringapatam; for in every plan of operation against that capital, a communication was necessary with the army of Bombay under General Abercromby, who had ascended through the

Malavalli Taluk, connected with the railway and Bangalore-Seringapatam trunk road by a cross road from Maddur through Malavalli, 30 miles in length. The Kaveri here branches into two streams, each of which makes a descent of about 200 feet, in a succession of picturesque rapids and water-falls. The principal island embraced within these torrents, called Heggura, but more generally known by the name of Sivasamudram or Sivanasamudram (Sea of Siva),—the ancient city of which a few vestiges are strewed around—is about 8 miles long by $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile broad." (Rice: *Mysore Gazetteer*, Vol. II, p. 304.)

friendly territory of the raja of Coorg, and was already in possession of the fort of Periapatam, not forty miles distant from Seringapatam in a western direction.

The Sultaun had not yet, from the commencement of the war in 1790, thought proper to risk a general action with the English army, and he supported the practice by quoting the example of his father, who obtained no advantage by any one of his general actions, but uniformly profited by striking at detachments. It was argued by those whom he admitted to his confidence, that the present leader of the English army pursued a system of measures which afforded little hope of such an opportunity. The example of the capture of Bangalore rendered it inexpedient in every opinion to leave the capital without the army; and under these circumstances there was no hope of striking an effectual blow against General Abercromby, except by a general action with Lord Cornwallis, which should cripple the equipments of that officer, and compel him to return for provisions to Bangalore. The representations of his most faithful officers, and even the remonstrances of his women, deprecated the disreputable effects of allowing his capital to be insulted without an effort; and these united considerations determined him to try the chances of a general action.

On arriving at the ground of encampment near Arikera, Lord Cornwallis perceived a considerable body of the enemy occupying strong ground about six miles in his front, with their right to the river, and their left along a rugged and apparently inaccessible mountain. This was at first considered as a detachment, but certain intelligence was received, during the ensuing night, that although a part only of the Sultaun's army was visible, the whole was present: that his whole front, placed on a continuation of the same strong ground, was strengthened by batteries above, and a swampy ravine below; and as

the intermediate ground for the approach of the English army was narrowed by the river on their left, and a steep ridge of hills on their right, to a mile and a half at most, and in approaching the position to less than a mile; he was determined by these favourable circumstances to resist, on his present ground, the nearer approach of the English army to his capital. Lord Cornwallis ascertained, at the same time, that it was practicable to cross the ridge on his right, that after descending on the opposite side, and passing a continuation of the same swampy ravine which ran along the enemy's front, it was possible to ascend the tail of the same range of mountains which formed the Mysorean position, some miles to its left, where the range is crossed by the direct road from Cenapatam to the capital; and he resolved, on that information, to attempt by a night march, to turn the enemy's left flank, and by gaining his rear before day-light to cut off the retreat of the main body of his army to the fort and island of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given with the utmost secrecy, for six regiments of European, and twelve of native infantry, with their field-pieces, and the most effective of the corps of cavalry to march at eleven o'clock; Nizam Ali's horse to follow at day-light; and the intelligence was only communicated at the moment of moving, in order that the plan might not be foiled by treachery. The rest of the army with the camp guards and picquets as they stood, remained to protect the camp, provisions, stores, and heavy artillery under Colonel Duff. Before the appointed hour, one of those heavy storms peculiar to the season set in with more than its accustomed violence. The cattle, scared by the lightning, and shivering under the torrents of rain, could scarcely be made to move. In the contrasted and irregular succession of vivid light and impenetrable darkness, almost every corps lost its way, and

was moving in every variety of direction. Lord Cornwallis himself, with the best guides, was found to have advanced between four and five miles, accompanied by no more than one company and one gun : he, of course, halted ; and the staff officer who made the discovery, and was confident of being able to find the column, by retracing the marks of the gun wheels, with the aid of the lightning, soon found the tracks completely obliterated by the deluge of rain, and narrowly escaped riding into the enemy's encampment.

Nothing could be done before the dawn, farther than getting the corps into their proper situations ; the hope was extinguished of being able then to execute the original plan, or to resume it on the ensuing night, after the indication thus given of the intended movement. Lord Cornwallis therefore determined to persevere in endeavouring to force an action on ground which would probably be less advantageous to the enemy than that which he had chosen ; and the consequences of a complete victory might, as his Lordship hoped, relieve many of his distresses, and hasten the conclusion of the war. That the movement had been totally unexpected by the enemy, was evinced by their taking no alarm, until the English army began to descend the heights east of the ravine. Tippoo Sultaun did not decline the meeting, and the praise cannot in justice be denied to him on this occasion, of seeing his ground, and executing his movements with a degree of promptitude and judgment which would have been creditable to any officer. In the rear of his position was the high hill of Carigat,¹ crowned by a redoubt, and terminating abruptly at the Caveri ; his own position was a lower branch from the same ridge of hills ; and a more direct continuation of the Carigat hill

¹ *Carigat*.—Karighatta, the hill which rises to the north of the eastern end of the island of Seringapatam. It rises steeply to a height of 2,697 feet above sea level.

descending northwards, formed a strong rocky ridge between two and three miles to his left, at right angles with the line of the English column descending the eastern hill to cross the same ravine which ran along his front.

A considerable body of cavalry and infantry with eight guns was soon perceived in rapid march to seize this rocky ridge, which was equally the object of the English General, and Tippoo very promptly changed the front of the main body of his army to the left, and afterwards advanced over a series of small hollows and eminences, formed by the annual fall of the waters from the Carigat ridge into the great ravine before described. The detached body completely anticipated the English column in the occupation of the rocky ridge, and opened its first guns just as the first English corps had cleared the hollow and the ravine: between that ravine however and the ridge of rocks thus occupied by the enemy was, first a gradual ascent, and then more level ground broken by large rocks, forming an imperfect ridge, parallel to that occupied by the enemy at the distance of about five hundred yards, but not so elevated; and these broken rocks were used as a support to the subsequent formations. In front of the English column was now a strong position occupied by a powerful corps, and on the left the main body of the enemy's infantry and guns, having changed front, were preparing to advance in line. It was necessary to oppose corresponding arrangements, and a formation was ordered of two unequal fronts united to each other at one and the same right angle. When a considerable part of the column destined to oppose a front to the left had reached its position, and was in the act of wheeling into line; the detached body of select cavalry concealed by the ground until within charging distance, made a respectable but unsuccessful effort to break the line, many horsemen falling on the bayonets. They did

not desist on the first repulse, but hovered round, prepared to take advantage of the least disorder; the weak state of the gun bullocks, and the necessity of cautious movement, delayed the formation, and during that period some loss was sustained from the guns on the height opposite the ascending column, and from a well directed though distant fire from the cannon of the main body; each possessing an enfilade more or less perfect of the two lines of formation, if the English had not judiciously availed themselves of the cover afforded by the rocks and broken ground. The rocket, a weapon hitherto held almost in derision, because seen in small numbers it is easily avoided, performed perhaps on this day better service to the Sultaun than any other instrument, because his vicinity to the capital enabled him to discharge, at one and the same moment, flights too numerous to admit of being watched.

The formation of the English army being at length completed, the action commenced with the attack of the position on the rocky ridge, by the smaller of the two fronts, consisting of five battalions under Colonel Maxwell: the instant this was perceived, the eight guns were as usual drawn off, the infantry continuing a good countenance, and a heavy ill-directed fire of musquetry: but Colonel Maxwell, being unincumbered with guns, and having made a disposition for covering both flanks against cavalry, moved with such rapidity, that he not only quickly broke the infantry, but overtook some of the guns in the opposite descent of the hill; the infantry made a creditable struggle to carry them off, but were ultimately obliged to abandon three. The success of this attack was the signal for the advance of the remainder in two lines, against the main body of the enemy; and the action became general along that front. After passing the first of the undulating hollows which have been mentioned, and ascending the next height, the fire of Tippoo's artillery began to

relax, but the infantry maintained a respectable countenance, covering the retreat of their cannon according to the uniform practice of the dynasty of Hyder, which never risked guns against the English, to perform their best service with grape. No opportunity had been afforded on this day, of making any effective use of the English artillery, and the first line was only enabled to advance by leaving its guns to the protection of the second, and on their near approach the enemy's infantry began to waver and retreat, making however a stand at each succeeding height.

Colonel Maxwell, who had been ordered, after carrying his first point, to look at once to the security of the right of the advancing line, and to turning the enemy's left, was rapidly succeeding in the latter object, and the Mysorean infantry retired with a more rapid step. At this moment the English cavalry under Colonel Floyd, who had been ordered to keep out of the enemy's range of shot, on the descent of the rising ground beyond the ravine followed by the allied cavalry, and ready to take advantage of any opportunity that might occur, charged the rear guard of the enemy's retreating infantry, which made a determined resistance, and nearly destroyed them. It was like a theatrical exhibition to the first line on ascending one of the swelling eminences described, to see their own cavalry unexpectedly charging the enemy across their front in the hollow below; the operation was executed by the men with perfect gallantry, but it was painful to observe that the exhausted horses were absolutely incapable of striking into a gallop; pursuing the object, they were checked by a heavy body of infantry which had rallied and made a stand, in a strong position of broken rocky ground. Colonel Floyd very properly drew off to leave this position to be forced by the infantry; but Nizam Ali's cavalry who had followed him across the ravine, had now thrown themselves in an unwieldy

mass in front of the left wing, and could for some time neither be brought to advance nor recede to the left; the whole line was thus prevented from advancing, and an opportunity was afforded for the escape of the guns and infantry, a large portion of which, must otherwise have been inevitably captured or destroyed. It is asserted by many officers in the Mysorean army, that this impediment was designed, that a horseman with a particular badge, from Assud Ali, was seen at this moment to deliver a message to Tippoo, who was in the rear, anxiously urging the escape of his guns, of which many had been actually abandoned, but were recovered during this delay, and one only fell into the hands of the English in this branch of the attack; and that another messenger attended Tippoo on the same night. The author has since perused the active and treacherous correspondence with the enemy in this campaign, not only of Assud Ali, a person notoriously worthless, but of other officers of fairer fame in the same service, whose names it might be injurious to the English interests in India, to disclose at the present period.

On getting clear of this allied cavalry, the new position of the Mysoreans was quickly forced, and the pursuit was continued, until the works on the island covered the fugitives: the English army lay on their arms, nearly on the ground in which the action terminated, and after the arrival of the tents in the course of the night, encamped just beyond the range of the cannon on the island. The casualties of the English army on this day, did not exceed five hundred men;¹ the Mysorean loss was uncertain, but

	Killed	Wounded	Total
¹ European troops including officers	27	102	129
Bengal native troops	34	136	170
Madras native troops	20	101	121
Total	81	339	420

is estimated by themselves at three or four times that amount.

As a mere evidence of superiority, the victory was complete, and had there been no movement of the cavalry, would have probably been very decisive. But the observation of Sir Eyre Coote on a parallel occasion, was applied by an old officer to the present, "I would gladly exchange all these trophies, and the reputation of victory, for a few days' rice." The distress was already considerable, and would be felt with a daily-augmented pressure, in every successive day that the army should remain in a country so effectually desolated ; and the admirable efficiency of the Sultaun's light troops, had prevented all communication of General Abercromby's situation, on which Lord Cornwallis's determinations would very materially depend. From the redoubt on the summit of the Carigat hill which terminated the action on the right, a bird's-eye view was obtained of the greater part of the island of Seringapatam, and the eastern face of the fortress. Two successive marches by a circuit of twenty miles to Caniambaddy,¹ gave the means of observing the northern face and western extremity. During the latter part of the march from Bangalore, many of the heavy guns, as well as the field pieces attached to corps, and in these two marches all the battering train, and almost every public cart in the army were dragged by the troops, and the reflection was not pleasant of exhibiting to

Horses.—		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
19th Dragoons	...	13	11	...	24
Bengal Body Guard	6	6
Madras Cavalry	...	5	10	9	24
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	...	18	21	15	54

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 208.)

¹ *Caniambaddy*.—Kannambadi, a village on the northern bank of the Cauvery river, twelve miles above the Karigat hill at Seringapatam.

the enemy, during two tedious successive marches, with an intermediate resting day, evidence so conclusive of the utter failure of all the equipments of the English army.

- May 20. It appears, however, that it was not until after receiving the official reports of the morning succeeding the last march to Caniambaddy, that Lord Cornwallis saw the impossibility of moving the heavy guns and stores from the spot where they then were, felt the conviction that the accompaniment of this cumbrous impediment at such a season, was from the first a false measure, and saw the necessity of relinquishing entirely the plan of the campaign, in which General Abercromby had been instructed to co-operate. The first orders for his return to Malabar,
21. were accordingly written on the 21st of May, and on the same day considerable bodies of troops were observed, moving towards him from Seringapatam.
 22. On the 22d, the destruction took place of the whole of the battering train and heavy equipments, and for the purpose of obviating unfounded impressions, a general order was issued, explaining to every soldier, European and native, the true motives of this measure, dressed in as cheering a garb as circumstances would admit. Still there was no intelligence from General Abercromby, nor of the hostile troops whose march had been observed on the 21st, and on
 24. the 24th, his Lordship's anxiety became so great, that he risked the diversion in his favour, of passing three brigades under Colonel Stuart across the river, merely to attract the enemy's attention, but not to move to any distance from the river; a perilous measure

¹ "Such in the mind of Lord Cornwallis was the state of the faculties on which foresight depends, that after he had brought the army to the extreme point of its line of operations on the day after his arrival at Caniambaddy when the official reports of the morning were presented to him and not before, did he discover that all this misery, all the loss of lives, and all this enormous expence, were to no purpose." (*Mill: History of British India*, Vol. V, pp. 273-74.)

which, in the event of its filling, would have placed those troops in a situation truly critical. They returned on the third day without intelligence. It was afterwards ascertained that the orders for the immediate return to the coast, of the army of Bombay had been entirely unexpected, but were carried into immediate execution. Misconceptions regarding the direction of the march, caused the capture of a large portion of the baggage, and an unhappy error in the medical department, the sacrifice of an officer and seventeen sick in the hospital. Four iron 18-pounders, imperfectly destroyed, were left at Periapatam, but the army, burying the remainder of its battering train at the summit of the pass, reached the coast without any farther casualties from the enemy, but with the destruction of nearly the whole of the cattle from the severity of the season, and a corresponding influence on the health of the troops.

Before receiving any authentic account of General Abercromby's march, Lord Cornwallis experienced the necessity of moving from Caniambaddy. All that had occurred of mortality among the cattle during the siege of Bangalore, fell far short of the horrible scene and pestilential air of this disgusting ground. Among the variety of untried expedients for conveying stores and provisions on leaving Bangalore, that of issuing to the native troops three times the quantity of grain they usually carried, was the least likely to succeed: the experiment was made, in the hope that means would be found by individuals, among their followers and friends, of conveying the surplus quantity of an article on which depended their future subsistence; but the temptations of hunger were paramount to all obligations, and many sepoys were actually without food before half the calculated period had elapsed. The ration of rice to the fighting men had now for some time been necessarily reduced one half; the appearance of the sepoys, of whom a large portion live exclusively on vegetable food, indicated a gradual

but very perceptible wasting and prostration of strength ; many followers had actually died of hunger, and more were verging in various degrees to the same extremity ; the animal food would, under any other circumstances, have been rejected with disgust ; some groves of cocoa-nut and areca which had been felled for the substance resembling cabbage found at their summit, had furnished to Europeans a pleasant but most indigestible resource. A bleak wind and continued drizzling rain had more than its usual influence on constitutions shaken by other causes, and greatly augmented the sufferings of the troops, and particularly of the division which had been without any cover to the south of the river, not one of whom escaped the consequent effects, and one young regiment, on its return to camp, was reported incapable of furnishing the camp guards.

In a condition thus imperfectly sketched, the
 May 26. army on the 26th commenced its march for Bangalore, by a route to the northward of either of those already mentioned. Every practicable exertion and contrivance was adopted for the conveyance of the sick, and among the most efficient, a regiment of native cavalry paraded in front of each regiment of European infantry that had suffered most, and the dismounted native dragoon led and supported his drooping comrade, as the only possible mode of moving without the abandonment of the sick. When scarcely half of a short march had been accomplished, a body of about two thousand horse, evidently increasing in numbers, made their appearance on the left of the principal column of march near its rear, on the very ground, as was afterwards ascertained, that bounded the field of Chercooli;¹ and although the enemy's army was known to be in the opposite direction, little doubt was entertained from the point at which

¹ *Chercooli*.—Chinkurall, seven miles north of Kannambadi where Hyder had been defeated by the Mahrattas on the 5th March 1771.

this body made its appearance, of an immediate attempt on the stores and baggage moving on that flank. Prompt dispositions to frustrate the attack were ordered by Colonel Stuart, who commanded in the rear: and they were not completed, when one of his staff, employed on the left rank, in giving directions regarding the skirmishers, was addressed in a loud voice by one of the horsemen, announcing that he was a Mahratta, and begging that the firing might cease. Although no suspicion had been entertained of the existence of a Mahratta army within one hundred and fifty miles, the request was complied with. The horseman approached, and the most satisfactory evidence was given of the presence of two Mahratta armies at the distance of a few miles; that of the Poona state, under Hurry Pundit, the Commander-in-chief, and the more efficient army of Purseram Bhow, of which the cavalry in sight was the advanced guard, under his son. Other messengers had taken the direction of the head of the column where the Commander-in-chief was; and before the army reached its ground of encampment, his Lordship received new evidence of the unparalleled excellence of the enemy's light troops; in finding that, not only while distant, every customary means had been employed of transmitting to him distinct intelligence of every successive step in the approach of the Mahratta army, but that in their nearer approach, with an overwhelming and certainly not an inactive cavalry, they were prevented by comparatively a few straggling horsemen, from conveying even the rumour of their approach, until actually in sight.

¹ Hari Pant Phadke had left Poona on the 1st January with 30,000 Mahrattas, and marched to Kurnool and on to Anantapur, in the Madras Presidency. They then approached Sira in Mysore, which surrendered and Maddagiri and then advanced towards Seringapatam. The other Mahratta army under Parasuram Bhau, which had been occupied with the siege of Dharwar with

Lord Cornwallis had certainly reason to complain of the imperfect execution of the promises made by the Mahratta chiefs, but if he had possessed even a few days before, accurate information of their tardy advance, the circumstances of the campaign would probably have assumed a different colour. The relief of hunger was the most urgent want in the English army, in which, perhaps, not one individual had, for the last fortnight, partaken of a wholesome meal; and the inimitable mercantile police of a Mahratta chief, in his own camp, was never more skilfully exhibited than on this occasion, in holding up exorbitant prices until the resources of individuals were exhausted, and gradually adapting the supply to the simple capacity of payment. It was however a spectacle of just retribution, to see the troops of Nizam Ali sharing in the exactions which their own torpor had chiefly contributed to produce: but even the influence of example was inefficient to rouse to energy these stately cavaliers, in all respects singularly contrasted to the mean aspect, and black meagre visage of the common Mahratta horseman, who foraged at large, and effectually commanded the resources of the country.

The bazar of a Mahratta camp presented an exhibition of no ordinary character: and to their famished visitors, exhibited a picture of the spoils of the east, and the industry of the west. From a web of English broad cloth, to a Birmingham pen-knife; from the shawls of Cashmire to the second-hand garment of a Hindoo; from diamonds of the first

Captain Little and three Bombay sepoy battalions, crossed the Tungabhadra river on the 22nd April and moved south-east and effected a junction with Hari Pant Phadke on the 24th May at Nagamangala, about 28 miles north of Seringapatam. The two armies then marched south and joined Lord Cornwallis south of Melkote two days later. If the Mahrattas with their supplies had arrived a few days earlier, the war might have ended then with a victory over Tippu. (Grant Duff *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 200-208.)

water, to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden; from oxen, sheep, and poultry, to the dried salt fish of Concan: almost every thing was seen that could be presented by the best bazars of the richest towns: but above all, "the tables of the money changers," overspread with the coins of every country of the east, in the open air, and public street of the camp, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity, utterly inconceivable in any camp, excepting that of systematic plunderers, by wholesale and retail. Every variety of trade appeared to be exercised with a large competition, and considerable diligence, and among them one apparently the least adapted to a wandering life—the *trade of tanner* was practised with eminent success. A circular hole dug in the earth, a raw hide adapted to it at the bottom and sides, and secured above with a series of skewers run through its edges into the earth, formed the tan-pit: on marching days, the tan-pit with its contents, in the shape of a bag, formed one side of a load for a horse or bullock, and the liquid preparation was either emptied or preserved, according to the length or expected repetition of the march: the best tanning material* is equally accessible and portable, and the English officers obtained from these ambulatory tan-pits, what their own Indian capitals could not then produce, except as European imports—excellent sword belts.

The large convoys of provisions and plunder coming up in the Mahratta rear, rendered it necessary, on consultation with the chiefs, to continue for some time interposed between them and Tippoo's army in the present vicinity. Lord Cornwallis was on the 27th relieved by letter from all uneasiness regarding May 2^d General Abercromby, although on the preceding

* *Catechu*, a vegetable preparation, long known in Europe by the strange name of *Terra Japonica*.

[The *acacia catechu*, a powerful astringent, the resin of which is exported to Europe for the use of tanners. From a mistake in its origin it was given the name *Terra Japonica*.]

evening a salute of rejoicing from the ramparts of Seringapatam had created serious uneasiness. As a token of joy for the deliverance of the capital it was entirely unfeigned, but it also pretended to announce a complete victory, with the capture of General Abercromby's battering train, and the unhappy hospital patients were exhibited as authentic evidence of these pretensions.

Moving slowly to the north-east, the English army passed the vicinity of Hooliordroog,¹ a small impregnable rock with a town at its foot; the town was easily carried, and the garrison capitulated on the usual terms of security for private property, and a special condition of protection against the Mahrattas. The condition was religiously observed, and the garrison and inhabitants who had taken refuge on the rock, moved at their own request in the direction of Madoor,² under the care of a sufficient English escort; the officer had directions to accompany them the whole distance if required, or until the kelledar should consider himself entirely safe. Not a single Mahratta horseman was seen to hover near, and after marching about half way, no danger being any longer apprehended, the kelledar, with many assurances of gratitude, informed the officer, that he would trouble the escort no farther; and they accordingly parted in opposite directions; but no sooner was the distance sufficient to prevent the possibility of relief, than these unhappy people were surrounded by Mahrattas, and plundered of all their property down to the meanest article of wearing apparel. Considered as an event in the campaign, the plan of this work would pass without notice, an incident productive of no military or political result; but as an illustration of national character the anecdote may hold a fair

¹ *Hooliordroog*.—Huliyurdurga, a town in the Tumkur District, Mysore, with a fortified hill rising abruptly 3,173 feet above sea level, about 25 miles north-east of Melkote.

² *Madoor*.—Maddur, a village 15 miles south of Huliyurdurga.

claim to the space which it occupies. As Hoolior-droog, if now held by a garrison of ordinary strength, would necessarily be in a state of siege or blockade until the armies should advance in the ensuing season, the place was dismantled and abandoned, and the united armies proceeded slowly towards Bangalore.

Before reaching that place, the intermediate plan of operations was finally adjusted, of which the first preliminary was a loan of 144,000*l.* to the Mahrattas, who of all the confederates had been personally and nationally most enriched by the war, from the English who had hitherto been personally and nationally impoverished. Lord Cornwallis had not to consider the moral rapacity which dictated the demand, but the political benefit of compliance to prevent their retiring behind the Toombuddra; and the intelligent reader will not fail to remark, that no other Commander-in-chief than the Governor-general of India could possibly have secured this advantage, the sum being realised by a simple order to stop the commercial investment of dollars in its transit from England to China.¹ Purseram Bhow, with his own army, accompanied by the detachment of Bombay troops, proceeded by the vicinity of Sera, for the purpose of operating to the north-west; Assud Ali, with the mass of Nizam Ali's cavalry, relieved Lord Cornwallis from the intolerable burden of their presence, and the forces of that state were to operate to the north-east. Hurry Punt was to remain with Lord Cornwallis as the representative and plenipotentiary of the Mahratta government for political purposes: Têdgewunt remained in his former charge of military commander, for which he was eminently

¹ "From his camp, near Ootradroog, (Hutridurga) on the 21st of June, he (Lord Cornwallis) wrote to the Governor and Council of Madras, to take the treasure out of the China ships, and coining it into rupees, send it to him with the utmost possible dispatch." (Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. II, Bk. VI, p. 219.)

unfit, but was relieved in his diplomatic trust by Meer Aalum, a man of real talent; and each of these representatives of their respective sovereigns was attended by a select body of cavalry, to aid in the general operations of the English army, while their own cavalry should be sent to Coromandel to recover and recruit. It was his Lordship's share of the general plan to interpose his army between the enemy and the Company's possessions for their security, for the convenience of gradually drawing forward his supplies; for reducing such of the intermediate fortresses as were necessary to these ends; and for the further object of establishing an uninterrupted chain of tenable posts from Madras to Seringapatam, by which small convoys or grain merchants might proceed with little or no escort, whenever the season should admit of the armies taking their ultimate ground before the enemy's capital: and in the meanwhile the operations thus allotted to each branch of the confederacy, enabled the whole to subsist, in a great degree, on the resources of the enemy's country.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Recurrence to the prior operations of the other armies—Army of Bombay—Coorg—its former history—and singular manners—Balance of blood—Raja restores his authority with energy and sagacity—Successful operations against Tippoo's troops—Misfortune of his family—First acquaintance with the English—improved—fixes their attachment by his gallantry and conduct—General Abercromby marches through his country—Mercara, the capital, possessed by the Mysoreans, on the point of surrender—relieved by the raja's express permission—Singular and romantic explanation—General Abercromby's confidence of resuming his former position—Nizam Ali's operations—Number and character of the forces under his personal command—proceeds to Paungul—his army to Rachore—to Capool—Description of the place—siege—surrender—march towards Kurpa—Gungicota—Results—Mahratta operations—Detachment from Bombay under Captain Little—ascends the ghaut of Amba—joins Perseram Bhow—United force moves to Darwar—Awkward and protracted siege—Reinforcement under Colonel Frederic—Misapprehension of wants—Premature assault—Repulse—Chagrin and death of Colonel Frederic—Major Sartorius—Promises of the Mahrattas constantly violated—All operations interrupted and precarious—Place capitulates after six months siege, for want of provisions—Garrison march away—are attacked and destroyed—Reciprocal accusations of violating the capitula-

tion—Perseeram Bhow with the English corps, advance to Seringapatam—Hurry Punt by another route—Junction as before described—Result of these operations—Negotiations during the campaign.

THE convenience of uninterrupted narrative has not permitted us to deviate into the prior history of the several armies which were concentrated near the capital of Mysoor; but the separation of the allies near to Bangalore, offers a period of natural pause, to look back at the preceding operations, first of the army of Bombay, before it received orders for its temporary return to Malabar; and afterwards, of the allied armies previously to their junction with Lord Cornwallis; but in no farther detail than may be requisite for explaining the nature and extent of General Abercromby's prospects for regaining the position from which he had retired; and conveying a correct impression of the actual progress of each branch of the confederacy towards the ultimate object of the war.

Our last notices of Malabar left General Abercromby the Governor of Bombay, in possession of Cannanore, and the whole province of Malabar, supported, with the exception of the Mapillas (Mahommedans,) by the anxious wishes of the great mass of the population, who rested their only hope of emancipation from the tyranny of the house of Hyder on the success of the English arms. The intermediate country of Coorg, which has frequently occupied our notice, interposes its mountains on the shortest route from Malabar to Seringapatam; and General Abercromby found a still more zealous ally in the extraordinary man who then governed that cruelly depopulated country as its raja.

In the course of those operations which preceded the death of Hyder, the raja of Coorg, with all his numerous family, were taken, and imprisoned in the

fort of Cuddoor,¹ on the eastern frontier of Bednore; the raja died, and when Tippoo passed that place in 1788, considering it to be within the reach of enterprise from Bednore, he ordered the family to be removed, by an inexplicable selection, to the fort of Periapatam, on the eastern frontier of the woods of Coorg. Among the prisoners was the raja, of whom we speak, then a youth about fifteen. In this situation, scarcely provided with the necessaries of life, neglected, and unobserved, he had an opportunity of witnessing the sympathy excited in the minds of even the Mysoreans, by the wretched fate of his country, and the barbarous expatriation of his subjects; and his situation on the direct route by which they were driven, like herds of cattle to the shambles, occasionally presented to his direct view, objects to rouse in his youthful and ardent mind, the distant hope of one day avenging their common wrongs.

With the assistance of some faithful friends of the family, who hovered in the woods, and found means of communicating the project they had formed, he escaped from Periapatam in 1788. It was probably after this event, that Tippoo Sultaun ordered the remainder of the family to be removed to Seringapatam; where, after the customary scrutiny, two females, sisters of the raja, were received into the royal harem;* and a third, deemed unworthy of that honour, had a destination of which we shall presently speak. The unhappy raja found his country depopulated, the lands in the possession of strangers, and the few remaining Coorgs prolonging a concealed and precarious existence in the woods, hunted wherever they were heard of, by the troops and new possessors. The young raja placed himself at the head of this

¹ *Cuddoor*.—Kadur, a town on the Bangalore-Poona Railway, in the Kadur District, Mysore.

* They were restored to the raja, after the capture of Seringapatam.

remnant of the fortunes of his house, and began to retaliate on his oppressors: he was heard of every where, but seen no where, and with the pretensions of a hero, led the life of a chief of banditti. At a very early period of these adventures, while pursued by encreasing numbers of Mysorean troops, he was deceived by amicable messages, to put himself into the power of his southern neighbour, the raja of Cota Angáree,¹ with whose house there had been an ancient family feud; and repaired to his residence below the ghauts, at a place named Paulee. In the history of every people, a period occurs, when the law of retribution precedes the establishment of regular government; constituting in some degree, the point of honour of that period of society; and our European ancestors scarcely kept a more correct account current, of wrong, and reparation, than is exhibited in the following abstract of this transaction, as related by the raja himself.*

When completely in the power of his host, without the possibility of escape, he received the following proposition. "Your grandfather slew one of my ancestors, I demand a head in return."—*Answer*, "Your ancestor opposed mine in open warfare, one hundred years ago, and was slain. I am here as your guest, trusting to your honour, and your promise; and instead of giving protection, you revive an antiquated claim of blood. I am in your power, and that is my answer." A paper was then produced, and the raja was distinctly told, that he must either make payment with his own head, or terminate the feud by signing the paper. He signed the act, of

¹ *Cota Angáree*.—This Raja is commonly known as the Raja of Kote, a fort commanding the entrance to the sea near Badagara, south of Tellicherry, in the Malabar District, Madras.

² *Paules*.—Payoli is 7½ miles from Badagara, a village overlooking the river.

* In the work noticed in the preface to vol. page xxix.

surrendering as the price of blood, certain of his districts above the ghauts. He was permitted to depart; and the raja of Cota Angaree in person took immediate possession of the districts, which happened to afford a convenient retreat during Tippoo Sultaun's active proceedings in the lower countries at this period. But while believing the raja of Coorg to be incapable of collecting fifty men, he found himself unexpectedly surrounded by five hundred, and completely at his mercy: the conversation which ensued completes the history of this singular transaction.—*Raja of Coorg*, "Render an account of your reasons for an hostile ascent of the ghauts."—*Answer*, "You know that you have surrendered this district, as the price of blood, and I am here on my own territory."—*Raja of Coorg*, "Your ancestor was slain by mine in fair battle, upwards of an hundred years ago; no retribution was ever demanded by your house from mine, until, by an unmanly breach of hospitality and faith, you extorted a forcible signature. That was not a convenient time to remind you of what you shall not now forget—the blood of two princes of my house, slain by you in Wynâad. You are now in my power, without a breach of hospitality. Against the head of one of these princes let the head of your ancestor be placed, and your own head shall balance the other."—*Raja of Cota Angaree*, "I admit the statement to be correct; but instead of my head, accept as the balance of the price of blood, the district of Wynâad, as far as Culpâty, a long-contested territory between our houses, to which I shall formally surrender my claim, and cancel the instrument which you signed at Paulee." This proposition was accepted; and in the instrument of transfer (given at length in the raja's life,) the debts and credits, and the adjustment of the balance of blood, are minutely recited. In such a state of society, the casuistry is remarkable, of distinguishing between the validity of an instrument forcibly executed, with or without the

occurrence of previous fraud; and that some value was annexed to an obligation extorted by mere force, which, among civilized nations, would be considered void, is evident from the corresponding forbearance in shedding blood. The reluctance to increase the balance of revenge, will afford no explanation consistent with the ordinary history of human conduct; and we can only contemplate as an exception, the rare evidence which will presently appear, that the quality of mercy doubly blessed, was not without its estimation among the chosen spirits of this semi-barbarous race.

During these transactions, the raja had been busily occupied in conveying intelligence of his wishes to the survivors of the dispersed population; and his numbers gradually but rapidly encreasing, he soon found himself in a situation to dispossess the new occupants. They were of two descriptions, and demanded distinct treatment; Mahommedans who had accepted establishments as a boon from the Sultaun, and the inhabitants of Adwānee, treacherously swept off at the conclusion of the Mahratta war, and forcibly settled in Coorg. To the latter he afforded such means as he possessed of returning to their native country, the Mahommedans he treated in all respects as enemies, and such as were not slain in the first encounters, quickly abandoned their habitations, to be re-occupied by the Coorgs. The country, however, had profited little from the industry of its new masters, and it was farther injured in the struggles for its re-occupation.

Cattle, implements of husbandry, seed corn, and even the means of immediate subsistence were wanting; and for all these the raja laid under contribution the territory of his enemy; along an extensive line of frontier, his incursions skilfully varied, were always successful; and he had the satisfaction of seeing, in the course of that and the succeeding year, a thriving population, hardened by misfortune, and

instructed by experience, capable of surrounding him with near four thousand faithful warriors. A detachment passing to Malabar, at the time when he began to shew himself in force, was defeated in its descent of the pass, with the loss of 1,200 men: and the Sultaun upon proceeding to Malabar in 1789, marched a division of his army, under Burhân-u-Deen through Coorg, for the purpose of re-victualing the posts; but before he could effect this object, the raja had carried two out of the four, one by a coup-de-main, and the other by encouraging a strong garrison to sally upon apparently inferior numbers, turning upon them with fury, and entering with the fugitives. Burhân-u-Deen effected the provisioning of the two remaining posts with considerable loss. One of these mounting seven guns was soon afterwards reduced, and Mercara alone remained, a post erected by Hyder near the usual residence of the former rajas as the head-quarters of the Mysorean troops in Coorg. In the midst of these successes, however, his enemy the raja of Cota Angaree was not afraid to encrease the balance of revenge, and while the Coorg was engaged in the open encounter of the Sultaun's troops, stole upon the retirement of the raja's family in the woods, and in the affray, two of his wives, a nephew, and many children were killed, and the retreat was plundered of all the domestic valuables, collected by his ancestors, all of which had hitherto escaped the general ruin.

But better fortunes awaited him in another quarter. The accidental mission of a confidential servant to make some purchases at Tellicherry, brought him into communication with Mr. Taylor, the chief of that English establishment. Their

Robert Taylor, the English Chief at Tellicherry, under the orders of the Government of Bombay, invited the Raja of Coorg to a conference, and in October 1790, a formal treaty was concluded, under which the Raja agreed to treat Tippu and his allies as enemies, to furnish the English with supplies, and to

common interests and views were quickly understood ; authority was received from Bombay, and a system of mutual co-operation was concerted for the invasion of Mysoor, with the inestimable advantages of passing through the country of an ally till within forty miles of the enemy's capital. In direct opposition to ordinary practice, in the country and class of civilization to which he belonged, every promise of this singular man was most sacredly performed, and generally overstepped. To an application for aid in gun bullocks, he correctly replied, that those of Coorg were as unfit for military purposes as the cattle of Malabar ; but he immediately made a most hazardous irruption into Mysoor, in which he carried off and sent to the English an acceptable supply of the best quality from the 'Sultaun's stock, and repeated the enterprise on every favourable opportunity. In provisions, intelligence, and aid of every kind, he anticipated the wishes of his friends, and rivetted their admiration by his frank and romantic gallantry.

In conformity to the plan of operations directed by Lord Cornwallis, General Abercromby commenced his march to the eastward, with four European regiments, five sepoy battalions, and a suitable artillery, in February 1791. He had water conveyance as far as Iliacore,¹ within 26 miles of the ghaut ; but the subsequent difficulties required a large exercise of patience and skill, and could not have been surmounted in the face of an enemy ; every separate gun being

have no connection with the French, while the Company guaranteed the independence of Coorg, and the maintenance of the Raja's interests in case of a peace being made with Tippu. (*Rise Mysore and Coorg*, 1878.)

¹ *Iliacore*.—Irikkur, a village 15 miles north-east of Cannanore on the high road leading up to Coorg, on the right of the Baliapatam river. During the rains, timber and bamboos are floated down from Irikkur to the coast. The road up the Berambadi Pass into Coorg passes through dense ever-green forest.

hoisted over a succession of ascents by ropes and tackles. Mercara, the only remaining post occupied by the Mysoreans, had long been invested by the Coorgs, and the raja had given reason to expect, that a few days more would determine its surrender; intelligence however was received of the approach of a convoy of provisions, escorted by a respectable division of the Sultaun's army; and of its being, after a severe action, surrounded by the raja, without the possibility of escape. While General Abercromby was in hourly expectation of learning its surrender, the raja was himself the first to announce, that although the convoy was completely at his mercy, he had allowed it to enter Mercara, and the escort to return in safety. Such a fact, however explained, would, in ordinary cases, be considered as direct evidence of treachery; but the raja's statement, as given in the manuscript, added to his singular character, now sufficiently understood, removed every shadow of suspicion from the mind of General Abercromby.

He explained that during his confinement at Periapatam, the officer commanding, influenced by compassion, (and probably by the interesting character of his young charge,) had been induced to allow of his walking out occasionally on parole, to take the diversion of hunting in the woods. In one of these excursions, he was benighted near a Mysorean post, within the frontiers of Coorg, and the officer commanding, Kâdir Khân Khêshgee, being informed of the circumstance, invited him to his house, and entertained him with hospitality and kindness until the morning: this was the officer who commanded the escort, and this is the whole extent of obligation stated in the manuscript; but there was another of greater importance, which delicacy prevented his relating. On the occasion already noticed, of selecting two of the raja's sisters for the royal harem, Kâdir Khân, who was a personal favourite of his

sovereign, obtained as a special distinction, the honour of receiving the rejected lady; she was sent to his house, was attended by a person of her own cast, and lodged in a separate apartment, where he never approached her, and availed himself of the first unsuspected opportunity of sending her secretly to her brother's protection.

After the action which has been noticed, in which Kadir Khān lost above seven hundred men, a disposition was made by the Coorgs, to fall upon the convoy at the dawn of day, with the national broad-bladed instrument, common to this people and to the Nairs; but before commencing the attack, the raja caused proclamation to be made at their outposts, that he acknowledged his obligations to Kadir Khān, and desired to spare his life. A conference ensued, in which it was pleaded, that the acceptance of individual safety, would cause the destruction of his family, and that his return without executing the service, would be fatal to himself. The raja, with a prodigality of romance, exceeding whatever has been related in the authentic tales of western chivalry, not only allowed the convoy to enter the place, and the escort to return, but at the instance of his friend, extended the courtesy to the kelledar of Mercara, who must have surrendered in a few days to the English army; it was accordingly agreed, that he should eat his provisions as fast as appearances could justify, and then be permitted to capitulate on condition of a safe conduct to Seringapatam; and the raja not only declined the offer of General Abercromby's assistance in the reduction of the place, but supplied the garrison with carriage and safe conduct, and presented them on their departure with a liberal pecuniary donation to supply their future wants:* the walls were then razed to the ground, and he committed

* After the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, the Raja invited his friend Kadir Khān to Coorg, where he was received in all respects as a brother of the family. The raja presented him

himself and his people to the national defence of their courage and their woods. The subsequent incidents connected with our design up to the period of return of the English army to Malabar, have been already related, and no farther explanation will be necessary to shew the solid grounds of expectation that General Abercromby would be enabled to resume, at the proper season, from the same advanced position, the part allotted to him in the future operations of the war. We proceed to resume the prior operations of the allies.

The army of Nizam Ali began to assemble in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad, in May 1790, and was joined by the stipulated English detachment of two battalions of sepoys, under Major Montgomery, with the addition of a company of European artillery, for the purpose of the intended siege of Capool. The cavalry individually resembled that under Assud Ali, but were somewhat better commanded and the infantry under Monsieur Raymond, an intelligent and enterprising Frenchman, was as good as, with indifferent arms and extremely imperfect means of enforcing discipline, he could be expected to make them. A gorgeous mass, numerically sufficient for the conquest of the whole peninsula, moved south-west, at first to Paungul,² which was the limit of Nizam Ali's personal campaign, and afterwards, with long and repeated delays to Rachore, within their own dominions, and there remained until authentic intelligence was received of the descent of Tippoo's army to Coimbetoor in September, when, free from the alarm of interruption, and carrying ruin and

with a large estate, suitably provided with cattle, implements of husbandry and labourers, and on this estate he resided in great affluence until his death, which occurred in 1806.

¹ *Capool*.—Kopal, a village about 200 miles south-west of Hyderabad, north of the Tungabhadra river.

² *Paungul*.—Pangal, about 85 miles south of Hyderabad on the Kistna river and 30 miles north of Kurnool.

devastation in their train, they sat down before Capool on the 28th of October.

A lofty and precipitous rock, surmounted by a rampart, and containing a central citadel commanding the interior area, might enable its defenders to smile at more efficient means. The cannon placed in the batteries were of so bad a quality, that in one week they were disabled by their own fire, a fact of which no previous assurance could convince Nizam Ali's general and a new battering train, to be brought forward from various points, did not arrive before the middle of January, 1791. The English artillery performed in the most satisfactory manner the duties required by that branch of the service; and the infantry was equally efficient—but the obstinate ignorance of Nizam Ali's commander, rendered their skill and energy of little avail. On the 18th of April, 1791, the place surrendered by capitulation, and Behauder Benda, a similar post about three miles to the northward, acceded to the same terms. Both places were amply garrisoned, and provided with every thing necessary for a much longer resistance; but the unexpected intelligence of the fall of Bangalore, which, correctly viewed, augmented the obligations of defence, had, in the ordinary influence of such events on the human mind, produced a converse operation. Capool had been invested for upwards of five months, and the intelligence which damped the energies of the garrison, furnished them also with a plausible apology for surrender. After the requisite arrangements in that vicinity, the army directed its march to the south-east to regain Kurpa and its dependencies, lost in 1779: Gunjycota¹ surrendered about the time that Lord Cornwallis left

¹ *Gunjycota*.—Gandikota, in the Jammalamadugu Taluq of the Cuddapah District, a large fortress, built on the edge of a cliff, on the south bank of the Penneru river. It was built in 1589. The fort is in good preservation with a fine mosque, and large gardens of orange trees, limes and custard apples.

Caniambaddy; minor places fell without resistance; but in many instances the fall was merely nominal, it was the submission of poligars who held or had recovered their own places; ever ready to bend to circumstances, and preferring Nizam Ali as a master, only because he could be disobeyed with impunity; with these reservations, however, Goorumconda was the chief place of strength and importance which remained to be reduced in that quarter, and this branch of the confederacy had, with slender merits, accomplished very considerable objects.

The Mahrattas, like Nizam Ali, ostensibly took the field at the same period as the English. The detachment of two battalions of sepoys, with one company of European, and two of native artillery, under Captain Little, destined to act with the army of that state according to treaty, embarked at Bombay, in May, 1790, and entering the river of Jaigur, nearly two degrees to the southward, proceeded in the same boats as far as the river was navigable, and then debarking ascended the ghaut of Amba, in the very depth of the monsoon. On the 26th of June, they joined the army under Perseram Bhow, (Putwurdun) at Coompta, a place about fifty miles southeast from the head of the pass. Meritch, the capital of this chief, is situated near the river Kistna. The removal of an hostile and dangerous frontier, was of the utmost importance to the security of his own possessions; and the virulence of political hostility was aggravated by the personal violation perpetrated on one of his family after the capture of * Neergoond in 1785. The interests of the confederacy in that quarter, could not, therefore, have been committed to Mahratta hands more likely to conduct them with earnestness and zeal; and the force under his command has been rated at 20,000 horse, and 10,000 infantry. The first national object was the recovery

of those provinces between the five rivers* obtained by the house of Hyder during the civil war of Ragoba; and of these provinces Darwar was deemed the capital, and principal military depôt, situated on a plain, with the usual annexation of a large fortified town, but both constructed with as much care and strength, as is compatible with an entire ignorance of scientific principles.

Its defence, and the military government of the province, were committed to Budr-u-Zemân Khân, the most respectable officer in the Mysorean service, with a division of five regular cushoons, furnished with a complete field equipment of guns, and an unlimited command over the irregular infantry of the province, a force which Perseram Bhow could not, with any military prudence, leave in his rear. The rivers being full, and the season unfavourable for military operations, he did not commence his march from Coompta until the 3d of August, and arrived before Darwar on the 18th of September. In spite of the opportunity of receiving better counsel, the old Mahratta tactic of firing into the town from a distant eminence during the day, and withdrawing the guns at night, was continued for about forty days. On the 30th of October, Perseram Bhow moved to occupy a more advanced position on a different face of the fort. The actual strength of the garrison at this time was estimated at 7,000 regular firelocks, and 3,000 irregulars, and Budr-u-Zemân Khân, with about 2,000 men and four guns, moved out to an exterior position, to prevent the occupation of the intended ground. He was attacked in this position, and as might be expected, the weight of the service fell on the English detachment; but although Perseram Bhow obstinately refused to adopt the suggestion of commencing the operation by a false attack with his own troops on the flank of the position, he performed,

with tolerable accuracy, all that he engaged to execute; and the enemy was dislodged and routed, with considerable loss, and the capture of three of their guns.

The same process of ridiculous annoyance by day, and reciprocal repose by night, was continued until the 13th of December, when an attack by escalade was made on the town, headed of course by the English detachment, whose commander was the first to ascend the ladders, and was wounded. The service was completely executed, and the English returned to their camp; but the Mahrattas who dispersed for plunder, accidentally set fire to the town in several places, and Budr-u-Zemân Khân availing himself of the consequent confusion, sallied, drove them out, and re-occupied the town, the Mahrattas having previously carried off three guns as trophies. It was again carried on the 18th; but in conformity to national practice, even the guns placed in battery in the town, were uniformly withdrawn at night. Captain Little had at a very early period, reported the total inefficiency of the means possessed by Perseram Bhow for the reduction of Darwar; but the precise nature of that inefficiency either was not accurately understood at Bombay, or was not adequately remedied. A reinforcement was ordered from that place, consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one battalion of sepoys, a considerable augmentation of European artillerymen, *but no cannon or stores*, and three officers of engineers, under the orders of Colonel Frederic, who arrived before Darwar on the Jan. : 2d of January 1791.

Independently of the insufficiency of the cannon furnished by the Mahrattas, so precarious and unskilful were the arrangements of their military departments, that there was frequently a want of ammunition at the most critical periods, and no operation of a siege could be undertaken with the least certainty that any one material required would be ready at the

period promised. A deficiency of ammunition, which could not be supplied for a considerable time, induced Colonel Frederic to attempt an assault, at an earlier
 Feb. 7. period than was otherwise expedient, on the 7th of February; the arrangements were well advanced, the dry ditch was filled with fascines, and the assailants were on the point of issuing from the advanced cover with the confidence of terminating their labours, when it was found necessary to abandon the attempt. The materials of the fascines were rather dry; the experienced kelledar had sent some trusty men to creep along the ditch and lodge a few lighted port-fires among them at the proper time, and before the storming party could have crossed, their fascine causeway was a mass of flame. It was the 1st of March before the expected supply of ammunition arrived; and the regular approaches were resumed; but Colonel Frederic, sinking under the feelings arising from sacrifice of reputation, in an important command, on which high expectations had been founded, without any of the ordinary means of commanding success, died on the 13th of March, and the command devolved on Major Sartorius of the engineers.

Perseram Bhow had by this time received a few additional heavy guns from Poona; but the same disregard of precision in the performance of a promise, continued to render it equally impracticable to pursue with consistency any fixed series of measures. The approaches, however, continued to advance, disturbed, as during the whole service, by frequent sorties. An extensive lodgment was made on the crest of the glacis by both the Mahrattas and English; but the incessant disappointments regarding every material and every supply, did not inspire any sanguine confidence of early success. Private intelligence, however, indicated an approaching scarcity of provisions
 Mar. 30. in the place; and on the 30th of March, after being invested for six months and twelve days, the kelledar

proposed to treat for its surrender. The intelligence of the capture of Bangalore on the 21st, had in this, as in every part of the Sultaun's possessions, produced the most powerful influence on public opinion; but the veteran kelledar professed to have been actuated by no motive but the impossibility of retaining the place for want of provisions; and the desire of joining his sovereign with his division, while still capable of efficient service. The last of the garrison, with their arms and ammunition, colours flying, and three field pieces, evacuated the place on the 4th of April 4. The casualties of the English throughout the service, were found to have amounted to about five hundred; and those of the Mahrattas were computed at three thousand.

Budr-u-Zemân Khân apprehensive of treachery, encamped, and marched his troops in a hollow square, with all the precautions of being surrounded by enemies, and unprotected by the obligations of public faith; and on the 8th, the British troops, who were 8. unanimous in their admiration of his respectable defence, heard with astonishment and grief, that his corps had been attacked, plundered, and nearly destroyed; and that he himself, covered with wounds, was sent as a prisoner to a Mahratta fort. No official explanation has ever been published of this transaction, and in the prints of the day, it was treated as a simple treachery, perpetrated for the purposes of plunder. The Mahrattas affirm, that Budr-u-Zemân Khân had stipulated to surrender the fort, with its guns and stores in their actual condition: that after the capitulation was settled, he caused the powder in the magazine to be ruined by water, and the stores to be destroyed to the extent that his time and means admitted; and they contend, that they were justified in retaliating the breach of the capitulation. This statement was denied by the party accused; but the author must add, as a tribute of truth, that it was circumstantially related to him by a Mysorean officer,

who was wounded on that occasion, and who had (as he affirmed), been personally employed in the destruction of the stores.¹

The reinforcement from Bombay, which had been conducted to Darwar by Colonel Frederic, commenced its return immediately after the surrender of the place, but before reaching the coast, the native battalion was ordered to return, at the request of Perseram Bhow, and formed a junction near Seringapatam, with the original detachment under Captain Little, now consisting of three battalions, which continued to serve with the Mahrattas, until the conclusion of the war.

The surrender of Darwar was followed by the early possession of every thing north of the Toombuddra, and Lord Cornwallis having communicated to the Mahratta court, his fixed determination to advance against Seringapatam, and his expectation of being joined by their army before that place, Perseram Bhow crossed the Toombuddra, at Hurryhur,² and advanced by the direct western road from that place, overcoming the resistance opposed to him at Ramgerry,³ Meyconda, and other inferior posts

May. early in May; while another army from Poona, under Hurry Punt, proceeded by the more eastern route of Harponelly and Sera, preserving a parallel line, and equal advance, until the junction already described was effected with the English army near the field of Chercoolli; an omen which contributed in a degree more important than can readily be conceived in civilized society, to the confidence of that people in a favourable termination of the war. To the north

¹ Compare the account of the affair in Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 201.

² *Hurryhur*.—Harihar, a village on the right bank of the Tungabhadra, in the Chitaldroog District, Mysore, on the railway from Bangalore to Poona.

³ *Ramgerry*.—Ramagiri, a railway station about 50 miles south of Harihar.

and north-west therefore the Mahrattas had not only recovered their former possessions beyond the Toombuddra, but several places to the south of that river. The garrisons had been withdrawn from the places occupied by Perseram Bhow, on his approach from Hurrygur to Seringapatam, by the western route; but the eastern communication by Harponelly and Sera, on which Hurry Punt had advanced, was strengthened and preserved: and in the course of the intermediate operations before the return of the proper season for concentrating before Seringapatam, the Mahrattas would necessarily contract within still narrower bounds the area of the enemy's remaining resources.

In order that we may be enabled, without further retrospect, to proceed in our narrative of the intermediate operations and ultimate concentration of the allies, it will be convenient to notice the advances towards negotiation which had occurred subsequently to Lord Cornwallis's command of the English army.

Tippoo Sultaun's first letter, dated the 13th of February, 1791, was received at Muglee on the 18th, and adverting to the actual distance to be travelled, and to the coincidence of time at which the Sultaun must have discovered all his plans for the defence of the ghauts to be frustrated, a conjecture may fairly be risked that the letter was antedated at least two days. In substance it offered to receive or send an ambassador for the adjustment of existing differences. To this letter Lord Cornwallis replied, on the 23d, that the infraction of the treaty was with Tippoo; that if he was willing to make reparation for the insult, and indemnity to the allies, it would be necessary for him to state so in writing, as without the establishment of a basis for negotiation sending an ambassador would be useless. On the 3d of March an answer was received from the Sultaun, containing a laboured explanation of the affair of the lines of Travancore, and drawing into prominent notice the

misconduct of that raja, in receiving and protecting his rebellious subject the raja of Cochin; disclaiming insult, and repeating his wish for negotiation: this did not seem to require any farther reply.

On the 22d of March Lord Cornwallis wrote a mere letter of courtesy, offering the body of Behauder Khan, the kelledar of Bangalore, for interment, which was declined with a suitable acknowledgment, and his Lordship directed the funeral to be conducted with due honours by the Mahommedans of his own army.

On the 27th of March, Tippoo renewed the proposition of sending a confidential person, to which Lord Cornwallis, at that time, unaccompanied by any plenipotentiary from either of the allies, answered, that as one of the confederates, he could not receive a confidential person, but if the Sultaun would reduce his propositions to writing, they should be communicated to the allies, and an answer returned.

On the 17th of May, Lord Cornwallis offered the release of the wounded prisoners of the action of the 15th, which Tippoo received with thanks, and renewed the proposal of negotiation. A Mahratta vakeel had joined his Lordship before his departure from Bangalore, and Têdjewunt was present on the part of Nizam Ali. Lord Cornwallis accordingly answered on the 19th, that if he would commit his propositions to writing, a meeting of commissioners might be arranged; *and his Lordship would even consent, if Tippoo should desire it, to a cessation of hostilities.* On the 24th Tippoo answered this letter, *without taking the slightest notice of the last proposition*, but renewed his former ones; and on the same day, (it will be recollected, his Lordship is at Caniambaddy, had destroyed his battering train, and had that morning detached three brigades across the river,) Lord Cornwallis gave up the point of written propositions, and consented that the allies should

send deputies to Bangalore. This letter remained four days unanswered; but on the 27th, the day after the junction of the Mahratta advanced guard, the army being in full view of Seringapatam, an episode was attempted, founded on the relaxation of the two last letters from the English General, of establishing an indirect communication, and an ostensible ground of jealousy, by a letter from the Sultaun's secretary to the Persian interpreter; with a present of fruit for his Lordship's use, and a camel, to replace that of the courier of the 17th, which had died at Seringapatam. These demonstrations were witnessed by the whole army, and without entering into all the feelings incident to such a situation, it will be difficult for the reader to comprehend the intense delight, with which on the ensuing morning they beheld the loads of fruit untouched, and the camel unaccepted, returning to Seringapatam.¹

¹ The Persian translator replied to Syed Ahmed Ali, Tippoo's secretary: "I have received your letter and have understood its contents. . . . As Tippoo Sultan has been pleased to direct you to send a present of fruits through me to Lord Cornwallis, I have mentioned it to his Lordship, who has desired me to reply to your letter that, in the present situation of public affairs, his Lordship cannot with propriety receive a present, but that, whenever peace shall be re-established between the two governments, he will be happy, by every means in his power, to encourage and increase a friendly intercourse." See also Dirom: *Narrative of the Campaign in India*, p. 6. Mill, in his history, makes severe comments on the refusal to enter into negotiations and the refusal of Lord Cornwallis of the present of fruits, and remarks, "that the English in India had been worked up into a mixture of fury and rage against Tippoo." (Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. III, Bk. VI, pp. 219-224.) It is not surprising that the English had strong feelings in the matter. Tippoo had treated the English prisoners in a manner which would have disgraced any half-civilised potentate, of which Wilks records numerous instances. Lord Cornwallis well understood Tippoo's wish to enter into separate negotiations with the English, to follow with separate negotiations with the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, and he refused to consider any proposal which did not include all matters relating to his two allies as well as himself.

On the 29th, however, Tippoo replied to Lord Cornwallis's condescending letter of the 24th, and after a series of long and unmeaning explanations, he proposes, that his Lordship should first return to the frontier, and then proceed in the manner suggested in his two last letters.

These abortive communications might have been more rapidly dismissed, but the detail appeared to be of importance, for the purpose of exhibiting an invariable feature of Indian diplomacy, in the exact coincidence of his Lordship's dignified tone, with the Sultaun's humility; and of the Sultaun's gradual ascent in arrogance, with every descending step in his Lordship's concessions.

August. It is probable that a corresponding conviction was impressed on his Lordship's mind; for without being able to state the precise nature of the intermediate advances, we find him early in August consenting to the reception of an envoy "at the warm instances of Hurry Punt," not as it would appear with the expectation of any result, but to obviate the impression of an actual aversion to accommodation, a feeling which was equally contrary to his own disposition and to the interests of his country. The veteran diplomatist, Apajee Ram, once more appeared upon the public scene:* his character was at that time unknown to the British army, and it was only remarked that a mean looking old bramin had arrived, very unlike an ambassador, and affording very little promise of the Sultaun's being in earnest. He was attended, at the town of Serjapoor,¹ by an English escort of protection and precaution; but on attempting to proceed to business by arranging the appointment of deputies to meet him on the part of the allies, it was found that he

* He was accompanied, as a matter of form, by a Mussulman of rank, ostensibly united in the mission.

¹ *Serjapoor*.—Serjapur, a town about 15 miles south-east of Bangalore, close to the frontier of the Salem District.

was specially prohibited from negotiating with any intermediate agent, and was ordered to open his business to the direct representatives of the respective confederate powers. Lord Cornwallis deeming his own exalted trust to place him in the situation of a principal, refused to meet, as on equal terms, the deputed servant of Tippoo Sultaun, and Apajee Ram, who was suspected of an incipient intrigue, was accordingly desired to return without delay, and without having the opportunity, in a conference of any description, to combat even these preliminary objections, or to exhibit a force of intellect said to have been still unbroken, and a luxuriance of wit rendered scarcely less playful, but far more caustic by age.¹

¹ Mill's comments on the various attempts to open peace negotiations are worth reading. (Mill: *History of British India*, Vol. III, Book VI, pp. 219-224.) The English soldier of that period was familiar with all the stories of the cruelties of Hyder and Tippu, towards the sepoys and English prisoners, and their desire not to see the war closed until Seringapatam had fallen is easy to understand. It was not "the passion of savages." The course of subsequent events is evidence that none of the attempted negotiations could have secured a peace which would have been "better for their country than war." From December 1790 to March 1791 discussions took place in the House of Commons on the origin of the war and the conduct of the negotiations before the war by Cornwallis in which Philip Francis and Fox made bitter attacks against the government. Pitt and Dundas defended the alliance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and the conduct of Cornwallis. These are fully described in Forrest's *Selections*, Vol. I, pp. 96-110.

CHAPTER XL.

Lord Cornwallis moves from Bangalore, to reduce the intermediate posts to the eastward—Rayacota &c.—recalled by intelligence regarding the Mahrattas—who had been attacked at Mudgerry—Loss not serious—His Lordship resumes his own line of operation—Northern forts—Nundidroog—strength and protracted defence—Irruption of Bâkir Saheb into Bâramahâl—Colonel Maxwell detached to dislodge him—Assault of Pinagra—Unsuccessful attempt on Kistnagherry—Returns—Singular defence of Coimbetoor—Siege raised—Second siege—Attempted relief fails—Intermediate fortresses between Bangalore and Seringapatam—Savendroog—Considerations regarding that place—Colonel Stuart detached for the siege—succeeds—Attack and fall of Ootradroog—Ramgherry—Shevengherry—Holi-oordroog—taken—Goorumconda—lower fort carried—Skilful expedition for its relief under Futteh Hyder—Facts regarding Hâfiz Jee—Injurious suspicions—Nizam Ali's army returns—retakes the lower fort—and ultimately joins Lord Cornwallis—Grain merchants—System adopted regarding them—Doubtful origin of that people—Professedly wanderers—Language—customs and manners—Note on the manufacture of salt—Observations on the value of these grain merchants—Preparations of General Abercromby—those of Lord Cornwallis—Embarrassing conduct of Perseeram Bhow—Consequent delay and its results—his intermediate operations—Private plunder preferred to the success of the campaign—Shameless and unprincipled breach

*of compact—Meditates the plunder of Bednore—
Brilliant services of the English detachment—
Hooly Onore—Defeat of Reza Saheb by Captain
Little—Perseram Bhow appears before Bednore
—hears of Kummer-u-Deen's approach—retires
—arrives at Seringapatam after the service was
over.*

LORD Cornwallis after the requisite arrangements at Bangalore, where the talents and military skill of Captain Read, had succeeded in bringing forward the most important supplies, without any loss, although greatly interrupted by the enemy's detachments, moved in a south-eastern direction to Oosoor, which was evacuated, and imperfectly blown up on his approach; fortunately a train laid for the magazine, and intended to explode after the entry of the English troops, did not succeed. Thence he moved in the July 11 direction of the passes of Policode and Rayacota, for the purpose of reducing the congeries of droogs, which command the access to these passes, from above as well as from below. The possession of these posts would accomplish the double purpose, of opening a free communication for his own supplies from Coromandel, and protecting the Company's possessions, from the inroads of small divisions of cavalry, by occupying all the direct roads from Seringapatam to Baramahal. An advanced brigade under Major Gowdie, had some sharp service at Rayacota,¹ the chief of these droogs, garrisoned by 800 men. He forced the lower works shortly before day-light, by blowing open 20. a gate, and hoped to carry the rock, by entering with the fugitives; he succeeded in carrying several successive gates, but found it imprudent to attempt

¹ *Rayacota.*—Rayakota, a railway station on the line from Dharmapuri to Hosur in the Salem District, Madras. The hill is easily ascended by a gradient, passable for a considerable distance on horseback. The fortifications are still in comparatively good order. It is 2,364 feet above sea level.

the summit. He had been instructed to withdraw, in the event of not completely succeeding in his first enterprize; but perceiving a probability of ultimate success, he ventured so far to deviate from his orders, as to hold his ground in an intermediate line of works about half way up the hill, and the place capitulated on the appearance of the army.

July 22. The minor posts, all capable of protracted defence, offered various but unsuccessful degrees of resistance; some of them, favoured by local circumstances, stood the assault, and the garrisons escaped by the opposite descent into the woods. His Lordship had it also in contemplation to adopt some arrangement for blockading Kistnagherry, the capital of Bāramahāl, a place deemed impregnable according to regular means; which, although not commanding any road, was capable, with a large garrison, of interrupting the transit of convoys: but he was called from this vicinity by causes which had not been entirely unforeseen.

In his first interviews with the Mahratta chiefs, he had proposed a systematic plan, of operating in columns at considerable distances with connecting corps, so as to ensure at once extended means of supply and the advantages of reciprocal support; but on farther observation, he found that he should attain no advantage and incur great embarrassment by insisting on such a plan with allies who were incessantly led away by temporary views of private interest, and although sufficiently capable of comprehending, were very unfit to execute any systematic plan. He had therefore yielded with less reluctance to their desire to keep up a complete communication with their respective countries, but had not failed to warn them against the imprudence of dispersing their force. Tippoo Sultaun, as his Lordship had foreseen, availed himself of the first removal of the pressure on his capital to strike at every detachment which should be left exposed, and in pursuance of this plan ordered

a powerful corps into Coimbatore, (to which we shall return,) and moved in person to the northward. It was the danger of Perseram Bhow, from this movement that induced Lord Cornwallis to make a few marches in the same direction, to check the advance of the Sultaun by alarming him for his rear. On arriving at Bangalore he found his apprehensions had been verified to a certain extent. On his route to Sera, Perseram Bhow had thrown a garrison into Great Balipoor, and had left a corps to mask Mudgerry; Kummer-u-Deen, with a superior force, attacked and completely routed this corps, and the garrison of Great Balipoor (800 men) returned in alarm to Bangalore; the loss was not so serious as was apprehended from the first reports; the incident proved useful to Perseram Bhow, by teaching a more prudent use of detachments; and Lord Cornwallis felt himself at liberty to renew his own objects.

With the exception of Kistnagherry, every thing Sept essential to the communication with Coromandel and Baramahal to the south-east and east, was already secured, but a considerable number of places, some of them of importance, to the north-east of Bangalore, not only prevented the very important object of commanding the resources of these countries, but were interposed in the line of communication with Goorurcondra, and with the army of Nizam Ali. Major Gowdie, reinforced with some battering cannon, was detached on this service, and rapidly succeeded in obtaining possession of all those of minor importance. But Nundidroog¹ was found to require larger reinforcements and more extensive means: he forced the petta, and examined the northern face on the 22d of Septem- 22

¹ *Nundidroog*.—Nandidroog, a famous fortified hill in the Chikballapur Taluk of the Kolar District, 31 miles north of Bangalore. There is an extensive plateau at the top sloping to the west. The fortifications whose ruins now surround the summit were erected by Hyder and Tippu. There is a precipitous cliff at the south-west angle. The hill rises 1,800

ber, and finding it unassailable in that quarter, made a circuit to the west, and finally sat down before the place on the 27th.

Sept. 27. Every fortified place the English had hitherto seen in Mysoor, exhibited evidence of the extraordinary attention paid by Tippoo Sultaun to the repair and improvement of this important branch of national defence, but the works of Nundidroog, a granite rock of tremendous height, seemed to have engrossed in a peculiar degree his design of rendering it impregnable; and its defence was committed to Lutf Aly Beg, an officer who had always merited the highest distinction both from Hyder and Tippoo, although by the former he had been condemned to a cruel degradation after the battle of Arnee in 1782,* and by the latter had but recently been relieved from the disgrace incurred on his return from Constantinople. There was no choice with regard to the face to be attacked, because except in that one direction, the precipice was inaccessible, the comparatively weak point had been strengthened by a double line of ramparts; and the foundation was laid for a third, which ultimately aided the assailants in forming their last lodgement. The defence was highly respectable, the ammunition of the cannon was well reserved, and the jinjalls, or wall pieces, were served with peculiar steadiness and skill; the labour was excessive, of working regularly up the face of a steep and craggy mountain to breaching distance, and dragging cannon to the batteries; but in twenty-one days two breaches were effected; one in the exterior rampart, and the other in an out-work, and it was resolved to give the assault and form a lodgement for the farther operations against the interior

feet above the plain, and is 4,851 feet above the level of the sea. The present houses on the summit of the hill were built about 1848; the hill was used until lately as a resort in the hot season for European officials from Bangalore. (Rice: *Mysore Gazetteer*, Vol. II.)

* Page 138.

works. The assailants received, however, a particular direction for endeavouring to enter with the fugitives, while the division allotted to forming the lodgement, should be employed in providing cover: and in order that every possible impression might be made on the minds of the garrison, Lord Cornwallis moved the army to the immediate vicinity: some additional flank companies were ordered in to lead the assault, and General Medows, with the usual spirit which animated him on such occasions, desired to take the immediate direction of the service.*

The assault was given by clear moon light on the morning of the 19th of October; the arrangements Oct. 19 of defence were excellent, and particularly the masses of granite reserved till this period to be rolled down the rock with tremendous effect, but the lodgement was within one hundred yards of the breach, and although the garrison was perfectly alert, the ardour and rapidity of the assailants surmounted every obstacle, and they pressed the fugitives so closely as to prevent their effectually barricading the gate of the inner rampart. It was forced after a sharp conflict, and the place was carried with the loss in the assault of only thirty killed and wounded, chiefly by the stones tumbled down the rock, and in the whole siege one hundred and twenty.¹

* Shortly before the assault, while all were waiting the signal in silence, one of the soldiers inadvertently whispered something about a mine. "To be sure there is," said General Medows, "and it is a mine of gold;" a smothered laugh ran along the ranks, and produced the proper impression.

¹ The place was carried with the loss of two men killed and twenty-eight wounded. The exertions of the troops were duly acknowledged by Lord Cornwallis in the orders of the day. "Lord Cornwallis, having been a witness of the extraordinary obstacles both of nature and art which were opposed to the detachment of the army that attacked Nundydroog, he cannot too highly applaud the firmness and exertions which were manifested by all ranks in carrying on the operations of the siege, or the valour and discipline which was displayed by the flank companies of His Majesty's 36th and 71st regiments,

The communication with Goorumconda, still invested by the troops of Nizam Ali, being thus completely opened, a portion of the battering cannon employed in the siege of Nundidroog was sent to their aid ; and Lord Cornwallis was called again to the south-east by an alarm for his communications. A force under Bâkir Saheb, an active young officer, and son of the venerable kelledar of Darwar, had been detached by the route of Coimbetoor and Tapoor into Bâramahâl, with a respectable reinforcement for Kistnagherry, with orders to act on the communications of the English army, and particularly to sweep off in a southern direction the population and cattle of the whole district. Colonel Maxwell with a suitable division of the army was detached for the

Oct. 21. purpose of endeavouring to disperse these intruders, and in descending the ghaut, he received intelligence that a proportion of the enemy had proceeded, in the execution of their barbarous purpose of carrying off the population, to Penagra, a post in the angle formed with the main range of mountains, by the cross chain of Tapoor, whence only a mountain path communicates farther south. He moved with rapidity in that direction, and demanded the surrender of the place by a regular summons; but the enemy, not satisfied with a simple refusal, fired upon the flag. As the appearance of works justified prompt measures, it was instantly assaulted and carried by escalade, with little loss to the assailants ; but of the garrison, two hundred men were killed, before the indignation of the troops could be restrained, and the cavalry escaped by the mountain-paths. The activity of Colonel Maxwell's movements, from the accurate local infor-

those of the Madras 4th European battalion; the 13th Bengal battalion of native infantry, and of the 3rd, 4th, 10th, 15th and 27th battalions of Madras native infantry that were employed in the assault of last night, and which, by overcoming all difficulties, effected the reduction of that important fort." (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 211.)

mation he had acquired in the previous campaign, soon induced Bakir Saheb to withdraw from a country too much bounded for the safe operations of cavalry. He descended by the pass of Changama into Coromandel; but finding, from the presence of the English cavalry under Colonel Floyd, that any enterprise towards Madras would be hazardous, he turned southward, and re-entered the Mysorean dominions by the pass of Ahtoor.¹

Colonel Maxwell had been ordered, if he found the enterprise advisable, to attempt the destruction of the town, within the lower fort of Kistnagherry, for the purpose of depriving the enemy as much as possible of cover for their predatory arrangements, and after effecting his objects in other parts of the province, he encamped on the 7th of November, Nov. 7. within a few miles of the place, without any other demonstration, than that of reascending the pass. He moved at ten at night, in three divisions, and carried the lower fort by escalade: the officers commanding the divisions were instructed, if appearances were favourable, to follow up the blow, and ascend the rock with the fugitives, who had barely time to shut and barricade the gate; and so close was the pursuit, that a standard of the regular troops was taken on the very steps of the gateway. The bearers of the ladders were not so expeditious in their ascent, and the garrison, more numerous than their assailants, began to hurl the dreadful missiles of granite: projections of rock afforded cover to the assailants, and repeated attempts were made during two hours, to apply ladders, which were as often crushed with those who bore them; and Colonel Maxwell at length found it necessary, to desist from the assault with considerable loss: the garrison sallied on their retreat, but it was conducted with so much regularity, that

¹ *Ahtoor*.—Attur lies 30 miles east of Salem. The road from Cuddalore to Salem passes the town, and north of the river is a large fort which protected the valley.

they quickly returned: the English troops, after setting fire to the town, withdrew before day-light; and the detachment soon afterwards returned to head quarters, having moved along the back of the range between the passes of Policode and Pedanaickdurgum, for the purpose of restoring a number of minor posts, to the families of their former Hindoo possessors.

Bakir Saheb had been detached from a corps under Kummer-u-Deen, which took the direction of the capital of Coimbetoor. We have already noticed the employment of a force in that direction, immediately after the Sultaun was relieved from the pressure on his capital in the month of May; and as no service throughout this eventful war, was accompanied by circumstances more remarkable, we shall revert to the proceedings of the first detachment.

It will be recollected that when General Medows followed the Sultaun's course from Baramahal to Trichinopoly in 1790, he detached a respectable force under Colonel Oldham, across the river at Caroor. During the early operations of Lord Cornwallis in 1791, his Lordship had ordered this detachment to the north, and it formed the basis of the strong corps which escorted his supplies to the upper country, after his junction with the horse of Nizam Ali. On Colonel Oldham's departure from the south, he left a detachment under the command of Major Cuppage, who, on the concentration of the army of Bombay for the ascent of the ghauts, was charged with the defence of Palgaut and Coimbetoor, and their reciprocal communication. On examining minutely the fort of Coimbetoor, Major Cuppage considering it to be incapable of standing a siege, removed the heavy guns, ammunition, and stores to Palgaut; its possession was indispensable to the fiscal management of the province, and it was deemed capable of resisting any force unprovided with heavy cannon; but on the appearance of a force so provided, the garrison

was ordered to fall back to Palgaut. Among the variety of troops employed by the native powers, is a description named *Topasses*,¹ (or persons wearing hats,) originally the descendants of Portuguese of mixed blood, but at that period exhibiting a motley assemblage of various classes and complexions, many of them possessing very distant claims to European descent. A number of these had formerly been entertained in the service of Mahommed Ali; in 1790 a small corps had been collected for the English service and placed under Lieutenant Chalmers; and general* opinion, not very favourable to their military prowess, was destined to receive a remarkable refutation.

After the removal of every thing valuable from Coimbetoor, Lieutenant Chalmers, on examining the guns deemed unserviceable, found two three-pounders and one four-pounder to stand the proof; means of mounting them were obtained from the fragments of broken carriages: there were also several swivels and jinjalls, and a large quantity of damaged powder; and he prevailed on Major Cuppage to send him five

¹ *Topasses*.—Topasy, a name used in the 17th and 18th centuries for dark-skinned or half-caste claimants of Portuguese descent and Christian profession. Its application is generally, though not universally, to soldiers of this class, and it is possible that it was originally a corruption of Persian (from Turkish) *topchi*, a gunner. It may be a slight support to this derivation that Italians were employed to cast guns for the Zamorin at Calicut from a very early date in the 16th century, and are frequently mentioned in the annals of Correa between 1503 and 1510. Various other etymologies have however been given. That given by Orme (and put forward doubtfully by Wilson) from *topi* 'a hat,' has a good deal of plausibility, and even if the former etymology be the true origin, it is probable that this one was often in the minds of those using the term, as its true connotation. (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Johnson*, 1903.)

* The difficulty of determining any measure of state, with regard to the widely increasing branch of Indian population, growing out of the irregular connexions of, perhaps, thirty thousand Europeans, has hitherto caused an apparent apathy, to a

hundred shot for his guns. His corps was reduced by detachments to one hundred and twenty Topasses, and two hundred men from a battalion of Travancoreans, under a young Frenchman named Migot de la Combe, of which number about one half made their escape to the hills when they found they were to stand a siege, and the rest were extremely insubordinate.

June 13. The place was invested, on the 13th of June, by about two thousand regular infantry and a considerable mass of irregulars, eight guns, (the largest an eighteen-pounder) a number of jinjall pieces served by irregular infantry, abundance of rockets, and a sufficient body of horse.

The bad quality of the powder was extremely unfavourable to the efforts of the little garrison, but while endeavouring as far as their limited numbers admitted to repair or scarp the breaches, and place swivels on their flanks in the berm, Lieutenant Chalmers was preparing with greater care the means of repelling the ultimate assault; the powder was

question of momentous political importance. The question must soon force itself on public consideration, and the longer it is postponed, the more difficult will be the decision.

[Owing to various causes, the increase in the number of the population of mixed origin, Asiatic and European, has not been great in recent years. The shortening of the voyage from England, the great decrease in the number of Englishmen, who make India their home, the introduction of short service in the army, all these have tended to make the regular or irregular connections between Europeans and Indians fewer than was the case at the time when Wilks wrote. The existence, however, of large numbers of persons of mixed race is still a problem which the Government of India has to face. The Indian Mutiny and the Great War gave opportunity to many of these people to show their worth, and their record was good. Much has been done for them in the way of education, and they have proved their aptitude both in the field of skilled labour and as furnishing material which has been much used in Government and mercantile offices. In the large cities they form unfortunately a very needy class owing to their inability to compete with the unskilled Indian labourer.]

sufficiently adapted to the preparation of a contrivance for exploding among the assailants; which was no other than filling with the proper materials a number of small barrels, provided with fuses, to be placed along the banquette in all parts of the fort, and chiefly in proper situations to be rolled down the breaches or over the parapet, and special orders were given that this defence should not be employed until the berm and ditch were crowded by the enemy. It cannot be necessary to enlarge on the coolness and gallantry, under many privations, and under an incessant clamour for surrender from all the Travancoreans, which could prolong such a defence for nearly two months, before the enemy, after repeated summonses, gave the assault. It commenced about two hours before day-light on the 11th of August, in Aug. 11. five columns, each accompanied by ladders, and the ramparts were completely gained at several points. The first struggle was at the post defended by De la Combe, who set an example of great gallantry, but was nearly overpowered by numbers until supported by a reinforcement of Topasses; the period had not only arrived, but had somewhat passed away, for the persons charged with the care of the combustible barrels to execute their orders, not only were the ditch and berm filled with the enemy, but a considerable number was actually on the rampart engaged in close encounter; and the post defended by Lieutenant Chalmers in person, as being the weakest point, was by this time pressed with still greater vivacity than any other; the explosion of a barrel at this moment in a crowded mass of the enemy produced the desired impression, and it was followed up by similar means, by tumbling down large stones prepared along the whole extent of the parapet, and by the redoubled efforts of the garrison to clear the ramparts of the enemy. After a severe conflict of nearly two hours, the efforts of the assailants entirely ceased; the day began to dawn, the enemy was

perceived carrying off his killed and wounded, and preparing to evacuate the batteries; while in another direction the distant but cheering sight was observed of an English corps in full march for the place, from Palgaut. At this critical moment, before all the guns were removed, Lieutenant Chalmers ordered De la Combe with a large portion of the garrison to sally; he found the two last and heaviest of the guns limbered, and the bullocks yoked to carry them off, and with the greatest coolness drove them under the immediate protection of the place. To besiegers, who had thus prolonged their operations we can scarcely ascribe an ordinary degree of skill, but the praise of bravery cannot be denied to an enemy who prolonged such a struggle for two hours, and left on the ramparts, and within the limits of the ditch (exclusively of what had been carried away,) a number of bodies, considerably exceeding the whole numerical amount of the garrison.

No efforts for the relief of Coimbetoor could have justified Major Cuppage in compromising the safety of Palgaut; and the detachment with which he marched was somewhat of a motley description: a weak battalion of regular sepoys, one of Travancoreans, 350 poligars, under the direction of an enterprising civil servant, Mr. Macleod, the collector of Madura, the whole not exceeding one thousand men, with four iron four-pounders of Travancore, and the two brass sixes of the regular battalion. The enemy still continued to occupy the petta after their repulse, for the purpose of covering the retreat of their cannon; but were dislodged from all their posts in the course of the day, and in a subsequent pursuit of two days to the Bawani, lost a considerable quantity of stores. Such a result was calculated to produce in the successful party a degree of confidence exceeding its legitimate grounds. No doubt was entertained that an effort of greater magnitude would be made by Tippoo Sultaun, and Lieutenant Chalmers

only requested one additional officer to relieve him in the fatigues of the siege. Lieutenant Nash, with his company of sepoys, was accordingly ordered in; and by means of detachments of various kinds and qualities, the garrison was made to amount to near seven hundred men.

He had scarcely repaired his breaches and mounted his captured guns before the enemy appeared on the 6th of October, with augmented means and a Oct. 6. more skilful leader, Kummer-u-Deen, with 14 guns (12 six-pounders and two eighteens), four mortars, 8,000 regular infantry, and a large body of irregulars and of horse. On the 23d, intelligence was received 23. of the approach of Major Cuppage with three regular battalions (at most 1,800 men), two of Travancoreans, and six field pieces. Kummer-u-Deen leaving a strong body in the trenches, marched with the remainder of his force to a distance of about ten miles, to the vicinity of a pass, where the woods of Animally terminate and the plain commences. Unfortunately at this period a large equipment of oxen for General Abercromby's army, were assembled at Palgaut; and Kummer-u-Deen made a decided demonstration of passing to the Major's rear. If he should be enabled to gain the pass, and the uninterrupted access to Palgaut; by the capture of the oxen, he would strike a blow of infinitely greater importance than the fall of Coimbetoor, and be even in a condition, with his superior numbers, to render precarious the Major's return to Palgaut. The one manœuvred for the pass, the other to prevent its occupation, and a severe action terminated in Major Cuppage's possession of the pass, but also in his return to Palgaut. "I have seen," said Kummer-u-Deen on his return, "the nature of your expected relief; do not persist in throwing away the lives of brave men." He resumed the siege with fresh vigour, and a very respectable degree of skill; a wide breach was in all respects practicable, and the sap was

carried to the covered way; the ammunition, originally bad, was nearly expended. Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash were both wounded on the same day, and the bravest of the former defenders of the place urged their commander to accept the repeated offers of an honourable capitulation. Terms similar to those
 Nov. 8. given to Daraporam in the campaign of 1790, were prepared and executed, and it was an explicit condition that the garrison should march to Palgaut; but after the actual surrender of the place, it was pretended that the Sultaun's ratification was necessary; and after a detention of 13 days at Coimbatore, they were ultimately marched as close* prisoners to Seringapatam, in direct and open violation of public faith, without even a pretext for its infraction, excepting one which was founded on an open violation of truth.¹

30. We return from these detached events, to the operations of the main army under Lord Cornwallis, after the junction of Colonel Maxwell, from his expedition to Baramahal.

Every thing interposed between Bangalore and

* My notes do not enable me to say what had become of De la Combe. I rather think that he returned to Travancore after the first siege.

¹ The second siege of Coimbatore began on the 6th October 1791. On the 25th of October, Kammer-u-din marched to Madukarai, a village on the road from Coimbatore to Palghat; near there, he attacked Major Cuppage in his retreat to Palghat. The siege of Coimbatore was then renewed with vigour, and Chalmers surrendered on the 3rd of November. Chalmers later became Major-General Sir John Chalmers, K.C.B. He and Nash were released from their prison at Seringapatam in 1792. Lord Cornwallis, as the rules did not admit of rewards by promotion, recommended that the services of these two officers should be rewarded by a grant of money, 2,000 pagodas to Lieutenant Chalmers, and 500 pagodas to Lieutenant Nash. This was sanctioned by the Madras Government. At the action at Madukarai, 68 men were killed and wounded. The troops engaged were the 5th Madras Battalion, the 16th and the 12th Bombay Battalions. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, pp. 212-216.)

Coromandel, was now cleared for the access of supplies; but between that post and Seringapatam, on every possible route, several places of strength remained in the Sultaun's possession, the reduction of which Lord Cornwallis deemed to be of essential importance to the uninterrupted communication with his depôts, during the intended siege. A fresh battering train had been brought forward, and the last and most important convoy, under Colonel Floyd, with the recovered cavalry, was shortly to arrive, but impediments connected with the operations of the allies, to which we shall presently revert, caused an embarrassing delay; and Lord Cornwallis determined to employ the intermediate time, in attempting the reduction of those places, of which the most formidable, and reputed to be the strongest in Mysore, was Savendroog,¹ a place which at one time he had determined not to attack, from the great improbability of success. This enormous mass of granite, is considerably more elevated than Nundidroog, and stands upon a base at the least eight miles in circumference, every where apparently inaccessible from below, and at the height of about two thirds of its total elevation, separated by a chasm, into two citadels, each independent of the other, and both abundantly supplied with water. Exclusively of the convenient position of this fortress, as the head quarters of a corps, to interrupt the communications, its extraordinary height commanded a view of every convoy that could move on either of the two principal roads. On the return of the army from Caniambaddy, the place had been carefully reconnoitred; it was then deemed to be unassailable, and the discouragement was increased

¹ *Savendroog*.—Savandurga, or the rock of death, a mountain in Magadi Taluq, Bangalore District, about 20 miles west of Bangalore. It rises to 4,024 feet above the level of the sea. It was taken in 1728 by Deva Raja, Dalavayi of Mysore, from Kempe Gowda, a chief descended from one Immadi Kempe Gowda, who had secured the stronghold for himself. (Lewis Rice: *Mysore*.)

by the reputed insalubrity of the woods and impenetrable thickets by which it is surrounded. The capture since that period of a considerable number of hill forts hitherto deemed impregnable, and particularly of Nundidroog, encouraged the English General in the attempt, which if successful, he expected to be followed by the early surrender of all the others that he desired to possess.

Colonel Stuart, with two European and three native corps, and a powerful artillery, was detached for the immediate conduct of the siege, and Lord Cornwallis made a disposition of the remainder of the army to watch every avenue from Seringapatam by which the operations of the siege might be disturbed. Colonel Stuart encamped within three miles of the place on
 ac. 10. the 10th of December, and immediately commenced the arduous labour of cutting a gun road through the rugged forest to the foot of the rock, a work which, added to the difficulties of dragging iron twenty-four pounders over precipices nearly perpendicular, called for a degree of incessant exertion and fatigue which could scarcely have been exceeded.

17. The batteries opened on the 17th, and the breach in what was named the lower wall of the rock, although at least fifteen hundred feet higher than its base, was deemed practicable on the 20th. Immediately overlooking it, at a precipitous height, and perfectly well situated for destroying, by the usual artillery of rocks and stones, every thing that should attempt to ascend beyond the breach, was a range of ancient wall. Lord Cornwallis had come from the camp, distant seven miles, to witness the assault; the grenadiers were ordered to their stations, and the garrison was seen to be collecting behind this wall. This observation fortunately prevented the assault on that day; the experiment was made of pointing with sufficient elevation by receiving the trail of the gun carriage into an excavation behind the platform. The execution was not only perfect, but the wall was

found to be so frail that a few discharges must dislodge its defenders. The arrangements for the ensuing day, were founded on the fact thus opportunely ascertained, the batteries were prepared for the purpose, and in the morning the requisite number of guns were directed against this wall with the most perfect success; every person behind it was dislodged, and the storming party, having been placed without observation, within twenty yards of the breach, the assault commenced by signal at eleven o'clock in the forenoon.

The defenders had been so unexpectedly dis- Dec. 21
lodged from their appointed positions, that no new disposition had been made. The assailants accordingly ascended the rock without the slightest opposition, clambering up a precipice, which, after the service was over, they were afraid to descend. The eastern citadel was completely carried; and the assailants, on reaching the summit of the rock, had the satisfaction to descry a heavy column of infantry, destined to reinforce the garrison, in full march to enter the place, which would have been effected if the assault had been postponed even for half an hour. A division of the assailants, after ascending considerably above the breach, had been directed to turn to the right along the path which had been observed to be practised by the garrison, leading along the side of the rock to the western citadel. The kelledar of that citadel, observing the defenders of the eastern rock to be driven from their post above the breach, and the assailants to have begun climbing up, sallied with the view of taking them in flank, but was unexpectedly met among the rocks by the division described; and at the same instant, a few well-directed shot from the batteries, fell with great execution among his troops. He retreated in surprise and dismay, followed with great energy by the English troops. At this instant the assailants, who had gained the highest eminence of the eastern rock, obtained

a distinct view of the pursuit: they observed the kelledar to fall just as he approached the gate of his citadel, and the pursuers to enter with the fugitives. Every thing was carried within one hour from the commencement of the assault; and an enterprise which had been contemplated by Lord Cornwallis as the most doubtful operation of the war, was thus effected in twelve days from the first arrival of the troops, and five of open batteries, including the day of the assault, with a moderate amount of casualties in the previous operations, and in the assault itself his Lordship had not to regret the loss of a single life.¹

Dec, 23, Colonel Stuart marched on the 23d for the next in strength and importance of the intermediate posts, Ootradroog.² This place had been examined and summoned on the return from Caniambaddy; the kelledar had then made a determined reply; but as the recent fall of Savendroog might produce a change in his decision, Colonel Stuart sent forward to offer liberal terms: the flag was escorted to a proper distance, and the garrison beckoned the staff-officer who accompanied it to advance, until within sixty yards of the gate, when a fire of musquetry opened,

¹ The following extract from the orders of the day of Lord Cornwallis shows that the Mysoreans made little attempt to resist the English. "He can only attribute the pusillanimity of the enemy yesterday, to their astonishment at seeing the good order, and determined countenance with which the troops who were employed in the assault, entered the breaches and ascended precipices that have hitherto been considered in the country as inaccessible. But although the resistance was so contemptible, he is not the less sensible that the behaviour of the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of the 52nd, 71st, 72nd and 76th regiments who led the assault, and also must have made such decisive impression upon the minds of the enemy, reflected the most distinguished honor upon their discipline and valour." (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 218.)

² Ootradroog.—Hutridurga, a fortified hill in the south-west of the Kunigal Taluk, Tumkur District, rising to 3,713 feet above the sea.

from which he and the non-commissioned officer who bore the flag were so fortunate as to escape unhurt : the chief engineer (Colonel Ross) accompanied the escort, and an opportunity was afforded of examining Dec. 24. the ground, which was favourable to the novel mode of attack adopted on the ensuing day. A proper number of field pieces were run down to the appointed stations, and under cover of their fire the escalade commenced : the side of the rock assaulted was not precipitous, but rose at an angle of perhaps thirty-five degrees, defended by a succession of seven ramparts rising above each other, including that of the petta first stormed, and the place was ill provided with cannon : the artillery officers were ordered, as fast as one wall should be carried, to point their guns over the heads of the assailants against the next in succession, for the purpose of keeping down the fire of the garrison. Some of the gateways were forced by the pioneers, but most of the ramparts were carried by escalade ; and such was the astonishment and confusion, that a heavy fire from each successive rampart was actually thrown into the air ; and to the surprise of Colonel Stuart, on collecting the returns, the place was found to be carried without the loss of a life, and with a trifling number of wounded.

The forts of Ramgherry and Sevengherry¹ on the central road, surrendered to a detachment under Captain Welsh, without much resistance ; Holioor-27. droog repaired and re-occupied by the enemy was retaken in advancing, and held, as a post of communication, and nothing intermediate remained, excepting Cabal Droog,² which, being on the southern road of

¹ *Ramgherry and Sevengherry.*—Ramgiri and Sivangiri were fortified hills, on the right and left banks of the Arkavati river near Closepet, 23 miles south-west of Bangalore.

² *Cabal Droog.*—Kabbaladurga, a fortified conical hill, 3,507 feet above sea level, in the Malavalli Taluq, Mysore District. It is now uninhabited. It was used as a prison by Hyder and Tippu for political prisoners ; a malarious unhealthy spot.

Kaunkanhully, not intended to be used, Lord Cornwallis did not deem of sufficient importance to repay the deviation and loss of time it would involve.

In the meantime the siege of Goorumconda had not proceeded in a prosperous manner. The army of Nizam Ali sat down before the place on the 15th of September, and no progress was made until the arrival, early in November, of the guns dispatched by Lord Cornwallis from Nundidroog. The droog of Goorumconda is of great and deserved reputation, and even the lower fort was of considerable strength. Captain Andrew Read, who had succeeded to the command of the English detachment serving with this army, impatient at their awkward proceedings, offered, on the condition of being permitted the exclusive direction of measures, to put them in possession of the lower fort which commanded the only access to the hill, and would thus complete the blockade which they might then manage in their own way. He made an effectual breach, and the artillerymen volunteered to quit their batteries and lead the assault: it was completely successful, and a large body of Nizam Ali's troops was put in possession, under an officer of reputation, named Hafiz Fereed-u-Deen, usually called Hafiz Jee, who was left with an adequate force of infantry and cavalry to continue the blockade; when the main army under the minister, Musheer-ul-Mulk accompanied by the English political resident, Sir John Kennaway, advanced for the siege of Seringapatam.

In order to ensure the safety of the last and most important convoy, proceeding from Coromandel under Colonel Floyd, Lord Cornwallis had requested that this army in its advance, would deviate a little to the eastward, and join Colonel Floyd at the head of the pass; but before they had proceeded thirty miles from Goorumconda, they were recalled by disastrous intelligence, and Colonel Floyd formed the junction without accident. Independently of the ordinary

motives which may be supposed to have influenced the Sultaun's mind in desiring to raise the blockade of Goorumconda, it still contained a few of his relations, the family of Meer-Saheb; and Hafiz Fereed-u-Deen was an object of peculiar vengeance. Futteh Hyder, Tippoo's eldest son, then about eighteen, was placed in the nominal command of nearly all the Silledar horse, assisted by Ghazi Khan, the Sultaun's original military preceptor; and Aly Reza, as a privy counsellor. Their appearance at Goorumconda was totally unexpected; and Hafiz, supposing the party to be no more than a few plunderers, mounted his elephant for the advantage of a better view, and went out to examine their numbers, followed by no more than twenty horsemen, the rest being ordered to follow. He had not advanced far, when he found himself surrounded by superior numbers, and descended from the elephant to mount a horse, and endeavour to force his way back. While in the act of mounting, he was charged on all sides, and carried off as a prisoner; and the horse, who were coming on in tens and twenties, as they could get ready, were attacked in this state, and cut to pieces; and such was the panic, that the lower fort was evacuated with great loss, and the Mysoreans were at liberty to remove the individuals from the hill, and to afford to the besieged the opportunity of re-occupying the lower fort.

The transactions of the ensuing day are not less remarkable than the first result of this well-conducted enterprise. It will be recollected that Hafiz Fereed-u-Deen was the ambassador sent by Nizam Ali to Tippoo Sultaun in 1789. He had been treated with marked disrespect, and was really more a prisoner than an ambassador, when in the course of negotiation, Tippoo was induced to depute Aly Reza to accompany him on his return, and to propose a treaty of marriage. The court of Nizam Ali felt it incumbent on their dignity to retaliate in some degree the

disrespect experienced by their own envoy; and the whole was very justly ascribed to Hafiz Fereed-u-Deen, who affected no concealment of his actual sentiments. When taken, he was plundered of his last garment, and some person had the charity to give him a sort of patch-work quilt, covered with which he was seated at the place of his imprisonment. In this state Aly Reza approached him. "You recollect," said he, "the disrespectful language you employed towards my sovereign and me at Hyderabad on the occasion of the demanded marriage."—"Perfectly well," replied the prisoner, "we were then serving our respective masters: that day is past. If you are here for the purpose of revenge, murder me at once, but do not dishonour me." Aly Reza immediately ordered him to be led out to a concealed situation under cover of a rock, and in his own presence to be cut to pieces

Jan. in cold blood. On the return of the detachment to Seringapatam, a circumstantial report was made in public durbar of the transaction. Tippoo had the grace to express a slight disapprobation of the death of Hafiz Fereed-u-Deen, actually commanded by himself; but expressed his satisfaction at the murder of a French officer in Nizam Ali's service, who had been taken at the same time. The military indiscretion of this unfortunate man produced inferences highly unfavourable to his character; and so little were the facts understood even by his own countrymen, that Lord Cornwallis, after receiving all the explanations, publicly ascribed to a treasonable communication with the enemy the inconsiderate act which terminated in his murder.

On the return of Nizam Ali's army to Goorumconda, the English detachment once more put it in possession of the lower fort, and after arranging a more efficient blockade, that army resumed its march to the south, and joined Lord Cornwallis 25. in the neighbourhood of Ootradroog, on the 25th of January.

Every thing that related to the eastern line of operation and supply, was not only ready, but the advance had been retarded, not so much by the awkward arrangements of Nizam Ali's army, as by the intentional delays of Perseram Bhow, to which we shall presently advert. All the convoys had joined, and the travelling grain merchants, furnishing to the amount of sixty thousand oxen, many of them formerly attendant on the armies of the house of Hyder, were already in a regular train of communication, and had, for several months past, furnished the English army with grain from various quarters, but chiefly from Coromandel. The granaries there provided for the service of the war were open to all such as brought the requisite certificates; they purchased the grain at cheap rates, and sold it in camp for whatever it would fetch. It was the obvious purpose of Lord Cornwallis, that grain should be plenty, not cheap, for cheapness would check the inducements of the merchant, and diminish the supply; while therefore no limitation of price was attempted, he always ensured to the merchant a fair profit, by purchasing on the public account, whenever it fell below a certain standard, and dispatching the adventurers for a fresh cargo: and by a steady adherence to these simple commercial principles, he secured an abundance which had never before been experienced in any English campaign, and the amount of the supply may be conjectured from the acknowledged fact, that the number of strangers in Mysoor in the campaign of 1792, could not have fallen short of 400,000 persons. Much has been conjectured, and little ascertained regarding this extraordinary class of men; whose habits and history were at that period entirely unknown to the English army. Every man and many of the women were armed with a great variety of weapons, and although moving with their whole train of women and children, who could scarcely be classed among the impediments, proved themselves capable,

in several instances, not only of military defence, but of military enterprise, as was particularly evinced in the assault and plunder of the lower fort of Cabal Droog. Farther north they are known by the name of *Brinjaries*,¹ a supposed Persian compound, designating their office with an army: in the south they are called *Lumbanies*,² but no conjecture has been hazarded regarding this name, and they have not even a tradition regarding their origin. After a discussion of some length with an assembly of chiefs regarding their descent, and pressing for some traditional account of their original country or home, "That is our country," said the eldest among them, pointing to the tent which covered his grain bags, "and wherever it is pitched is our home, my ancestors never told me of any other;" and nothing can be added of fact or conjecture, except that their language is northern, and apparently a dialect of the Penjaub-ee. After a war, in which of course many of their cattle are destroyed, they seek for some forest inhabited only by tigers, worthless to its government, and the terror of the neighbourhood, which they obtain permission to occupy, and enter it fearlessly, waging war with its former inhabitants, until it becomes a safe nursery for the increase of their herds, and affords a few patches for the growth

¹ *Brinjaries*.—Brinjarry. The word is properly Hind. *Banjara*, and Wilson derives it from Sanskrit *banji*, trade; *kara*, doer. It is possible that the form *brinjara*, may have been suggested by a supposed connection with Persian *birinj*, rice. They are dealers in grain and salt, who move about in numerous parties with cattle. They talk a kind of Mahratta or Hindi patois. Most classes of Banjaras in the west appear to have a tradition of having first come to the Deccan with Mughal camps as commissariat carriers. (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*.)

² *Lumbanies*.—Lambanis are a tribe wandering about Southern India, closely resembling the Brinjaras, or it may be identical with them. Their occupation is grain and salt carrying, and they speak a dialect of Mahratta and Hindi. The introduction of railways has destroyed their trade and in many parts of Madras they have settled down as cultivators

of roots and corn ; and detachments go occasionally forth carrying grain or drugs to the sea shore, and bringing a return cargo of salt.* In forming an establishment of this nature to which the author's assent was required, it was particularly stipulated, that they should be governed by their own laws and customs, and punished by their own magistrates, with two reservations, to which in the first instance they strenuously objected ; 1st, that no capital execution should take place, without the sanction of the regular judicial authority ; and 2d, that they should be punishable for murder : in other respects they were tenants at will, without rent or tax, and governing themselves according to a principle familiar in India, by the customs of their cast. The adjacent villages, however, began to claim the land, when it was no longer worthless, and on the whole they were troublesome to the Government. The executions to which they demanded assent, or the murders for which they were called to account, had their invariable

* Salt, of an inferior quality, is manufactured in the interior, by a very simple process, of lixiviating earth impregnated with salt, which discovers itself by an efflorescence on the surface ; a reservoir approaching the form of an inverted cone, is formed in a high mound, and lined with viscid clay, perfectly water-tight ; from the apex a communication is made by a hollow bamboo tube to the earthen vessel destined to receive the saturated water ; and over the tube, in the apex, a rude filter is prepared by crossed twigs and straw ; matters being thus adjusted, the reservoir is filled with the impregnated earth, and water added for the purpose of lixiviation. The saturated water, on being received into the separate vessel, is then removed to the boiler, and when sufficiently evaporated, the salt is spread out for its final drying ; from the imperfection of the filter, it always contains a quantity of black earth, and its bitter flavour seems to indicate the presence of sulphate of magnesia, and some specimens which deliquesce have probably muriate of magnesia. Many inhabitants prefer it from habit, to the sea-salt of the coast, obtained by solar evaporation.

[The manufacture of earth salt in the Madras Presidency is now prohibited, as interfering with the revenue from sea salt, on which a duty is levied at the factory.]

origin in witchcraft, or the power of communication with evil spirits. If a child sickened, or a wife was inconstant, the sorcerer was to be discovered and punished; and the traces of belief in a benignant and supreme being, were more faint and obscure in this semi-barbarous community, than among those rude mountaineers who, in every part of India, recede from communication with civilized man. The free command of their own time and means, which the nature of Lord Cornwallis's operations permitted him to allow, rendered them the most efficient branch of his commissariat; and an importance, beyond its value, was attached to their general utility from overlooking the very unusual circumstances of his situation in the campaign of 1792: but subsequent experience has shewn that the expectation of their accompanying the operations of an active campaign, of which the movements cannot certainly be foreseen, or depending on their supplies, without a perfectly open rear, will always terminate in disappointment.

The preparations of General Abercromby for the campaign of 1792 were well considered and effective. The duties of his government had carried him to Bombay, and he returned to Malabar in November 1791, bringing with him or receiving from Palgaut all the means of a good equipment; and he made his first march from the head of the pass towards Mysoor on the 22d of January with an effective force of eight thousand four hundred men.

Lord Cornwallis was ready at an earlier period, as we have already noticed, with an army, according to the returns, of 22,033 men, a battering train of forty-two pieces, and forty-four field guns, but excluding the artillery-men and pioneers, his effective force, in cavalry and infantry, was 16,721 men. The demonstrations of Tippoo Sultaun to the northward had induced his Lordship to request that Perseram Bhow should advance simultaneously on the direct

road from Sera, as well to prevent a detachment towards Goorumconda, which actually occurred, as to form a column on his right to unite at the proper time with General Abercromby: but the general purposes of the war were of secondary consideration in all the movements of this chief: he had a political illness which produced an embarrassing correspondence, and it was the necessity of delay arising from this circumstance which induced Lord Cornwallis to occupy the time intended for advance in the siege of Savendroog, which he had determined to leave in his rear from the great improbability of being able to reduce it; and thus in the actual result the delay was useful.

After separating from Lord Cornwallis on the 8th of July 1791, Perseram Bhow pursued his exclusive object of plunder, in which he was eminently successful, and completed what had been left unaccomplished by Hurry Punt, near Raidroog, of a secure route for its realization in the Mahratta territory. Lord Cornwallis's summons to advance, found him occupied in the neighbourhood of Chittledroog, on which he had formed some abortive designs, to be executed by means of treachery. His supposed illness detained him in that neighbourhood; but in fact, he contemplated the rich plunder of the town and province of Bednore; and to this object, he determined to sacrifice all those interests of the confederacy, which depended on his co-operation in the concerted plan. Well knowing that he could not with safety get entangled in the woods of Bednore, until Lord Cornwallis was actually before Seringapatam, and in conformity to a violation of compact with his friends, as shameless as any that Tippoo had ever practised with his enemies, he not only took no part in the general plan of operation, but did not even arrive at Seringapatam until upwards of a fortnight after the service was finished, and the preliminary articles of peace had been signed.

Perseram Bhow had not sufficiently concealed his purpose from the enemy: it was plainly indicated by his gradual approach on the western line instead of the southern, as demanded by the obvious combinations of any rational plan of campaign; and the Sultaun had strengthened the provincial troops of Bednore by a division under his relation Reza Saheb, which enabled that officer to take the field with a force of about 8,000 men, and 10 good field guns.

The English detachment, as usual, bore the prominent brunt of every serious service, and Captain Little who had no alternative but to comply with the requisitions of Purseram Bhow, executed those services in a manner which caused the sordid purposes of the expedition to be forgotten in its brilliant achievements.

Hooly Onore¹ situated near the confluence of the Toom and Buddra was carried by assault, after a siege of only two days on the 21st of December, and the army crossing the Buddra at that place, proceeded south-west towards Simoga,² situated on the western bank of the Toom or Tunga, which river they crossed on the 26th. It was the purpose of Reza Saheb to wait in the vicinity until the troops should be divided by the operations of the siege, and in that state to attack them unexpectedly in the rear, and by a powerful sortie from the fort. The position which he occupied about ten miles to the southward of the fort so plainly indicated his designs, that it was determined to anticipate them by an attack, which

¹ *Hooly Onore*.—Hole Honnur, a small town in the Shimoga District, Mysore, on the right bank of the Bhadra. In Hyder's time, Hole Honnur was given in jahgir to the officers of the sowars, and many Mahrattas were settled there. They still supply men to the cavalry in Mysore.

² *Simoga*.—Shimoga, the chief town in the district of the same name (Mysore State) on the left bank of the Tunga, 171 miles north-west of Bangalore. The place was taken by Hyder in his invasion of Bednur; previous to that, it was one of the possessions of the Keladi or Ikkeri Chiefs.

from the strength of his position, he did not expect. His right rested on the river, his front was covered by a deep ravine, and his left by underwood (jungle), deemed impenetrable, a lighter continuation of which in front of the ravine, it was necessary to pass before the position could be correctly examined. On the 29th, Captain Little with only two guns, about a thousand English sepoy firelocks, and five hundred Mahrattas, penetrated the jungle in two columns, and after a severe conflict of upwards of two hours, succeeded in turning the enemy's right by the bank of the river; three guns fell into his immediate possession, the enemy commenced a precipitate retreat, and Captain Little did not abandon the pursuit, on that and the succeeding day, until he had overtaken and captured every gun, and completely dispersed the whole corps; an achievement which, in a fair and combined consideration of judicious design and spirited execution, was certainly not exceeded by any operation of the war.¹

From this period until the middle of January, the Mahratta army made little change in its head quarters, being too busily employed in realizing plunder, over a large extent of plain country opened to their detachments by this event. In January Perseram Bhow penetrated the woods, and arrived

¹ "Captain Little's three battalions on this memorable occasion mustered about eight hundred bayonets! Notwithstanding the comparative insignificance of his numbers, he did not hesitate in moving down on the enemy's position: the irregular infantry of the Mahrattas following in the rear. Captain Little, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which the enemy was posted, and aware of the advantage of keeping his strength in reserve in such a situation, went forward with one battalion; and as the fire opened, he directed two companies to advance on the enemy's right and two other companies to attack their left, while the rest were engaged with the centre. Every attempt to penetrate into the jungle was warmly opposed, but the enemy's right seemed the point most assailable, though defended with obstinacy. Two companies were sent to reinforce the two engaged on the right; but Lieutenants Doolan and Bethune, who led them, were

on the 28th before the exterior lines which surrounded the city of Bednore. He was preparing to force them by means of the English troops, when he received intelligence that Kummer-u-Deen had been detached with a large corps of infantry, from Seringapatam, and was rapidly approaching by a route in the woods, which would intercept his retreat. He instantly commenced a retrograde movement, called in his detachments, and commenced his march to the south-east, crossing the Toom, near Simoga on the 10th of February, four days after Lord Cornwallis had stormed the enemy's lines at Seringapatam; and he did not reach the vicinity of that capital until near the middle of March, when general indignation at his faithless and unprincipled conduct had long been merged in greater events.

wounded successively. The grenadier company under Lieutenant Moor was sent to their support; that officer also fell disabled. Six companies of the 11th battalion were then brought forward and Brigadier-Major Ross, who directed them, was killed." . . . "Captain Little, watching the opportunities when his men's minds required support, with admirable judgment and gallantry . . . rallied, cheered, and reanimated them." (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 209-210.) Lieutenant Moor wrote *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment* (London 1794. Quarto). He wrote the well-known *Hindu Pantheon*. He became a member of the Royal Society. He died in 1848. Captain Little's reports on this action will be found in Forrest's *Selections (Mahratta Series)*, Vol. I, p. 534.

CHAPTER XLI.

Lord Cornwallis's advance—Considerations—Description of the Sultaun's position—General attack on the night of the 6th February 1792—Plan of the attack in three columns—Execution—right—centre—left—Tippoo's conduct—Operations of the 7th—Attack on Colonel Stuart in the morning—Admirable defence of the Sultaun's redoubt—Attack on Colonel Stuart in the evening—Advances to negotiation—Tippoo releases the Officers taken at Coimbetoor—Some of them had been liberated in the operations of the 6th—Lord Cornwallis consents to receive the Sultaun's envoy—Discussion of that measure—Attempt to assassinate Lord Cornwallis—Negotiations—Preliminary treaty submitted by Tippoo, to a full meeting of his officers—executed—Delivery of the hostages—Conferences preparatory to the definitive treaty—The Sultaun's rage at the demand of Coorg, as a violation of the preliminaries—discussed—Reciprocal preparations for renewing the war—considered—Tardy decision of Lord Cornwallis—forces the conclusion of the definitive treaty—Territorial cessions described—Motives of Lord Cornwallis's moderation—discussed.

THE English army under Lord Cornwallis, that of Nizam Ali under one of his sons, Secunder Jah, accompanied by the minister, exhibiting an apparatus more splendid, and a crowd as little efficient as that of the former campaign, together with the small body of Mahrattas under Hurry Punt, a superannuated old man, united on the 25th of Jan. January, near Savendroog, and commenced their

Feb. 1. march from Hoolioordroog. On the 1st of February every human dwelling was in flames as they approached, and on the 5th, after passing over a high ground which gave a full view of Seringapatam, and of Tippoo's army encamped under its walls, the confederates encamped about six miles to the northward.

Lord Cornwallis, ascribing to his enemy councils equally dictated by firmness and by wisdom, apprehended that he would leave the defence of the capital to a trusty officer and ample garrison, and keeping aloof with a light and effective army, act on the communications of the besiegers, and dislodge them by the mere force of their own numbers: these apprehensions received additional force, from the absence of the only branch of the confederacy (that under Perseram Bhow) from which his Lordship could expect efficient aid; but the actual presence of the Sultaun's army dissipated all alarms on that account, and promised to realize his best hopes of being enabled to strike a decisive blow before the commencement of the siege.

A bound hedge, formed of a wide belt of thorny plants, commencing at the bank of the river, about a thousand yards above the island of Seringapatam, runs due north, about three thousand yards, and embracing a commanding eminence, sweeps south-east, in nearly a diagonal direction, until it terminates at the river immediately under the Carigat hill, near the point which terminated the action of the 15th of May 1791; the intention of such belts, is to form a retreat for cattle on the appearance of a superior cavalry, and to be a sort of exterior line of defence. The eminence described, was fortified with a well constructed redoubt, and the Carigat hill had another work not finished; these two works, one within the bound hedge, the other without it, might be considered as advanced works, on the flanks of the position: another interior system of seven powerful

redoubts, supported by the fort, and by each other, formed the main position of the army, but an eventual retreat was secured by the works of the fort, and by strong lines on the island, along the whole extent of the banks of the river, which formed in itself an additional defence, being in many places not fordable, and in most very rocky and difficult. The guns pointing north in all the works described, were not less than three hundred. The knowledge of the principles of fortification* ascribed to Tippoo Sultaun in some publications, was certainly not discovered in its effects on any of his newly erected fortresses. In the practical erection of redoubts of various construction, he had, on this occasion, been well assisted; their situations had been skilfully chosen with reference to the ground, and he had devoted his whole time and attention to the strengthening of this formidable position from the period of the recession of the allies in June 1791. One detachment of importance only, that of Kummer-u-Deen, was abroad, for a small corps of cavalry, which appeared in the vicinity of Madras, about this period, is no farther worthy of observation, than as it may suggest the true and efficient means which were not employed.

The Sultaun was confident that no decisive enterprise could be undertaken until the junction of the army of Bombay, which had again arrived at Periapatam, and in the intermediate time he expected to finish the important work on the Carigat hill; and although an English corps ascended that hill on the morning of the 6th, for the obvious purpose of Feb. 6.

* A very handsome case of instruments was found in his tent. In his library, (see Stewart's catalogue,) was a translation of Euclid, and several works of reputation on geometry, mathematics, and astronomy. I have reason to believe, that in the theory or practice of mathematics, nothing could be ascribed to him, except the ambition of being thought to possess this as well as every other science.

reconnoissance, while another examined his right, it is certain that he had no expectation of attack on that night.

Lord Cornwallis, having prepared written instructions to be communicated to officers commanding divisions and corps, the orders were issued immediately after sun-set, and three distinct columns in their appointed order of march, were ready to move about eight o'clock, with a brilliant moonlight; the right hand column preceding the others about half an hour on account of the greater distance, in order that all the attacks might be simultaneous. Until the whole had marched no communication was made to the allies, who were in astonishment and dismay, at hearing of an attack without cannon, and in consternation at Lord Cornwallis's undignified arrangement of going out himself to fight like a common soldier.¹

The right attack under General Medows was ordered to leave untouched the advanced redoubt on the eminence which was distant from the nearest

¹ Lord Cornwallis had not acted without due deliberation on a course which was adventurous, but not rash. He had learnt what reliance he might justly place on the force under his command. He wrote to the Court of Directors (camp before Seringapatam, March 4, 1792,) that taking into consideration the nature and strength of the fortifications of the camp, it was evident that an attack in daylight might be doubtful, and that the loss of a great number of our best soldiers would have been certain, whilst at the same time Tippu had a retreat for his army so near and so well covered that he could hardly have been sanguine enough to hope that any advantage which it would have been possible to have gained in the day would have been decisive. He added, "I therefore determined to attack him in the night and without loss of time; and as little use could be expected from our guns in the work, and the nature of the ground between us and the enemy's camp would have rendered it extremely difficult to convey them, I resolved to march without artillery of any kind; and in such an enterprise neither our own nor the cavalry of the allies could afford any assistance." (Forrest: *Selections from State Papers, Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 139.)

part of the fort about two miles, and was situated so far to the enemy's left as to be clear of the direct front of their main position. It was intended that this column should penetrate the left of the encampment and line of works about fifteen hundred yards in the rear of the advanced work, and turning to the left carry all the works and overthrow the troops of the enemy's left wing, until it should come into communication with the centre column under Lord Cornwallis and receive his farther directions. The firelocks of this column were 3,300, and the Europeans exceeded in number those of the centre column.

The centre column had no more than 3,700 firelocks, and may be considered as subdivided into three divisions; the front, under Colonel Knox, which was to mix with the fugitives, and pass over into the island; the centre, under Colonel Stuart, which, after penetrating the whole depth of the camp, was to turn to the left, and overthrow the enemy's right wing, after which he was to endeavour to force the works of the island. The rear of the column formed a reserve under Lord Cornwallis, to be joined by the right column under General Medows.

The left column, under Colonel Maxwell, had 1,700 firelocks; it was ordered to force the work on the Carigat hill, to descend and turn the right of the main position, and unite with Colonel Stuart (the senior officer), in forcing the works of the island at that point, or obey such other orders as he should receive from the Commander-in-chief. The whole operation will be most distinctly understood by presenting a summary account of the separate proceedings of each column.

On receiving the several reports of the officers who had examined the position in the morning, two suggestions were discussed regarding the advanced work on the enemy's left; one, to make it the first object of attack; the other, to leave it out of the plan

of operations. The last was determined; but there was an ambiguity in the order,¹ and the officer charged with guiding the column, led it to the advanced redoubt, and it was three quarters of an hour later in commencing the attack than either of the other columns. The redoubt mounted eight pieces of cannon, and was supported by three other guns in position which flanked its approach. It was defended with the most obstinate bravery by the troops within, as well as those appointed to support that part of the position. The grenadiers rushed steadily forward, through a heavy fire of grape and musquetry, to escalate the work; but the officer of engineers, who had charge of the scaling ladders, and several of his men being killed in the first attempt, the ladders could not be found, and without them it seemed impossible to get into the redoubt. The last finish had not been given to the work by the construction of a drawbridge, and a narrow path-way had been left for communication, with a good traverse, which commanded also the gate of the sortie. The gate and traverse were forced; but the enemy determined on resistance to the last, turned one of their guns loaded with grape, and nearly the whole of their musquetry against the gorge. It was stormed; but the fire of the enemy was so well reserved, that nearly the whole party that entered was swept away, and the attack was repulsed, but rallied behind the traverse. The fire of English musquetry, although inferior to that of the enemy, was so well directed through the gorge, that the gun could not be reloaded. A fresh disposition was made for renewing the attack,

¹ This was the attack on the Bad-gah redoubt, which Lord Cornwallis stated that it was not his intention to attack. The order referred to was: "If the right attack is made to the westward of Somarpet, the troops of that attack should, after entering the enemy's lines, turn to the left. But if the attack is made to the eastward of Somarpet, the troops should turn to the right to dislodge the enemy from all their posts on the left of their position."

and the grenadiers ultimately succeeded in closing with the bayonet, and carried the work. Some of its garrison defended themselves to the last; many leaped from the embrasures into the ditch; but scarcely a man escaped being killed or taken. About four hundred men fell in its defence; and the English casualties were ninety-one, of whom eleven were officers. A strong garrison of four companies of Europeans and one battalion of sepoys was left for the defence of this important work, and the column wheeled to the left to execute the remaining part of the order; it was led clear of the left hand redoubt of the main position, (which could now scarcely be deemed tenable), against the next in succession: when the work became distinctly visible, the head of the column was halted for the purpose of closing up, and the great strength and magnitude of the work, combined with the desperate resistance of the first, and the total cessation at this moment of all firing in the centre or left attacks, suggested the idea that they must either have been completely successful, or have been repulsed, in either of which cases it was of greater importance to Lord Cornwallis to be strongly reinforced, than to risk heavier losses for the attainment of works which it was argued must fall of themselves, in consequence of the possession of the commanding work already carried. This reasoning being adopted, the column counter-marched, re-crossed the bound hedge and made a detour to fall in with the route of the centre column, which it did not find until day-break, after the conclusion of the business of the night.¹

¹ It was an unfortunate decision to make a detour outside the bound hedge. A number of ravines and rice-fields had to be crossed, and owing to being misled, the centre column reached the Carighat Hill without receiving any news of Cornwallis. Then hearing heavy firing, Medows halted and counter-marched and advanced and found the centre column not far from the foot of the hill. Cornwallis had asked "where General Medows had been disposing of himself."

The head of the centre column was discovered about eleven o'clock, by the enemy's advanced posts; the silence previously enjoined, was not broken by a single voice, but without any previous order, every man, as if actuated by a single impulse, lengthened his step, and before the lapse of one minute, the whole column was marching at nearly double its former rate. The advanced division was composed of six flank companies of Europeans, one regiment and one battalion, one battalion company of the regiment preceding the whole, to cover the pioneers; the column penetrated with the bayonet alone, but as the battalion following in its appointed order, was just entering the camp, a galling fire on its flanks, brought down among others, the officer* commanding; he was exceedingly beloved by his men, and his fall produced some agitation, which ended in confusion. Colonel Stuart, whose station was immediately in the rear of this corps, rode on to rally them, but finding that much time would be lost in the attempt, he ordered up the next corps, the 71st: three companies of the battalion had followed the advanced division, and the remainder of the corps formed in the rear of the 71st, and afterwards behaved with great steadiness.

In order that the direction to mix with the fugitives might be more effectually executed, Lieutenant-Colonel Knox instructed the captains commanding the flank companies, to look more to celerity than solidity of movement, each captain to be exclusively responsible for his own company. The regiment and battalion was directed to follow in compact order, and he passed himself, with the flank companies, through a crowded mass of fugitives, by the main ford close under the guns of the fort. From the circumstances which have been noticed, the flank companies separated in the crowd into two bodies, one continued

* Captain Arabdeson.

to penetrate along the glaxis, to the south branch of the river, considerably to the eastward of the Mysoor bridge, and contributed by the alarm spread in that direction, to prevent any disturbance to the more serious operations. Three companies, with Lieutenant-Colonel Knox obtained a guide to Shaher Ganjaum, in the centre of the island, and contributed essentially to the success of the centre division, as will presently be seen. The remaining seven companies of the regiment, and three companies of sepoy following in compact order under Captain Hunter, missed the ford, and crossed the river a little below it, into the palace named Deria Dowlut Baug; and Captain Hunter considering himself to be the first that had crossed, took post to wait for farther intelligence or orders; but as day light approached, and neither orders nor intelligence arrived, he perceived that his post, under the immediate fire of the fort, would not be tenable by day light, and most fortunately as we shall find, re-crossed the river, and joined the reserve under Lord Cornwallis.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, with the centre division of the centre column, after calling up the 71st, as has been stated, was proceeding the whole depth of the camp before he should turn to the left, and perceived himself to be close to a strong work (afterwards known to have been named, by way of eminence, the Sultaun's redoubt,) which it was necessary to storm, and a compact mass of cavalry coming forward to charge; a single volley dispersed the cavalry, and the resistance of the redoubt was inconsiderable. Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart left for its defence two companies of Europeans, one of sepoy, and a proportion of artillerymen, and proceeded according to order to overthrow the enemy's right wing. A heavy body of infantry retreated before him, and was supposed to have taken the direction of the river, and to have passed into the island; but when following the direction of the tents as his most certain guide, he had

attained nearly the extreme right of the position, he perceived a line of troops drawn up with perfect regularity to oppose him. It was Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's division. They reciprocally mistook each other for enemies; and Colonel Stuart had just ordered a volley to be given, and an immediate charge with the bayonet, when the error was most happily discovered. This division had executed with the greatest precision the service allotted to it, by storming the work on the hill; but in descending, in farther prosecution of its objects, was severely galled by an advanced body from the enemy's right, who had availed themselves of the cover of a water-course which winds round its foot, and subsequently by the troops forming the right of the main position. The column, however, surmounted every obstacle, broke the enemy's right, and proceeded until met, as related, by the column under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

Both columns were now near the river, and a heavy fire was opened upon them from the works on the opposite bank. A disposition was made for forcing them; but this first attempt being made where the river was not fordable was beaten back with great loss. Endeavours were now made, at various points, to find a practicable ford: one was found by Lieutenant-Colonel Baird, who lodged a small party under cover on the opposite bank, and sent back a report of his success: the head of the principal column had scarcely half crossed, when the enemy's fire suddenly and totally ceased. It was to the three companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Knox that they were indebted for this unexpected facility: that officer, having waited long and in vain at Gunjaum for the remainder of his division, perceived the heavy fire below him, and distinctly penetrating its cause, ordered the batteries to be stormed in reverse, and thereby ensured a success which might otherwise have been doubtful. The depth of the river where crossed by the united columns, left not a dry cartridge;

the bayonet remained as their sole reliance, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, until day-light could give him better means of examining his ground, occupied a position to the eastward of Sheher Gunjaum, with a flank resting on each branch of the river, the right nearly under the Carigat-hill.

In the meanwhile Lord Cornwallis took post with the reserve within the bound hedge where the column had penetrated, with his left towards the Sultaun's redoubt; he received in due time intelligence of complete success in the ultimate and most doubtful object of the whole operation, a firm footing on the island; and took the earliest means in his power to send over by a better ford, which was afterwards discovered, ammunition to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart to maintain it. He was still, however, without tidings of General Medows, and reflected with the utmost anxiety on the profound silence on his right. The enemy was better instructed, and collecting the unbroken forces on the left, with such part of the centre as had retreated in that direction, bore down with the greatest resolution on this reserve: it had consisted of the battalion companies of one regiment, and two complete battalions of sepoy, and had recently been joined by the seven companies of Europeans and three of natives from the Dowlut Baug already mentioned, who had but just replaced their wet ammunition when the attack commenced, about two hours before day-light. "If General Medows be above ground," said his Lordship, "this will bring him." The charge of their venerated Commander-in-chief, assailed by overwhelming numbers, animated every individual, European and native, to the highest stretch of exertion; and he personally gave his own orders with his accustomed coolness and precision: he waited a very near approach before he ordered the charge of the bayonet, which caused a complete but a temporary route; the enemy perceiving his small numbers returned repeatedly,

and each time with apparently encreasing vigour, but they were each time met and repelled with augmented energy and cool determination, and it was near day-light before they finally desisted. Lord Cornwallis had, at an early period, been wounded in the hand, but concealed the accident, and the number of casualties in his staff and among the troops was considerable. Still ignorant of General Medows's situation, it was necessary to take a position where his small corps could not be surrounded, and he retired to the Carigat hill, which had been occupied, after being carried by the left column, and at the foot of that hill he at length met General Medows's division. The whole encampment was now brought forward to a nearer position; but before relating the events of the succeeding day, it will be satisfactory to revert to the Sultaun's proceedings during the operations which have been described.

His tent was pitched in the usual place, in the rear of the centre of the position close to the road, by which the head of the centre column penetrated. He had made his evening's meal in the Sultaun's redoubt to the right of that situation, and the garrison which had made way for him and his suite had not time, perhaps not much inclination, to resume their posts when he left it in haste. On the first alarm he mounted, and before he could receive distinct reports of the nature of the combined attack, a mass of fugitives announced that the enemy had penetrated the centre, and the bright moon-light soon discovered to him a lengthened column passing through the camp, and pointing directly to the main ford which would intercept his retreat. He went off with celerity, just in time to pass over before the head of the English column, many of his attendants being killed by the advanced company. He passed in by the sortie of the Bangalore gate, and entered the detached lozenge work at the north-east angle of the fort, whence he issued his orders, and remained until day-light. One

of the companies (commanded by the Honourable Captain Lindsay), in passing this sortie, looked in to ascertain whether the gate were open, and could not have been many minutes behind the Sultaun. The day of the 6th had been employed in issuing pay to the troops. It was the routine that on the first day the sum payable to each cushoon should be counted out to the respective buckshees. On the second day they made their detailed payments, and for the custody of the money during the intermediate night, the bags were closed with the seals of the buckshee and the treasurer, and remained in the responsibility of the general treasury or pay-office, till next day. In this state was the charge of Poornea the treasurer when the action commenced. He began immediately to load the treasure on his camels, and in the act of doing so was severely wounded by a musquet ball. He continued however to complete his work, his camels passed over along with the grenadiers, they were particularly noticed by the troops as inconveniently encreasing the crowd, but to no farther extent; and he carried off his whole charge along the foot of the glacis of two faces of the fort, and lodged it at the Mysoor gate without the loss of one rupee. The Ahmedy Chêlas constituted the centre which had given way, and availing themselves of the confusion which ensued, and the open retreat by the Mysoor bridge, nearly the whole body, amounting to 10,000, many accompanied by their wives and children, marched off with their arms to the western woods of Coorg, and thence to their respective homes. Many of the Assud Oollahee availed themselves of the same opportunity; the fugitives and followers of every description passed in crowds over the Mysoor bridge, and many did not stop till they reached Nunjend-gode, a distance of twenty-five miles. A number of foreigners who had served both Hyder and Tippoo took advantage of this opportunity to quit a service which they detested, and among them an old man

named Blevette, who had really constructed most of the redoubts, and several of the artificers sent by Louis XVI., who had no other means than flight of returning to their native country. On collecting the reports of the morning, the killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to twenty-three thousand men; and Poornea recommended as the most efficient mode of rallying the missing, to proclaim the farther issue of two lacks of rupees on account, which brought back a much smaller number than he had expected.

Tippoo Sultaun, seated in the detached work, issued his orders for the operations which have been described. During the movements of the advanced portion of the centre column, close under the works, a few guns had been opened by the fort, of which he peremptorily prohibited the repetition, from the apprehension that the troops still in camp might imagine the fort itself to be attacked, and imitate the example of the Chélas. When clear day-light appeared, it opened without reserve on every thing hostile within its reach. Lord Cornwallis had ascended the Carigat hill for the purpose of commanding a more extensive view. With the exception of that unfinished post, the position on the eastern extremity of the island, the advanced work on the left, and the Sultaun's redoubt, the other detached works continued to be occupied in force by the Mysoreans, scattered parties seemed to be collecting in all directions, but the tents of the encampment were struck and no semblance remained of an exterior army.

Feb. 7. A little after day-light, a body of infantry advanced to dislodge Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart from the provisional position which he had assumed, and finding their fire not returned, (the dry ammunition having not yet arrived,) came forward under cover of walls and houses in considerable numbers. Colonel Stuart had no alternative, but to cover his troops in the best manner he was able, until the enemy should give him an opportunity of using the bayonet; and

Lord Cornwallis, who perceived these transactions from the hill, sent a reinforcement with ammunition, which enabled Colonel Stuart to resume the offensive, and drive back the assailants,

The troops on the island were found to be in greater force than the Sultaun had supposed, and before renewing the attack, he deemed it necessary to retake the Sultaun's redoubt, which had a considerable command of the communication between the island and the northern side of the river. This work was nearly of the same construction and strength as the advanced redoubt on the left, but being within range of the fort and island, its gorge was very properly left open, in order that, if carried, it might not be tenable, and there had been no time to reverse its defences, if the rocky ground had admitted the attempt. Under these circumstances, the fire of the fort, keeping the army at a distance, the garrison, consisting of one hundred and fifty men, was left to its own resources. A temporary barricade of the gorge, with some broken carriages found in the place, was soon cleared away by the cannon of the fort, and of several field pieces brought into an advanced position; and in the first furious assault, which was repulsed, between ten and eleven, Captain Sibbald, the officer commanding, was killed: Major Skelly, one of Lord Cornwallis's aid-de-camps, who had been sent thither on duty, and found himself unable to return in consequence of its being every where encompassed, had hitherto merely assisted; but now assumed the command; and found, that in this obstinately contested assault, the men had expended nearly the whole of their ammunition: most fortunately, two oxen carrying spare ammunition with the column, and scared in the course of the night, had strayed into the ditch of the work, and were discovered about noon: the men had scarcely filled their cartouch boxes from this resource, when a fresh attempt was made. The Sultaun, on

the first repulse, had exclaimed in grief and indignation, "Have I no faithful servants to retrieve my honour?" After some consultation, the cavalry volunteered the enterprize, and a body of two thousand, in compact order, advanced about one o'clock, with a determined countenance, as if to charge at once into the redoubt, but stopping suddenly at musquet range, four hundred dismounted, and rushed with the greatest impetuosity to force the entrance with their sabres. The garrison was perfectly prepared, the gorge was necessarily cleared during the existence of the cannonade, but when it ceased, from the approach of the assailants, the garrison formed across the opening, while the portion of the parapet which bore on the enemy was also fully manned: the fire was so coolly reserved, and deliberately given, that the leading part of the column was completely brought down; and though, after the first hesitation, a disposition to advance was strongly manifested, the steady and rapid continuation of the fire threw the enemy into confusion and retreat: two captured guns in front of the right of Colonel Stuart's position had just been tried, and being found to reach the spot at random ricochet range, are said to have produced an unmerited impression: the retreat of the assailants was covered as before by the cannon, and by large bodies of infantry, under the shelter of rocks, firing into the gorge, and the garrison resumed what little cover was afforded by the circular form of the work.

The next and last attack was made by the French European corps, which the garrison awaited with the expectation of a severer effort. The Europeans, however, did not justify this expectation, but went off with a much smaller loss than had been sustained by either of the prior attacks. If the Sultan found a repugnance in his troops to renew the assault of the redoubt, its defenders were cordially rejoiced to perceive them finally drawing off about

four o'clock. In this small work, two officers and nineteen men lay dead; three officers and twenty-two men were wounded, to the extent of being totally disabled, exclusively of the less serious cases. Not a drop of water was procurable throughout the day, for the relief of the wounded; and the sufferings of the unhurt sustained a more severe trial from their friends than from their enemies; but the glory was imperishable, of a number now reduced below one hundred effective men, totally unsupported, having for a whole day, and in circumstances highly unfavourable, defied the efforts of an army acting under the support of the guns of their capital. The inversions of military fact in some European bulletins, have long become the theme of proverbial jest even in their own country; but perhaps none can be quoted so perfect in its kind as a triumphal ode* to commemorate the capture of the Sultaun's redoubt, by the Sultaun's own hand, composed by his orders, and the most favoured performance of the royal band.

Success against the redoubt being now deemed impracticable, it remained, as a last effort, to attempt to dislodge the troops from the island, where, with the exception of advancing his right to turn some of the enemy's guns against the troops attacking the redoubt, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart had made no material change in his dispositions. About five o'clock, two heavy columns of infantry entered the town, drove in the advanced posts, and opened a fire on the main position. They were promptly attacked, driven through the town with great loss, and there was time before dark to establish a strong post at the advanced gate nearest the fort. The Sultaun thus

* The reader may consult the opinion of the Kirkpatrick, regarding the merit of the encomiastic odes.—Tippoo's Letters, page 391; and I venture to add, that independently of its veracity, I have never heard a travestie more truly ludicrous, than the song of triumph alluded to in the text, which I heard recited several years afterwards.

foiled in every effort to dislodge the English troops from any of the positions they had seized, thought proper on the same night to evacuate the whole line of redoubts to the north of the river, and leave them to be occupied by the English, who commenced without a moment's unnecessary delay all the preparatory operations of the siege.*

Our last notice of an advance to negotiation related to the fruitless mission of Apajee Ram in August 1791. When the long gathering storm was at length ready to burst over his head, the Sultaun, on the 12th of January 1792, made a farther attempt to obtain Lord Cornwallis's reception of an envoy; to which an answer was immediately returned, stating that no negotiation could take place with a person who not only disregarded treaties, but directly violated articles of capitulation. "Send hither," added his Lordship, "the garrison of Coimbetoor, and then we will listen to what you have to say." On Feb. 8. the 8th of February, after all his military efforts had failed, he sent for Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, who had comparatively not been ill treated, and after addressing himself to the former, to announce their intended release, he asked if he were not a relation of Lord Cornwallis? No. Then he was an officer of considerable rank? No. The Sultaun was incapable

* The amount of casualties was less than might have been expected, from 11 p.m. of the 6th, till 7 p.m. of the 7th. Their proportion will shew the degree in which each column had been engaged.

Right column	95
Centre	342
Left, including its separate and conjoint operations				98
				<hr/> 535

Of which number there were:

European officers, including those of sepoy	36
European non-commissioned and private	267
Natives	232
				<hr/> 535

of comprehending those sacred obligations which are independent of personal motives. Should he not see Lord Cornwallis on his return to camp? Certainly: he hoped to have that honour. He was then desired to take charge of a letter on the subject of peace, which, as he earnestly affirmed, he had always been anxious to preserve and renew; he solicited Lieutenant Chalmers's assistance in obtaining it, and begged that he would return with an answer to the letter. To all this a suitable reply was made, and the two officers were sent on the ensuing morning to the English camp. The letter affirmed that the terms of the capitulation had been misrepresented, that Kummer-u-Deen had not engaged for the liberation of the garrison of Coimbatore, but only promised to recommend it; and to cover this gross violation of truth, the Sultaun had caused the counterpart of the articles of capitulation, signed and sealed by Kummer-u-Deen, to be forcibly taken from Lieutenant Chalmers previous to his release. This fact is broadly stated in Lord Cornwallis's reply, as well as the notoriety of the remainder of the garrison being in irons; he nevertheless accepted the release of these two officers, as the indication of a desire to make atonement, and the allies consented to receive his envoy.

In fact a considerable proportion of the prisoners of Coimbatore, with 27 European captives, and among them several of the Christians, abandoned to barbarian slavery by the grand* officer of an order whose religious vows imposed an opposite obligation, were in prison at Sheher Gunjaum at the time of the assault, and the release of these unhappy sufferers by their comrades and countrymen, was a source of reciprocal joy, more allied to the purest feelings of domestic virtue, than to the lofty agitations of victory. Others of the victims surrendered by the same

* *Bailli de Suffrein, 1782.*

Suffrein, in 1782, had escaped with some fellow-prisoners from Chittledroog, and received protection from the English corps, serving with the Mahrattas: the information received through these channels; indicated the continued secret disappearance of prisoners,* but testified the existence of many still remaining, contrary to the conditions of the peace of 1784: and independently of the suggestions of moral feeling, the political wisdom might still be questioned, of the slightest relaxation, until the surrender of the last captive; if the murder of the whole, and the fabricated tale of their previous death, might not unhappily have been anticipated as the consequence of persisting in that demand.

A few hours however, before sending for Lieutenant Chalmers, to announce his liberation, Tippoo Sultaun had adopted other, and as he conceived, more efficient measures for the termination of the war, which this concession was intended to promote, by its tendency to remove suspicion. It was observed and reported by the spies, that the head-quarters of the army, well known by its distinguishing flag, was placed in the new ground of encampment, in the rear

* A considerable number of bankers and other natives, imprisoned at various periods, and falling under various suspicions, were dispatched about this time; among them was a Mussulman, named Mahadee Khan, of whose crime the following account was given me by one of his friends. On the return of Lord Cornwallis to Bangalore, in June, 1791, this person strongly urged his master to make peace, and on Tippoo's objecting that the confederates would demand an enormous sum of money, Mahadee answered, that if the requisite powers were committed to him, he would be responsible for raising the money, without touching the treasury, or burdening the country. It was immediately comprehended, that there was no other mode than to lay under contribution those who possessed it; and as his experience enabled him to form very correct estimates on this subject, he was considered by the courtiers as a dangerous adviser; it was only necessary to hint, that he was carrying on a secret correspondence with the English, and his secret murder was immediately ordered.

of the left near the hill, in a situation which exposed it to enterprise, and some officers of the guards, (stable horse) on being consulted, deemed the attempt so feasible, that they volunteered its execution. The whole of the corps was accordingly warned for duty : all the principal officers were admitted to the Sultaun's presence early on the morning of the 8th, and Feb. were harangued on the importance of the enterprise with which they were charged, and the confident certainty of an early and glorious termination of the war, if they could only rid him of one individual; the officers all solemnly pledged themselves not to return without executing the service, and received the betel¹ from the Sultaun's own hand; their march down the river excited no other impression than that of a detachment sent to act on the communications, and they were perceived to cross it at Arakerry² without any other suspicion. On the 9th they received farther reports from their spies, and at dawn of the morning of the 10th, their selected advanced 10. guard entered in the rear of the left between the camp of Nizam Ali and the English. The enterprises, founded on their exact similarity to each other, had been numerous in the preceding year, and this similarity was the cause of no alarm being excited by seeing a body of horse, supposed to be Nizam Ali's, between the two camps. They lounged on, until they approached the park of artillery, and asked some gun lascars with apparent indifference, for the tent of the *burra saheb*, or commander. The men, supposing Colonel Duff the commandant of artillery to be meant, pointed without suspicion to his tent, when the horsemen instantly drew their swords and galloped towards it,

¹ The leaf of the *Piper betel*, chewed with dried areca nut by natives of India. It was a mark of particular favour and honour for Tippu to offer betel to these men, and also showed his confidence in them.

² *Arakerry*.—Arakere, a ford about six miles east of Seringapatam, down the river.

cutting down the few persons they found in their route: they did not, however, even reach the tent, which they erroneously supposed to be that of Lord Cornwallis; a small body of sepoy drafts for the army of Bombay, encamped in the rear, turned out with alacrity; and opened a fire which dispersed the cavalry without farther alarm, and they escaped with little loss across the hills. The use of bang* or opium among the horsemen of India, is a familiar preparation for a desperate charge, mischievous at the best, even for that single purpose, but utterly ruinous on any service requiring self-possession; but I am not disposed on enquiry to concur with those who ascribe the failure on this occasion to intoxication. The *morale* of the army (if a term of modern application may be allowed), had sustained a severe shock; and the cool reflection of two days on a desperate enterprise, had not tended to remove the depression. The effect, however, of this evident attempt at assassination, added to the impression of the event formerly related on his approaching Bangalore, induced Lord Cornwallis to listen to the intreaties of his friends for the security of his person. His only guard had hitherto been two sentries, native troopers from his body guard; but from this period, he was prevailed on to permit a captain's guard of Europeans to mount every night over his tent.

Vague accounts had been received of Perseram Bhow's operations; but Lord Cornwallis finally dismissing from his mind all dependence on such an ally, ordered General Abercromby to advance by the route of Eratora,¹ thirty miles above Seringapatam, where

* The leaf of the *cannabis sativa*, (hemp,) used in various forms, green and dry, and sold as an intoxicating substance in every bazar in India. I certainly should not state the fact if I supposed public brewers to be ignorant of this article of the *materia venenata*.

¹ *Eratora*.—Yedatore, a town on the right bank of the Cauvery, 22 miles north-west of Mysore. The town derives its

he crossed the Cavery on the 11th of February. Feb. 11 Colonel Floyd, with the English Cavalry and some of the allies, met him at Caniambaddy on the 14th, 14. and on the 16th the junction was formed without 16. material impediment*; the intermediate time between the 7th and 16th, having been industriously employed in the formation of materials for the siege, by the reluctant, but indispensable ruin of the extensive and beautiful† garden of the Lall Baugh. All the arrangements were completed for its active prosecution. Colonel Stuart occupied a more advanced and concentrated position on the island, which he strengthened by field works, in order that he might be enabled to spare troops for the ordinary duties of the trenches. His command included the island, the Sultaun's‡ redoubt on the north, and another, which he had himself constructed south of the river, to command a ford, and to prevent the occupation of ground which would overlook his position. This position supplied the whole of the materials for the approaches and batteries, and working parties for their preparation. The principal attack was determined

name from the bend to the left (*yeda*) made by the river at this point, which invests it with peculiar sanctity

* Four regiments and seven battalions, amounting to about 6000 effective men.

† Beautiful, according to the ancient taste of our own country, when it had not begun to abhor straight lines, and imitate nature.

[“The Lall Baug appeared a princely nursery for the produce of Mysore: trees bearing apples, oranges, guavas, grapes, plantains, cocoanuts, beatlenuts, as also sandalwood, sugarcane, with cotton and indigo plants, rose from out the several enclosures; and paddy, raggy, choalum, chewarce, nachine, coultie, with various other species of pease, grains and pulses, might be seen in different directions. Plants of mulberry too, from the extraordinary attention with which they were treated, discovered that the Sultaun had set his mind on the manufacture of silk.” (Mackenzie: *Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, pp. 215-216.)]

‡ Now called Sibbald's, in honour of the officer who had fallen in its defence.

against the northern face, near the western angle; and General Abercromby was ordered to pass the river above that angle, to establish the requisite enfilade of the face attacked. There was no regular ford, and the Sultaun supposed the rugged bed of the river to be impracticable for guns; he accordingly evinced particular surprise on finding an advanced guard already in position at day-light on the 19th, and made some active but ineffectual efforts to frustrate the design: but the operation was effected without any material loss.

22. On the 22d, in connection with the degree of progress made in the trenches of the northern bank, General Abercromby advanced his posts for the purposes of the siege. The Sultaun very properly felt a keen jealousy of every thing attempted on that side, and Kummer-u-Deen having returned to the vicinity, after having alarmed Perseram Bhow into a retreat from the woods of Bednore, as already related, the Sultaun determined to make a great effort, not only to dislodge the advanced posts, but to compel Lord Cornwallis to abandon altogether the objects to be accomplished by the division south of the river. In the early part of the action, the advanced troops having expended all their ammunition, attempted to retire for a time to better cover, until they could receive a supply, and the Mysoreans rushed forward with a general shout to overwhelm them; the party consisting of no more than three companies of Europeans and two of sepoys, retiring in the most perfect order, unable any longer to tolerate the triumph, suddenly faced about, and reversing the order of pursuit, charged with the bayonet, drove the multitude far beyond their former position, until checked by the fire of the fort, they were obliged to resume it. The enemy reinforced by still greater numbers again advanced, and the party again retired, but were met by a reinforcement and ammunition which enabled them to resume the

offensive. Appearances which indicated an attack on General Abercromby's main body, if he should detach too largely, prevented his reinforcing so liberally as he would otherwise have done, and all his dispositions, justly influenced by these considerations, prevented that greater danger; an intermediate corps checked the attempts of a body of horse advancing to fall on the right of the advanced troops, they maintained their ground against the repeated efforts of the enemy throughout the day, and it was near sun-set before the Mysoreans finally desisted from the attack; the English casualties being 104—those of the enemy greatly more numerous. The corps of Kummer-u-Deen had advanced from Mysoor on the same morning, the bridge of that name,* under the guns of the fort, was open to the Sultaun's whole army, now encamped on the southern glacis, close to the scene of action; the whole English force south of the river, consisting of three regiments, and six battalions, separated by a rocky river, and a detour of nearly five miles from the main army, might thus be considered as exposed without support to the whole force of the enemy, and great credit is due to the perfect steadiness with which such a situation was maintained. Colonel Stuart's position, although nearer than that of the main army, was now too weak in troops, and too much exposed from contiguity to the fort, to admit of detaching with safety; the distant appearance however of the action, and the obvious alternation of advance and retreat, had caused some anxiety, and he had assembled his flank companies at the ford, ready to attempt a diversion, if farther appearances should seem to demand the risk.

Having noticed the operations which materially influenced the fortune of the war, it is not intended to enter into the detail of the contemporaneous or subsequent proceedings of the siege.†

* More generally called the Periapatam bridge.

† The reader who may desire greater detail, will find the

In the meanwhile, and in conformity to the acquiescence indicated by Lord Cornwallis in his letter, dated the 11th of February, Tippoo's vakeels had been received in camp on the 14th. For this important service, Gholaum Ali was released from the confinement and disgrace which he had sustained since his return from the embassy to Constantinople, and was associated to Ali Reza, whose infamous proceedings at Goorumconda have been recently discussed. They were met, on behalf of Lord Cornwallis, by Sir John Kennaway, political resident at the court of Nizam Ali, on the part of Secunder Jah,¹ by Meer Aalum, the former envoy to Calcutta, and by a person deputed by Hurry Punt, conversant with the statements of revenue which would form the basis of the ultimate arrangements. Four conferences, lasting nearly the whole day, generally with the intervention of a day for reference and instruction, brought the demands of the confederates to a distinct issue; and on the 22d, their ultimatum was sent in to the Sultaun. The operations of the siege were so far advanced as to enable Lord Cornwallis to calculate with certainty on opening his breaching batteries on the 1st of March, at five hundred yards distance, against two points, where an unfinished part of a glacis of masonry towards the river enabled him to see the base of the rampart, with the certainty of forming a practicable breach on the second, if not on the first day, that he should direct his fire to that exclusive object; and frame-work was in preparation to carry the flying sap across the rocky bed of the river, if prudence should seem to require that delay. The action of the 22d had secured the means of corresponding progress on the south. The island

operations of this campaign given with clearness and precision in Major Dirom's narrative, 1 vol. 4to.; and for those of the whole war, he may refer to Mackenzie's Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultaun, in 2 vols. 4to.

¹ *Secunder Jah*.—Sikandar Jah, the son of Nizam Ali.

and Sibbald's redoubt, with another advantageous point of enfilade on an islet west of the fort, were prepared to take their subsidiary portion of the service, and means were in reserve to set fire to the whole town, if a measure so dreadful to a crowded population should become indispensable. Although a considerable proportion had been sent off, by the route of Mysoor, of the fugitive inhabitants, unconnected with the army, the families of the officers and soldiers were deemed a necessary pledge. The defective public departments had never re-organized the wreck of the 6th of February. Tumbrils, ammunition and store carts, run in for security on the 7th, remained, blocking up the streets in the utmost disorder; the additional crowd had converted the whole interior into an incipient pest-house, and the carnage in the event of a siege must have been horrible. Grain daily pouring in from the east and from Coorg created an absolute abundance in the camp of the besiegers. A respectable corps of four hundred Europeans and three battalions of sepoys, with field artillery, under Major Cuppage, in Coimbatoor, had reduced the intermediate posts and ascended the Guejelhutty pass, where large supplies were ready to advance; and independently of Perse-ram Bhow, and the English brigade serving with his army, who however were now positively known to be approaching, means existed of seizing Mysoor and completing the blockade. The opinions therefore which have suggested any doubt of the enemy's capital being at Lord Cornwallis's mercy, appear to have little other ground than the uncertainty of every human event not absolutely accomplished.

On the 23d Tippoo assembled in the great mosque Feb. 23. all the principal officers of his army, laid before them the Koran, and adjured them, by its sacred contents, to give him their undisguised advice on the question he was about to propose. He then read to them the ultimatum of the confederates, in the form of five

preliminary articles of peace, requiring generally—the cession to the allies from the countries *adjacent* to theirs of one half of the dominions which he possessed before the war,—the payment of three crores* and thirty lacs of rupees, one half immediately, and the remainder in three instalments of four months each;—the release of all prisoners from the time of Hyder Aly,—and the delivery of two of his sons as hostages for the due performance of the conditions. On the mutual execution of these preliminary articles hostilities were to cease, and a definitive treaty was to be adjusted. “You have heard,” said the Sultaun, “the conditions of peace, and you have now to hear and answer my question: *shall it be peace or war?*” The officers unanimously replied that they were ready to lay down their own lives in defence of their sovereign and his capital; but with various shades of expression they were in substance equally unanimous, that the troops were disheartened and had become undeserving of confidence. As a mere scene, our settled abhorrence of the principal character cannot entirely extinguish the general impressions of sympathy, resulting from the mournful circumstances of such a meeting, extending to some who were really deserving of compassion: impressions exaggerated perhaps in the author’s mind, by finding, in aftertimes, that few of the members of that assembly could recite its events without tears; but as a mere scene, it also exhibits a singular illustration of the most corrupted mind, and the farthest alienated from truth, being driven by the mere force of adversity to repose its last confidence in truth alone.

Feb. 23. The preliminary articles duly signed and sealed by the Sultaun were sent to Lord Cornwallis on the same day, and although the terms required that they

* The original demand had been six crores, (each crore equal to about a million sterling,) and had been reduced to the sum stated in the text, on the offer of the Sultaun’s vakeels to swear to the impossibility of paying more than three!

should be delivered by the hostages in person, he not only consented to a delay of two days in their arrival, but agreed that hostilities should cease on the ensuing morning. The English soldiers received the order with grief, and almost with indignation; independently of the ordinary feelings of the profession, they had long cherished as a moral duty, the hope of liberating with their own hands the survivors of their murdered countrymen; and when for several hours after the cessation, the enemy continued to fire with redoubled animation (a conduct exclusively arising from ignorant and arrogant stupidity), it was difficult to restrain them within the limits of obedience; but about noon the cessation became reciprocal.

Every thing that the most delicate consideration could suggest, was observed in the reception and treatment of the hostages; one, a boy of ten, and the other of eight years old; and the observation of Gholaum Ali, that the paternal character was now transferred from Tippoo Sultaun to Lord Cornwallis, ceased to be an Oriental image, if determined by the test of paternal attentions.

The extent of the cessions was of course to be determined by the amount of revenue, and some time, as might be expected, was lost in discussing fictitious statements: when, however, the schedules were prepared for inspection and reference, and in the English share was found the principality of Coorg, the Sultaun became frantic with rage. "To which of the English possessions (he asked) is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam? They know that I would sooner have died in the breach than consent to such a cession, and durst not bring it forwards until they had treacherously obtained possession of my children and my treasure:" (for a crore of rupees had already arrived in camp.) Although there can be no question that the demand of Coorg was unexpected by the Sultaun, there is assuredly as little doubt of the absence of all design of unworthy

concealment, on the part of Lord Cornwallis. That his demand, as has been argued, was reasonably chargeable with the character of a departure from his preliminary engagement, is a proposition that can scarcely be maintained. The cession of the principalities of Malabar, adjacent to no English possession but the commercial establishment of Tellicherry, was so far from being questioned as a departure from the preliminary treaty, that the Sultaun and his vakeels openly congratulated themselves on that selection, which was avowed in the conferences even before the conclusion of the preliminary articles. Coorg was a continuation of the same territory without any intervention : no limitation in the length of radius, or form of frontier line, was stipulated by the preliminaries : and that the territory of Coorg was above the ghauts, and in a commanding situation, relatively to the Sultaun's capital, and remaining territories, would be too much to urge as a conclusive objection, in discussing the principles of a treaty, which had for its professed object, to cripple his resources, and render him incapable of farther mischief. But admitting, as was the fact, that the demand was really unexpected by Tippoo Sultaun, it may be affirmed, without the fear of reasonable question, that it ought not to have been unexpected ; and that no reflecting mind, acquainted with the principles on which the war had commenced and been conducted, could have expected from Lord Cornwallis the intention of abandoning the only ally who had performed all his obligations with fidelity, efficiency, and honour.

That the surprise of the Sultaun was entirely unaffected, was proved by his having expedited upwards of a crore of rupees to camp, in the confidence of such a selection of territory as accorded with his interpretation of the preliminaries ; and immediately after the reception of this demand, immense bodies of men were perceived at work on a strong retrenchment behind the face attacked : a fact

which the Sultaun deliberately and repeatedly denied, on receiving remonstrances on the violation of the armistice, although it was distinctly visible to the two armies; while the studied procrastination of the vakeels appeared to indicate a renewal of hostilities, and a desire for obvious reasons, that the rupture should be protracted to the latest possible period. The situation of Lord Cornwallis about the middle of March, was widely different indeed from his condition about three weeks before, at the period of the signature of the preliminary articles. It has been noticed that the only materials for the siege were procured by the destruction of the splendid garden of the Lall Baugh, they were chiefly of the cypress tree, and from having been long made up were become so dry, brittle, and inflammable, as to be unfit for use; and a new stock of materials must be brought with immense labour from considerable distances. But above all, the army had now been before the place, occupying the late field of action, for upwards of six weeks, under circumstances which materially aggravated the common insalubrity of a standing camp. The precise nature of the climate generating a pestilent endemic at this worst season of the year, had until that period been little understood; but the hospitals had for some time been encreasing their numbers in the most alarming degree. Every successive day diminished the powers of the besiegers, and augmented the chances of successful resistance. If hostilities should even be instantly resumed, the delays consequent on the causes described, would in the actual ratio of encreasing sickness, scarcely leave the requisite number of effective men for the ultimate assault; and farther delay would be fatal to every reasonable hope of success; the growth of this state of things had been so slow and imperceptible, every successive evasion had so skilfully consumed* time, that it was

* It was not known that one of the individuals entrusted with the conduct of the joint negotiation, held a separate corres-

made to burst in all its truth on Lord Cornwallis's mind, like a discovery which admitted not a moment's pause. Fair copies of a definitive treaty were prepared and sent to the Sultaun, with the alternative of executing them within a certain number of hours, or finally breaking off the negotiation. The captured guns which had been brought to camp, were sent back to the positions assigned them for the siege, and all other preparatory measures were openly adopted. Perseram Bhow, who had at length appeared, and whose presence might be depended on while there was plunder and not one minute longer, was sent to join General Abercromby,* and commenced his ravages before the armistice was denounced; the vakeels blustered, made some impotent and absurd claims to the liberation of the hostages, and talked of taking their leave, until they found his Lordship's determination to be irrevocably fixed, and then at length announced their master's acquiescence. On an evasion to gain more time, the hostages were

Mar. 16 moved preparatory to their march to Coromandel, and their guard of Mysoreans were made prisoners. The vakeels entreated with abundant promises, and obtained, that their departure might be suspended for

17. one day; but that day passed over with promises only;

18. a third had nearly elapsed, when they at length appeared with the treaties duly executed; the hostages

pendence with the Sultaun during the whole period; the individual is no more; but the subject is still too delicate to be farther pursued, with reference to our connexions at the court to which he belonged: the evidence of the fact rests on original documents.

* Lord Cornwallis, in one of his dispatches, explains the reason why he could make no detachment of his allies before the arrival of Perseram Bhow. "It suited neither the health nor inclination of Hurry Punt to go on any detached service, and Nizam Ali's minister, although he with great zeal offered to supply the place of the Bhow, was so completely ignorant of military affairs, and so total a want of arrangement prevailed in every part of his army, that he was equally unable to put the troops in motion, or to provide for their subsistence, even for a few days, if removed from our army!" Precious allies!

Were restored to their former condition, and on the ensuing day the forms of delivery and interchange of Mar. 19. the definitive treaty were publicly concluded.

Where both parties were equally anxious for separation, the matters, chiefly of form which remained to be adjusted were treated with proper dispatch, but the wisdom of the alternative which brought the question to an immediate issue was evinced, by the indispensable necessity of accepting from the Sultaun a large supply of doolies and bearers, to move the accumulating numbers of sick, who generally experienced a perceptible amendment on the very first march from this horrible ground.

The shameless infraction of the treaty of 1784, with regard to the inhabitants of Coromandel had been daily and constantly evinced during the whole period subsequent to the 6th of February. In consequence of confidential communications from these unhappy captives, Colonel Stuart had latterly appointed the southern redoubt for their resort by night, and it was an interesting spectacle at the dawn of every morning to see its whole circumference surrounded with men, women, and children, with their cattle and effects, who were passed over to the island before broad day-light, and forwarded by Lord Cornwallis's orders by the first escort, and with such aid as they required; and notwithstanding the mortality which had thinned their numbers, many thousands were in this manner restored to their native homes.

The cessions of the treaty of 1792 may be described in a few words; they were founded on the principle of equal partition to the three confederates, without reference to the gratuitous inequality in the provisions of the offensive and defensive treaties of 1790, or any retrospect to the conditions intended to secure to the earliest in the field, the exclusive benefit of their own efforts. The selections of ceded territory brought the Mahrattas to the river Toombuddra, their frontier in 1779; restored to Nizam Ali his

possessions north of that river and the province of Kurpa to the south, which had been lost about the same period. The English obtained Malabar and Coorg; the province of Dindigul, which had jugged inconveniently into their southern provinces, and Baramahál, an iron boundary for Coromandel, which placed her frontier fortress of Rayacota on the table land of Mysoor to the east, as the undisputed cession of Coorg secured a similar advantage to the west

In whatever degree the wisdom of these measures may have divided public opinion, the moderation of Lord Cornwallis was eminently conspicuous, and universally acknowledged. That the desire of maintaining or establishing a balance of power had, according to the prevalent opinion,* influenced his Lordship's determination, can no where be traced in his official correspondence. The treachery or imbecility of his allies, of whom one (the Mahrattas), had exhibited a total disregard of every obligation necessary to the success of combined measures; and the other, an incapacity to take any effective part in their execution, had undoubtedly rendered him long anxious for an early termination of the war, but constituted no part of the question at issue at the date of the preliminary treaty, when he had only to determine, whether he should be satisfied with any thing short of the extinction of the house of Hyder, which, according to every information and appearance, would have followed the capture of the capital. The approach of Mahdajee Sindia to Poona, with views inimical to the English, might constitute a very important object of future consideration, but did not affect the question, limited to ten or fifteen days, of urging the siege to extremity, or consenting to a smaller sacrifice. Without, therefore, seeking altogether to exclude the influence of these considerations, they are certainly more doubtful than those which remain to be described.

* This opinion is discussed and rejected in Malcolm's India, page 95.

General opinion in England was averse to all war in India, and would censure with peculiar asperity any result which might be tortured into evidence of premeditated conquest. The expediency of the earliest practicable termination of the contest, a proposition self-evident in every war, disputable with reference to conditions alone, and never to the abstract principle, had been strongly impressed on his Lordship's attention by the most recent dispatches from the Court of Directors and the minister for Indian affairs; and the great national importance of being prepared to take any part that the exigency of events might require, in those agitations which were about to convulse the whole European world, was too obvious to be absent from the mind of any statesman. But leaving, as is most candid in every practicable case, the author of a measure to assign his own motives, the decision itself, and the more immediate grounds on which it was formed, are stated with the greatest clearness and simplicity in his official dispatches, before the negotiation, and during its progress. In the first of these documents he declares, "that to allow Tippoo to retain even a considerable portion of his present power and possessions at the conclusion of the war, would only, instead of real peace, give us an armed truce, and he should immediately reject any proposition of this nature; but that if such concessions were offered as would put it out of the enemy's power to *disturb the peace of India in future*, his Lordship would suffer no prospects, however brilliant, to postpone for an hour that most desirable event, a general peace."* In the second document, describing the nature of the measure in progress, he states his opinion "that it would be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam, and render the final settlement

* Abstract of Lord Cornwallis's correspondence with the Government of Madras, given in their general letter to England dated 21st February, 1792.

with the allies much more easy;" a most important consideration, which has been overlooked or undervalued in all the discussions on the subject. "Those, (his Lordship adds,*) whose passions were heated, and who were not responsible for consequences, would probably exclaim against leaving the tyrant an inch of territory, but that it was his duty to consult the real interest of the Company and the nation."

Although in the sequel of his communications with the Sultaun, after the conclusion of the peace, his Lordship's natural courtesy disposed him to the most conciliatory conduct, and even to language indicating the direct hope of cordial amity, it is neither just nor necessary, to infer so superficial an estimate of human nature, as should really calculate on friendship as the fruit of deep mortification. No adequate ground had intervened for changing the opinion delivered by his Lordship, in the official letter accompanying the definitive treaty, which describes Tippoo "as a faithless and violent character, on whom no dependence could be placed." It is necessary, therefore, to revert to his Lordship's professed determination to exact "*such conditions as should put it out of the Sultaun's power to disturb the peace of India;*" and it only remains to decide, whether this legitimate purpose, of which the English General had been the acknowledged master, was or was not effectually attained. The evidence of subsequent events will probably be deemed to amount to a negative answer: but candour cannot fail to add, that if, under the political circumstances of the moment, the entire extinction of the Mysorean power were really inexpedient, no farther reduction of that power could have been attempted without the imminent risk of being forced into the extreme alternative.

* General letter, 15th March, 1792:

CHAPTER XLII.

After the departure of the confederates, Tippoo makes arrangements for liquidating the payments—Description—The Sultaun's boasted improvements discussed—Physical science—Barometer—Thermometer—Medical science—General regulations—Coincidence of eastern and western novelties—Military regulations—Infantry—Cavalry—Artillery—Reflections on these changes—Navy—Lords of the Admiralty—Admirals—Ships—Equipments—Commerce—Exports—Imports—Political economy—Black and red pepper—Medical regimen—Connection of commercial and political views—Laborious code—Curious section—Swindling conditions—Suppression of bankers and money changers—Circumstances related—Contrast of particular details with general ignorance—Revenue—True antiquity, and pretended novelty—Innovations not improvements—One improvement—the suppression of drunkenness—of Hindoo temples—Police—Regulations regarding the right and left hand casts—Ethics—from the Korán—and the Greek schools—Truth—Oaths and their systematic violation—Book of regulations all-sufficient—Anecdote—Royal state—The word Tippoo—Tiger—Throne—Intended regulations—Reformation of the calendar—Incidental notices of the intention of a new revelation—Weights and Measures—French—English—Bengal—Ancient Mysoor—Tippoo Sultaun—Measures of internal administration—Erection of an interior rampart to Seringapatam—Means of procuring workmen—Shocking abuses—Siege and capture of Oochingy—Barbarous mutilation—

Strange and fraudulent allotment of dwellings to his officers—Return of the hostages—Conversations—Banishment of the Mehadees—Early history of Dhoondia—Strange history of his connection with the Sultaun—Discontents of the husbandmen—Deceptions practised on the Sultaun—Augmentation of revenue—army—jageers—Ludicrous selection of officers—Death of the raja, and plunder of the palace—Royal nuptials, and previous disappointments—Reformation of the army—Zumra—Dress—Oaths—Proclamation—Destruction of the lake of Tonoor—Fairy tale—Projected rupture of the dams—Camp bazâr.

AFTER the departure of the confederates, Tippoo Sultaun assembled the chiefs of his army and the heads of departments, and announced to them that the three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, by which he had purchased their safety and his own, must be divided into three portions.

1st. From the royal treasury he would give one crore and ten lacs. 2d. The army should contribute, as a *nezerâna*,¹ (forced gift) sixty lacs: and 3d. The civil officers and inhabitants at large must give a *nezerâna* of one crore and sixty lacs.

For the contribution of the army it was calculated that ten putties* or monthly payments were, or ought to be, made in the year. This number was ordered to be reduced to seven in the year, and so to continue until the difference should amount to the *nezerâna* of sixty lacs.

For the remaining crore and sixty lacs, the

¹ *Nezerâna*.—*Nusser*, Hind. from Ar. *nasr* or *nasar* (prop. *nadhr*.) primarily a vow or votive offering; but in ordinary use, a ceremonial present, properly an offering from an inferior to a superior, the converse of *inam*. The root is the same as that of *Nazarite* (Numbers, vi. 2). (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*, p. 634.)

* See p. 757. of vol. i.

distribution was prepared by the heads of civil departments, who were most directly interested in lessening the weight to be borne by themselves, and it is notorious that it was not only lessened but entirely removed. The nominal contributions of each were fairly enough computed, and entered in the accounts as paid, but the amount was actually made up by an excess in the contributions of each district, beyond the sum at which it was assessed in the books; and this corruption in the heads of departments, in levying clandestinely the amount of their own contributions, made it necessary for them to connive at similar exactions in the local authorities down to the lowest runner of the most subordinate collector. It is generally believed, that a sum very far exceeding a crore and sixty lacs, was levied on the country; but in the two years, during which the payments to the confederates were protracted, one crore only was carried to the public account, and a balance of nearly sixty lacs remained as a charge against the country till the extinction of the dynasty. This *nezerâna*, or forced gift, and the horrible tortures inflicted in levying it, caused the most extensive secret emigrations of merchants and others into *Bâramahâl*, a country under the direct management of the Company's Government; and as every new attempt to realise the balances afforded a cloak for further exactions, these emigrations continued, in various degrees, as long as the existence of the dynasty.

The "incomparable inventions and regulations,"* introduced into the administration of affairs by Tippoo Sultaun, constitute the prominent boast of his own memoirs, and have been frequently adverted to in the course of this work. The sudden abstraction of one half of his dominions, imperatively demanded corresponding changes; and this appears to be the

most convenient period for taking a general view of his institutions, which are dated at different periods from 1783 to 1799, and underwent the most capricious changes without any adequate motive. No delineation of character can exhibit so authentic a portrait of mind, as these strange aberrations of untutored intellect, purporting to be the spontaneous effusions of superior wisdom: and an abstract sketch of the most remarkable of these performances, added to some very brief notices of a similar tendency, will not occupy any considerable space.

The Sultaun's acquaintance with physical science may be estimated by two letters addressed to Monsieur Cossigny, governor of Pondicherry; one acknowledging the receipt of "a *barometer*, complete in every respect, excepting the quicksilver, which, owing to its oldness, does not move up and down. It is therefore returned; and you are requested to send a good one, made in the present year." Another letter requests a certain instrument, and a Persian translation of an European treatise on its use; "in which it is written, that at certain times, the quicksilver rises a certain number of degrees; and that, if at such times, a person afflicted with certain disorders, shall, during a paroxysm of the complaint, place his hand on the instrument, the ascent of the quicksilver will mark the height of the disease."* In the first of these letters, the word *barometer* is used; in the second *howanumdu*, literally shewing the air. He appears to have received some obscure idea of the common, or, perhaps, the differential thermometer; and, desired to ascertain its application to medicine, a science in which he affected to be considered as a master, to the extent of frequently commanding, in his official letters, certain prescriptions for the cure of disorders. His system, like that of all Mahomedan physicians, was founded on the distinctions of

* Kirkpatrick's Tippoo's Letters, p. 464.

[Kirkpatrick: *Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan*, 1811.]

the Greek schools, into hot, cold, moist, and dry ; and among a multitude of absurdities, may be noticed one prescription, perhaps hitherto untried, to prevent hydrophobia, by keeping open the wound for six months.

The professed and formal regulations for the conduct of affairs had commenced before his departure from Mangalore, with the aid of his great innovator, Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen ; and embraced either directly or incidentally every department in the science of government. Regulations military, naval, commercial and fiscal, police, judicature, and ethics, were embraced by the code of this modern Minos, and his reformation of the calendar, and of the system of weights and measures, was to class him with those philosophical statesmen and sovereigns, of whose useful labours the secretary had obtained some obscure intelligence ; and it may be convenient to premise regarding the whole, that the *name* of every object was changed : of cycles, years, and months, weights, measures, coins, forts, towns, offices military and civil, the official designations of all persons and things without one exception,* exhibiting a singular coincidence, at nearly one and the same time, and in distant and unconnected quarters of the globe, between the extremes of unbridled democracy, and uncontrolled despotism in a system of subversion, as sweeping and indiscriminate, as if the axiom were familiarly established, that every thing is wrong because it exists.

A few words will suffice for each subject. The elementary instructions for the infantry contained in a code of *military regulations*, were as well given as could be expected from a person copying European systems, and unacquainted with the elements of mathematical science : the invention of new words of

* Many of these regulations may be referred to in the appendix to Kirkpatrick's Tippoos Letters ; and in an anonymous publication named British India analyzed.

command, would have been a rational improvement, if the instructions had thereby been rendered more intelligible ; but the substitution of obsolete Persian* for French or English, gave no facility in the instruction of officers and soldiers, who, speaking of them in mass, may be described as utterly ignorant of the Persian language. The directions for military conduct have a very creditable allusion, (without the name) to the means by which Sir Eyre Coote repeatedly provisioned Vellore in the face of superior armies, and triumphant reference to the fate of Baillie and Brathwaite, in the mode prescribed of attacking the Nazarenes on a plain ; but as a general code of instruction, it is below mediocrity. The organization of companies, battalions, and brigades, was frequently varied, and was sometimes made to include a body of cavalry, and to become a sort of legion, and at other times it changed the proportions of artillery to infantry. Perhaps none of these establishments could be condemned as extremely bad, nor could any be deemed entirely unobjectionable. Previously to 1792, they were all superior to any thing then existing among the native powers, with perhaps a doubtful exception in favour of Sindia's brigades, afterwards so well matured : and the practical effect of the whole system of his infantry was considerable expertness in the use of the musquet, and a respectable degree of facility in the evolutions most commonly required on service.

In the cavalry, besides a formation of regiments never effectually organized, his most remarkable change was the abolition of the martingale, universal among the native powers, which he considered in his instructions as rendering the horse obedient, but cramping his powers. The efficiency of the English cavalry, in the campaign of 1790, was the true motive for prohibiting an equipment, to the absence of which he was willing exclusively to ascribe the superiority

* Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen never lost the nickname of *Chap-gerr-Dumac*, his first word of command in the manual exercise.

which he thus practically admitted. The general tendency of the changes, effected in the whole of his military establishment, was to increase and improve his infantry and artillery, at the expence of the cavalry. In the artillery practice in particular, the Sultaun affirms, that he had left his masters the Nazarenos at an infinite distance behind him, "although, like the salamander, they pass their lives in fire." There can be no question, that this change in his military establishment was among the causes of that superiority which he attained over his Indian adversaries, in the campaigns of 1786-7, and there is as little doubt, that it became the most decided source of inferiority, in his contest with the English power. The observation is neither new in itself, nor singular in its application; it may be traced in the history of every Indian power, which has prematurely opposed Europeans with their own tactics; and it has received its most recent illustration, in the erroneous counsel and false measures of defence, suggested to the Persians, instead of reading to them, in the history of their ancestors, a better hope of security in the same description of troops, and the same system of warfare, which continued through the lapse of ages, to foil or destroy the flower of the Roman legions, from Crassus to Julian.

The fleet was originally placed by Tippoo under the board of trade. The experience of two wars had shewn that it would always be at the mercy of an European enemy; and it seemed to have been chiefly considered as a protection to the trade against the system of general piracy then practised along the western shores of India, up to the Persian gulf. The loss of a moiety of every resource in 1792, gave a new scope and stimulus to invention; and the absurdity was not perceived of seeking to create a warlike fleet without a commercial navy, or of hoping, literally without means, suddenly to rival England in that department of war, which was represented to be the

main source of her power, by the vakeels who accompanied the hostages, and had been specially instructed to study the English institutions. This novel source of hope was not finally organized on paper till 1796, and can scarcely be deemed to have had a practical existence. He began in 1793 with ordering the construction of an hundred ships; but in 1796, he sunk to twenty ships of the line and twenty frigates; eleven commissioners, or Lords of the Admiralty, (*Meer-e-Yem*,) who were not expected to embark thirty *Meer Buhr*, or Admirals, of whom twenty were to be afloat, and ten *at court* for instruction — a school for seamanship which it is presumed a British Admiral would not entirely approve. A 72-gun ship had thirty 24-pounders, thirty 18-pounders, and 12 nines; a 46-gun frigate had twenty 12-pounders, as many nines, and six 4-pounders; the line-of-battle ships were 72's and 62's; and the men for the forty ships are stated at 10,520. To each ship were appointed four principal officers: the first commanded the ship; the second had charge of the guns, gunners, and ammunition; the third, of the marines and small arms; the fourth, the working and navigation of the ship, the provisions, and stores; and the regulations descend to the most minute particular, from the dock-yard to the running rigging; from the scantlings of the timbers to the dinner of the crew. Without obtruding farther details on the general reader, professional men will probably be enabled to determine the sources of his information. So far as a landsman may presume to conjecture, he had access to tolerably correct authorities in matters of mere detail, which in many cases he rendered ludicrous by a pretended knowledge, and profound ignorance, of the objects to be regulated.

The *commercial regulations* were founded on the basis of making the sovereign, if not the sole, the chief merchant of his dominions; but they underwent the most extraordinary revolutions. On his accession,

he seems to have considered all commerce with Europeans, and particularly with the English as pregnant with danger in every direction. Exports were prohibited or discouraged; 1st, because they augmented to his own subjects the price of the article; 2d, because they would afford to his neighbours the means of secret intelligence; and 3d, because they would lift the veil of mystery which obscured the dimensions of his power. Imports were prohibited, because they would lessen the quantity of money, and thereby impoverish the country; propositions which may indicate the extent of his attainments in political economy; and such was the mean adulation by which he was surrounded, that domestic manufactures of every kind were stated to be in consequence rapidly surpassing the foreign, and a turban of Burhānpoor would be exhibited and admired by the unanimous attestation of all around him, as the manufacture of Sheher Gunjaun. The reader would draw an erroneous inference, who should consider these doctrines regarding export and import as belonging to the level of defective knowledge by which he was surrounded. It is not intended to try the opinions of any person from whom he could receive counsel by the test of those profound works which have instructed modern Europe; but at least his treasurer, Poornea, had a sound practical conception of the more simple fundamental truths, connected with the subject; and seldom propounded erroneous opinions, excepting when immediate fiscal profit occasionally obscured his views of prospective advantage. It was under the influence of this utter darkness in commercial and political economy, that in 1784 he ordered the eradication of all the pepper vines of the maritime districts, and merely reserved those of inland growth to trade with the true believers from Arabia. The increase of this article of commerce became some years afterwards an object of particular solicitude, but I could not determine

whether the prohibition of growing red pepper or Chili, was to be considered as a commercial regulation to increase the growth of black pepper, or as a medical regimen, or as a compound of both motives. It is a general opinion in the south of India, that the free use of red pepper has a tendency to generate cutaneous eruptions, and the Sultaun certainly prevented its entering his harem for six months; whether in that period he did not find the ladies improved in the smoothness of their skin, or was influenced by other causes, he withdrew the prohibition of culture about a year after it had been promulgated.

It was only from the personal reports of the vakeels who accompanied the hostages to Madras, that his attention was called to a proposition however strange, yet stated to be generally admitted among the most enlightened persons at Madras, that the power not only of the English Company, but of the English King, was founded in a material degree on commercial prosperity; and the Sultaun devised an extensive plan for a similar increase of power; still however pursuing the principles which he conceived to be sanctioned by the example of the India company, of combining the characters of merchant and sovereign. In a long and laborious code of eight sections, with which the reader shall not be fatigued, he established a royal board of nine commissioners of trade, with seventeen foreign and thirty home factories in the several districts; furnished with extensive instructions for a profitable system of exports and imports, by land and by sea, and a strict theoretical control over the receipts and disbursements; the monopolies however continued to be numerous, and those of tobacco, sandal wood, pepper, and the precious metals, were the most lucrative.

One, however, of the sections of commercial regulation is so perfectly unique that it may afford entertainment. It professes to be framed for the attractive purpose of "regulating commercial deposits,

or admitting the people at large to a participation in the benefits to accrue from the trade of the country." Every individual depositing a sum not exceeding five hundred rupees was declared entitled at the end of the year to receive, with his principal, an increase of 50 per cent. For a deposit of from five hundred to five thousand, 25 per cent. Above five thousand 12 per cent. with liberty at all times and in all classes, to receive on demand any part of the deposit together with the proportion of interest* up to the day. These variations of profit, in the inverse ratio of the deposit, were probably intended to shew his consideration for the small capitalist, but a project for enticing his subjects into a swindling loan, was too glaring to be misunderstood, although covered with the thin cloak of religion in the following introductory paragraph. "All praise and glory be to the most high God, who, breathing life into a handful of clay, before inanimate, gave it the form of man; and who has raised some chosen individuals to rank and power, riches and rule, in order that they might administer to the feeble, the helpless, and the destitute, and promote the welfare of the people. In pursuance of this duty, it is decreed, &c. &c." At a very early period of his government, he had, in an ebullition of anger, extinguished the business of banker, and monopolized its dependent and most profitable trade of money changer. The circumstances have been related† which in 1779, led to a balance of twenty lacs, charged against this profession; and on Tippoo's demanding payment in 1784, the bankers assented to the gradual liquidation of the demand, on the condition that the revenues should pass through their hands, according to the usual practice of Indian Governments; a direct refusal, and a threat to imprison them all, was deprecated by the intimation,

* The word *interest* is not employed, usury being at variance with the precepts of the Koran; *profit* is the term used.

† Vol. i. page 755.

that the business of the money changer would also be at a stand, in the event of their confinement. "I can do without you both," answered the Sultaun in a rage: he ordered the whole to be confined, and issued an ordinance, converting the trade of money changer and broker, into a monopoly for the benefit of Government, furnishing coin for the purpose, from the treasury, to servants paid by regular salaries. In the subsequent year, we find an intelligent person, named Raja Ram Chunder,* reporting that the dealers kept aloof from transactions with the Government shops, that the expences far exceeded the profits, and that it was necessary either to abandon the plan, or to enlarge it, so as to embrace, not only regular banking establishments, but commercial speculations necessary to their prosperity; to all which he could obtain no more satisfactory answer than the following. "There is no regulation issued by us, that does not cost us, in the framing of it, the deliberation of five hundred years—do as you are ordered." A part of the suggested plan was, however, gradually introduced, and the funds in the hands of the money changers, were employed in advantageous loans. Yet with all this parade of being the master of every detail, he was ignorant of the contents of his "tosheck khana"¹ royal warehouse of the capital, to the extent of sending to Poona, on the occasion of a marriage, for a small quantity of gold cloths, of which a ton at the least, was found in store on the capture of the capital.

The regulations of revenue, professing like those for pecuniary deposits to be founded on a tender regard for the benefit of the people, contained little

Kirkpatrick's Tippoos's Letters, p. 129.

¹ *Tosheck Khana*.—Toshaconna, Toshakhana, the repository of articles received as presents, or intended to be given as presents, attached to a government office. The *toshakhana* is a special department attached to the Foreign Office of the Government of India. (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*, p. 986.)

that was new except that the nomenclature and the institutions of Chick Deo Raj and Hyder were promulgated as the admirable inventions of Tippoo Sultaun, on the same principle that Spanish guns were found ornamented with the tiger stripe and inscriptions, purporting that they were cast at Seringapatam. Among the real novelties in the code of revenue not one improvement can be discovered as specimens, may be adduced an instruction to seize all Christians and confiscate their property; and directions to individuals for rearing horses, absurd in themselves, and impracticable from the expence. There was indeed one novelty of a ludicrous description; offices requiring an exact knowledge of accounts, and formerly filled by bramins or Hindoos, were ordered to be executed by Mahommedans; and when it was objected to many of the individuals that they could not even write, the Sultaun gravely replied, that they would learn. But in the midst of our disgust at his vices and follies, one improvement occurs not undeserving the modified consideration of western statesmen, who value the health or the morals of the people. He began, at an early period, to restrict the numbers, and regulate the conduct of the shops, for the sale of spirituous liquors, and he finally and effectually abolished the whole, together with the sale of all intoxicating substances, and the destruction, as far as he could effect it, of the white poppy, and the hemp plant, even in private gardens. The large sacrifice of revenue involved in this prohibition was founded on the unforced interpretation of a text of the Koran; "every thing intoxicating is forbidden," and on that fanatical zeal which is deemed to cover, and found to accompany so many deviations from moral rectitude.

The same bigotry led him to the extinction of Hindoo worship, and the confiscated funds of the temples were intended to compensate, and would, if well administered, in a great degree have balanced

the tax on intoxicating substances: the measure commenced at an early period of his reign, and the extinction was gradual, but in 1799, the two temples within the fort of Seringapatam, alone remained open throughout the extent of his dominions.

Of his system of *police*, the following extract from his official instructions may suffice. "You must place spies throughout the whole fort and town, in the bazars, and over the houses of the principal officers, and thus gain intelligence of every person who goes to the dwelling of another, and of what people say, &c. &c." All this Hyder effectually did, and all this Tippoo Sultaun only attempted. No human being was ever worse served, or more easily deceived.

Of his talents for judicature, we must seek for examples, not in a general code to supersede the all-sufficient Koran, but in those occasional edicts which may be thought in some degree to belong to the department of police.

Few persons filling public situations in the south of India, have escaped embarrassment from the feuds and audacious excesses of the right and left-hand casts, and no person, European or native, so far as I am informed, has been able to trace with the slightest probability, the origin of these distinctions. The active leaders of each association belong to the *outcasts*; the *Parias* being the champions of the right, and the *Chucklers*, or workers in leather, of the left; and the higher casts of artificers range with one or the other of these general divisions. According to the Sultaun, the right hand enumerate eighteen casts in their party, and the left hand twelve in theirs. The loss of lives in the contests arising from their public processions, and the contempt of all authority, in forcibly shutting up the bazars, and arresting the progress of all business, until the contested flags or distinctions be put down by their opponents, are familiar occurrences, and on one of these occasions

the Sultaun applied his profound research and experience to trace the origin of these sects, and to devise the means of preventing future riots.

To the Parias he had already given the new name of *Sámeree*, Samaritans, because, as he affirmed, they and the ancient Samaritans, were equally distinguished by skill in magic. The Chucklers were *Chermdôz*, the common Persian designation of their chief employment. "In the language of this country," he adds, "they are called *Yère Kei* and *Bul Kei*, that is right and left hand, because these men being the grooms and foragers of the horsemen of Islâm, may be considered as their right and left hands, with reference to the important services which they perform; and such is the origin of the distinction, and of the names: they must accordingly now, as in ancient times, continue obedient to the men of Islâm, and serve no other masters." Then follow some rules for monopolising their services, and for suppressing future riots. The laws of Draco are tender mercies, compared with those which he established. The *Yâsa* of Chengiz Khân may have been equally summary, and equally careless of human life; but history exhibits no prior example, of a code, perverting all possible purposes of punishment as a public example, combining the terrors of death with cold-blooded irony, filthy ridicule, with obscene mutilation, the pranks of a monkey with the abominations of a monster.

Of eighteen customs or claims, seven liable to become the grounds of contest, were abolished, and the remainder were retained: but the penalties, however characteristic, cannot be exhibited without a veil.*

* 1st, The *Sámeree* and *Cherm Dôz* shall use no flag or standard on pain of the amputation of both hands.

2d, Umbrellas are prohibited to both the divisions of cast; *at si cuiquam adfuerint, testes ejus exsecti in ore suo ponendi sunt.*

3d, The red turban or head-dress is prohibited to both; at

The best ethical treatises of the Mahommedans, of which the Sultaun's library contained a respectable collection, present beautiful abstracts of the doctrines of the Greek* schools, mixed with abundant darkness,

si cuiquam adfuerit, caput amputandum, et super podicem suum ponendum est.

4th, Neither are to wear shoes on pain of having their feet cut off.

5th, They are both required to relinquish the figure of the kite, either on the standard, as formerly, or in any other manner.

6th, Military weapons are prohibited, from the dagger to the firelock. The possession of any instrument besides the small cutting knife, the awl, and the sickle, and such others as may be given by Government, involves the forfeiture of both hands.

7th, The pike with the tinkling circular ornament, is specially forbidden under the same penalties; and the whole of a strangely unconnected regulation, the order of which has only been observed in the seven prohibitions, is closed with the following sweeping clause; *si quis mandata hæc violaverit, palo in imo ventre infosso, crimen suum luet.*

In another regulation we have the following example of uncharitable barbarism; "persons born of slave-women and prostitutes shall not be taught to read or write; if any one shall instruct them, his tongue shall be cut out." "If any person before or after marriage, shall keep a prostitute or female slave, you shall, after ascertaining the fact, *take the slave for government!*"

[The disputes between the Right-hand and Left-hand castes, which Abbé Dubois mentioned as a perpetual source of riots, have long ago ceased to give trouble. The division appears to be of comparatively modern origin and arose from a struggle for precedence between the principal castes of artificers, the goldsmiths, ironsmiths, coppersmiths, carpenters and masons and the other principal castes, especially those connected with agriculture. The division is confined to the south of India and does not exist outside the Madras Presidency and Mysore. The centre was at Conjeevaram near Madras, where there are to this day special halls for both parties called Valangay mantapams and Yidangay mantapams. (Dr. Macleane. *Madras Manual of Administration*, special article under "Yidam." Also Lewis Rice: *The Gazetteer of Mysore*, Vol. I. p. 222.)]

* It has been affirmed, (in Le Sage's Political Atlas and elsewhere,) that translations of the Greek poets and philosophers

from the metaphysics of the east and the west, to obscure the infidelity which is too obvious to be mistaken, and too dangerous to be avowed. To conjecture that Tippoo Sultaun could not read and understand these performances, is an inference fairly deducible from the general state of literature in the south.

were made into Arabic : with regard to the former, I believe the supposition to be entirely erroneous ; the mythology, pervading almost every line of Greek poetry, is intolerable to the true believer. The Iliad and the Koran could not co-exist ; and this obvious reason rendered impossible the translation of a Greek poet into Arabic. If, in the age of Haroun-ul-Resheed, Homer and Pindar had travelled as freely as Aristotle and Euclid, Europe would have imported back from Arabia, an earlier and a larger portion of civilization and knowledge than she actually received. In a Persian biographical collection, I have seen a life of Homer, in which he is stated to have held the same estimation as a poet among the Greeks, as *Amarilkeis* among the Arabs, but not a line of quotation.

[I am indebted to Sir Thomas Arnold for the following note, "The first translation of Homer in Arabic appeared in 1904, and was made by a Syrian Christian, named Sulaiman Bustani. During the great periods of translation from Greek into Arabic in the 9th and 10th centuries of our era, no translations appear to have been made from the Greek poets. The reason is probably this: the translators were generally Christians and they probably did not care to have to do with a literature that was so obviously polytheistic and pagan. All that early Arabs seem to have known of Homer was his name, which occurs in the work of an Arab writer who died in A.D. 995 ; but nothing whatever is said about him or the two other Greek poets, whose names are given in such a mangled form as to make them incapable of identification. So Wilks is right in his facts ; but I doubt the correctness of his reason. In the 9th century there was such an intellectual curiosity that any new knowledge was welcome, however inconsistent it might be with the Koran. The lack of Greek poetry was more likely due to the fact that the intermediaries, the Oriental Christian translators, were not interested in it themselves."]

The late Sir Barry Close, a man as extraordinary as he was estimable, who studied, and who mastered, the logic, the ethics, and the metaphysics of Greece, through the medium of the Arabic and Persian languages, sought in vain among the literati of the south of India, for a person who could read and understand the Akhlak e Nâseri.

But the following extract from the general regulations, affords abundant evidence, that even his theological lore, derived from the impure source of the Koran, furnished a master principle of ethical science; the inversion of which formed the fixed basis of his own conduct. "Falsehood is an offence of the highest nature, against both morality and religion. According to the books *Sherra Wekaya*, and *Tareech Velayet Khorassaun*, &c. offences against the sovereign are of four descriptions; and the punishment ordained for each of them is mentioned in these books. God has also pronounced his curse against liars:—*so heinous a vice is falsehood, that all the other vices on earth are produced by it.*" He then details the punishment of the four-fold offences against the sovereign which, in other passages, are described by the abbreviated terms of the offences of the hands, the tongue, the eyes, and the ears. The two first are obvious; and the two second relate to the crime of concealing any thing injurious, which is seen or heard. To render more sacred the injunctions to an honest discharge of public duty, the principal public officers, civil and military, were annually assembled from all parts of the country, and each made oath on the Koran, that he had not in the preceding, and would not in the current year, defraud the Government, or suffer it to be defrauded; and had observed, and would maintain fidelity to the sovereign in every respect. The Mysoreans observe, that every sort of peculation was increased by the cover of these oaths; and that when subsequently, not content with the oaths of the great officers, he exacted them from every individual in the ranks of the army, and the lowest civil offices of the Government; the lust of plunder became unbridled and unlimited. A person of strict veracity

¹ No. 126 of the The Mysorean Revenue Regulations translated by Burrish Crisp, Esq., from the Persian original under the seal of Tippoo Sultaun in the possession of Colonel John Murray. Calcutta, 1792. Printed in British India Analyzed. London, 1793.

who was present at the examination of an account furnished by a Mahomedan officer, in which the frauds were too obvious to be concealed, related, that the minister, Meer Sadik could not help noticing it to the Sultaun. In the idiom of the language, when a man has embezzled public money, he is said to have *eaten it*. The Sultaun paused, and meditated for some time. "He is a Mussulman," he gravely replied, "and pronounces the *bismilla** before his meal: if the revenue be diminished, the praise of God is encreased." Whether this particular peculation really remained unpunished, my informant could not positively say; but the extraordinary and notorious facilities for abuses of every description, were too well understood by the rapacious and unprincipled, and only silently deplored by a few honourable and unobtruding individuals.

The code of regulations was ordered to be studied night and day. It was declared to contain "all rules necessary to be observed," but "if any case should occur not provided for, and requiring reference to the resplendent presence, such reference was to be made." An anecdote on this subject enlivened general conversation for many years afterwards. A husbandman came out of breath to tell the aumil† at Kaunkanhully, that a large field of sugar-cane was on fire. "Fetch me the book of regulations; positively I can recollect nothing about a fire in a field of sugar-cane." I will tell you what to do, if I may be permitted, said the astonished husbandman, and with great volubility talked of the village drum summoning every man, woman and child, with each a pot of water. "The book of regulations tells me what to do," said the aumil, "the case is unprovided for, and must be reported and referred." In the meanwhile, the field was destroyed, and the report

Bismilla, in the name of God, the commencement, and often the whole, of the grace before eating.

† Aumil, collector of revenue.

was made. Rumour was more expeditious than the letter, and every one was full of jest and expectation. The Sultaun heard the dispatch with a vacant stare, which sometimes preceded a laugh, and sometimes a wise reflection. The courtiers misinterpreted the look, and a competition ensued of wit and epigram, at the expence of the unhappy aumil. The royal stare continued for a time, and then dropped into the philosophical preparative. "The man," said the Sultaun, "is a good and an obedient servant; prepare instantly an edict to be added to the regulations, prescribing what is to be done in the event of fire in sugar-fields."

The royal state and title had been assumed in 1786, and the throne found in Seringapatam at the capture of the place, was ordered at the same time to be constructed. In 1789, the period at which his power and arrogance may be deemed to have reached their summit, preparations had been made for the public solemnity of ascending it, but the events of that year interfered with the projected festivities, and the Sultaun never sat upon his throne. The circumstances attending his being named *Tippoo*, and the meaning of that word (tiger), in the Canarese language, have been stated;* the adoption of the tiger stripe in the uniform of the infantry, and as a distinctive ornament in the palaces, in casting guns, and on all the insignia of royalty, was founded on this name. Royal tigers were chained in the court of entrance of the palace, and the construction of the throne was made to conform to the same terrific emblem. A tiger, rather exceeding the full size, of pure gold, and well fashioned, the eyes and teeth of appropriate stones, was the support of the throne; and from a richly ornamented canopy, was suspended over the throne a fluttering *humma*, formed of beautiful precious stones, in conformity to the poetical

fancy, that the head on which its shadow falls is destined to be encircled with a crown. One branch of the national festivity was to have been the solemnization of 12,000 marriages on one and the same day, and a separate code was prepared about the same period for regulating domestic manners and morals; among the minutiae of which one of the secretaries assured me that he saw a draft in the Sultaun's hand-writing to the following effect: "The faithful shall dine on animal food on Thursday* evening, and on no other day of the week: On the same evening and on no other *uxores suas amplexu tenere licet.*"

In the western world a *reformation of the calendar* is uniformly associated with ideas of profound scientific attainment. The era of all Mahomedan nations commences with the Hejira (the flight of Mahommed from Mecca to Medina), but this like all other names was to be changed, and the Sultaun adopted the term *mowlood*,¹ the birth, of course signifying regeneration, or being born anew; a figure of speech among Hindoos, originating in the metempsychosis, and of ordinary and familiar application;† but I do not recollect tracing it in any other instance among Mahomedans. The Mowlood is placed about thirteen years before the Hejira, which brings it close

Which they call *Friday evening*, the night not belonging, as with us, to the preceding, but the ensuing day.

¹ Kirkpatrick, with greater probability of accuracy, considers the term *mowloody*, or era of the birth, referred to the birth of Mahommed, or perhaps to his mission, and actually was used to show the Sultan's zeal for the glory of his religion. He supposes that Tippoo regarded the reference to the flight of Mahommed in the ordinary chronological tables as a slight upon the Prophet. Cf. Kirkpatrick: *Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan*, 1811; Remarks of the Kalendar, p. xxx.

† A fine bramin boy of about sixteen, a singer and a mendicant, made some ingenious improvisatores, and asked alms. "It is a pity," I said, "that so fine a boy should beg, come with me, and I will make a soldier of you." "That, to be sure, (said he,) would be a transmigration."

to the commencement of Mahommed's mission at the age of forty; and the new calendar consisted in the simple adoption of the Hindoo cycle of sixty years, and the substitution of their year, consisting of twelve lunar months, with an embolismal month at stated periods, to make it correspond with the solar reckoning, for the ordinary lunar year of the Mahomedans, which makes the beginning of every successive year recede eleven days, and thus make the round of all the seasons. The reader who desires to investigate the Indian cycle of sixty years, may consult the second volume of the Asiatic Researches; each year in the cycle has its appropriate name, and new ones being indispensable, the Sultaun fabricated them from the scheme usually named *Abjud*, the first word of an arbitrary verse, for settling the numerical powers of the letters of the alphabet, and in general use in epitaphs and inscriptions. This was adopted, ordered, and circulated in 1786, and the very next year he discovered, that it would be an improvement, to adopt another and more simple scheme, by which the power of each letter depends on its place in the alphabet; and the new edict was issued in 1787. The numerical letters composing the name of each year, being added together indicated the place† of that year in the cycle; and the new names of the months were merely ordered so, that the first letter of each should shew its place in the year, as in the alphabet, the twelve first letters of the alphabet, being the initials of the new names of the twelve

For the purpose of adjusting the odd hours and minutes exceeding 354 in the lunar year, amounting in 30 years to eleven days, the Mahomedans intercalate one day in the 2d, 5th, 7th, 10th, &c. years, adding it to the last month of the year Zihlhedjeh; and the months being alternately of 29 and 30 days, this last month has in the intercalary years, 30 days, and in the others 29 days.

† The letters, for example of the year *Shaddab*, are Sh = 40. a = 1. d = 8. a = 1. and b = 2. total 52; which shews that *Shaddab* is the 52d year of the cycle.

months; but it was a consideration, which his avocations and studies do not seem to have brought under review, that all chronology is set at defiance, by reckoning from a particular date or era, one part of the series in lunar years, and the remainder, by the solar account.

Before dismissing the subject of the calendar it may be interesting to observe, that the absurdity of an ambulatory year, making the round of the seasons, was the exclusive work of Mahommed. Before his time, the Arabs, like the ancient Greeks, the Jews, Hindoos, and Chinese, had their embolismal months to reconcile the lunar with the solar year. But of the lunar months, four were held sacred, to the degree of declaring war waged within them to be impious. Mahommed* promulgated a particular revelation, enjoining his followers to attack their enemies in all the months. His enemies, it would seem, had made their embolisms convenient to their own, and injurious to his operations, perhaps because unexpected: it was accordingly declared, by a pretended revelation, that "the number of months with God is twelve months," and "the transferring of a sacred month to another month, is an additional infidelity." Whether Sale be correct or otherwise, in ascribing to Prideaux and Golius an error, in supposing this passage to relate to the embolismal month, he admits that this mode of correcting the calendar, was practised by the ancient Arabs, and was prohibited by Mahommed, by the innovation which limited the number to twelve lunar months in one year, and thus subverted the order of nature. The Mahommedans of India necessarily refer to the solar year in their accounts of revenue, and other transactions, which depend on the unalterable order of the seasons, but to the lunar year of 354 days, in their religious festivals, chronology, and military annals. The Sultaun held a

* Koran, chapter 9.

† Sale, Preliminary Disquisition, 198-9.

consultation of Mahommedan priests (which I have not been able farther to trace) to determine the true date of the Hejira, and probably of the mission of Mahommed; but when in addition to the "incomparable invention" of seventy-two new names, which constituted the amount of real novelty, we find him adopting a reckoning, as the universal standard of all transactions, in direct opposition to the positive injunctions of the Koran, it will be difficult to abstain from combining the new doctrine of a new birth, with those impious pretensions, which he darkly but systematically encouraged, to the prospect of a new revelation, of which he was himself to be the immediate author or minister.

Such is the whole amount of novelty contained in the reformation of the calendar. The new system of weights and measures, although the reverse of improvement, is yet connected with some circumstances in the system previously established, which are not entirely destitute of interest. A fixed standard in nature, to which other standards might be practically referred, has been the desideratum of every people, however imperfectly pursued; and previously to the establishment of better principles of science, the merit of these standards ought to be compared rather with each other, than with those subsequently discovered. It is obvious, that a fixed standard, either of weight, capacity, or linear measure, affords very simple and reciprocal means of keeping the others equally invariable. The first and the only scientific standard has been adopted by the French Government, in assuming as their unit of linear measure the ten millionth part of a quadrant of the meridian; and yet this measure, assumed in 1793 as invariable, and deemed to be perfect in general estimation, has been found on subsequent investigation to be full of absurdities* and defects. It has been ascertained that two

* Article on weights and measures, in the 17th number of the British Review, ascribed to Doctor Gregory.

portions of any one meridian on different sides of the equator, are neither similar nor equal; and that the true measurement of a given portion of such an arc, in any one place, so far from having been practically effected, has terminated in a diversity of results.

An attempt has been made in England, to deduce the measures of length, capacity, and weight, from the measure of time. A pendulum, vibrating seconds under given conditions of temperature and locality, gave the linear measure derived from this invariable standard; and the measures of weight and capacity were deduced by means equally beautiful and simple. A bill for the establishment of these standards passed the House of Commons, and was thrown out by the Lords, on account of a variety of acknowledged errors in detail, and of imperfections stated to require a more mature revision. This enlightened age cannot be much longer disgraced by a system, if such it may be called, of weights and measures which has already received its universal condemnation. A reformation of principles does not necessarily involve the subversion, but rather the regulation of existing practice: and as the proposed principle is more sound in theory, and more simple in application than the plausible scheme of our neighbours, it seems probable that we shall also avoid the serious practical inconvenience of their visionary systems. The French revolutionists held it as a principle, *that every thing was to be destroyed, because every thing was to be renewed*. We might hope to approach nearer to a suitable English principle, in affirming, *that every thing is to be preserved, because every thing is to be improved*.

Unfortunately however, the English weights and measures remain in a state little if at all superior to the system of Bengal, as explained in the 5th volume of the Asiatic Researches. This system of northern India like that of England employs one particular kind of grain, to determine the standard of weight,

and another to regulate linear measure ; and of course leaves both to fluctuate with the quality of the grain, according to the season, and the soil. My attention has but very recently been drawn to the material difference between this system of the north of India, and that which prevails in Mysoor ; and as I must trust exclusively to memory for the imperfect account of the latter which I am able to present, it shall be accompanied by such circumstances as may satisfy the English reader that my recollection is not materially wrong ; and may enable the Indian observer to furnish the public with a more accurate description.

A question to a large pecuniary amount, depending on a difference in the measures of capacity, was at issue between persons under the jurisdiction of the government of Mysoor, and others under that of the East India Company at Seringapatam ; after some previous communication, the magistrate* of that place was so good as to meet me at the residency for its adjustment ; and the minister (Pornea) was requested to be present. The parties attended with their documents and evidence ; and the first documents on which the parties were reciprocally agreed, were the texts of the Purānas, which determine the mode of ascertaining the measure of capacity, through the medium of the standard of weight, and these texts were read and collated. Each party brought samples of nine different kinds of grain, sound and well dried ; and it was explained, that from the history of their culture, they were necessarily the produce of every variety of soil, and requiring various degrees of moisture or drought ; that every variety of season favourable to one would be unfavourable to some other ; and that specimens from any one year must necessarily compensate each other, and thus make the average of any one year, equal to the average of any other year ; this being premised, one

* Colonel Symons.

grain of each kind was deposited in a very delicate scale, and the sum of the nine formed the unit of weight. The experiment was verified three or four times, by taking again one grain from each of the nine different heaps, and there was not the slightest perceptible inclination of the balance. These units, increased in the regulated ratio, were then compared with the established weights (which are uniformly the current coins), and carefully verified; and as the result of the whole, a vessel containing a certain weight of these nine kinds of grain, carefully counted, equalized, and well mixed, to fix the specific gravity, was the standard measure of capacity, by which the cause was determined.—The case did not require a reference to the measure of length, and I do not recollect (although I then knew) the manner in which it was deduced. These details will, I trust not appear tiresome, if, as I am disposed to believe, they describe a nearer approach to an invariable standard in nature, than was any where in practice, before the present French system.

The Sultaun simply destroyed* these chances of average accuracy, by referring his standard of weight to poppy grains, accommodated to the old weights in every thing but in name, as is evident from his making one of his established weights $6\frac{1}{2}$ poppy grains. The measure of capacity, as before, was deduced from the actual coins, but without any allusion to the nine kinds of grain which were to regulate the specific gravity. The standard measure of length was fixed at twenty-four thumbs' breadth,—*because there are twenty-four letters in the confession of faith*; and the breadth of a thumb was ascertained by a certain number of grains of fine rice of a certain weight, or another number and weight of coarse rice, or another of wheat; and this, with a new name for every object, constituted the extent of his retrograde

* The ancient system was restored on the re-establishment of the Hindoo dynasty.

march, in this most important branch of public regulation.

A few examples and incidents, selected from a large variety of the "incomparable inventions," on which this strange being sought to found his fame as a legislator and reformer, have been presented with the exclusive view of unfolding a character, inexplicable by any other means: not, however, without apprehension, that a respectable portion of readers may deem the selection too abundant, while another may wish for more ample details.

The digression from which we return, may obviate interruptions to our future narrative, but cannot exclude the farther illustrations of character, with which its progress is inseparably mixed; and in describing the events of the remaining seven years, it may farther contribute to perspicuity, if we endeavour to separate, as far as the subjects shall admit, the measures of internal administration, from those of exterior policy.

The year 1792 was not suffered to elapse without commencing a work intended to secure the capital from the imminent peril which it had recently escaped. The faces of the fort towards the island were already defended by a double line of works. A single line had been deemed sufficient for the northern face, and a small portion of the western works, washed and defended by the river. But the demonstrations made on both these points, and the extraordinary sacrifices to which the Sultaun had submitted, evinced his conviction that both were vulnerable in a dangerous degree. The work now ordered was a second line of rampart and ditch, immediately within, and parallel to the existing single line; together with the improvement and completion of the stone glacis towards the river; and if no other evidence existed, regarding his ignorance of the principles of fortification, and of stupid obstinacy in disdaining the instruction which

some of his French officers must have been capable of imparting, it would be found in the continuance of all the original defects in the outline of the exterior works.*

The corps of pioneers, maintained at a large expence by Hyder for military purposes in war, and useful labours in peace, had been suffered, by negligence and abuse, to be reduced, at the capital, to a number not exceeding one thousand, and an edict was now issued for collecting twenty thousand men, including masons, simply by a circular order, to seize certain descriptions of men, and their families, and to settle them at Seringapatam until the works should be completed. When collected, they were divided into eighty companies, of two hundred and fifty men each, with officers and accountants; and a guard of peons to each company, to keep them to their work. The guards could not keep perpetual watch over 20,000 persons; the desertions were incessant, and the vacancies as constantly supplied by forcible seizures in the districts, until husbandmen and respectable inhabitants were included in the requisition. A bribe to the officer and accountant at the works, could always procure for any person *to be returned dead*, and this was converted into a new source of corruption, in which the asophs (civil governors of districts) soon participated: after purchasing this report, and returning to their homes, it was necessary to repeat the bribe to the asoph, to prevent being sent back; a result which would probably verify the report of *dead*, from mental and bodily misery; and the

* The well-constructed bastion at the western angle, erected on the rampart, and within the exterior line, the remedy of some of the worst defects of original construction by finishing "*en cremaille*" some of the faces of his towers, and even portions of the covered way; and the construction of very good redoubts, shewed rather a comprehension of mechanical advantage than the slightest approach to scientific principles, and these slight improvements were derived from the French.

manuscript from which I take this statement, goes on to observe, that "this state of things continued to the end, without any other effect, than the desolation of the country, no part of the works having ever been completed."

During the late war many of the ancient poligars had been restored to their possessions by the confederates, and some had risen and wrested their former strong-holds from the garrisons appointed by the Sultaun for their defence. Among the latter number was Oochingy, a strong hill-fort, situated about twelve or fifteen miles to the north-east of Hurryhur; and at the conclusion of the war the enthusiasm of its ancient possessors induced them to resist the forces of the Sultaun; a strong detachment under one of his best officers, Seyed Ghoffar, suffered
1793. a severe repulse early in 1793. Kummer-u-Deen, who was seldom employed, excepting in cases of difficulty, was detached with a considerable force in the month of March, and on his report a farther reinforcement, under Khân Jehân Khân,* joined him in

* The vicissitudes experienced personally and in his connections, by this brave, able, and interesting man, strongly illustrate the character of the Sultaun's oppressions. He was born a bramin, and was at the age of seventeen a writer in the service of Sheikh Ayâz at Bednore, when it surrendered to General Matthews. On the recapture of that place by Tippoo, every person was sought for who had been in any respect useful to the fugitive, and this youth was forcibly converted to Islâm, and highly instructed in its doctrines. He was soon distinguished as a soldier, and invested with high command. In 1799, he fell, desperately wounded, in attempting to clear the breach and repel the assault at Seringapatam. He recovered, and was appointed to the command of the raja's infantry, and witnessing the opening of the temples, on the restoration of the Hindoo government, made advances through the minister to be re-admitted to his rank and cast, as a bramin. A select conclave of Gooroos assented to the measure, with certain reservations to mark a distinction between him and those who had incurred no lapse from their original purity; but the khân would have all or none. "I prefer," said he (in conversing with me on the subject), "the faith of my ancestors, but the fellows wanted to shut up my present road

April: the defence was prolonged with great obstinacy and valour for three months; when the place was carried by two separate and simultaneous assaults; that under the last named officer having alone succeeded. Kummer-u-Deen, without any previous intimation (and that alone illustrates the general state of feeling), ordered five handsome boys from among the prisoners as a present to the Sul-taun, to be prepared for the future services of the harem, and wrote him a complimentary letter on the occasion. Tippoo was delighted with the hint, and

to a better world, and would not fairly open the other. I believe that I shall not miss my way, if I perform my duties in this world according to any of the revelations by which the Almighty has deigned to manifest his will to the various classes of mankind; and I feel myself more respectable with the full privileges of a Mussulman, than I should as a half-outcast bramin." Before his forcible conversion he was betrothed, or married in the usual form, and the lady, on arriving at the proper age, sent a message intimating that notwithstanding his change of religion, and marriage with a Mahomedan lady, although she could not be his bramin wife, she could not be the wife of another, and deemed herself bound to regulate her future life according to his commands. After some farther messages, she determined to receive his own immediate protection; a separate quarter of the house was allotted for her exclusive use; when he visited her it was in the braminical costume; and he presented himself to his Mahomedan wife as a true Mussulman. Before I knew him he had married a Mahomedan daughter to a Mussulman, forcibly converted like himself; a Hindoo of the military cast, heir apparent to the ancient chieftainship of Kenchingoad on the Toombuddra, captured when a boy on the fall of the place. On this occasion, his widowed mother had escaped into the woods, and, contrary to the habits of her cast, placed herself at the head of the ancient followers of her house, and continued, during the remainder of Tippoo's reign, to lead the sort of life which has been described in the case of the raja of Coorg. She paid me a visit in 1808, and among other adventures related the following. "Tippoo's aumil, who polluted the mansion of my lost husband and son, wanted iron, and determined to supply himself from the *rut*," (a temple of carved wood fixed on wheels, drawn in procession on public occasions, and requiring many thousand persons to effect its movement.) "It was too much trouble to take it to pieces, and the wretch burned it in the square of the

instantly ordered the whole garrison to be treated in the same manner, a command which was actually obeyed.*

The Sultaun had discovered, that among the examples of laxity in the execution of old regulations, while his mind was absorbed in the invention of new, a very small portion indeed of the families of his officers had resided in the fort, a fact which would probably never have reached his knowledge, if desertions had not extended to officers as well as men; and the remedy which he adopted is truly characteristic. The buildings within the fort were divided into ten wards, one of which was allotted to the bramins filling public offices, and the rest to the different officers, civil and military, and a price in proportion to its dimension was fixed on each house; not to be paid to the proprietor, for his rights, merged in the higher exigencies of the state, were too unimportant to be considered, but to the Sultaun himself, and it was accordingly stopped by instalments from the pay

great temple, for sake of the iron. On hearing of this abomination, I secretly collected my men, I entered the town by night, I seized him and tied him to a stake, and (bursting into tears, and an agony of exultation) I burned the monster on the spot where he had wantonly insulted and consumed the sacred emblems of my religion." It was on the occasion of the marriage of the khan's own son, that this lady and his connections and relations, of various casts, prevented by the tyranny of their late ruler from the comforts of their customary domestic intercourse, nevertheless assembled for the celebration of the nuptials. Particular days were set apart for braminical festivals, conducted by bramins, others for the khettries, (the family of his son-in-law,) others for Mahommedans; and he was anxious, if I had not dissuaded him, to incur the expence of a great public dinner for the *English, who certainly did not stand lowest in his estimation.*

* *Tribus membris excisis, i.e. penitus emasculati, ut mos est alibi apud Mahometanos Indicos.* The adults all died: I have seen and conversed with some of the younger survivors. One, not from Oochingy, but from Coorg, personated the Sultaun's eldest son, after the capture of Seringapatam, and attempted an insurrection in Canara.

of the purchaser; the true proprietor being ordered to shift for himself outside. This arrangement commenced in the early part of 1793; but in the subsequent years of pecuniary pressure, he was so shameless as, under the pretext of allotting dwellings more suitable to the rank and dignity of the individuals, to exact the full price of the new dwelling, and to resume the former without compensation. By a perfectly new discovery in finance, he thus effected a perpetually renewable circle of sale, by which, although the property seemed to change masters, the consideration-money always returned to one and the same hand. Some few officers did actually bring their families, but the greater portion merely went through the exterior forms, a deception which, in Hyder's reign, would have been impracticable. The asophs, or civil governors, of districts, were most anxiously included in the arrangement, and messengers were repeatedly sent to expedite the journey of their families from the districts. The messengers were bribed; Meer Sâdik (the minister) was propitiated, a marriage in the family occasioned a delay, the ladies were sick, or pregnant, or confined, or dead; one or two introduced a fictitious harem of slave girls, but not one sent a wife or a child.

The payment of the instalments due to the confederates was protracted by the attempt to pay off the English with more than the stipulated promptitude, and to leave the accounts of the other confederates to future adjustment; but Lord Cornwallis had provided in the most honourable and effectual manner against these designs, by ordering that no payment should be accepted by his own nation, until official accounts had arrived of the actual receipt of the corresponding instalment by the other confederates; and this abortive project had no other consequence than prolonging the detention of the hostages until March 1794. On their approach, 1794. accompanied by Captain Doveton, the officer who

had been officially appointed to receive them, and pay the proper attentions on behalf of the English Government, the Sultaun proposed as a written question for deliberation, whether he should or should not admit this Englishman to his presence. The counsellors to whom the question was referred represented that the refusal to receive him might excite suspicion, that "he might be amused with professions of friendship, while whatever is in the heart may nevertheless remain there;" the Sultaun accordingly left the capital and moved to a plain in the neighbourhood of Yoosuf-Abad (Deonhully),* where the hostages were formally restored. On entering their father's tent of audience, accompanied by Captain Doveton, they approached with every demonstration of awe, and when close to the musnud, placed their heads on their father's feet; the Sultaun perfectly silent, and apparently unmoved, touched their necks with his hands; they arose, and he pointed to their seats, and on receiving Captain Doveton's obeisance, pointed to his seat near to the hostages. In a very courteous reception, he supported with considerable exterior dignity all that related to the intercourse of form, and afterwards entered with great ease and fluency into the topics of the day: the French revolution, the confederacy against that nation which, although formerly pretty equally matched by England alone, seemed to make head against all Europe; the embassy of Lord Macartney to China, with his incredulity at its being limited to commercial objects;

* One of the new names of places, "the town of Yoosuf,"—Joseph. Flattery and vanity left nothing untouched: Deonhully was the place of the Sultaun's birth. He was the most beautiful of human beings in his time, as Joseph had been the most lovely of antiquity. Yoosuf and Zuleikha, (Potiphar's wife,) are the hackneyed hero and heroine of many beautiful poems, filled with Joseph's irresistible beauty and Zuleikha's unhappy passion.

¹ *Musnud*.—Ar. *Masnad*, the large cushion, etc., used by native princes in India in place of a throne. (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*, p. 600.)

his Lordship's former duel¹ with one of his council, and other topics of a general nature, were the chief subjects of conversation. In some subsequent interviews he went the full length of declaring *that he deemed Lord Cornwallis his best friend*; "that he would be governed by his advice to forget the past," and cultivate the friendship of the English nation as the primary object of his policy; and having thus gone through the requisite forms, and literally followed the advice of his counsellors, he gave Captain Doveton his audience of leave, and returned by a circuitous route to Seringapatam.

During the period of about ten days that he had been encamped at Deonhully, an incident occurred, which was raised into importance, and attended with consequences more serious than would otherwise have ensued, from the Suldaun's rage at an indignity offered to his authority, in the presence of his enemies, who in fact were not sufficiently apprized of the circumstances to receive any such impression.

The Korân teaches as one of the signs of the times which are immediately to precede the end of the world, the appearance of an Imaum—*Mehedee*,* who will govern the world for forty years; that *Khyzer* (who drank of the waters of immortality, and by some is identified with Elias) and *Jesus* will descend on earth at the same time, and aid in uniting all mankind in the true religion, the belief and the worship of one God.

¹ "An occurrence, doubtless much talked of at the time, (24th September 1784) was a duel between Macartney and Sadleir, arising out of a difference in the Select Committee. Sadleir, with more than accustomed perversity, contested a motion for increasing the allowances of the Military Department Secretary to which he had previously agreed. Macartney, ordinarily the most courteous of men, was betrayed by irritation into impugning Sadleir's veracity, and the result was a challenge by the aggrieved member." (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 225-26.)

* Instructed in the right way.

In the town of Joanpoor (my notes omit the date) a person appeared, said to be an Arab, named Seyed Mahommed, who professed himself to be the expected *Mehedee*, and obtained many followers. That he was a holy man, all the sects are agreed; those who are not his followers argue, that if he were the expected *Mehedee*, the time has long passed for the termination of the world, and that he must have uttered the words *Ina Mehedee—I am Mehedee* (enlightened or instructed by the Almighty, in the right way), without meaning that he was the *Mehedee* who shall precede the dissolution of all things: a numerous class, chiefly of Afghans, contend for the latter doctrine; and it is their distinctive dogma, which they are ready to support with the edge of the sword, "that *Mehedee* has appeared, and has passed away." By the other sects they are represented, perhaps not altogether without ground, as ignorant, ferocious, and treacherous, and cherishing revenge for the slightest offence through successive generations. In all their other tenets, they coalesce with the Sunnites, or sect of Omar; but for the purpose of preventing religious feuds, they are every where excluded from the performance of their rites, within cities, and the body of the camp, from the shout of faith and defiance, offensive to all the other sects, which they put forth together, on a particular night (the 27th) of the Ramazân. On any opposition too, this is their war-whoop, and the signal of resistance, intimating that they will either die or prevail.

The Ramazân occurred while Tippoo Sultaun was at Deonhully, and the *Mehedees* had prepared, *within the camp*, a place for their periodical worship. The Sultaun hearing of this unusual procedure, and highly respecting them as soldiers, sent his Dewan, Meer Sadik, to remonstrate with their chiefs (men of rank) on the commotion which might ensue; offered them tents, and every sort of facility, in a proper and customary situation, but positively prohibited the

performance of the rites within the camp. The chiefs assented to the proposed arrangement, and Meer Sadik returned with that report to the Sultaun. Yet at the appointed hour of the same night, an assemblage of about three thousand set up their horrid yell. This shout of defiance being distinctly heard in Tippoo's tent, he arose in real alarm, girt on his sword, and ordered a considerable body of troops to be stationed around his tent, for security; but his greatest mortification, was the humiliating reports which would be made of the inefficiency of his government, by the English actually in his camp. I have heard the reports of this religious feud from the conflicting parties, and although misrepresentation is attributed to Meer Sadik, and the impracticability was affirmed, of removing at so short a notice, it was not even pretended to be customary, that their place of worship should be erected within a camp or a town. For this act of mutiny, the Sultaun, on the ensuing morning, ordered the two chiefs to be confined, and the remainder of the sect (all horsemen) to be banished, and knowing their vindictive union, he issued circular orders for banishing all who resided in the several districts.

One person only was exempted from the sentence. Seyed Mahommed Khan, the Sultaun's ancient associate and early preserver, whose appointment to be kelledar of Seringapatam, on his first accession had given an impression of the Sultaun's virtues, which was not confirmed by many incidents of equal promise. The first impulse of this person's mind was to retire from a service whence his religious associates were banished; and in this temper he removed his family to a retired part of the country, with a view to their escape, and proposed to effect their common flight. On reflection, however, he changed this determination. But Tippoo had early intimation of the fact; and on his return to the capital, ordered Seyed Mahommed Khan into confinement, from

which he was only released by the capture of the place in 1799.

The two chiefs, named Mehtab Khān and Aalum Ali Khān, were not released till 1795; and during their confinement, a servant of the former escaped from prison, and was found at the gate of the palace, armed with a dagger. On being seized and interrogated, he avowed that he was there for the purpose of killing his enemy; but declared, in a tone of defiance, that he would answer no farther questions, and it was generally supposed that his object was Meer Sādik, the person to whose misrepresentations they affected to ascribe their disgrace. However this may be, the Sultaun assigned as a reason for simply remanding him to prison, that if he had ordered his execution, his own assassination would be certain; and no reasonable question has been raised of the accuracy of this opinion, regarding these fit successors of the old man of the mountain.

A person of no ordinary talents, whom subsequent events brought into prominent notice, came into communication with the Sultaun in the course of this year, in a manner which would scarcely be deemed credible, without the previous knowledge of character possessed by the reader. Dhoondē* Wahag, a Mahratta by descent, was born in the territory of Mysoor and the town of Chengerry: his first † military service was performed as a private horseman, under

* Sometimes called Dhoondia, and Dhoondajee, Wahag.

† Colonel Kirkpatrick's account of Dhoondē, from a manuscript history of Sbānoor, written by Meer Hussein Ali, differs in some respects from the text, which is chiefly founded on the verbal authority of his commanding officer, Bistnoo Pundit, and the historical compilation of Poornea. Colonel Kirkpatrick's work having been published since my departure from India, I had no opportunity of comparing and investigating the circumstances in which they differ; and they are too unimportant to require a discussion of my reasons for adhering to the statement in the text.—Kirkpatrick's Tippoo's Letters. Appendix p. xxvi.

the command of Bistnoo Pundit, in Hyder's invasion of Coromandel in 1780: he was considered by this officer to be brave, active, and intelligent, but eminently dishonest. During the campaign of Lord Cornwallis, he, with a few followers, left the service, carrying off considerable booty, which he had acquired from his enemies, and some which he was accused of purloining from his friends: he proceeded in the first instance to the neighbourhood of Darwar, where, after the conclusion of peace, and the return of the Mahratta armies, he collected a party of freebooters, and levied at first secret, and progressively more open contributions north of the Toombuddra. At a very early period of his new fortunes he sought for conditional protection, and sent an agent (an Afghân Mussulman) to represent to the Sultaun, as his ancient master, that with a little secret aid he would engage, on certain conditions, to recover for him the whole principality of Savanoor, without any overt infringement of the treaty of 1792. The Sultaun would give him no direct aid, but exhorted him to prudence and preparation. Dhoondée was too precipitate, and provoked the court of Poona to send an expedition under a chief named Gôckla to destroy him as a robber: he continued however, with great ability, to carry on a desultory warfare with a handful of men, until he was at length so hard pressed as to be obliged to avail himself of the eventual engagement concluded by his Afghân agent to enter into Tippoo's service with his whole party, consisting of about two hundred horse.

He arrived in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam in June 1794, and proceeded to pay his personal respects to the Sultaun. He was accosted in the anti-chamber, by the Sultaun's desire, with the most magnificent promises of promotion, on the condition of his becoming a Mussulman, a proposition to which Dhoondée gave at once the most unqualified negative. He was accordingly ordered into prison,

and a detachment was sent to surround the little encampment; and after seizing the horses and valuables, down to the very clothing, the men were set at liberty to seek a new fortune.

On the ensuing day, when the plundered horses were brought to be inspected, Tippoo ordered the Afghân agent into his presence. "It was agreed," said the Sultaun, "that Dhoondéc was to become a Mussulman—" the Afghân looked astonished—"What," resumed the Sultaun, "was not that an express condition?" "It may be so," said the Afghân, "I did not hear of it." "What, do I lie?" said the Sultaun, in a rage, "off with his nose and ears." The Afghân was carried out of the presence, and mutilated according to orders; and in a fit of indignation and despair, plunged into the Caveri, and was drowned. A detailed statement of facts, regarding Dhoondée, on which the Sultaun desired the opinion of the four departments of his government, is given* in Colonel Kirkpatrick's work, and occupies upwards of two quarto pages, of very small print; the reader's curiosity may be excited by the information, that in an official document, thus submitted to the consideration of his most confidential advisers, these two pages do not contain two lines of truth. Among the persons required to give an opinion on these false premises, was Bistnoo Pundit, who had himself been robbed by Dhoondée, and who knew him to be both unprincipled and unsafe—he voted for his death—the others for imprisonment. The opinion of the majority prevailed, the captive was forcibly converted, and furnished with a Mahommedan preceptor, and a really liberal maintenance, *in prison and in irons*, from which he only escaped on the day of the ultimate assault and conquest of Seringapatam; when, putting himself at the head of a band of desperate adventurers, who are always to be found on the dissolution of a

* Appendix, page xxvii.

government, he made the most rapid strides to the establishment of a new and formidable dynasty in the south. He was, however, once more too precipitate, and by seeking, with unparalleled activity, to disorganize all around him, without distinction, rendered it necessary for the English Government to employ against him the troops of Mysoor, under the Honourable Colonel Wellesley; and after a series of defensive movements, combining distinguished activity and judgment, which protracted his fate for several months, he at length fell in a charge of cavalry, personally led by his opponent.

The adventures of this extraordinary person, terminating in the suppression of an incipient sovereignty, have incidentally led us beyond the limits assigned to this work. The events of the campaign are diminutive, when compared with the subsequent glories of the Duke of Wellington; but they will exhibit to the future historian, a clear development of those astonishing powers, which have fixed the homage of other nations, and the pride and gratitude of his own.

The unprincipled character of the sovereign has 1795. been sufficiently unfolded; and the nature of those gross deceptions, practised by persons who possessed his confidence, will be illustrated in an incident, which led, without previous design, to an important augmentation of resource. It was notorious, that the full extent of extortion practised on the husbandmen was unknown to the Sultaun; and the landholders of an eastern district, not far from the capital, trusting to the authentic evidence of the village accounts, and the plain simplicity of their case, assembled to the number of six thousand persons, accompanied by the village accountants, to submit their grievances to the sovereign. Their spokesmen were admitted to an audience; the account of the sums extorted was indisputable; and Meer Sadik, the minister, frankly admitted the facts;

but affirmed (as was not true), that the whole had been carried to the account of nezerâna, which with the Sultaun was permitted to cover almost any enormity. The minister, however, was not satisfied with simple justification; but in a separate interview with the landholders, gave his own explanation of the nezerâna demanded by the necessity of affairs; represented to them the Sultaun's grief and displeasure, at the ingratitude of his subjects; and pledged himself, that no farther contributions should be levied, if they would consent to an augmentation of thirty per cent. on the fixed revenue; and the amount of the prior exactions may be conjectured, by their gladly agreeing to these moderate terms. He then told them, that he had it in contemplation to relieve them, for a small commutation, from two sources of exaction, which he knew to be severe, the money-changers' shops of the Government, and the monopoly of tobacco.

To the Sultaun he then returned to represent the ill consequence of countenancing groundless complaints, and the admission of the fact which he held in his hand, in the spontaneous assent of the husbandmen to add thirty per cent. to their annual payments, which a deputation at the door was ready to confirm; but that they were particularly anxious for the abolition of the monopoly of the money-changers, and of tobacco, (which the Sultaun knew to be unproductive, and the minister knew to be making the fortune of his personal enemy, Ismael Khan,) and that they would perhaps consent on these conditions to a farther small augmentation.

The Sultaun was delighted with the proposal; and a compromise was made of seven and a half per cent. on these accounts, making the whole augmentation equal to thirty-seven and a half per cent.

But Meer Sâdik was not yet satisfied. After obtaining the assent of the landholders to the formal instrument, and presenting it to the Sultaun, he

took the opportunity of summing up the facts of the case. That persons who could by their own confession and written agreement afford such an augmentation of their payments, should assemble in a tumultuous manner, to interrupt the ordinary business of the Government, by a *false complaint* against the officers of the revenue, was unpardonable; but that the interests of the Government demanded lenity, and he should only recommend the execution of two of the ringleaders. The chief spokesmen, the most intelligent and active of the potails,¹ were accordingly hanged in the presence of the astonished husbandmen. The whole dispersed. The same exaction was, on the authority of this spontaneous increase, nominally extended to the rest of the country; and no praise was deemed adequate to the merits of a minister, who by an operation so simple had raised the landed revenue in the extraordinary proportion of 37½ per cent.

The army in the meanwhile had received no more than seven months' pay in the year, and began to evince considerable discontent. To reduce the numbers, or touch the efficiency of the instrument, by which alone he could hope to retrieve his affairs, did not enter into the Sultaun's contemplation; but he adopted the project of granting jageers² in lieu of one half of the pay, reckoned at ten months' pay in the year, which would leave a balance of five, to be paid in money.

The reader is aware that the receipts of a jageer are simply the transfer of the revenue of the Government; but in collections to be made by those immediately interested in their amount, it was deemed reasonable to reckon the value of the jageer at something more than the common receipts of the Govern-

¹ A Mahratta title for the headman of a village.

² *Jageer*.—Jagheer, Persian *jagir*, literally place, or holding. A hereditary assignment of land and of its rent as annuity. (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*.)

ment, and this excess was deemed to be moderate at an estimate of 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; but the calculation was made, not on the old rates, but on those recently established, and the actual excess above the ordinary value at which the jageers were estimated to the troops was exactly 71 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.*

It is obvious that such allotments could be made only to corps, troops, or companies, and not to individuals, and the acceptance was very prudently permitted to be optional. The Silledar horse, without exception, embraced the arrangement, and many of the stable horse and infantry. It was Tippoo's wish to extend it to his whole army, but the details of such a measure were complicated, and proceeded but slowly; and such was the disordered state of finance, that the possessors of jageers were alone exempted from frequent and urgent distress.

1796. The annual assembly of the officers of every department to renew their oaths of honesty has been already adverted to, and in the confidence of that obligation on the faithful, who alone were admitted to the new offices of trust, the districts were subdivided, and the number of aumils exceedingly increased, in order that they might be able, by a minute examination of every detail, to augment the amount of public revenue. If the claims of talent or recorded service were ostensibly disregarded, corrupt recommendation did not seem to exclude those pretensions in the Sultaun's most extraordinary scheme of selection for these new offices. All can-

* Ancient estimated value	100
Late augmentation	37 $\frac{1}{2}$
25 per cent. upon 137 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$
			<hr/>
		Total	171 $\frac{1}{2}$
			<hr/>

but as the estimate was made on the gross value, and the expenses of collection were saved to the Government, the estimated augmentation of revenue approached one hundred per cent.

didates for every department were ordered to be admitted and drawn up in line before him, when looking steadfastly at them he would, as if actuated by inspiration, call out in a solemn voice, "Let the third from the left be Asoph of such a district: he with the yellow drawers understands naval affairs, let him be Meer-è-Yem, Lord of the Admiralty: he with the long beard and he with the red turban are but Aumils, let them be promoted," &c. &c. There can be no question that he had studied his lesson for this fraudulent exhibition of oracular wisdom; but it failed in effect from the ludicrous blunders of the scene.

The title of raja of Mysoor, so long excluded from our recollections, will necessarily occupy a brief notice in consequence of the death, by small-pox, of Cham Raj, the father of the present raja, who had been raised to that pageant office, by Hyder, in the year 1772.

Even Tippoo Sultaun in the height of his arrogance had not hitherto omitted the customary form of shewing the raja to his people once a year, at the feast of the Dessera, but now for the first time the ceremony was omitted of even a nominal succession to the musnud. The ancient Rance, the present raja, then two years old, with the remnant of the family, were removed to a miserable hovel, in which they were found at the capture of Seringapatam, and the palace was rifled of all its contents, and even the individuals of their personal ornaments; the present raja cried bitterly at the attempt to take away his little golden bracelets, and there was still sufficient feeling among the instruments of tyranny, to be touched at the distress of the child, and to abstain from this last violation.*

Among the domestic occurrences of 1796, was the solemnization of the royal nuptials. We have

* It was on this occasion that the manuscript was removed, which is described in the preface, page xxii. of the 1st volume.

noticed one of the Sultaun's disappointments in a treaty of marriage in 1780, and another had occurred in 1794. In that year, immediately after the return of the hostages, he dispatched a confidential envoy to Calburga, the residence of a saint by hereditary claim, who continued to enjoy a large jageer from Nizam Ali, to demand in marriage a daughter of that family, particularly celebrated for the beauty of its females; a connexion of that description being not unusual among Mahommedan princes. The saint assented to the proposal, on the condition that the Sultaun should either directly or through the medium of the English Government, or in any other manner he should prefer, obtain the sanction of Nizam Ali, without which it was obvious that the family would risk the loss of its jageer; but if the Sultaun could not consent to the application, as circumstances were then unfavourable, and might improve, *when the Sultaun's victorious standard should be erected in Decan*; the saint concluded with an admonition which may sound strangely in an English ear; four wives he observed are allowed to every Mussulman, and peculiarly to Sovereigns; he accordingly exhorted the Sultaun to provide himself with that indispensable requisite, leaving one vacancy for one of his daughters, who would always be at the Sultaun's service, whenever political circumstances should admit: a private envoy from Calburga followed some time afterwards to attempt the removal of these difficulties; but the Sultaun was immovable on the question of any application to Nizam Ali, and the project was abandoned. The Sultaun, although as little scrupulous as his father in filling his harem, was in fact at this time without a lawful wife. In 1778, Hyder had obtained from Arcot a Nevayet lady,* celebrated

* Sister to the person who for many years was known at Madras by the name of the Pondicherry Nabob; and pretended, without the slightest foundation, to be the lineal descendant of *Chunda Sahab*.

for beauty, to be the wife of his heir apparent. During her journey, rumour injurious to her family (not personally to herself) had reached the ears of her destined husband, and although the marriage was solemnized it was never consummated; but at the intercession of Tippoo's mother, who is stated to have received and communicated the first unfavourable reports, another marriage was arranged for him, with the daughter of Lalla Mea, a near relation of the family, and solemnized at the same time with the other: the daughter of Lalla Mea became the mother of his only legitimate children,* Mohy-u-Deen and two daughters: this lady died on the day after the storm of the lines in 1792, and the funeral procession to a cemetery without the fort, was observed and respected by the English army. From that period therefore, according to Mahomedan as well as English law, he was a widower, and after the entire failure of his negotiations with Calburga, he married in 1796 another relation, the daughter of Seyed Saheb, who, together with a son whom she bore, died about a year and a half afterwards.

It can scarcely be necessary to state that the 1797. various but irregular accessions to the treasury which have been incidentally noticed, continued to be entirely inadequate to meet his disbursements; he looked with increasing impatience to succours from revolutionary France, which should enable him to destroy the English power, and he was anxious that his army should be found in a state of efficiency to perform their part in the expected service. In the letters which he received from his agents at Muscat, successive accounts were received of the rise and progress of the Wahábees, and he was particularly

* Besides these, he had in 1799, *living*,

illegitimate	17 + 3	legitimate	= 20
Illegitimate, deceased	...		24

Total	...	44
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struck with the account of the assassination of the Turkish general in his own tent by one of that sect, who disdained to escape, and courted the crown of martyrdom, from his confidence in the promised joys which awaited him in paradise, as the reward of the deed. This idea having once entered the Sultaun's imagination, he could speak of nothing but the tribes of Arabia, the *Eels* (tribes) of Persia, and the religious zeal, heroism, and devotion arising from such a bond of union and reciprocal attachment. He accordingly projected the establishment of a tribe, which should be as much devoted to his orders as the Wahabees to that of their chief, and a considerable portion of this and the succeeding year was devoted to the requisite selection and organization of his own tribe, to which, as it must have a new name, he assigned the appellation of *Kebeela*, one of the many Arabic names for a tribe. But tribe and family being in Arabia nearly synonymous, the delicacy affected in speaking of women has made it a practice in India to say, *my family* instead of *my wife*; and thus the word *Kebeela*, incorporated into the vernacular language, is universally understood in the south of India to mean *wife* and nothing else. This equivocal term for the Sultaun's elect, became accordingly a source of the most filthy jests throughout the army; and the courtiers were distressed in what manner to apprise him of the ridicule he was exciting. One of the Moonshees (Seyed Hussein—my authority) was at length induced to write on a slip of paper all the synonyms of *Kebeela* in the Arabic and Persian languages, and to take a favourable opportunity of placing it in the Sultaun's view. He immediately recollected the vulgar acceptation of the word *Kebeela*, and changed it to *Zumra*. A general dislocation of corps was the necessary accompaniment of the new organization, and in making the promotions and appointments, he exhibited the same impious pretence to inspiration, which had attracted universal ridicule

in his civil appointments. Exterior distinctions were also deemed necessary, for the *Zumra*, as well as the other corps of the army; for the bramins and Hindoos of the different departments were appointed each their appropriate colour for the turban, and patterns for the other articles of dress; and it was upon this occasion that old Butcherow, being questioned by a courtier regarding his dress, made answer—"he may strike off my head, but he shall never put a new turban on it."*

It was on the occasion of closing his arrangements for the organization of the *Zumra*, that, obscurely anticipating better consequences than actually resulted from his mission to the Isle of France, to be hereafter related, he administered oaths of fidelity to all his officers, civil and military, and to each individual soldier of horse and foot; and caused every Mussulman in his service successively to partake with him of rice and milk, a form of confederation sacred among the Hindoos, but now for the first time introduced into the rites of Islam.

It was about the same time, and with the same view, that he issued a proclamation, dated 11th of April, 1798,† fifteen days before the arrival at Mangalore, of his ambassadors from the Isle of France. This document, which escaped the diligent researches of the public officers employed in 1799, and did not appear in the printed collection, as

* Related to the author by Butcherow himself. The statement may possibly be heightened, but at least it is evidence of what was passing in his mind. After some severe lessons, we do not yet seem to have learned wisdom on these subjects!!!

† The proclamation is ordered to have effect from the commencement of the year Shadáb, 11th of April, 1798, which would rather indicate its being published at an earlier date, but does not amount to evidence of that fact. The date of the first letter from the ambassadors, written on their return to Mangalore, is 9th Baháry year, 1226 from the birth of Mahommed, which, in the printed copy of the official documents found at Seringapatam, is said to answer to the 26th of April.

evidence of the Sultaun's hostile designs, was painted in large letters on a board, suspended in the great mosque. It was observed in that situation by the author, in the ensuing year;* and the following is the substance of the curious, and not doubtful evidence which it presents. "From the commencement of the year Shâdâb, five benefits are conferred by the God-given Government, upon its servants:—
1st. Of the countries which shall be conquered by the God-given Government, the fourth part of the annual revenue is a donation to the troops.

2d. To the widow and children of every man who shall fall in battle, a maintenance equal to a fourth of the share so accruing, and of the pay of the deceased martyr.

3d. The widows and children of men who merely die on service, one quarter of a gold fanam daily (about two and a half rupees a month).

4th. The booty which every individual may acquire shall be his own (meaning that the Government shall demand no share).

5th. Distinctions and honours shall be conferred in proportion to merit and fidelity; in return for all which important benefits, it is incumbent on all the servants of the state to be united and of one heart, in obedience to the command of God and of the Prophet, in laying down their lives to insure the success of the God-given Government in its intended undertakings."

In closing the narrative of such domestic occurrences, from the war of 1792 to the war of 1799, as accord with our general design, it may be proper to notice the nature and objects of a tour at the head of his Zumra and army, after the completion of that arrangement. He had frequently noticed in conversation, that the great lake of Tonoor or Môtee Talâb (the lake of pearls†) had furnished water, and its irrigations forage, at a convenient distance from the

* It is probably in the possession of Colonel Marriot.

† Vol. i. page 260.

capital, to several hostile armies at different periods ; and in the war for death or empire which he was resolved to wage, that it ought not to exist, and he took this opportunity of gratifying his army by marching them to the spot, to partake of the diversion of fishing as the water should be drawn off: the project failed in consequence of the breach having suddenly enlarged during the night, and in the morning the lake was empty. The natural fall of the country caused the waters to flow into the lake of Heroor ; and that his army might not be disappointed, he marched thither, broke down this bank also, and feasted them for several days on the sport of the two lakes: that this gratification was the single object of the second operation is evinced, by the order which he gave for the immediate repair of the embankment ; and the general intention of the tour has been stated, because far more absurd motives were ascribed to the Sultaun, and had seized the imagination of the credulous soldiery. In the depths of this ancient lake resided every variety of animal, corresponding to the terrestrial kinds, including man, with water nymphs of superhuman beauty: a golden rut, (moveable temple) of enormous size, was bound by a talisman at the bottom of the lake, and guarded by this aquatic people. The Sultaun had discovered the charm which was to dissolve the talisman, and the rut would furnish resources for the holy war which was to restore the fortunes of his house, and pour countless wealth into the purses of the soldiery. That Tippoo believed these fairy tales was affirmed by a large majority of his court and army ; but the imputation seemed to be either doubted or denied by many among the better informed.

The tour embraced an examination of the dams of the river above and below the capital ; and plans for breaking down the old, which chiefly bore the name of Deo Raj, and erecting new ones, with new names, in more judicious situations, in order that

Tippoo Sultaun's name might be identified with every monument of peace or war; and that the memory of every other conqueror or benefactor might sink into oblivion. These views, however dark and illiberal in themselves, were magnificent for a sovereign preparing a last desperate effort; and evinced the confidence with which he anticipated a glorious result. The fancy for novelty, which was his ruling passion to the last, found, towards the close of the tour, one remaining object in the regulation of the camp bazâr. The absence from the capital had lasted longer than the bazâr-men had anticipated, and there was a deficiency in the supply of rice. After the feasting which has been described, the foot-soldiers, finding some difficulty in making their requisite purchases, proceeded to seize rice wherever it could be found; and a commotion ensued in the bazâr, which was reported to the Sultaun. He observed, that it was disgraceful for a gentleman soldier to go to the bazâr at all; that they ought to send their servants; and that he would find a remedy on his return to the capital. He accordingly ordered, that the bazârs should be opened but once in seven days; that every person should on that day make his weekly purchases of provisions, which would make a quiet bazâr for the remaining six days. In this fine phrenzy of imaginary reform, he could not condescend to calculate on the vulgar facts, that a variety of perishable articles will not keep for even a second day; that a great proportion of purchasers have not wherewithal to pay for a week's provisions; and that many wants occur which are either not foreseen, or for want of credit, cannot be supplied among those classes who subsist from day to day. The edict, however, was not only issued, but absolutely enforced, for upwards of a month. The most dreadful confusion and distress ensued; and at the expiration of about forty days, the shops gradually opened without orders and without notice.

The balanced alternative of faulty brevity, or uninteresting detail, on which I was unable to satisfy my own judgment, in sketching the strange institutions of the Sultaun's government, has pervaded in a similar degree the selection from a cumbrous mass of matter, for a narrative of domestic transactions, which should convey a just impression of the actual character of his internal administration: a character which, in every despotism, will be frequently found at variance with the principles on which its institutions are *professedly* founded. If the degree in which a suitable medium has been approached, shall divide the opinions of my readers, my expectations will have been accomplished; and leaving the decision to its fate, I return to the measures of exterior policy, subsequently to the peace of 1792.

CHAPTER XLIII.

External affairs since 1792—Treaty of guarantee anticipated by the confederates in the treaty of 1790, is not accomplished—Causes as regard the Mahrattas—Nana Furnavese—Sindea—Counter project—Nizam Ali's anxiety—charges the English with a violation of faith—his reasoning—Mahrattas prepare to attack him—he solicits protection—it is refused—Discussion of the subject—Proof of the insufficiency of the treaty of 1792—Death of Mahdajee Sindea—Succeeded by Dowlut Row—Mahrattas invade the territory of Nizam Ali—Battle and treaty of Kurdla—Nizam Ali prostrate—relieved by two unexpected events—the rebellion of his son Ali Jah—and the death of the Peshwa—Augmentation of Raymond's corps—Jageer—gives alarm to Sir John Shore—Cases discussed—terminated by the march of Raymond against Ali Jah—and an application for aid from Nizam Ali to the English—Distractions at Poona—Treaty concluded by Nizam Ali's captive minister—Better dispositions towards the English—Ali Jah's mission to Tippoo of Kadir Hussein Khan—Conditions—Kadir sent back to Ali Jah—Diplomatic deception at Hyderabad—Ridiculous collision with the former envoy at that place—Tippoo's various intrigues—Well grounded confidence in their success—Operations of the English against the French and Dutch possessions—Manilla—Cause of the recal of that expedition—Curious consultations at Mysoor regarding its destination—Embassies to Cabul—discussed—Negotiations with France—1788—after 1792—Conviction of the military superiority of revolu-

tionary France—Accidental arrival of a French privateer at Mangalore, commanded by Ripaud—Deception—Consequent plan of Tippoo—Ludicrous loss of his money—Suspensions regarding Ripaud—he is ultimately deputed with others to the Isle of France—Explanation of the bond for the ship, hitherto unintelligible—Embassy arrives at the Isle of France—Public proclamation of this secret mission, by the Governor-General Malartic—his conduct and that of the ambassadors discussed—Curious confusion of the Sultaun's mind—Return of the ambassadors—and recruits—Tippoo might still have averted war by disavowal—Opposite conduct—Levy of ninety-nine men—Jacobin club—Revolutionary morality of the superior officers—Dubuc deputed to France.

THE 13th article of the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, between the English, the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali, concluded in 1790, provided that "if after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, he should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him; the mode and conditions of effecting which, shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties:" and Lord Cornwallis, after the conclusion of peace, in the spirit of sincerity and good faith which he had testified from the commencement of the alliance, made an endeavour to reduce this conditional stipulation into the form of an explicit and intelligible treaty of guarantee. But the policy of his Mahratta allies, was in direct and systematic opposition to every thing explicit and definite in its connection with other powers; and the minister, Nana Furnavese, being freed from all immediate apprehension of hostility from the side of Mysoor, was infinitely more anxious for the maintenance of his own influence and power in the Mahratta state, against the designs of Sindia, than for the guarantee of Nizam Ali, whom he

contemplated as his earliest prey For the first of these purposes, he made an early application to Lord Cornwallis to subsidise a British corps, for the declared purpose of enabling the Peshwa (his nominal master) "to reduce to obedience any dependent which might prove refractory." An obligation thus broad and indefinite, to support the acknowledged head of the Mahratta state, against the dependents of that state, might bring the British subsidiary force into immediate contact with the troops of Sindia, or avert that necessity, as was Nana's true intention, by involving the English Government in an indirect pledge, at variance with the whole spirit of the treaty of Salbey; and Lord Cornwallis very properly rejected the proposition, without any specific reference to the case of Sindia, on those general grounds, which were equally and obviously applicable to all the branches of the Mahratta confederacy.

Sindia possessing no equivocal pretensions to independent power, at the date of the treaty of Salbey, had subsequently been permitted, without even remonstrance on the part of the English Government, to usurp the whole power of the Mogul empire; and to effect an aggrandisement highly dangerous to his

¹ Lord Cornwallis wrote in 1805 "Hurry Punt, a few days before the separation of the armies on their return from Seringapatam, said to me 'No States can be on more friendly terms than that of the Peshwa and the British Government. Now we are going to separate. Let me ask you why you will not give a subsidiary force to the Peshwa, as you have done to the Nizam?' I replied that I disapproved very much of all subsidiary treaties, as they tended to involve the British Government in quarrels in which they had no concern; that the treaty with the Nizam was made many years before I came to India, and it was not in my power to release myself from it, but that I was determined not to enter into any more engagements of that kind. that if it were otherwise, there was no person with whom I would more readily form such a connexion than the Peshwa."—Letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Hon'ble Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., dated August 16, 1805. (*Forrest Selections from State Papers. Cornwallis, Vol. II, p. 197.*)

neighbours and equally perilous to Nana Furnavese, from whom he possessed the power to wrest at pleasure the possession of the Peshwa—the pageant of a pageant, whom they each desired to employ as the mere instrument of their respective designs. Sindea had even before the war of 1790. made overtures to become a party in the confederacy against Tippoo, and for that purpose to subsidise a British corps, which should accompany him in the first instance to Poona; a curious example of two Mahratta competitors for Mahratta power, reciprocally attempting to render the English Government the instrument of their domestic feuds; but independently of these designs, Sindea desired to impose on the Government of Bengal, not only the obligation of defending his northern possessions during his absence but a general pledge to aid him in the reduction of the Rajpoot* states in Hindostan, an ancient and honourable people whose preservation and support appears to have been at that and all subsequent times, incumbent on the British Government, on the plain and sound policy of respecting immemorial rights, of preserving a safe counterpoise against the desolating encroachments of the Mahrattas, and of establishing a formidable barrier against foreign invasion from the north.

A scheme of alliance so entirely inadmissible in all its principles, had been rejected by Lord Cornwallis. Sindea had in consequence, moved as we have seen, towards Poona, in the expectation of a much longer continuance of that war, as the most favourable juncture for the accomplishment of his designs on that Government; and with views far from friendly to the English, whom, at its close, he affected to consider as too powerful; and made little secret of his opinion, that Tippoo ought to be supported as an

* Malcolm's India, page 101; a work to which I refer with confidence, from my knowledge in most instances, and my conviction in all others, of the authenticity of its facts.

instrument for restraining their dangerous aggrandisement. We accordingly find, in 1793, evidence of an active correspondence between Sindia and the Sultaun, referring to former letters and messages; some probably in 1792, and others of an earlier date.

With a court thus torn by dissension, polluted by intrigue, and governed by a system hostile to fixed rights, there could at no time have existed any reasonable hope of a treaty of guarantee, which should subvert the first principle of Mahratta policy—the plunder of their neighbours. A counter project of a guarantee treaty, drawn by Nana Furnavese, contained among other anti-social conditions, the recognition of the claim of the Mahrattas, on Tippoo Sultaun, for *choute*: a demand, which appears to have excited the animadversion of the English, from being unauthorised by the stipulations of the treaty of Seringapatam.* But it is to be remembered, that this instrument, which formally recognises the preceding treaties between the house of Hyder and the English Government, is entirely silent with regard to any political relation of a similar nature between Tippoo Sultaun and the other confederates; and, if the Mahrattas had even admitted the practice of European diplomacy, to record in a new treaty, the former engagements intended to be confirmed; the annulment or confirmation of any or every former treaty, left the question of *choute* equally and entirely untouched. They argued, not without reason, that a treaty for terminating a war, implies the restoration of all those relations, not altered by such treaty, which existed before the war; and it is highly probable, that if Lord Cornwallis had attempted in the treaty of 1792, to introduce any limitation to the claim of *choute*, either on Tippoo or Nizam Ali, he would at the least have found an augmentation of his difficulties and delays at Poona.

* Malcolm's India.

After a protracted negotiation of more than a year, the hope of obtaining the assent of the Mahrattas to any reasonable treaty of guarantee was finally abandoned: but in the exact proportion of the aversion of the Mahrattas, was the anxiety of Nizam Ali for that bond of union and security; and in his anxiety for its completion, he had even demanded as a right already established, the interference of the English in his dispute with Tippoo regarding the tribute of Kurnool. In arguing for the treaty of guarantee, he contended with great appearance of justice, that the failure of one of three parties in the fulfilment of its engagements, was no justification to the other two, for a violation of theirs; and he urged on Lord Cornwallis with the greatest anxiety the conclusion of such a treaty before his departure from India. He could, however, obtain no farther satisfaction from his Lordship, than a declaration that the English Government was satisfied with his verbal acquiescence, and a vague assurance that it would always be ready to act according to existing treaties. On this important subject, historical truth demands the remark, that whatever praise may be assigned to the wisdom and public virtue of Lord Cornwallis's government, the judgment of posterity will probably decide on a few memorable exceptions; and among these will be peculiarly marked, the neglect, before his departure, to regulate by negotiation or otherwise, that degree of reasonable guarantee, for the mere political existence of Nizam Ali, to which he was solemnly pledged by the whole tenor and spirit of the communications which preceded the treaty of 1790, still more than by the letter of that instrument: and whatever animadversions may be excited by the political measures of his non-military successor, towards this declining and dependent power, it must in candour and justice be constantly remembered, that he was left by his military predecessor in a

predicament which a liberal candour can scarcely be brought to justify.¹

Mahdajee Sindia took an active part in the negotiations at Poona, regarding the treaty of guarantee, not only as it regarded the Mahratta state, but that of Nizam Ali, with whose minister he violently and openly remonstrated—against any farther connection with the English power. The Mahrattas, in fact, were preparing, as Nizam Ali well knew, and explicitly declared to the English resident, for the plunder of his dominions, resting on those complex claims of unadjusted account, and arrears of choute, which the reader is aware it would be very unprofitable to discuss. Nizam Ali, sensible of his own weakness, earnestly sought a consolidation of his alliance with the English, and their mediation to avert the extremities which he anticipated from the Mahratta claims; but although it was evident, that unsupported, his destruction was inevitable, to the extent that Mahratta policy might determine, and it was admitted that such event would be injurious to the security as well as to the reputation of the English state; although the improved alliance which Nizam Ali required, would consolidate the English power, without the infraction of any existing engagement; although it was admitted as an established fact in these deliberations, that Tippoo Sultaun was leagued with the Mahrattas against Nizam Ali; and although by the spirit of the 13th article of the treaty of 1790, the English were bound, by no doubtful obligation, to defend the territories of that prince, against the Sultaun's aggressions: these united considerations were deemed by the Governor-general,

¹ Sir John Shore succeeded Lord Cornwallis in August 1793. He did refuse to support the Nizam when he was attacked in 1795 by the Mahrattas. Probably, had Lord Cornwallis been in office, things would have taken a different turn; but the words of the treaty of 1790 did not bind the Government of India to render the assistance asked for by the Nizam.

Sir John Shore, insufficient to balance the hazard of giving offence to the Mahrattas, and the consequent risk of war,* an extremity highly inconvenient to the public finances, and expressly prohibited by act of parliament. To the reproach of justifying his own violation of treaty with Nizam Ali, by the faithlessness of the Mahrattas, he opposed the argument, that the defection of one party from a tripartite alliance, offensive and defensive, and its union with the very power against whom the league was formed, for the purpose of attacking one of the other parties of the alliance, cancelled the obligation of the remaining party, and gave it a right to remain neuter. The refined reasoning brought to establish this abstract right, was expressly declared by Nizam Ali to be at variance with the practical facts of the case; and he earnestly recalled to the remembrance of the English, that he entered into the triple alliance on the avowed and acknowledged conviction of the future treachery and hostility of the Mahrattas, and in a full confidence and dependence on the pledged faith and support of the English Government, who now threatened to forfeit that pledge, contrary to their own most obvious interests. Such was the substance of the reasonings on which Nizam Ali was abandoned to a fate which all India saw to be inevitable. Nana Furnavese would have consented with reluctance to any enlargement of the Sultaun's power or dominions, and therefore disliked his co-operation; and Tippoo, from a reciprocal feeling of personal enmity, was somewhat shy in his advances until the expected downfall of that minister should be effected. Sindia pretended to be ready to force the measure either with or without the deposition of Nana; but there is reason to believe that the support of Nizam Ali by the English, instead of his abandonment, would at

* The reasoning on which this decision was founded, is fully and fairly stated in Malcolm's India, page 153, and the following pages.

least have caused Sindia to pause in his designs; and the counter-influence of Nana Furnavese might probably have preserved the peace of India. Under the actual circumstances, however, Sindia was too good a Mahratta to admit an associate in plunder where the work can be accomplished without assistance; and Tippoo was kept back because the English had made his aid unnecessary. Such then is the earliest test of the insufficiency of the treaty of 1792 for its intended purposes. Tippoo Sultaun, so far from being rendered incapable of disturbing the public peace, was ready and willing to be marshalled by the Mahrattas against Nizam Ali and the English power, if the latter, by the abandonment of its ally, had not left a clear field for the Mahrattas alone.

Mahdajee Sindia died during these discussions,¹ and his nephew and heir Dowlut Row Sindia, not only adhered to the views of his predecessor, but assembled additional forces for their execution. Nizam Ali, abandoned by the English on whom he had confidently leaned for support; sought for such aid as he could obtain from their European rivals. Monsieur Raymond, a person of considerable military talents who had served with his troops in Mysoor, and had been employed after the war, with Lord Cornwallis's sanction, in making a selection from the arsenal at Madras, of a variety of military stores for the service of Nizam Ali, had been skilful and active in forming several corps of infantry, and from the moment of the suspected secession of the English, had been authorised to augment their numbers, and to obtain French officers from Pondicherry and elsewhere: the procrastination of the Mahrattas arising from intestine feuds gave time for the organization of these corps; and in February 1795, when

¹ Mahadaji Sindia died in February 1794. "A man of great political sagacity and of considerable genius, of deep artifice, restless ambition, and of implacable revenge." (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*.)

the Mahrattas approached in force, Monsieur Raymond did not decline the contest with the celebrated brigades of Sindea, organized and commanded by officers of his own nation, of which however the best remained at that time in Hindostan for the maintenance of the authority exercised in the name of the imprisoned Mogul.¹

The better cavalry of the Mahrattas, destitute of all pretensions to tactical discipline, had an interior organization, which enabled the chief to wield and dispose his apparently disordered masses, and admirable arrangements for forage and subsistence. Nizam Ali's cavalry was lamentably deficient in both of these requisites, and particularly the last; but individually, the horses were better, and the men braver, where they could be brought to act; and were animated in this war by the sentiment of defending their means of subsistence and their homes. An action was fought near the frontier on the 11th Mar. 11. of March,² in which among other incidents, a charge of Nizam Ali's cavalry drove Purseram Bhow completely off the field, from which he retreated a day's march, in the full persuasion that the battle was lost; abundance of confusion on both sides occurred in various parts of the field, but Monsieur Raymond manœuvred his troops with great ability, and it would appear, from a plan of the action now before me, sketched by an English officer who was present, that the operations of the day were on the whole most favourable to Nizam Ali. Monsieur Raymond urged him by repeated messages to follow up the advantage gained by the flight of Perseram Bhow, and was

¹ Shah Alam II succeeded to the throne as Mogul in 1759, and died in 1806. He had thrown himself into the hands of the Mahrattas, who kept him as a prisoner. In 1788 Ghulam Kadir, a Rohilla Chief, seized Delhi and blinded Shah Alam. Sindia shortly afterwards recovered Delhi and held it.

² The battle of Kharda in 1795. Kharda is now in Ahmednagar District, Bombay.

in momentary expectation of receiving the requisite orders and support, when at four o'clock in the afternoon, he was stunned by the order to retreat. Nizam Ali in conformity to the absurd practice of his life, was accompanied by his harem, and was actually moved to this fatal order by the fears of the favourite of the day, who threatened to disgrace him by exposing herself to public view, if he did not instantly retreat to the little fort of Kurdla;¹ a position where nothing short of imbecility could have led him, and where nature aided the efforts of the Mahrattas, in completely enclosing his army, and cutting it off from every source of supply. Hopes infinitely exceeding all that his most sanguine adherents had formed, were thus blasted by the childish compliance of a doating old man, and the sufferings of some weeks in this distressing predicament terminated, as the reader will have anticipated, not in the entire destruction of his power, which would have forced some serious considerations on the English and on Tippoo Sultaun; but in a disgraceful peace, of which many conditions were stipulated to be secret; the public articles being a cession of territory yielding thirty-five lacs of rupees, including the fort of Dowlutabad, the key of Decan, and above all the delivery, as a hostage, of the minister Azeem-ul-Omra, whose councils had led to that dependence

¹ With the Nizam's troops, on this occasion, was a corps of female infantry. The following is an official account of them in 1815:—"The late Nizam had two battalions of female sepoys of one thousand each, which mounted guard in the interior of the palace, and accompanied the ladies of his family whenever they moved. They were with the Nizam during the war with the Mahrattas in 1795, and were present at the Battle of Khurdlah, when at least, they did not behave worse than the rest of the army. One of the battalions was commanded by Mama Burrwa, and the other by Mama Churnbebee, two of the principal female attendants of the Nizam's family." (Lt.-Col. V. Blacker *Memoir of Operations of the British Army in India*, 1821.)

² Mentioned subsequently as Musheer-ul-Mulk and so called by Grant Duff in his *History*.

on the faith and political support of the English, which had commenced with the negotiation regarding Guntoor in 1788, had been improved in 1790, and seemed according to present appearances to be for ever extinguished.

After the conclusion of this treaty, the Mah-rattas retired within their own frontier, but Nizam Ali was clearly and unconditionally prostrate before them, and would probably soon have ceased to exist, as a power, when two events occurred, which in their remote and unexpected consequences, tended to avert his extinction, and restore his political importance. These were the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah, in June, and the death of the Peshwa, in October, 1795.¹ Immediately after the peace of Kurdla, Nizam Ali, justly sensible of the value of Monsieur Raymond's services, and the importance of augmenting and improving the corps under his command, which, even at Kurdla, had amounted to twenty-three strong battalions, had adopted the most efficient means of accomplishing his object, by assigning to that officer territorial revenues sufficient to ensure their regular payment; the country selected for this purpose was Kurpa, the most convenient to the Government to give, and particularly acceptable to Monsieur Raymond, from its vicinity to the sea-coast, the facilities thereby acquired of recruiting his officers, and the still more important expectation, of uniting with an European corps from revolutionary France, with which he hoped to strengthen the interests of his nation in Decan and the South.

Sir John Shore appears to have felt with acuteness the dangers of this preparatory arrangement, and directed the British Resident to declare that if Monsieur Raymond were not withdrawn from Kurpa he should be under the necessity of advancing a body of English troops in that direction. We have

¹ Madhu Rao Narayan committed suicide.

ventured to suggest that any event which should have transferred the dominions of Nizam Ali to the direct possession of the Mahrattas or of Tippoo Sultaun, or both, would have forced upon the English Government a more decided line of policy; and a very obvious illustration of this opinion may be found in the highly probable case of the possession of Kurpa by this very corps which would unquestionably have transferred its allegiance to one of those victorious states; and the merits of that neutral system, which would consider as foreign to the policy of a state, the depression or aggrandizement of its neighbours, may, in this case, be brought to a tolerably fair test, by examining whether the occupation of Kurpa by a powerful corps in the interest of France, were more safe under the guidance of the hostile states of Poona or Mysoor; or the friendly direction of Nizam Ali; and even this alternative is too favourable to the argument of neutrality, for in the event of an open determination to support Nizam Ali, danger from Monsieur Raymond's corps would not have existed. The refined arguments in favour of neutrality may be farther illustrated, by anticipating the case which occurred in 1797, of an apprehended invasion of Nizam Ali's territories by Tippoo alone: in this event, the Governor-general deemed himself bound by the implied guarantee to repel the aggression in the first instance, and then to unite with Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas for obtaining redress; whereas in 1794 he deemed the guarantee void, because the Mahrattas had combined in the same expected aggression, and thereby dissolved or suspended the triple alliance. If however the first principle of political duty be recognized in the celebrated charge to the Roman dictator* "to preserve the state from injury of every kind," and if the destruction of this ally were an acknow-

* *Ne quid republicæ detrimenti capiat.*

ledged injury to the English state, then the distinction between the cases of 1794 and 1797 would lead to the unfortunate inference that this ally might be defended against a small danger but not against a great one.

The rebellion and flight of Ali Jah terminated the disagreeable discussions on the subject of Raymond's troops, in consequence of the orders given to that officer to march instantly against the rebel; and a simultaneous and most urgent application from Nizam Ali to the English government, to aid him with a detachment of troops for the same purpose. Raymond had reduced and captured the rebel just before the arrival of the English corps; but the alacrity with which this request had been complied with, and the efficient celerity of the movement tended to restore better dispositions. The dissensions at Poona regarding the choice of a Peshwa, between Sindea, who supported the true heir, Bajee Row, son of the late Ragoba, and Nana Furnavese, who desired to establish as his own pageant Chinnajee, his younger brother, divided* the chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy into two contending factions; and the desire of Nana to employ the aid even of the feeble state of Nizam Ali, facilitated the able machinations of Azeem-ul-Omra, who, as a hostage and a prisoner, contrived to hold at his disposal some of the most powerful Mahratta chiefs; and by concerted demonstrations of the troops of his own state, was enabled to negotiate and conclude a new treaty; softening or omitting the most injurious parts of the treaty of Kurdla; and obtaining his own liberation, which was

* In the course of these intrigues, Purseram Bhow, the inveterate personal enemy of Tippoo, was alternately with Nana and with Sindea; after an interregnum of some continuance Nana was himself forcibly expelled, Chinnajee was placed on the musnud with Purseram Bhow as his minister, but this usurpation was of short continuance, Purseram Bhow and his charge fled; Bajee Row was placed on the musnud, and Nana was recalled, but he also was afterwards made the prisoner of Dowlut Row Sindea.

followed by his reinstatement in the office of prime minister to Nizam Ali. The favourable dispositions towards the English excited by the prompt assistance recently afforded coincided with the original counsels of this minister, who himself believing, was enabled to impress the belief on his sovereign, that the treatment he had recently experienced from the English state, constituted no part of their genuine national policy. A spirit of amity was accordingly cherished. of which we shall have occasion to relate some important results, which that sagacious minister had probably foreseen.

The Sultaun was in the meanwhile no careless observer of these transactions; we have seen that an envoy from the Saint at Calburga, was sent to Seringapatam on the return of Tippoo's matrimonial messengers; this envoy was named Kadir Hussein Khan, and his knowledge of that court had pointed him out to Ali Jah as a fit agent, to obtain the Sultaun's active and immediate co-operation in the dethronement of his father. The first overture, mostly promptly accepted was the cession to the Sultaun of every thing south of the Toombuddra and* Kistna. The Sultaun's troops destined for the service, were ordered with as little parade as possible to rendezvous at Gooty, on the pretence of demanding tribute from Kurnool; and Kadir Hussein Khan, who was received for the purpose into the immediate service of Tippoo, was sent as his envoy to the camp of the rebel, to concert the conjoint operations. He was anticipated by the activity of Monsieur Raymond, who had defeated and taken Ali Jah before his arrival. And the envoy having reason to think that his mission was suspected, and his life in danger; instead of destroying his documents, which would have arrested the career of diplomatic ambition, resolved with great address to provide himself with

* Original letters of both.

proofs of innocence. It was at that time one of the Sultaun's improvements, to seal his letters with wax, instead of the customary Indian process of an impression with ink, and these waxen seals, Kadir Hussein very dexterously removed from the letters addressed to Ali Jah and his associates, to others of his own composition; addressed to Nizam Ali to Mumtaz-ul-Omra his relation, who possessed great influence in the absence of the minister, and to other courtiers; and fortified with these documents, he proceeded, after a long pause and considerable hesitation, to Hyderabad, whence he actually dispatched answers to these forgeries, addressed to the Sultaun, who highly approved the ingenuity of the device. There was, however, at Hyderabad, another Mysorean envoy, with whom he came into ridiculous collision: Medina Shah of Kurnool, a saint, whom the Sultaun appears to have addressed* with great humility, in August 1792, as his spiritual superior, whose aid he solicited as a Mussulman, in forwarding the political objects of the faith: the correspondence with Medina Shah, led to his visiting Seringapatam; where the saint, certainly a man of talent, shewed himself to be among the most mean and rapacious of that venal court; and was afterwards deputed as the instrument of all the secret intrigues, which he had already aided in establishing at Hyderabad. I suspect some mistake in the date of the letter of this personage, describing the arrival of Kadir Hussein in 1797, but the error, if such it be, is of little consequence. Kadir Hussein, a man of rank and consequence, somewhat ironically magnified, is stated by Medina Shah to have arrived in the suburbs, without a suitable retinue, without orders, and without documents; to have been arrested by the police, to have given a false account of himself, and to be oftener drunk than sober. A singular correspondence ensued between

* Original draft of his letter.

the Sultaun and each of them, in which they were more occupied with reciprocal accusations than political events. He seems alternately to have meditated the recal of each, and at one time had even stopped the allowances of both; but notwithstanding the incessant representations of pecuniary distress, the intrigues were actively continued; and neither of them ever returned to Seringapatam. It would seem, from the negotiations of that period, that Nizam Ali was still ready to conclude arrangements for a perfect union of interests with Tippoo, if the latter had consented to exchange the pledge of a Koran; and the Sultaun's continued rejection of this advance, is a curious example of that intellectual aberration so often observable, which, abandoning every intelligible principle of morality and religion, is yet restrained and chastened by an unimportant form.

Among the complicated intrigues of Hyderabad, at different periods, from 1792 to 1797, was a treaty of marriage with the great niece of Nizam Ali, not only without his consent, but for the purpose of subverting his power; and, after the rebellion of Ali Jah, a treaty of alliance with another son, who meditated rebellion, and who deputed to Seringapatam a person of importance, to concert the means of success, as a permanent ambassador.* All the combinations were considered to be so perfectly prepared, that the parties deemed it only necessary to wait a fit opportunity. The Sultaun's own persuasion of success in a project so long and so earnestly pursued, would be insufficient evidence of a speculative fact, in which his judgment was so much biassed; but, the joint opinion of the principal officers of his Government,

* He left Seringapatam before the war of 1799; during that war he was in the suit of Meer Aalum, and was exceedingly alarmed regarding the discoveries which might be made by the examination of the records after the capture of the place. For the reasons already assigned, his name is suppressed.

in a document* intended to dissuade him from a crude and precipitate developement of his general designs, furnishes satisfactory testimony of the maturity of these combinations. The country of Nizam Ali, as they distinctly state, will come into his possession with the greatest facility at the proper time: it is an event which would unite the English and the Mahrattas against him; and, it was therefore necessary to wait with circumspection until he could throw the weight of a French armament into the scale.

Subsequently to the peace of 1792, and particularly during that state of military preparation, which the complicated intrigues of Hyderabad had rendered necessary to the Sultaun's views; the English Government of Madras had been incessantly engaged in expeditions, rendered necessary by the state of the war in Europe. Pondicherry and the French possessions had been reduced in 1793. In 1795, and 1796, the Dutch settlements in Ceylon and Malacca, and their valuable possessions in Banda and Amboyna, were reduced by armaments equipped at that presidency. An expedition prepared in 1794 against the Isle of France,¹ had been abandoned without any reference to the state of Indian politics; but in consequence of events which had interfered with the expected co-operation from Europe. An armament on a considerable scale intended for the reduction of Manilla, of which the first division had actually sailed to Penang, was also countermanded in consequence of intelligence received by Lord Hobart² the

* Seringapatam papers submitted to Parliament; opinion of the five departments on the folly of his connection with Ripaud in 1797.

¹ Mauritius.

² Lord Hobart arrived to take up his appointment as Governor at Madras on the 7th September 1794. He was recalled by the Directors, who disapproved of his policy as regards the debts from the Nawab Walajah of Arcot. He left Madras on the 21st February 1798. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 458.)

Governor of Madras, of the extraordinary successes of the French army of Italy, the consequent negotiations between General Buonaparte and the Archduke Charles, and the expediency of reserving for defensive measures all the forces of England; which in the judgment of the Governor would be left to sustain alone the pressure of a general war; a fortunate determination with reference to the affairs of India, when we consider the active preparations of the Sultaun, the suspicion of his designs of hostile aggression against the dominions of Nizam Ali, which in 1797, the Governor-general had ordered to be repelled, and the danger to the public interests which would ensue from the absence of so large a portion of the military force. But it is not a little curious to observe, that at the period when the troops destined for Manilla, were on the point of embarking at Madras, the minutes* of a consultation held at Seringapatam shew, that the Sultaun was not without apprehension of its landing at Mangalore, while the principal officers of his Government, unanimously declared their disbelief of those reports which referred its destination to that port, or to Mauritius, but think the most probable object to be Manilla, or *stopping up the route by which the French are expected*, without any indication of what that route may be. The same consultation discusses the intelligence from Poona, of secret conferences which are rumoured to have for their object the invasion of Mysoor by Sindia. On which the same officers agree, that such invasion is not probable, without the concurrence of the English and Nizam Ali; that each of the three powers are too much occupied with their own affairs and intestine dissensions; that exclusively of these, Sindia has too much ground of uneasiness regarding his affairs at Delhi, to undertake so absurd an expedition; but that if he should

* Original documents.

come alone, his arrival would rather be a subject of exultation than of fear. The combined result of the documents on both sides thus evince, rather a reciprocal alarm at the preparations of the other, than any matured and definite plan of immediate hostility.

In the boundless variety of schemes, contemplated by the Sultaun for the restoration of his power, and the expulsion of the English from India, he had found means, through his agents at Delhi, of opening a correspondence with the ministers of Zemân Shah, the king of the Afghans; and the Sultaun, early in 1796, sent ambassadors to Cabul, who were instructed carefully to conceal their political objects, to proceed by the way of Kutch, where a commercial factory was already established, thence to Kerâncy, in Sindé, on the pretence of establishing another factory; and from that place, on the pretext of a mercantile and religious journey to the holy tombs in Persia, to obtain safe conduct through Belochistân, and make good their way to Cabul. The projected means by which the co-operation of this sovereign was proposed to be rendered available, moved at a more rapid pace than was justified by the sanction of historical experience: the conquest of Delhi, the expulsion of the Mahrattas, and the consolidation of the empire of Hindostân, was to occupy one year: and in the second, an Afghan army was to invade the Mahratta dominions in Decan, from the north, while he should assail them* from the south: these objects effected, the destruction of the remaining infidels would be nothing. Zemân Shah had previously meditated the invasion of Hindostân, and did move for the purpose in the same year, but was recalled by intestine war: the expectation of such an event, however, continued for several

* The original leaves it doubtful, which of the infidels was to be first destroyed; the context seems to indicate the Mahrattas, as the power whom he would necessarily first attack, in achieving the conquest of Delhi.

years to be viewed by the English Government of Bengal, with serious apprehension, and without speculating on the very improbable event, of an Afghan invasion of Decan, would have constituted a most efficient diversion for the Sultaun, to prevent the resources of Bengal from becoming available in the south: the ambassadors accomplished their journey, and appear to have made a suitable impression, and the same persons were again deputed, in January 1799, when the object was not offensive war, but preservation from impending destruction.

Having noticed, to the extent that appeared to be requisite for rendering our narrative intelligible, the most prominent circumstances of those intrigues on the Indian continent, which were intended to restore the Sultaun's affairs; it remains to describe the measures directed to the same end, which he attempted to concert with the French Government. The embassy to Paris, in 1788, terminated in general professions of amity; in assurances of a disposition to promote his views, at a proper opportunity, and in explanations of the reasons which prevented the French King from then engaging in an English war.¹ After the humiliating events of 1792, the Sultaun, in his numerous applications for aid, uniformly ascribed his misfortunes to the jealousy of the English at some previous indications of friendship

¹ The French account of the mission in the *Histoire des progrès et de la chute de l'Empire de Mysore* (J. Michaud, 1801) is as follows:—"Les ambassadeurs obtinrent une audience publique de Louis XVI, le 3 août 1788. On déploya, en cette occasion, tout l'appareil de la cour; les envoyés reçurent l'accueil le plus distingué, mais le premier objet de leur mission ne put être rempli. Ils demandoient des secours contre les Anglais; le gouvernement français ne put leur donner que des spectacles et des fêtes. Le malheureux Louis XVI, sortant à peine d'une guerre ruineuse, et pressé par la crainte des troubles intérieurs, ne put se décider à donner de nouveau le signal des hostilités. Il se contenta de cimenter l'alliance établie entre la France et Tippoo-Saïb, attendant une époque favorable pour réaliser les promesses de son allié indien;"

with the state to which he addressed himself; and, in conformity to this general rule, his uniform attachment to the French, and his public embassy to Paris, in 1788, were stated as the efficient and exclusive causes of that confederacy, which the fears and jealousy of the English had contrived for his destruction. The Frenchmen in his service had no difficulty in procuring the means of transmitting these representations; and, it appears, that formal propositions from the Sultaun to the French Government, of which the date is uncertain, but probably in 1795 or 6, were transmitted through the medium of Pierre Moneron; and that numerous communications were made through General Cossigny, who resided in the Isle of France. The remarkable success of the revolutionary armies had enabled the persons of that nation in his service, to impress on his mind the decided superiority by land, of the new French tactics and moral energy, over any possible efforts of the English; and these opinions rendered him not only anxious, but impatient, for the execution of those splendid assurances of the utter expulsion of the English from India, of which he had received the lavish and incessant promise.

While in this frame of mind, in the early part of 1797, a privateer from the Isle of France arrived, dismasted, at the port of Mangalore, and solicited the means of repair. The Meer-è-Yem (Lord of the Admiralty) at that port was Gholaum Ali, one of the former ambassadors to France; he had attained a slight acquaintance with the language; he conversed with the master of the vessel named Ripaud, and reported as the result of his examination, that this person called himself the second in command at the Mauritius, and had been specially instructed to touch at Mangalore, for the purpose of ascertaining the Sultaun's wishes regarding the co-operation of a French force which was ready at the Isle of France for the expulsion from India of their common enemy,

the English. Gholaum Ali was accordingly desired to conduct this important personage to the presence, where he was admitted to daily interviews and long consultations. The Sultaun, according to his most usual course of action, first made up his own mind, and then proceeded in due form to demand the opinions, in writing, of the principal officers of his Government; not whether negotiations and engagements should be entered into with the French nation, but what those engagements should be, and how they were to be accomplished, stating his own suggestion to receive and retain Ripaud in his pretended capacity of envoy, but ostensibly as a servant: to purchase the ship, lade it with merchandize for the Isle of France, and send confidential agents of his own, with letters from Ripaud to the Government of that island, for the purpose of concerting all that related to the desired armament.

The officers of Tippoo's Government had discovered, through the medium of one of Ripaud's companions, that his assumed rank and political mission was an impudent imposture; and in a joint
 (Mar. 8. public document, dated the 8th of March, represented, with a degree of freedom altogether unusual, their conviction of the folly, the peril, and the disrepute of any agency, in which this person should be concerned. "From first to last (they declare, in this remarkable document) the language of this man (whom they afterwards designate rather coarsely as a scoundrel) has been that of self-interest and falsehood, nothing has resulted from this business, and nothing can—the medium of such a low fellow tends to throw discredit on the transaction:" and after stating the facility of possessing the country of Nizam Ali, and the delicacy of any thing which should prematurely combine him again with the English and the Mah-rattas; they observe, "the object of this state will be better effected, at a seasonable opportunity, than by relying on the agency of this compound of air and

water.”* This written instrument, and the verbal representations of its authors to the Sultaun, that he was in the act of disclosing all his designs to the English; and subjecting himself to their immediate hostility, without the prospect of timely succour, were insufficient to divert him from the crude conceptions of his own arrogant mind; he had one uniform remark for all arguments which he could not answer.—“Whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished.” Ripaud’s vessel was accordingly purchased for the sum of seventeen thousand rupees,† and the consideration money was paid and committed to the hands of a Frenchman named Pernore‡ who was to pay it at the Isle of France, in conformity to Ripaud’s instructions: the officers of the ship were to navigate her on the part of the Sultaun; Ripaud was to remain as French ambassador at his court; and four envoys from the Sultaun were appointed to embark in the assumed character of merchants, and after concluding the proper negotiations at the Isle of France, one of them was to return with the fleet and army, and the other three were to proceed as ambassadors to the Executive Directory, at Paris. For this purpose, the four ambassadors, with their credentials for these several objects, together with *Pernore*, who was also charged with the seventeen thousand rupees of Ripaud, and his letters to the Government of the Isle of France, did accordingly depart, in the month of April, April. 1797, from Seringapatain, to embark at Mangalore.

* Seringapatam papers submitted to Parliament.

† About 2,125*l*. This seems a small sum for even a two masted vessel, which the Sultaun states her to have been; and it is possible that the Sultaun’s agents might have discovered, on their arrival at the Isle of France, that Ripaud was only authorized to sell his own share of the vessel.

‡ The name was so pronounced by several persons of the late court, with whom I conversed on the subject; but their blunders in European names, are too well known to admit of any thing approaching certainty, and I am aware that the name cannot be as stated in the text.

On the night following their arrival at that port, *Pernore* absconded in a boat, with three other persons, and the seventeen thousand rupees; and, according to the statement of the remaining crew, must have been taken prisoners by the English; an event, of which no traces have been discovered.

On the receipt of this intelligence at Seringapatam, Tippoo appears to have been for a time heartily ashamed of himself, and of Ripaud, who was placed under restraint on the suspicion of collusion, to obtain double payment for the vessel; the affair was too delicate and ridiculous to be tolerated in conversation; but a commencement had been made; the royal will (the identical and only law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not) had been pronounced, and it was necessary to make some adjustment, in order that the embassy might proceed. If the vessel should arrive at the Isle of France without the consideration money, it is certain that she would be claimed and seized by the owners, among whom it was probable, that Ripaud possessed but a small proprietary share; and to release her and Ripaud, was to abandon the money and the political prospects together. After some consideration, it was determined to restore the vessel to Ripaud, to require his bond for the repayment of the seventeen thousand rupees which he had actually received; and for which the vessel was declared to be a collateral security, and to send him to the Isle of France with the ambassadors, now reduced to two, who did not ultimately sail until the month of October. The explanation prefixed to the official documents on this subject, printed by authority in India, ascribes this delay to "the monsoon having set in before the embassy was ready to depart;" and it is probable, not only that the true cause obtained little notoriety, but had been treated with habitual reserve by those who either knew or suspected it; but the complaints and reproaches of Ripaud, after they had sailed,

(as stated in the official narrative of the ambassadors) of his *having been compelled to give a bond for the ship*, would be unintelligible without the explanations now given.

Ripaud had scarcely got to sea, when, like a true buccaneer, collecting all his Europeans, amounting to five or six, he came up to the envoys in a threatening manner, reproached them for the treatment he had received (for he had been compelled not only to give the bond above mentioned, but to pay for the whole outfit of provisions and stores which the Sultaun promised to furnish), and demanded to *see* the letters addressed to the constituted authorities at the Isle of France; without which, instead of pursuing his voyage thither, he would proceed on a privateering cruize. After some altercation, he forcibly seized and opened the letters, and probably finding that their contents did not confirm the apprehensions he had formed, he steered, without further hesitation, for Port Louis, in the Isle of France, where he arrived, on the 19th of January * 1798.

1798.

The strictest injunctions for the concealment, not only of the object but the existence of a political mission, were contained in their official instructions, and they were furnished for the same purpose with fictitious commercial orders, and a false passport, as merchants; but the Sultaun had not considered that a secret known to the master and crew of a privateer, was not in the train of being rigidly kept. General Malartic, the governor, on being informed of the rank and quality of the persons on board, sent some gentlemen of his suite to wait upon them, and adjust the time for their landing, under suitable honours. The separate report of one of the envoys, states, that the strongest remonstrances were made against this open disclosure of a secret mission; but

* The ambassadors were not very careful journalists. In their separate reports, one dates their arrival on the 8th.

the other report is silent on the subject: it is obvious that it depended on themselves, positively to resist a public reception, and probable that their vanity, or their avarice, or both, may have contributed to obtain an implied assent, which, to any penetrating or experienced mind, must have been identified with absolute treason to their sovereign.

The Governor, the Admiral, and all the constituted authorities came out to do honour to their public reception, under the customary salutes; and they were conducted in form between a double line of troops to the Government house, where the dispatches were delivered in the same public manner; and after the usual ceremonies, they proceeded to the dwelling appointed by the Government for their residence. The dispatches were found to contain the project of a treaty with the Government of the Isle of France, for fixing the terms and objects of co-operation of a large army supposed to be present, of from five to ten thousand European French, and from twenty to thirty thousand Africans: they were to be joined, at a rendezvous to be fixed, by sixty thousand Mysoreans, and the first object of the war was the conquest of Goa, from the Portuguese, with whom no cause of enmity was assigned: this port and territory were to belong to the Sultaun, and Bombay, when conquered, to the French. The ambassadors were instructed to explain, as the next objects of the war, after the adjustment of every thing in the west of India, the reduction and razing of Madras, the subjugation of the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali, and finally the conquest of Bengal.

The ambassadors however, on proceeding in the next conference to discuss the business of their mission, found that every part of Ripaud's representations was equally and totally false; and that no armament for the service of the Indian continent had arrived or was expected. Two frigates were dispatched without delay, with the letters in duplicate

for the Executive Directory, who, as the envoys were assured, would immediately order the required succour; and in the meanwhile General Malartic had no other means of aiding their views than by raising a corps of volunteers in the Isles of France and Bourbon. It was to no purpose for the envoys to represent that they were deputed to bring a large force, and not a small one; that they were not furnished with money to raise a new levy; that the whole proceeding was contrary to their instructions, and "that they would not carry with them the recruits proposed to be raised."* General Malartic, on the second day after their arrival, ordered an advertisement to be published, and on the 30th of Jan. 30. January, issued a formal proclamation of similar import, informing the citizens of the two islands (and of course the whole world) that two ambassadors had arrived from Tippoo Sultaun with dispatches to his Government, and to the Executive Directory; that the Sultaun desired to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and to maintain, at his charge, the troops which might be sent to him; that he was perfectly prepared, and waited only the arrival of the French, to declare war against the English; whom he ardently desired to expel from India: that as it was impossible for the Governor to spare any regular troops on account of the succours he had lately sent to his allies the Dutch, he invited the citizens who might be disposed, to enter as volunteers, and serve under the banners of Tippoo, and assured them of an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which would be fixed by the ambassadors, who would farther engage, in the name of their Sovereign, for the volunteers being at all times free to return.

In whatever degree the ambassadors at first

* This is the 5th of six distinct written propositions, submitted to General Malartic, as detailed in the narrative of Mahommed Ibrahim, one of the ambassadors, in the published documents.

resisted, or tacitly permitted the publicity of this most unstatesman-like proceeding, it is certain, that they were weak enough to lend themselves to its consequences; to hold publicly the same language which the proclamation contained, regarding their master's designs; to permit the document itself to be publicly distributed at the place of their residence; and without actually enlisting, to encourage men to accompany them, on condition that their pay should be regulated by the Sultaun himself, a point on which some serious dissatisfaction was ultimately expressed by General Malartic, who told them plainly, that having come unsought for, to solicit aid, they ought to submit to such conditions as he thought proper to impose.

The conduct of General Malartic, in frustrating the designs of secrecy, which were so obviously essential to Tippoo's expectations of success, have been ascribed to either inadvertency or design: and neither of these suppositions would increase our respect for his talents as a statesman. It would be difficult to infer inadvertency, when it is considered that, independently of the information he must necessarily have received from the ambassadors before their landing, the most inexperienced mind would perceive the demand from one power, for hostile means against another with which it was at peace, to indicate secrecy as the very essence of the transaction. After perusing his dispatches, he must have perceived that the whole mission was founded in the false information of Ripaud, and that the premature publicity in the Isle of France, and of consequence soon afterwards in India, of an open and undisguised plan of hostility against the English and their allies, would inevitably expose the Sultaun to be attacked and overpowered before he could possibly receive assistance from France; and finally he leaves us no room to doubt of his being perfectly apprised of the consequences of his proceedings, by announcing in his letter to the

Sultaun that he had laid an embargo on all vessels in Port Louis until after the departure of the ambassadors and recruits, "lest the English, our common enemy, should be apprised of the part which you seem determined to adopt with regard to them, and of the supply of men which I have sent to you." If therefore we are to reject the supposition of inadvertency, the alternative, of referring to motives of policy, the crude conception of sacrificing an unsupported ally to the hope of producing a temporary embarrassment to the common enemy, would be equally unfavourable to the sagacity of these public demonstrations: and it may be conjectured, with greater probability, that the obvious disadvantages of precipitating a rupture between Tippoo and the English, were overpowered by the exigencies of his local situation; by the terrors of a furious democracy, which rendered nearly nominal his office of Governor-general of the French possessions in the east; and by the hope of exciting, in a greater degree than he ultimately found practicable, the avarice and enterprise of those perturbed spirits by whom he was surrounded and assailed, and by the expedient of giving a new direction to the lust of plunder, novelty and mischief, for the purpose of effecting his own deliverance from the most worthless and dangerous characters of the colony. The degree in which these several motives may have influenced his conduct, cannot perhaps be determined with accuracy, but no doubt can encompass the proposition, that he unintentionally conferred the most important benefits on the English Government in India, by distinctly, publicly, and officially, unfolding the dangers which it had to avert and retaliate.

Before dismissing the subject of this mission, it is not a little curious to observe an example of the strange wanderings of the Sultaun's mind, in confounding together the events of 1784 and 1792, in the narrative contained in his letters to the constituted

French authorities, regarding transactions of which they were perfectly informed, and with which they are first reproached and then forgiven. "During the last war, when he was on the point of conquering the English, an order from Monsieur Bussy compelled the French forces under M. Cossigny to abandon him, and even Lally followed the example, and thus left to his own resources, and abandoned by his allies, he was compelled to make peace, with the loss of half his dominions and three crores and thirty thousand rupees in specie."

Ultimately, the ambassadors did embark on the 7th of March, 1798, on the *Preneuse* frigate, with exactly ninety-nine men, including civil and military officers, for the service of the Sultaun. The capture of two English Indiamen, in the roads of Tellicherry, in consequence of intelligence received on the voyage, detained them but a few days, and they landed at April 26. Mangalore, on the 26th of April, 1798.

In the letter from General Malartic, to Tippoo Sultaun, which accompanied the return of his ambassadors, he distinctly announced, that in the event of the Sultaun's disapproving the terms of service which had been conditionally arranged, he had "authorised all the officers, volunteers, and others, to return on the frigate to the Isle of France:" and, although the ambassadors had the imprudence to debark them at Mangalore, without waiting for authority, it was still competent to the Sultaun, after reading the narratives of his ambassadors, and ascertaining in them the boundless publicity given to his designs by the official proclamation; and the subsequent enlistment, embarkation, and arrival of men for the expulsion of the English from India, to have still arrested the mischief. He could still have reimbarbed, and returned the men without the risk of offence, by representing to the French the impolicy of courting war, before he was prepared; he could still have disavowed to the English, as unauthorised, the whole

proceedings of General Malartic, and have announced the return to the Isle of France of his repudiated levy, and he could thus have neutralized the most powerful public grounds on which they justified their preparations for war.

Not the slightest objection however was made to the reception of the troops, nor to any part of the diplomatic proceedings: he evinced the greatest impatience for the arrival at Seringapatam of this motley reinforcement of naval, and military, creole, and European levy, of 99 men; who, soon after their arrival, organized a Jacobin club, on the most approved Parisian models, under the sanction of the Sultaun, whom they distinguished by the fraternal designation of *Citizen Tippoo*: the tree of liberty was planted, surmounted by the cap of equality; the citizens assembled in primary assembly, instructed each other in the enforcement of their new rights, and the abandonment of their old duties: a council of discipline was formed to subvert discipline, by superseding the military authority of the commandant: all emblems of royalty were publicly burned, and the national colours of *the sister republic* were consecrated by *Citizen Tippoo on the public parade*, under a salute of two thousand three hundred pieces of cannon*: all was concluded by the characteristic oath of hatred to royalty, and fidelity to a tyrant, and followed, according to the admission of their own recorded journals, by scenes of the most scandalous disorder and insubordination. Of any comprehension of the purport or tendency of all these proceedings, the Sultaun was so entirely innocent, that he fancied himself to be consolidating one of those associations devoted to his own aggrandizement, by which his imagination had lately been captivated, in the history of the Arabian Wahâbees.

* The number of guns is taken from the proceedings of a Jacobin club found at Seringapatam; the fact is of trifling importance, otherwise than as a test of the absence of veracity.

Two persons, Monsieur Chapuis, chef-de-brigade, and Monsieur Dubuc, captain in the navy, commanding the land and the sea forces, seem to have taken little or no share in these mischievous absurdities, although an indication appears of their having imbibed a full portion of the new lights in revolutionary morality. As the time approached for their being presented to the Sultaun, some doubts would seem to have occurred regarding their rank and quality, and the officers of government addressed to them a written requisition for explanations; in answer to which, in a formal instrument under their joint signatures, they declare that they are deputed by General Malartic and Admiral Sercey, not only to serve in their respective professions by sea and land, but as diplomatic envoys to the Sultaun's court, *with full power and authority, in the name of the French republic and its representatives at the Isle of France*, to treat with him of an alliance to serve as a fundamental basis, and that the treaties concluded by them would be presented to the national convention, and ratified by the executive power. On which formal and authentic declaration, it is only necessary to observe, that no trace of any such diplomatic delegation is to be found in the dispatches addressed to Tippoo Sultaun, by General Malartic, or Admiral Sercey; or in the proceedings at the Isle of France, or yet in the letter of Captain L'Hermite of the *Preneuse*, announcing his arrival at Mangalore; "with the Sultaun's ambassadors, Hussein Ally Khan, and Mahommed Ibrahim, and the Frenchmen whom Général Malartic had sent under the orders of M. Chapuis commanding the land, and M. Dubuc commanding the naval forces."

After some conferences with these officers, it was suggested, that although his dispatches had been forwarded to the Executive Directory, it would be expedient to have an accredited minister on the spot to expedite the succours, and furnish the requisite

local information ; and Monsieur Dubuc was finally associated with two Mahommedan envoys in a joint embassy to the Executive Directory, to embark according to Dubuc's suggestion at the neutral port of Tranquebar,¹ on the coast of Coromandel ; and they received their credentials and instructions on the 20th of July, 1798.

While the Sultaun continued, without apparent indication of alarm, to be amused with these revolutionary novelties, and to be occupied with the internal arrangements of his own state, which have already been described, the English government were far from being passive observers of the designs unfolded at the Isle of France, of which they received early and authentic intelligence.

¹ A sea coast town, 143 miles S.S.W. of Madras. The Danes obtained Tranquebar in 1616. It was taken by the English with all the other Danish settlements in India in 1807, but restored in 1814. It was bought by the English in 1845 for Rs. 12,50,000 and now forms part of the District of Tanjore.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Government of India—Olive—Hastings—Lord Mornington—Relations with the native powers at the time of his arrival—Sindea—his unresisted aggrandisement—Admission of the right to interfere—De Boigne—placed in the situation of a sovereign prince—his successor Perron—Difference of their systems—Perron excludes English officers—French army on the English frontier—Complicated use of the authority of the imprisoned Mogul—Designs of the French—Appeal to the candour of those who thought the case overstated—State of the Mahratta dissension with reference to the situation of the English—Nizam Ali—Raymond's fine corps of 14,000 men—His character and conduct—becomes formidable to his superior, Nizam Ali—Governor-general receives authentic intelligence of the events at the Isle of France—Preparation for war—Danger from Raymond's corps—Nizam Ali's fears of both French and English—Dangers accumulated by the English system of neutrality—Negotiation at Hyderabad, for dismissing the French and substituting an English force—Offensive and defensive treaty concluded—Disarming and dismissal of the French officers—Wisdom and energy of the measure—Its effect at the native courts—Secret dissatisfaction of the Mahrattas—Sindea's presence at Poona unfavourable—Fluctuating councils—Lord Mornington determines to proceed without them—Tippoo's intrigues at that court—Secret agent—Erroneous conceptions—Friendly disposition of the Peshwa—Curious evidence of this, in his secret interviews, and excellent advice—

Public embassy from Tippoo—Secret agent discovered by Nana, and obliged to return.

AMONG the distinguished persons who at different periods presided over the administration of the British interests in India, two men had appeared, whose extraordinary talents and services have assigned to them an eminence in public estimation which had been approached by no other governor; and the greatest statesmen of the first powers of Europe might have deemed themselves honourably classed with *Clive*, the founder, and *Hastings*, the preserver of that singular empire. A third was now to be added to these illustrious names, on whom nature had bestowed, with a liberal hand, all that could lead to the same eminence; and the systematic education and practical experience of an European statesman, had conferred advantages which were wanting to the early career of his great predecessors. To these important qualities were superadded the inestimable benefit of early friendship and confidential intercourse with the great statesmen who then directed in England the general interests of the empire, an intimate knowledge of the bearings and influence of all their political views on the complex machinery of the government committed to his charge, and a well-founded confidence of support in every measure which the exigencies of the time might render necessary to strengthen and secure it. A consciousness of his own superior powers rendered Lord Mornington¹ confident in opinions once fixed,

¹ Richard, Baron Wellesley, in the Peerage of Great Britain, and Earl of Mornington in the Peerage of Ireland, arrived at Madras in April 1798 on his way to Calcutta. General Harris was then the provisional Governor of Madras, having taken charge after the recall of Lord Hobart in February. Lord Wellesley had been, for several years, a member of the Board of Control, and had given special attention to the acquisition of knowledge of Indian politics. He was almost 38 years of age when he became Governor-General.

and in measures once adopted ; but before determining, the most meagre intellect could not have sought with greater anxiety to be informed and enlightened by previous discussion. No man was so eminently qualified to do every thing for himself, and no man laid under larger contribution the talents of those around him. His own superiority was too marked to admit any mean jealousy of the borrowed credit to be attained by subordinate instruments, whose merits he anxiously and publicly acknowledged and appreciated, sometimes rather above than below their actual value. The same generous feeling prompted him, when he gave confidence, to make it almost unlimited ; when he conferred authority, to make it at least commensurate to the occasion ; and in guiding the exercise of a delegated discretion, to mark what was well done with applause, and correct what might be better, with a delicacy which almost obliterated the sense of error, or merged it in the confidence of meriting future approbation ; and of his penetration in appreciating character, it may be affirmed, without the fear of giving reasonable offence, that of an unprecedented amount of public probity, moral worth, intellectual eminence, and military daring which existed in British India during the period of his administration, the largest and most brilliant portion was drawn forth, and wielded by the master mind of this great statesman.

Lord Mornington arrived at Madras in April, and at the seat of Supreme Government in Bengal in May 1798. In order that we may be enabled to consider with greater accuracy, such events of this wise and brilliant administration as are connected with the scope of our narrative, it will be necessary to take an abstract view of the actual state of those relations with the native powers, which had the most prominent influence on the general security of the British interests in India, at the period of his assuming that important charge.

Of the native powers whose frontier touched that of the British possessions, the most powerful, and looking to future contingencies highly probable, the most dangerous, was Dowlut Row Sindea¹; but the inordinate ambition which had led him to follow the projects of his uncle and predecessor for extending over Decan and the south, that unlimited authority which he had established in Hindostan, although it kept him at this period, too much occupied with intrigues at Poona, to excite immediate apprehension for the north-western frontier of Bengal; rendered his actual resources, and ultimate designs, objects of serious consideration for an English Governor-general, who should prefer the manly examination of real danger, to the torpor of a delusive and fallacious security.

We have had occasion to advert to the extensive power possessed by Mahdajee Sindea in Malwa and Hindostan, at the period of the treaty of Salbey; and without entering into the detail of those important transactions which brought his territories to touch the most vulnerable points of the British frontier in the Doab, it will be sufficient for the purposes of this work to state that he had been permitted to effect this aggrandisement without even a diplomatic effort to arrest its progress. For the purpose of illustrating the circumstances to which we advert, it will be necessary to explain, that public news-writers are to be found at every Indian Court, who insert in their daily papers of intelligence, exactly what is permitted and no more; that the contents of these papers, together with such secret intelligence as may be obtained, is forwarded by the news-writers of foreign powers whose known functions were generally sanctioned at almost every Court excepting that of Seringapatam; and that these papers, like a more celebrated European

¹ Daulat Rao succeeded his great uncle in 1794. He was then a boy of thirteen. His father-in-law, Sarji Rao Ghatke, was his minister, notorious for his execrable cruelty.

journal, were sometimes made the vehicle of feeling the dispositions of their neighbours, to tolerate or resist an intended injury. In July 1792, the news-writer employed by the English Government at Delhi transmitted one of these papers of intelligence, published under Sindea's sanction, which stated "that the Emperor of Delhi had written to the Peshwa and to Sindea, informing them that he hoped through their exertions to obtain some tribute from Bengal"!!! An intimation so very plain could not be overlooked by Lord Cornwallis, and he accordingly, in August 1792, furnished his resident at the court of Sindea, with instructions to represent "that in the present condition of the Mogul (the prisoner of Sindea) he should consider all letters written in his name to be by Sindea's power and authority only, and that the attempt to establish principles of the above description by any power whatever, will be warily resented by this Government." This it will be observed was the second time in six years, that a similar attempt had been made, once in the direct claim of choute, made in 1786 on Sir John Macpherson, who answered that Sindea must instantly renounce and disavow the claim, or abide the consequences of immediate war; and now in the more cautious advance to the same object with Lord Cornwallis. His Lordship goes on to instruct his political resident,— "You will take care to recal, in the most forcible manner, to his recollection, the spirit of moderation and *forbearance*, that has been manifested by the Government, during the long period in which he has been employed, in extending his conquests in Hindostan, &c. &c." Forbearance necessarily implies, the right to do that from which we abstain; and the English Government would appear, on the face of this record, to have acquiesced in an aggrandisement which it had the right to prevent; a right which perhaps ought not to be forcibly exercised, excepting after timely remonstrance had failed; but in this case

even the remonstrance was wanting. It is not intended to exclude from this consideration the question of expediency, on which public opinion was far from being agreed; but the recurrence of the Government to its own past forbearance, when the danger had begun to assume a mature aspect, involves a tacit admission which could scarcely have been expected under the circumstances of the case.

The chief instrument in effecting this aggrandisement, was M. De Boigne,¹ formerly a subaltern officer in the East-India Company's service, on the Madras establishment; who had quitted the trammels of rise by seniority, for a more wide and indefinite field of ambition. The genius and talents of this distinguished officer, had enabled him to organise for Sindia, a regular establishment of infantry and artillery, such as had never before been seen in the service of a native power: and this Mahratta chief, by a liberal, but hazardous policy, assigned to the exclusive management of Mr. De Boigne, territory on the English frontier, yielding a revenue adequate to the maintenance of a regular field force, which in 1803, under his successor, amounted to 43,650 men, and 464 guns; and before that period, was supposed to have been more numerous; indefinite means of levying or discharging Silledar horse to any amount, with all the apparatus of military, civil, and fiscal

¹ De Boigne was born at Chambéry in Savoy. He began his career in the Irish Brigade in the service of France. He resigned his commission and joined the Greek army, and was taken prisoner by the Turks. On release, he found his way to Cairo and then to India in 1778, where the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Rumbold, appointed him to the 6th Native Regiment. He resigned his commission later on in the time of Lord Macartney and went to Calcutta. Warren Hastings furnished him with letters to the authorities in the upper provinces, and he went to Lucknow. Eventually Sindia employed him to raise two battalions of soldiers for employment in Bundelkund. He continued in the service of Sindia until 1796, when he left India and retired to Chambéry. He died in 1830 in his eightieth year, as Count de Boigne.

establishments, fortresses, arsenals, founderies, and depôts, belonging to actual sovereignty, to which pretension little seemed to be wanting excepting the declaration of independence. In the effective encouragement offered to European officers, the entire freedom of leaving the service, and remitting their property without restraint, was the most novel and attractive. De Boigne, personally availed himself of this liberal conduct, and was succeeded by Monsieur Perron,¹ about 1794. The management of these two officers was, however, in one respect, entirely opposite. De Boigne, received indifferently English and French adventurers as officers; Perron accepted French candidates alone; and, at the period of Lord Mornington's arrival, the number of the English was so very limited in itself, and so systematically discouraged, that the formidable army which we have described, may be considered as officered by Frenchmen, and to constitute a French force on the English frontier. The deposed Mogul Emperor, was made, by a singular contrivance of circuitous mockery, to appoint the Mahratta Pêshwa, his (Vakeel-ul-Mutluk) absolute vicegerent, and the Pêshwa, to appoint Sindia his deputy! an imprisoned sovereign appointed as his absolute vicegerent the usurping minister of another imprisoned sovereign; and that minister was supposed to appoint as his deputy, the actual conqueror of the first named imprisoned pageant; this conqueror being engaged in the design of usurping all the authorities of the very usurping minister, who was feigned to confer this imaginary appointment on himself! These fictions were carried to so great a

¹ M. Perron was the officer second in command to De Boigne. While De Boigne always advised Sindia never to excite the jealousy of the British Government, M. Perron took the opposite view and was one cause which led Sindia to disaster. After the capture of the fort of Aligarh in 1803 by General Lake, M. Perron, conscious of a decline in Sindia's favour, left Sindia's army, and under the protection of General Lake, escaped to Lucknow.

length, that Monsieur Perron called his army the "*imperial army*," and himself a servant and subject of the Mogul; and the very plain and intelligible design of rendering the unfortunate Mogul the main instrument of the French for the establishment of their power in Hindostân, was afterwards confirmed by a written projet to that effect, which came into the possession of the English Governor-general.

It has been admitted that this danger, although the greatest, was not the most imminent; and although it be an anticipation of events beyond the scope of this work, it may be submitted to the candour of those statesmen, who condemned the subsequent Mahratta war, and deemed the case of the French influence to have been overstated, whether they would really have continued to hold that opinion, in the event of this *imperial army* having been left untouched, and in the farther event, soon afterwards expected, of the arrival of a French or Russian army in Persia, or the Penjâb?

To the overgrown power of Sindia in the north, Lord Mornington could not, at this time, have opposed with any effect the party inimical to Sindia's views at Poona, chiefly because their enmity rather related to the interior, than the foreign policy of the Mahratta confederacy. It is true that the young Pêshwa, Bâjeerow, had evinced the greatest anxiety, to be released from the state of insulting thralldom, in which he was kept by Dowlut Row Sindia, and had even secretly solicited the interference of the British Government: but the influence of a state prisoner can seldom be efficient, and there was obvious ground of apprehension, that any pressure or interference from without, might have tended to unite the discordant chiefs. Instead, therefore, of viewing with surprise the subsequent apathy of the Pêshwa's Government, in failing to take its assigned part in the impending war of Mysoor, we shall see abundant cause to admire the skilful management by

which the Governor-general was enabled to prevent the Mahratta force from being marshalled against him : and these observations, added to the degree in which our narrative has already attempted to develop the intricate politics of Poona, will be sufficient to afford a general conception of the state of the most important branches of the Mahratta power in 1798.

The ordinary course of our previous narration has sufficiently unfolded the dangerous and hostile designs of Mysoor, together with the means by which an expected invasion from the north under Zemaun Shah, might be made to distract the English councils, to divide their force, and to dissipate their treasure; the state of the war in Europe requires no farther illustration with regard to our immediate object,¹ and the sketch which we proposed to present will be completed by describing the political condition of the court of Hyderabad.

We have had occasion to enter into some detail regarding the origin and progress of the corps of Monsieur Raymond, until the termination of the rebellion of Ali Jah, in the latter part of 1795. Subsequently to that event, this enterprising officer continued to be indefatigable in the organisation, improvement, and augmentation of his corps; which in 1798 amounted to fourteen thousand men, describ-

¹ The Court of Directors in England realised the gravity of the position of affairs in the summer of 1798. In their despatch to the Governor-General in June of that year, they acquainted him with their apprehension of danger from the French preparations at Toulon and their intrigues with Tippoo, and they urged the Indian Government to take immediate action. "It is highly improbable," they said, "that Tippoo should have entered into any league with the French without some apparent preparation, on his part, of an hostile nature in furtherance of their designs. If such, therefore, shall have been the case, it would be neither prudent nor politic to wait for actual hostilities on his part." They direct an enquiry of Tippoo, and a simultaneous disposition of troops on his frontier to give effect to it. (Letter from the Secret Committee, dated 18th June 1798. Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 1-2.)

ed in the public dispatches of the Governor-general to have "attained a degree of discipline superior in every respect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the sepoy's entertained in the English service;" and their efficiency was supported by a large and well organised train of field artillery.¹ Monsieur Raymond appears to have been deeply imbued with those principles and practices which had been generated by the French revolution, in contempt of the obligations of honour since so familiarly violated in Europe; he had opened a successful correspondence with the officers of his nation, prisoners of war on parole at Pondicherry, for the purpose of obtaining their services; and he was only prevented by the vigilance of Lord Hobart, from being joined by a number* of them, who were apprehended at the moment they meant to effect their escape; but this disappointment did not prevent his obtaining a tolerably full proportion of French officers. He had opened a correspondence with Tippoo, which the few documents discovered shew to have been discouraged after the arrival of the party from

¹ "The corps of Raymond had been in the service of the Nizam before the last war with Tippoo Sultaun, and in 1792, when it served with Lord Cornwallis's army, its strength was not greater than 1,500 men at the highest estimation, and its discipline very defective. At the battle of Kurdlah, in 1795, its strength amounted to about 11,000 men. During the rebellion of Ali Jah, and in a variety of service in which the corps has since been employed, it has acquired experience and skill, and it is now composed of thirteen regiments of two battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of 14,000 men. Its discipline, according to every recent account, is very considerably improved, in so much that, although inferior to our native force, it is said to be superior, in nearly an equal proportion, to the ordinary scale of the infantry in the service of any of the Native Powers. Besides field pieces to each regiment, a park of 40 pieces of ordnance, chiefly brass, from 12- to 36-pounders, with a well-trained body of artillery men (including a number of Europeans) is attached to the corps." (*Minute of the Governor-General, dated 12th August 1798. Owen: Selections from the Wellesley Despatches, p. 32*.)

* Malcolm's India, page 176.

the Isle of France, by the jealousy of the Frenchmen in the Sultan's service, of the established reputation and influence of that adventurer. His battalions carried the colours of the French Republic (then at war with England); the staff being surmounted by a spear, transfixing, or supporting, as fancy might interpret, the Mahommedan crescent; the cap of liberty was engraven on the buttons of the clothing; by secret intrigues he encouraged mutiny and desertion (in some instances with success) among the native corps in the English service, who were stationed near the frontier¹; and every indication, public and private, proceeding from Monsieur Raymond and his officers, evinced (as indeed might reasonably be expected) a spirit of determined hostility against the English Government.

The feeble and indirect effort of introducing English adventurers into the service of Nizam Ali, for the purpose of rivalling the influence and authority of Monsieur Raymond, only served, by its inefficiency, to stimulate the activity and consolidate the power of that chief²; and at the period of

¹ "A considerable desertion of our troops took place in that quarter (the frontier of the Nizam's Dominions) some time ago, and nearly 500 men, with several native officers who deserted on that occasion, are now serving in Monsieur Perron's corps." (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, p. 33.)

² "It was therefore thought advisable by the late Governor-General in Council to resort to the expedient of encouraging the introduction of British adventurers into the service of the Nizam, for the purpose of counter-balancing, in some measure, the influence of the French army at Hyderabad. With this view, the corps commanded by Mr. Finglass has received the protection and encouragement of the Acting Resident, and has been augmented to the number of 8,000 men.

"The policy of this expedient always appeared to me very doubtful, and I have entertained serious apprehensions that the measure might ultimately furnish additional recruits to the cause of France instead of counteracting her influence." (Minute of the Governor-General, dated 12th August 1798. Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, p. 44.)

Lord Mornington's arrival, the most serious alarm for the independence, if not the very existence of the Government, had been excited in the minds of Nizam Ali and his ministers, by the overbearing disposition frequently manifested by the officers of this efficient French force.

Although these considerations occupied the earliest attention of the Governor-general, they acquired a more urgent importance, on the receipt of *authentic* intelligence of the proceedings consequent to the arrival of the Mysorean mission at the Isle of France, which reached Calcutta on the 18th of June 18. June. The necessity of the earliest possible preparations for war with Tippoo Sultaun was too obvious to admit of hesitation, and in contemplating the right arising from his declared designs of aggression, to demand from the members of the confederation of 1790, the execution of the 13th article of that treaty; it was obvious that while an army commanded by Frenchmen, of such principles and views, and of such uncontroled power, should remain in the service of Nizam Ali, the alliance of that Prince, instead of an accession of strength, would be a source of imminent danger, in a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

Nizam Ali had at no time been insensible to the danger of that increasing power, which disgust at the imputed tergiversation of the English, and the necessity of some resource, had induced him to place in the hands of this French party. Their arrogant and augmenting ascendancy, which forced itself with increasing force on the attention of Nizam Ali, and still more on that of his minister Musheer-ul-Mulk,¹ was balanced in the mind of the former, by an apprehension of the consequences of a more intimate connection with the English; which like every unequal alliance, would have a tendency ultimately

¹ The minister called Azeem-ul-Omra, in the account of the battle of Kuddah, after which action the Nizam surrendered him as a prisoner to the Mahrattas.

to reduce him to a state of dependence on that power. This proposition Musheer-ul-Mulk never attempted either to evade or deny, but he met it by a representation of existing danger from his nominal servants; by their insufficiency, without a farther and more dangerous augmentation, which would number the English among his enemies, to save from destruction his avowedly declining state; by the actual power of the English to protect him from every other enemy; by an appeal to the relative character of the individuals of each nation with whom his long experience had made him acquainted; and by the confidence which he had always endeavoured to inculcate, in the systematic good faith of the English nation, notwithstanding the unfavourable appearances of 1794.

The imperfect sketch which has been attempted will at least enable the reader to understand, that the neutral and pacific system with the states of India, which in the north had preceded the administration of Sir John Shore; and subsequently to the treaty of 1792, had left six years of profound peace in every part of the Indian continent, to recruit the public treasures, had also accumulated abundant necessity for future expenditure; and in the estimation of every person of knowledge and discernment, had left this termination of a period of peace to be any thing but a season of security.

Surrounded on every side with latent dangers, Lord Mornington, in determining to look them successively in the face, and to substitute, by either negotiation or war, substantial and permanent peace, for a precarious and deceitful security, had only the option of selecting that danger which was first to be removed: and the considerations which have been stated, gave an obvious priority to the critical condition of affairs at Hyderabad. The subsidiary force of two English battalions, stipulated by the treaty of 1790, had been dismissed in consequence of the disgust created by the refusal of support demanded

in 1794, and recalled at the earnest solicitation of Nizam Ali, chiefly on the early impression of committing his own person to their guard, while the extent was still uncertain, of the defection occasioned by the rebellion of his son Ali Jah : and throughout the vacillating councils of encouragement and augmentation, or distrust and apprehension of the French corps, these two battalions were retained and considered as a resource in every extremity, and had probably diminished his apprehensions of the French party, and thus indirectly contributed to its dangerous growth.

After the previous communication rendered necessary by the circumstances of the case, the Governor-general, on the 8th of July 1798, issued July 8. his instructions to the resident at Hyderabad, for the negotiation of a new treaty, augmenting the English subsidiary force to six battalions, with a formidable artillery; and stipulating for the dismissal of the corps commanded by French officers, in His Highness's service. This treaty, which was signed at Hyderabad on the 1st of September,¹ and ratified at Sept. 1. Calcutta on the 18th of the same month, declares in 18. its preamble the augmentation to be founded on the express desire of Nizam Ali, and professes the enlarged conditions of the alliance to be founded on the hostile proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun, and the French already described; and the necessity imposed on the confederates of 1790, united in a defensive league, to take immediate measures for the security of their respective possessions; and besides the ordinary conditions, a stipulation for a treaty of triple guarantee, if the Peshwa shall consent, and if otherwise, binds the English to mediate in any future differences between the two other confederates; and obliges Nizam Ali to acquiesce in their decision; and finally it confirms all subsisting treaties between the

¹ The treaty is given in full in Owen's *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 165-170.

English, the Peshwa, and Nizam Ali; and declares the free assent of Nizam Ali, to similar subsidiary engagements between the English and the Peshwa, if the latter should express a desire for such an arrangement.

- The first measures adopted in fulfilment of the provisions of this treaty were executed with a degree of celerity and vigour, which was calculated not only to command success, but to produce the most salutary impressions, far beyond the sphere of their immediate operation. The additional four battalions with their artillery, which during the negotiation had been collected on the frontier, marched to Hyderabad, and joined the two battalions already there on the
- Oct. 10. 10th of October. The weakness of Nizam Ali, as the crisis approached, and the natural timidity of his minister Musheer-ul-Mulk, in contemplating the sanguinary conflict which was apprehended in disarming the French party, added perhaps to the effect of those intrigues at native courts which cannot always be penetrated, disposed the government of Hyderabad to evasion and delay; but after some preliminary discussion, the British resident (Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick) declared, that at this stage of the transaction he could listen to nothing short of the complete and immediate execution of that article of the treaty; and a diplomatic note to this effect,
21. dated on the 21st of October was reinforced by a movement of the British corps to a position which commanded the French lines, and by a declaration that they would be attacked in the event of farther delay: these decided measures removed the previous hesitation of the court, and produced its active concurrence in the subsequent measures. A proclamation was issued and dispersed in the French lines on the same day, by which the troops were informed that Nizam Ali had dismissed the French officers from his service; that they were released from their obedience to these officers; and that all who supported

them should be considered and punished as traitors. The internal divisions in the French party, and some pecuniary balances due to the men, which the officers were unable or unwilling to discharge, added to the menacing position of the British troops produced a serious mutiny in the lines; the men imprisoned their officers, loudly and violently demanding their arrears of pay, and even threatened the lives of their prisoners; and the officer commanding the British troops (Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts) in concert with the resident and the minister, took a judicious advantage of this state of confusion. On the morning of the 22d of October, at day-light, the French cantonments were surrounded by a body of horse, belonging to Nizam Ali, and by the British detachment. The men, still in a state of mutiny, were offered full payment of all arrears, and future service under other officers, on condition of laying down their arms; to which terms, after some discussion, they assented "and, in a few hours, a corps, whose numbers were nearly fourteen thousand † men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed, without one life having been lost." Oct 22

As the first step in a series of great political measures, the last mentioned character of the transaction, added an inestimable value to this important event; and, an hostile army transformed in one day and without the effusion of blood, into a friendly force, diffused an impression of wisdom to plan, and energy to execute, which had the most decisive influence at all the native courts.

The apprehension of giving offence to the

Malcolm's India, page 244. He was at that period assistant to the resident, and an active and meritorious agent in effecting this important arrangement.

† Including detachments; the number actually disarmed on the 22d of October was eleven thousand.

Mahrattas, which prevented a similar treaty in 1794, was not of inferior importance in 1798. The successful issue of the preliminary measure, in the manner which has been described; contributed, perhaps, to a little salutary caution, in expressing their dissatisfaction; but it is obvious, that the future mediation stipulated by the treaty of Hyderabad, could not fail to be secretly offensive to the power which lived on the plunder of its neighbours. There was, however, no mystery observed in the transaction; the objects of the treaty were communicated to the Pêshwa, both before and after its conclusion; and he was uniformly and earnestly invited to concur in giving effect to the principles of guarantee, contained in the 13th article of the treaty of 1790¹: but, the councils of Dowlut Row Sindea, which, at that period directed the nominal measures of the Pêshwa, had a reference to interests of his own, distinct from those of the state of Poona. The British Government had a right to remonstrate against that open interference and control which prevented the Pêshwa from performing his engagements as a member of the alliance of 1790, and used the most strenuous endeavours to oblige Sindea to leave Poona. Sindea was perfectly well disposed to unite with Tippoo for the prosecution of his own views in Decan and the South; but he distinctly saw that during the hostile operations of a large portion of his regular army in that quarter, his most valuable possessions in Hindostân, were open to a

¹ In his despatch to the Directors at Fort St. George, dated 20th March 1799, Lord Mornington wrote: "At the same time my endeavours were employed with equal assiduity to give vigour and effect to the treaties subsisting with His Highness the Peishiwa. The return of Nana Furnaveese to the administration afforded for some time a just expectation that our alliance with the Mahrattas would speedily be restored with additional vigour and advantage, but the increasing distractions of the Mahratta empire unfortunately frustrated the wise counsels of that experienced and able statesman, and disappointed my views at the Court of Poona." (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, p. 97.)

formidable English army, cantoned near the frontier, and that he could not effectually prosecute new conquests without imminent hazard to his actual possessions. Considerable fluctuation, sometimes ostensibly amounting to the prospect of an improved alliance, was manifested at different periods by the Court of Poona; but such demonstrations had no other foundation than the desire to evade and procrastinate. The accession of strength to the English interests, from the events at Hyderabad in October 1798, alarmed Sindia for the double danger which he should incur in the south, and in the north, by a rupture with that state; and although he pertinaciously adhered to the prosecution of his views at Poona, and prevented the Peshwa from executing the provisions of the triple alliance of 1790, he determined to postpone, to some more favourable opportunity, expected to arise from the events of the war, any active military interference of his own on either side.

While, therefore, Lord Mornington anticipated an unwilling neutrality as the best object he could immediately accomplish at Poona, he continued the intercourse of amity, together with most sincere and reiterated invitations, to participate with the two allies, in the execution of their common engagements, and he accordingly decided on the necessity of pursuing his operations against the Sultaun, without any aid from the Mahrattas, leaving in their present undecided, but not immediately dangerous condition, the state of his political relations with the Peshwa and Sindia. Before concluding what we have to observe on the actual state of affairs at Poona, it may prevent interruption to our future narrative, if we briefly advert to the state of the Sultaun's secret machinations at that court; which will not only unfold his imperfect conception of the affairs of Poona, but a diplomacy founded as much on personal hatred, as political wisdom; and will aid in exhibiting a more intelligible picture of its confused administration.

On the death of the late Peshwa, in October 1795, Tippoo dispatched a secret emissary (Balajee Row, from whom this information is derived) to congratulate his successor (Bajee Row as he concluded), and to concert with him a more intimate political union. On his arrival at Poona, the envoy found Chimnaje on the musnud, Perseram Bhow minister, and Bajee Row a prisoner in Sindia's army. He soon discovered that this order of things would not last, and found means of getting himself introduced to a secret interview with Bajee Row, who did not succeed to the musnud till December 1796. The envoy was instructed by the Sultaun, to represent that their respective fathers (Hyder and Ragonaut Row) had been connected by the most intimate political ties that Nana Furnavese had been the efficient cause of his father's banishment and death, and of placing on the musnud the spurious offspring of a* silversmith; and had equally been the source of Tippoo's misfortunes, by promoting the confederacy of 1790: that the Peshwa ought to consider that minister as a worm secretly consuming the edifice of his government, that he was treacherously leagued with the English, and that his imprisonment or removal was essential to the efficiency of the Peshwa's rule. To these observations he answered, that he

¹ Madhu Rao Narayan committed suicide on 25th October 1795. Many intrigues between Sindia, Holkar and Nana Furnavese followed, but on 26th May 1796, Chimnaji Madhu Rao, Baji Rao's brother, was invested as Peshwa, while Baji Rao was detained as a prisoner by Sindia. Eventually, Nana Furnavese, who had fled from Poona, obtained a guarantee from Nizam Ali and Sindia, and returned to Poona and resumed his duties as Prime Minister, and Baji Rao was placed on the musnud on 4th December 1796. (*Cf* Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, where a full account of these confused events will be found.)

See Hyder's observations on the same subject in 1779, Vol. i. p. 762. Among the pregnant females shut up with the widow of Narrain Row to insure the appearance of a male infant, the wife of a silver-smith, according to that account, produced the future Peshwa, *Sawai Madho Row*, who died in 1795.

was encompassed with various conflicting evils, and would endeavour to extricate himself from them all; he desired the envoy to assure his master of his sense of the important connection between their parents, and his grateful recollection of the pecuniary aid afforded by Hyder to his father in his greatest distress; he expressly prohibited the envoy from any intercourse with his ministers, or relations, and placed with him a confidential agent as a medium of private communication. On the occasion of Musheer-ul-Mulk's departure from Poona, the Peshwa appears to have entertained a temporary hope of being emancipated both from Sindea and Nana Furnavese, and expressed a desire for military aid; to which Tippoo replied, that his whole army was ready, and recommended, after terminating the domestic feud, an immediate invasion of Nizam Ali's territories from the west, while he should attack it from the south: but although the Sultaun was in secret communication with Sindea, he does not seem to have comprehended that the views of that chief were entirely incompatible with the political emancipation of Bajee Row, on which expected event the Sultaun unquestionably most relied for giving efficiency to his projected alliance with the state of Poona.

On the occasion of the negotiations opened by the English resident at Poona in consequence of the discovery of the transactions at the Isle of France, the Peshwa sent for Balajee Row, and informed him of the events at Hyderabad which had established the English ascendancy at that court on the downfall of the French; admonished him that the distracted state of his own Government would compel him to adhere to the stipulations of the treaty of 1790 on the requisition of the two other powers. That his master's intrigues with the French at such a period, were in the last degree imprudent, and would lead to his destruction, without its being possible for the Peshwa, however well disposed, to avert it; and that

as a sincere friend he advised him to drop that connection and conciliate the English by whatever concessions: and it is curious that, among other reasons for temporising, he adverts to the inefficient state of the Sultaun's army, which in general opinion had been exceedingly injured by his late innovations. The Pêshwa was considered both by the envoy and his master to be seriously well disposed to the Sultaun; whose preservation he considered of importance to his own interest, and chiefly in what related to his eventual emancipation from Nana Furnavese; he promised his best efforts to prevent the ultimate march of the Mahratta contingent for the siege of Seringapatam; and the actual ascendancy of Sindia being on the same side; the councils of Nana, who really desired the performance of the 13th article of the treaty of 1790, were made to yield to that conjoint influence. Balajee Row however being but a secret agent to the Pêshwa personally, without the knowledge of Nana, had no opportunity of attempting to negotiate with that minister, who had the conduct of the communications with the British resident, and he recommended to the Sultaun a public mission, which accordingly took place near the conclusion of 1798 under Ahmed Khan and Fucker-u-Deen. It was not until April 1799 that Nana Furnavese discovered the existence of this secret mission, when he alarmed the Pêshwa at the consequences of its being known to the English resident, and prevailed on him to dismiss Balajee Row, which he did with professions of the greatest friendship, charging the envoy to return with all possible expedition, and advise his master to dispel at any sacrifice the storm which was ready to overwhelm him. Before the envoy reached the frontier of Mysoor, he heard of the fate of the capital.

CHAPTER XLV.

Lord Mornington's luminous and instructive discussion of his political relations to the Sultaun—The reduction, not the extinction of his power, desired—Second proof of the insufficiency of the arrangements of 1792—Intelligence of the expedition to Egypt—Lord Mornington's letter to the Sultaun on this subject, 4th November, 1798—Friendly reply—8th November, expostulation and proposal to send an envoy—Sultaun declines to receive him—Vague hopes—Passive fatality—roused by a second letter, 10th December—awakened by a third, 9th January—Rage, not at his own folly, but that of his agents—Sultaun's eastern apologue—Expected succour from Egypt, founded on the erroneous conceptions of his French officers—contrary to all the facts—Important documents from Constantinople, forwarded to Tippoo by the English—Letter of the Grand Signor—Two answers—one for the perusal of the English, the other the true reply—Curious abstract of European aggression in India—Strange and offensive answer to Lord Mornington's last letter—Consents to receive the envoy too late—Infers his destruction to be intended—Marches against General Stuart—Strength of Tippoo's army.

HITHERTO no direct communication had been made by the British Government to Tippoo Sultaun, regarding their knowledge of his proceedings at the Isle of France, and no remonstrance or explanation had been offered or demanded on either side, regarding those preparations for war which were

notoriously in progress; although the usual formalities had taken place on the occasion of Lord Mornington's assuming the Government, and a correspondence had occurred regarding some adjustments of frontier, which were pending at the period of his arrival. The grounds of this delay are so

Aug. 12. distinctly unfolded, in a minute of the Governor-general in the secret department, dated the 12th of August 1798,¹ that it were an injustice to this most able and luminous performance, to attempt the abstract of a political lesson so brief and so instructive. "*The rights of states, applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety; this necessity is the foundation of the reciprocal claim of all nations, to explanation of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for injuries done, and to security against injuries intended.*"

"In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been denied, or from the evident nature of circumstances, cannot otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the injured party, to resort to arms for the vindication of the public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the state becomes the duty of the Government, unless some material consideration of the public interest should forbid the attempt.

"If the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad, Poona, and Cabul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure; it might be our duty

¹ This minute will be found in full in Owen's *Wellesley Dispatches*, pp. 11-57.

to resort in the first instance to his construction of proceedings, which being of a doubtful character; might admit of a satisfactory explanation. *But where there is no doubt, there can be no matter for explanation.* The act of Tippoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British government in India.

"To affect to misunderstand an injury or insult of such a complexion, would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the correspondence of our residents at Hyderabad and Poona, sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both those courts; and in so clear and plain a case, our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would therefore be, the disgrace of our character and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France, would persist in his denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them, and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case the idea, therefore, of demanding explanation must be rejected, as being disgraceful in its principle, and frivolous in its object.

" The demand of reparation, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to cases of intended injury, excepting in those instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention.

" Where a state has unjustly seized the property, or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made, by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed ; but the cause of our complaint against Tippoo Sultaun, is not that he has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge ; we complain, that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction ; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of extermination against us ; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire ; and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence.

" That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited, may be ascribed, either to the weakness of the Government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils ; but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained ; for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited ; we know that they were addressed, not merely to the Government of Mauritius, but to that of France, and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full

extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate, and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description, no effectual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power, as shall not only defeat his actual preparations, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence."

Here, then, we find, for the second time, the proof of a proposition, which received abundant intermediate illustrations, that the reduction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, in 1792, to the degree which was then deemed necessary to render him incapable of mischief, had been sufficient to produce precisely the opposite effect; that in the general confusion of the times, of all the native states of Decan and the south, connected with the political transactions of 1792, his power alone had not only remained unimpaired, but had been anxiously augmented; and finally, that its farther diminution was indispensable to the safety of the English Government. The absolute extinction of Tippoo Sultaun's power was at no period of these preparatory measures in the contemplation of Lord Mornington. He had hoped, through the effective co-operation of his allies, and the successful issue of his preliminary measures, to convince the Sultaun of the fatal tendency to himself of his hostile designs, and to induce his unwilling assent to such arrangements as should render his political existence compatible with the security of those great interests committed to an English Governor-general. To have delayed such preparatory measures, or to have apprized Tippoo Sultaun of their object, before it was out of his power to render them abortive, would have involved a degree of imbecility at variance with the whole character of this administration.

During these preparations, however, the danger of French co-operation assumed a more threatening aspect; and although the expedition to Egypt had no immediate connection with the embassy to the Isle of France, it was the result of those previous designs which always reckoned on Tippoo Sultaun, as the efficient instrument of France, for the recovery of their power in the south, as the blind imprisoned monarch of Delhi was to be the ostensible engine of their operations in the north. The existence and position of this approaching danger, whatever might be its previous history, was abundant cause of congratulation to the Governor-general, that he had not delayed those preparations on general grounds, which this particular danger rendered more urgent and indispensable.

A letter to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 4th of November, announced this unprovoked attack on the Sultaun's Mahommedan ally, and the splendid victory of Aboukir; on which the Sultaun in return offered his congratulations in the language of undisturbed amity; but on the 8th of the same month the Governor-general deemed the proper period to have arrived for announcing his knowledge of the Sultaun's recent negotiations with the French, and proposed to him, in the name of the three powers, to depute an envoy personally known to him (Major Doveton, who had conducted the restoration of the hostages in 1794,) who was authorised to propose the sole means which appeared to be effectual for the removal of distrust, and for the confidence of permanent peace. To this letter he had the temerity to answer, that the existing treaties were a sufficient security, and that he could imagine no other means more effectual; thereby distinctly declining the reception of the envoy.

¹ In this letter Tippoo gave the following account of his transactions with the French. "In this Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and

The negotiations of the English at Hyderabad and Poona were intimately known to the Sultaun, by the reports of his emissaries at those courts, and the extensive preparations which were in progress, under the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, were too public in their nature, to escape the knowledge of the most careless observer; they were the subject of Tippoo's incessant conversation, and were recounted with a sort of quiescent distress belonging to the fatalist, who rests his hopes on some unknown or improbable event. The English preparations were always tardy, and his allies might be more alert; his ambassadors had, in 1789, returned from the Red Sea to Calicut in less time than was necessary for the maturity of the English plans of invasion, and his allies would not abandon him to destruction, without some effort for his deliverance, from France, from the Mauritius, or from Egypt. He would send embassies to Constantinople and to Cabul, and stir up the faithful to prevent the extinction of the faith; his emissaries at Poona would work on the passions and interests of Sindia, and of Bajee Row, and the ascendancy of the English at Hyderabad, might again yield to his superior political address. The means alluded to by the Governor-general, could be no other than demanding his remaining sea-coast in Canara;† and thereby excluding him from communicating with the

having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to the Mauritius from whence forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment. Such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of the Sircar (the gift of God); and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship, to put about reports with a view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars." (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 59-62.)

These were dispatched, but returned without reaching their destination.

† This conjecture was perfectly correct.

French, and from the only possible chance of retrieving his affairs; if his destruction were pre-ordained, let it come! the sooner the* better! but he might still hope that his own efforts would prolong the contest until aid should arrive, and every discussion was terminated by the professedly pious remark, "after all, whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished:" and this state of passive contemplation, although materially disturbed, was not permanently changed, even by the receipt of the letter from Lord Mornington, dated the 8th of November.

He was somewhat more acutely moved by a second, dated the 10th of December, earnestly impressing on his mind the necessity of giving an early and serious consideration to the subject of the former letter, and announcing the Governor-general's intention of proceeding to Madras, where he hoped to receive satisfactory communications. The Sultaun was still so weak as to believe, that a fabulous version of the history of his embassy, would satisfy Lord Mornington's credulity, and remove his suspicions; but when, early in January 1799, he obtained intelligence of the Governor-General's actual arrival at Madras on the 31st of December, to direct the operations of an immediate war; and soon afterwards received a letter, dated the 9th of January, in answer to his own silly fabrication of a mercantile adventure, on a vessel of two masts, on the return of which a few Frenchmen had taken their passage to India; when he perused his Lordship's remonstrances against his rejection of the proposed envoy; his recital in detail of the entire amount of the information he possessed, regarding the hostile proceedings at the Isle of France, with a Persian translation of General Malartic's proclamation; his explanation of the necessity imposed on the allies, of seeking relief from this ambiguous state of supposed peace, and hostile

* A sort of proverb, "if the evil must arrive to-morrow, let it rather arrive to-day."

negotiation and alliance, and their anxious desire to continue the relations of peace on such terms as should render it safe and permanent; his most serious and solemn admonition to assent to the reception of the intended envoy; his intreaty not to postpone an answer more than one day after the receipt of the letter, and the final and portentous observation, that "dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs;" when he had finished the perusal of this letter, he appeared to be aroused, as if from a dream, to consider as new facts, all the circumstances which had occupied his discussions for several months before; and at length to be really awake to the full extent and immediate pressure of the danger, and even in a certain degree, to the folly which had produced it.

Until this period, he had no distinct conception 1799. of the gratuitous folly of receiving a military reinforcement of ninety-nine Frenchmen; he had only contemplated their arrival with exultation as the precursors of a more mighty aid; and even now he inveighed, not against his own senseless stupidity in the arrangement of the mission, contrary to the earnest advice of his principal ministers; not against the childish imprudence of receiving, after its arrival at Mangalore, this useless demonstration of hostility, so entirely disproportioned to his own original expectations and designs; but against the incapacity and disobedience of his envoys, which now for the first time he condescended to discover. One of these, Mahommed Ibrahim, was unhappily a dolt, and knew no better; but for his colleague, Hussein Aly, a man of reputed understanding, no punishment could be too severe. "If," said he, "I were to hang him, his execution would not dispel the storm which is now ready to burst over me. I will send him as an appendage to my embassy to *Room* (Constantinople) that he may perish in the element by which he has conveyed to this country the sources of its

impending calamity and he was accordingly appointed secretary to that mission.

In his usual volubility of discourse on all subjects by which he was particularly excited, he successively vented his indignation against every person and thing immediately or remotely instrumental in producing his present misfortunes, himself alone excepted, the true, and (with the exception of Monsieur Malartic and the envoys) the exclusive author of his own ruin. In Asiatic conversation, no subject is considered to be gracefully discussed without the introduction of an appropriate tale. The following would, on its own merits, scarcely find a place in a selection of Indian apologues, but it derives an interest from being almost daily recited by the Sultaun to some new hearer, as the most applicable to his own situation.

"A certain king, who was learned in the prophetic and mystical characters formed by the sutures of the human skull, stopped to decypher the fragment of one, which he perceived by the road side; and found the inscription to mean, *this will cause the death of forty persons*. Being desirous of averting the destruction of so many human beings, he ordered the fragment to be preserved, and on his return to his private apartments, pounded it into a fine powder, which he put into a little box and deposited in a secret part of his cabinet, the access to which was prohibited to every other person. In the latter part of this process, he was observed by his favourite wife, who from the king's skill in pharmacy, supposed this powder so carefully preserved, to be some precious medicinal preparation.

"The king soon afterwards departed on a distant expedition, and the favourite wife, disconsolate for his absence, declined in health, and obtained no relief from the united skill of the state physicians. At length it occurred to her to try the effect of the medicine prepared and deposited by the king." The apologue does not stop to explain in what manner

this powder of skull obtained or exercised its latent powers, but goes on to say that "the queen became immediately pregnant. The king returns, and is of course enraged: the queen acknowledges her miraculous pregnancy, but pleads innocent of the ordinary means by which it might have been accomplished. The king orders to be tortured and slain, first the chief eunuchs, and then every male thing that could possibly fall under suspicion. At length the queen, reflecting on the possible origin of her disgrace, and anxious, in the expectation of her own death, to confess her unintentional errors, acknowledged that she had violated the secret cabinet, and taken some of the medicine which she had seen deposited by the king in the manner which has been described. The king instantly recollected the circumstances of the deposit. The number of persons put to death was found to be exactly forty, and the mystic prophecy was fulfilled."

The moral, or application, like many annexed to more celebrated apologues, is not particularly obvious; but the Sultaun went on to explain: "a weather-beaten fragment of skull produced the death of forty persons,—the fractured mast of Ripaud's worthless vessel will cause the subversion of an empire."

With this strong conviction on his mind, the Sultaun for some time after the receipt of the letter from Lord Mornington, dated the 9th of January, had nearly made up his mind to throw himself unconditionally on his Lordship's compassion, and to receive the envoy; but, notwithstanding the significant intreaty, to lose not a single day in his reply, he went on with the procrastination naturally belonging to an unpalatable resolve, hesitating from day to day to execute the determination of the last; and the lingering indecision of the fatalist, suggested the hope that, if at the last moment no favourable chance should arise, he might still be in time to submit to an alternative, short of absolute destruction. During that

particular period, constant letters were arriving from Dubuc, (who did not finally sail from Tranquebar, until the 7th of February,) assuring Tippoo that the French must actually have embarked on the Red Sea for his assistance, and might be daily expected. Chapuis, and all the French admitted to his presence, reiterated the same assurances; projects of resistance or submission, held their alternate empire, as reason or passion prevailed; and it is believed, by those who had the best opportunities of judging, that the confident assurances of the French officers, were the efficient cause of diverting the Sultaun's mind from the only wise resolution it was then in his power to form, and produced his ultimate destruction.

It is difficult to determine the degree in which these officers may have themselves believed, in the probable realization of the hopes which they excited; but it is certain, that any such belief, so far from being founded on authentic, or even probable intelligence, could only have originated in vague inferences regarding the ultimate objects of the Egyptian expedition, and in an entire ignorance of existing facts. After the destruction of the French fleet, on the 1st of August, 1798, and the universal hostility manifested by the inhabitants of Egypt, in October of the same year, it is certain, that General Buonaparte, so far from being in a condition to meditate distant detachments, had reason to look with anxiety to the mere preservation of his first conquest. His expedition to Acre appears to have been essentially defensive*; and intended to anticipate and destroy the offensive means which Jezzar Pacha was preparing for a formidable Turkish invasion of Egypt. Although Jezzar had previously looked with an eye of jealous hostility to his nominal sovereign, the events of the war shewed that they became cordially united against the common enemy: and, if we even

* Buonaparte's letter to Jezzar Pacha, and the known facts connected with his representation.

dismiss from our consideration, as a mere pretence, the imputation of offensive preparation on the part of Jezzar, still, the design of occupying a fortress and port, which should place in the hands of its possessor a direct command over the subsistence of the intermediate country, must, in the actual situation of General Buonaparte, be considered as a wise, defensive precaution.

That General's letter * to Tippoo Sultaun, written in February, 1799, professing the intention of liberating him from the iron yoke of England, distinctly shews the intended execution of that design to be distant, by the wish expressed of previously receiving and conferring with a confidential agent from the

* The words with which the letter begins, "You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea," may seem to refer to a former letter, which, if sent, is not known to have been received. Intimation was made to me by the person best qualified to know, of a letter or letters addressed by Tippoo to General Buonaparte. I can only say, that in a constant, and generally a daily intercourse for several years with two of Tippoo's secretaries, I never heard of such a letter or letters; and that if its existence had been known to Lord Mornington, I apprehend that it would not have been omitted in his collection of Seringapatam papers.

[The letter was as follows:—

Bonaparte, membre d l'Institut National, Général en chef, au très-magnifique Sultan, notre très-grand ami, Tippoo-Saib.

Quartier-Général, au Caire, le 7 pluviôse
an 7 de la republique, une et indivisible.

On vous a déjà instruit que j'étois arrivé sur les bords de la mer Rouge, à la tête d'une armée innombrable et invincible, plein du désir de vous affranchir du joug de fer de l'Angleterre.

Je saisis avec empressement cette occasion de vous faire connoître le désir où je suis d'apprendre de vous même, pas la voie de Muscat et de Moccoa, votre situation politique.

Je desirerois même que vous puissiez envoyer à Suez ou au Caire une personne intelligente, et revêtue de votre confiance, qui pût s'aboucher avec moi.

Que le tout-puissant augmente votre puissance, et détruise vos ennemis.

Signé Bonaparte.]

Sultaun at Cairo; and if any farther proof were wanting of the absence of every possible intention of an immediate movement to the east, it would be found in the remarkable coincidence of this letter being intercepted at Judda on the very day (the 17th of February) in which he himself crossed the northern frontier of the Egyptian territory for the attack of *El Arish*, a place recently garrisoned by Jezzar, with two thousand men; and in the exactly cotemporary events of the siege of Acre and the siege of Seringapatam.

But the intelligence regarding Egypt was not limited to the representations of the French officers; two documents of a more authentic nature were presented to the Sultaun; a copy of the declaration of war issued by the Porte against the French, in consequence of their invasion of Egypt, transmitted some time before by Lord Clive,¹ Governor of Madras; and on the 16th of January, a letter addressed to the Sultaun, by the Grand Signor, dated the 20th of September 1798,² transmitted through the English minister at Constantinople, and now forwarded by Lord Mornington, accompanied by a most impressive letter from himself. The letter of the Grand Signor states, that in a time of profound peace with France, and of a neutrality in her wars with other powers of Europe, which those powers even represented as being too partial to their enemy, a French armament under General Buonaparte, suddenly invaded Egypt, without previous complaint, or representation, or notice; pretending that the expedition was exclusively against the Beys, and insinuating that it was

¹ Lord Hobart left Madras on the 21st February 1798 and handed over the Government to Lieutenant-General Harris, the Senior Member of Council, who became provisional Governor until the arrival of Lord Clive, who arrived at Madras on the 31st August 1798.

² This letter is given in full in Owen's *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 70-74.

undertaken with the consent of the Porte "which is a horrible falsity;" that intercepted letters had discovered their design of *dividing Arabia into various Republics*; and progressively of passing to India, where the French expected to unite with the Sultaun, for the expulsion of the English from that country: that the hostility against all true Mahomedans, proved by the invasion of the *venerated province of Egypt, the granary of the holy cities Mecca and Medina*, ought to unite against them all persons of that faith; that in addition to the ties of religion, the bonds of amity already established between them, afforded reason to hope for his concert in the common cause; that England was united with the Porte in the war against France; and that he made it a particular request, if the Sultaun had harboured any idea of joining the French, that he would lay it aside; and in the event of any subject of complaint against the English, that he would accept the good offices of the Porte for its adjustment.

The fictitious answer to this letter to be transmitted through the English Government, was not written until near a month afterwards, and without noticing the offer of mediation, it professes his readiness to unite in all the objects of the Porte for *the prosperity and due ordinance of the faith and its followers*; and acquiesces in the proposition, that the French, by attacking the head of the Church, had rendered themselves the enemies of all true Mussulmans; supporting the doctrine by a somewhat singular text of the Koran, intended for the perusal of the English—"consider not infidels as friends, consider none such but Mussulmans." The true answer containing his genuine sentiments, to be delivered by his own ambassadors, refers to their oral communications for the particular measures in his contemplation, but gives a compendious history of the origin and progress, "the treachery, deceit, and supremacy of the Christians in the regions of Hindostan,"

which, as a mere literary curiosity, is not unworthy of perusal.¹ In the history, equally of French and English transactions, the mere facts are neither badly narrated, nor more broadly caricatured, than in the early pictures drawn by Englishmen, of the fabulous enormities of their countrymen, in the east : but in the higher colouring of Oriental imagery, the fables are rendered more fabulous ; and the supremacy of the English over the French nation, is made as perfect in licentiousness as in power. Twelve hundred French soldiers, in a state of intoxication, in open day, are represented to have entered the houses of the faithful at Hyderabad ; to have violated their women, and to have excited general enmity ; a fact which, if founded at all, may be supposed to have occurred in a moment of victory, or insubordination. But the English vices are of a more deliberate character, and belong to a more lofty rank, for in the catalogue of their crimes, the sober commission of the same enormity, on the widow of a monarch (the vizier of Oude) is gravely ascribed to an English Governor-general, Lord Teignmouth.

The impressive letter of Lord Mornington, which accompanied the dispatch from the Grand Signor to the Sultaun, certainly produced a considerable effect ; but his reply is perhaps the most singular document in these extraordinary transactions ; he acknowledges the receipt of the letter from the Grand Signor, whose titles occupy three-fourths of his reply, and without the slightest observation on its contents, this strange epistle abruptly terminates with the following sentence : " Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding on a hunting excursion ; you will be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton, (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written,) slightly attended (or un-

¹ The translation of the draft of the letter from Tippoo to the Sultan is given in full in Owen's *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 74-82.

attended)."¹ This letter, which must have been written early in February, arrived at Madras on the 13th of that month, and independently of its strange manner was liable to the suspicion of being intended to convey an equivocal sneer; the word (*shekâr*) hunting, being in the idiom of Mysoor, familiarly applied to military operations,* and without attention to dates, it might seem to indicate his intended attack on General Stuart, which did not occur till about a month afterwards. But I have been assured by those who were near him that the abrupt dictation was the mere effect of chagrin at the necessity of humiliation; that he then really intended and earnestly wished to receive the British envoy, and marched to the Madoor river, upwards of forty miles to the east; General Stuart's position being nearly the same distance from Seringapatam, in an opposite direction, from the same motives that in 1794 led him to Deonhully—in order that the state of the capital and its vicinity, might not be exposed to observation. But the same persons, so confident of his humble views at that moment, were equally alarmed for some new caprice, and were satisfied, that if the envoy even had been sent and received, faithless evasions would have imposed on the allies the same ultimate necessity: and it must be added, that his private memoranda, since discovered, strongly evince a still lingering hope of some propitious event. From that eastern encampment, however, he did actually detach an escort as far as Oossoor, with orders to be ready to receive and conduct Major Doveton to his camp. But he had miscalculated the period to which he might venture to procrastinate: he entered his own tents on the 15th of February,

¹ The letter will be found in Owen's *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 74.

* When it is intended to speak of an officer as a good partisan with the light troops, he is said to be perfect in *Sawáree Shekáree*.

and moved on the 20th, and the English army made its first march in advance from the point at which it had concentrated, on the 11th, two days before the receipt at Madras, of the letter which has been described. The declaration of the Governor-general, to be issued on crossing the frontier, and his answer to this extraordinary letter, were coincident in date. In the latter, Lord Mornington expressed his sincere regret, that his urgent representation of delay had produced no effect, and that the Sultaun had postponed noticing his admonitions, until the period of the season (for which an appeal was made to his own conviction) rendered the advance of the army necessary to the common security of the allies; that the mission of Major Doveton to him, was no longer expedient, but that General Harris, the Commander-in-chief of the advancing army, had been empowered to receive any embassy which he should dispatch; and the General was directed to issue the Governor-general's declaration,¹ and to dispatch this letter, both dated on the 22d of February, on one and the same day, that on which he should enter the territory of Mysoor.

The Sultaun, in the meanwhile, kept in constant agitation and suspense regarding the arrival of the envoy; receiving no answer to the letter which conveyed his tardy, ungracious, and insulting assent; and knowing, from the systematic movements of General Harris, that he would necessarily cross the frontier in a few days, drew inferences regarding the determination of the allies more fatal to his own political existence than those which had actually been formed. "All my decisions (he said) must now

¹ The declaration will be found in Owen's *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 88-93. It is signed by Josiah Webbe, Principal Secretary to the Government of Madras, as Lord Mornington on his arrival at Madras on the 31st December 1798 took his seat as President of the Council. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 460.)

be desperate. I am but losing precious time in waiting for their ambassador, while they are closing in upon me, on either side. I will march and strike a decisive blow." He accordingly left the whole of the Silledar and three thousand of the stable horse under Poornea, with four cushoons of infantry, the whole under Seyed Saheb, to watch the motions of General Harris; and with the remainder of the army proceeded by forced marches by the route of Caniam-baddy and Periapatam to attack General Stuart, in whose presence he arrived on the precise day (the 5th of March) that General Harris, after passing the frontier, dispatched to the Sultaun the letter of the Governor-general, dated the 22d of February. But before entering on the narration of military operations, it will be convenient to take a short view of the strength and position of the advancing armies, the circumstances under which they were assembled and advanced, together with the defensive force which the Sultaun possessed to resist this formidable invasion. The latter may be stated, in round numbers, at thirty-three thousand effective *firelocks*, including the garrison of Seringapatam, but no other garrison, exclusive of officers and of a numerous artillery, which, with drivers and other establishments, amounted to eighteen thousand * more, and about fifteen thousand cavalry and rocket-men, making an effective total, including officers, of about fifty thousand fighting men; of which, at the commencement of hostilities, about five thousand were detached, and eventually not available during the war.

* Kirkpatrick. Appendix, page c.—Beatson, Appendix, page xcii. compared with manuscript information.

CHAPTER XLVI.

View of the strength, advance, and position of the invading armies—Calcutta—Fresh receipt of intelligence—Lord Mornington proposes immediate hostility if possible—Practicability discussed—Short delay judicious and fortunate—Considerations regarding the Egyptian expedition—Remarkable statement of Lord Mornington regarding that armament—Value of Egypt—colonial—commercial—military—discussed—Actual destination of this armament favourable to his views—Hope that the Sultaun would submit without coercion, to the terms required—Lands at Madras—Delicacy towards Lord Clive—Reciprocal feelings of that nobleman—Movements of Zemaun Shah—detain Sir Alured Clarke at Bengal—Command in the south devolves on General Harris—his staff—Early exertions of Nizam Ali—Lord Mornington issues his final instructions for the advance of the army—Wise and liberal authority to the Commander-in-chief—Provisions in the rear—Army of General Stuart—ascends to Coorg—Defensive position attacked by Tippoo, 5th March—Action—repulse—described by the Raja of Coorg—Diplomatic commission under the orders of General Harris—he enters the enemy's country—operations—defects discovered in the first day's march—Abstract of the effects—Slight affair of the 21st March—Intelligence of General Stuart's action—Tippoo's movements—prepares and abandons a fine position at the Madoor river—Battle of Malvilly—results—General Harris's unexpected movement across the Caveri, frustrates the Sultaun's plans—motives

for this movement—Tippoo's disappointment and dismay—Gloomy and affecting consultation of the Sultaun and his officers—determine on a desperate battle on chosen ground—which the English army passed at the distance of three miles—Fresh disappointment regarding their intentions—Average progress of the English army under five miles a day—Ultimate encampment for the siege.

RUMOURS of the proceedings at the Isle of France reached Calcutta on the 8th of June, 1798, and on the 18th a regularly authenticated copy of Monsieur Malartic's proclamation¹ was received in a letter from Earl Macartney, governor of the Cape of Good Hope, dated the 28th of March, and this unquestionable intelligence was confirmed and explained by the attestation of several respectable individuals who had personally witnessed in the Isle of France the transactions to which that document referred.

The evidence of meditated hostility was complete: the time and the means of receiving a French force sufficient for its execution remained uncertain; it was the business of a wise and vigorous policy, if possible, to anticipate the blow; and an energy was certainly displayed, in all respects, proportioned to a just estimation of the value of time. On the second day, after the receipt of this intelligence, Lord Mornington issued his final orders for assembling, without delay, the English armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, with the view of making an attack on the Sultaun, instantaneous, if possible, or at the earliest possible period that it could be made with effect. The coincidence of date is very remarkable between the receipt of this intelligence by

¹ The proclamation, dated 30th January 1798, is given in full in Owen's *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 67-70.

the Governor-general, and a letter addressed to him by the secret committee of the Court of Directors, 18th of October,¹ 1798, (in concurrence with His Majesty's ministers), noticing the armament of Toulon, and the proclamation of Monsieur Malartic, and recommending that anticipation of the meditated attack which Lord Mornington was in the act of ordering at Calcutta at the moment of the signature in London of authority to that effect. The expediency of early and active preparation was incontestable; but an immediate movement on an adequate scale, was found to be impracticable on various accounts, on consulting with General Harris, at that time Commander-in-chief and provisional governor at Fort St. George.²

The arsenal of Madras, and the resources of its government, were to furnish, not only the great body of the invading army, with its field equipments, but the whole of the battering train, the stores and provisions, and the means of transporting to a distant object, this enormous and unwieldy mass. Motives of economy had prevented the existence of any regular establishment of draught or carriage cattle, and experience of every war had shewn the difficulty of collecting, and the still greater difficulty of giving an efficient training to the requisite numbers of wild and unpractised animals. Even in the war of 1790—1792, when the authority and resources of the state under Lord Cornwallis, were made to bear with all their energy on the means of efficient equipment; officers of observation had deemed one of the most important results of the inconclusive campaign of 1790, to be

¹ "October" is a mistake for "June."

² See extract of letter from the Secret Committee, dated 18th June 1798 (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 1-3), and the Memorandum for General Harris from Josiah Webbe, dated 6th July 1798, (pp. 4-11 of the same) describing the state of the army in Madras and the impossibility of acting on the offensive with any hope of success.

the training and organization of this most essential branch of military equipment; for the better conducted operations of 1791, and 1792; and the practical force of these remarks, which it requires experience and candour to appreciate, may be conceived from the following, among numerous facts; that Lord Cornwallis's army with a battering train, even after the exhausting effects of the siege of Bangalore in 1791, marched in *two* days more than General Harris on the same route, was able to perform with every possible exertion in *five*,* while he had yet scarcely seen an enemy. Those who were disposed to undervalue these impediments, quoted as a parallel instance, a case far removed from similarity, the sufficiency of the preparations made by early exertion for the siege of Pondicherry in 1793, when the trained equipments discharged in 1792, were ready and anxious for employment, and thousands were solicitous to hire their cattle and drivers for a simple transport of stores, to a fixed domestic point in Coromandel, on whom no inducement could prevail to undertake an active foreign campaign; and it can scarcely be deemed a speculative proposition, not only that no large army in the south of India ever has been, but that no army ever will be perfectly efficient in its movements, in the early part of a first campaign, without a proper establishment of oxen previously trained.

To this most essential obstacle to immediate movement, was added at the time, the dispersed state of the military establishment of Fort St. George; partly arising from the permanently vicious administration of the nabob of Carnatic, aggravated at this period by the large detachments made for the

* Beatson, page 67; ascribed by the author to abuses among the natives in that department, and a spirit of opposition to their reformation; this is the chief impediment always experienced in organizing that department in every first campaign, on a large scale.

expeditions against Ceylon, and the Eastern Islands, recently captured from the Dutch.¹

¹ The state of the Madras army may be gathered from the Memorandum for General Harris by Josiah Webbe, Chief Secretary, dated 6th July 1798. "This idea, then, of striking an immediate blow being abandoned, let us look to the slow and regular equipment of an army for the invasion of Mysore. The different corps could, I believe, be assembled at Walajabad in about two months from the time of their being ordered to march. The equipment of bullocks for the army, with its train of field artillery, could not, according to my estimation, be accomplished before the month of January; but in respect to a train of battering guns, sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam, I can form no notion; nor do I believe Mr. Cockburn can, of the time when it could be furnished with cattle. This period of the season (January) is, by the experience of Lord Cornwallis's campaign, too late for the establishment of a depôt at Bangalore and the siege of Seringapatam in the same season; for though we should be able to put Bangalore in a state to admit of its becoming a depôt, we could not avoid being overtaken at Seringapatam by the monsoon, which sets in in May. Hence the necessity of a second season, and probably of a second equipment of bullocks, before an efficient army could invest Seringapatam. Supposing it however there, and joined by the Bombay army (the difficulty of which it is here unnecessary to consider), I doubt whether there are any well-grounded expectations that they could feed themselves. The experience of Lord Cornwallis's army proves that we were unable to supply ourselves, or to open our rear for the admission of Brinjaries until we had been joined by the Mahratta army, and the whole country embraced.

"At present there is no grain at Arnee or Vellor, and I believe no considerable quantity could be stored in the forts of the Bara-Mahal before the harvests of November. The vessels which bring grain from the northern ports and from Bengal do not arrive here before the months of September and October.

"Upon the whole there are sufficient grounds for concluding that the whole of the coast army which could be assembled would be incapable of offensive operations, and that they could not be put in motion before the month of January. How far, and at what period, they may be in a condition to make a serious attack upon Tippoo must depend upon the extent and time of reinforcements from Bengal; and as nothing of consequence could be undertaken without them, the time of our making any serious impression must be proportionately delayed." (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 4-11.)

To a conjoint movement from the side of Malabar, the season opposed an insuperable obstacle, experience having shewn, that no equipment can surmount these western hills, and retain its efficiency at an earlier period than December: man is the only animal who braves the seasons with success.

It may perhaps be deemed fortunate, with reference to other considerations of a collateral nature, that the impediments to immediate movement, were of so decided a character: the masterly transactions at Hyderabad, had in the intermediate time, doubled the efficiency of that alliance, by the whole amount of the danger removed, and the force rendered disposable for the war; the preparations for the two governments of Madras and Bombay, were better matured, the eventual and probable expence was saved, of a second campaign, and the danger was averted, of an enlarged scope to the critical intrigues of Poona; while with the ample means of every description, which this comparatively short delay afforded the opportunity to provide, the Governor-general was enabled to form the brilliant conception, of finishing the war, not only in a single campaign, but by one operation, to which undivided object, every effort from every quarter should be exclusively directed. Looking, therefore, with all the advantages derived from subsequent experience, to the determination which Lord Mornington ultimately formed, on a full discussion of these combined considerations, it is probable that, in determining to commence the war as soon as should be practicable, after the conclusion of the monsoon of Malabar, no time was really lost; the truest economy was consulted, by bringing forward the whole force of the state for one great and efficient effort, instead of conducting less effective operations at a protracted and ultimately enlarged expence: and in the actual event, the intrigues at Poona were anticipated and foiled, before

their authors had begun to reduce them to a definite shape.¹

The first authentic information of the invasion of Egypt by the French, was received at Calcutta, on the 18th of October: previous intelligence of the preparations making in the Mediterranean had arrived in the beginning of August. "Various circumstances attending the equipment of the armament at Toulon, had inclined the Governor-general to apprehend, that at least a part of it might be destined for an expedi-

¹ Probably Wilks was perfectly justified in his opinion that the delay, which was imposed on the Government of India by the "radical defects which existed in the military establishments" in Madras, proved in the result fortunate. But he no doubt considered, and probably correctly, that the only satisfactory issue of any campaign against Mysore, was the entire destruction of Tippoo's government and the restoration of the old Hindu dynasty. Lord Mornington's original intention, however, as can be gathered from his minute, dated 12th August 1798, was not to put an end to Tippoo's government, but to seize his sea coast territory; to compel him to defray the expenses of the war; to compel him to admit a permanent Resident at his Court; and to force him to exclude all Frenchmen from his State. Had the Madras Government maintained the coast army in its proper condition, all these objects might have been achieved, in one campaign, at a small expenditure of money. However, the state of the Madras army was such that the Government there even "deprecated the ordinary precautions of defence, lest they should draw down the resentment of the Sultaun" upon them: Lord Mornington, giving up therefore, his original plan, hoped that by delay, which would enable him to bring about greater co-operation between him and his allies, the Nizam and the Mahrattas, he would be able to make Tippoo realise his hopeless position and be ready to accept his terms "without incurring the hazard of war," provided the cession of the sea coast was waived. In the result, Tippoo declined to meet Lord Mornington's proposals in any way that was satisfactory, and war followed with the result that Tippoo's rule was destroyed. It is possible, though not probable, that had Lord Mornington been able to carry out his first intention, a satisfactory peace might have been secured. But in that case, the people of Mysore would have remained subject to alien rule by a despot who thought of the happiness and prosperity of his people as a matter of trifling consideration.

tion to India, although he could not believe that the attempt would be made through Egypt;" and Rear-Admiral Rainier had, with his accustomed zeal and ability, concurred in the expediency suggested by Lord Mornington, of proceeding with the fleet to the coast of Malabar, instead of Malacca, as he had previously intended. It is remarkable that Lord Mornington's statement, that he could not believe, in August 1798, that the attempt on India would be made by the French through Egypt, is dated in March 1799, many months posterior to his knowledge of their actual occupation of the country, with that ulterior view. Ordinary minds are contented that results should seem to correspond with their supposed anticipations; and this spontaneous admission of being disappointed by the event, ought probably to be viewed as the tacit dissent of a great statesman, from the political wisdom of the measures of his adversary. Doubts have occurred to less competent observers, regarding the soundness of either of the three avowed motives, for undertaking this celebrated expedition:—1st, the attainment of a valuable colonial possession; 2d, commercial advantages to arise from opening the canal of the Ptolemies across the Isthmus of Suez, and thus placing in the hands of the possessors of Egypt, a superiority in the Indian trade over those nations who should continue to double the Cape of Good Hope; and finally the military facilities afforded to the French for the attack of the English possessions in India.

As a colonial possession, all the facts which have hitherto been developed, seem to shew that its advantages could at no period be made to equal the expence of its maintenance; or if such a period should ever arrive, it must be posterior to an entire dislocation in the present relations of the world; in which revolution must among other events be involved, the destruction of that government "whose moon is in its wane," according to the prophetic

denunciation of every historian, and whose fall has often been predicted, without being as yet followed by any serious symptom of immediate accomplishment.

At the apprehension of commercial rivalry it is presumed, that no London merchant would be alarmed who should compare the single expence and hazard of the longer voyage, with the endless repetition of risk, damage, and embezzlement, exclusively of actual disbursement, which would accompany the more complex operation; shorter in mere geographical distance alone; even admitting what, might perhaps be questioned, the assumed facility of opening a really practicable communication between the Red Sea and the Nile.

The military facilities are more obvious to a transient than to a close observation. The power possessed of naval superiority, might always and easily render impracticable the communication by the narrow mouth of the Red Sea; and with regard to the plans indicated in the intercepted letters, of dividing unconquered Arabia into various republics, as the *via sacra* of democracy from Paris to Calcutta, the wonders really accomplished by the efforts of revolutionary France cannot restrain a smile, at this projected extension of fraternity among the defenders and the religious plunderers of the holy cities: a march through the inheritance of the robbers of the desert; or at best through a region depending on foreign countries for its own food, to reach the sister republic of Citizen Tippoo.

It is not intended to conjecture in what degree the disbelief of the Governor-general was founded, on any of these considerations, but it may be suggested with greater confidence, that his knowledge of the actual invasion of Egypt, by the whole of the armament prepared at Toulon, relieved him from the apprehension of immediate interruption from that quarter, during the probable continuance of the war

in Mysoor. The motives for urging his preparations for the purpose of shortening, by every practicable means, the duration of the impending war, were sufficiently powerful, independently of all reference to the Egyptian expedition; and his greatest apprehension continued to apply, not to the force amply occupied, and after the 1st of August, locked up in that country, but to an additional armament which might have proceeded by the ordinary passage, round the Cape of Good Hope, to co-operate in its farther objects. On the second day after receiving the intelligence from Egypt, (the 21st of October,) he issued peremptory orders to the Government of Fort St. George for completing the equipments in every department, and advancing the battering train and all the heavy stores to the most eligible situation on the western frontier; and announced his intention of reinforcing their native army with three thousand volunteers from Bengal, and with the most ample supplies of treasure. The brilliant victory of Aboukir, of which information was received at the close of the same month, materially augmented the improbability of interruption from any armament which had not previously sailed; and the Governor-general opened the correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun which has been recited, and determined to proceed to Madras for the purpose of conducting the expected negotiation; in the hope that the prosperous events in India already detailed, combined with this recent intelligence, and with the progress of his military preparations on both coasts, would dispose the Sultaun's haughty mind to a just estimate of his actual danger, and render unnecessary these formidable means of ultimate coercion.

On the last day of the year 1798, Lord Mornington landed, as we have seen, at Madras, where the son of the great Clive had succeeded to the Government in the preceding August. The provisions of the law required that the authority of the Governor

in Council at Fort St. George should be vested in the hands of the Governor-general during his residence at that Presidency ; and the public acts and proceedings of that Government must necessarily pass in his name ; but on first assuming his seat in council, Lord Mornington declared that his power of superintendence on the spot, should not exceed its ordinary exercise at the seat of the Supreme Government at Fort William, and he requested Lord Clive to conduct all the ordinary details of the Government, and especially those which related to patronage, according to the principles which had been observed by his Lordship since his arrival in India, while his own attention should be chiefly devoted to the general interests of all the Presidencies. The delicacy of this proceeding was calculated to excite a continuance of that energy and vigour in forwarding the public service, which had already obtained the recorded testimony of his unqualified approbation ; no declarations, however, could entirely divest his Lordship's presence at Madras of the ostensible interception of that credit, which the subordinate Government might otherwise hope to claim, from the independent exercise of its own energies, in the important crisis in which it was placed, or subdue in ordinary minds the smothered jealousy produced by a necessary supercession. But a genuine purity and nobleness of mind, elevated far above the access of every such unworthy feeling, was evinced by Lord Clive, in public exertions, if possible, augmented by the presence of the Governor-general ; in efforts to insure success, as anxious as if they tended to his own exclusive honour ; and in a manly and honourable support of his superior, on public principle, as warm and cordial as if it had been the undivided result of personal attachment.¹

¹ Colonel Love, in his *Vestiges of Old Madras*, remarks that "during Lord Mornington's protracted stay in Madras, Lord Clive, effacing himself, laboured heartily for the public weal."

The continued apprehension of an invasion of Hindostan by Zemaun Shah, who was stated to have crossed the Indus, rendered it necessary to place the army of Bengal in a state of preparation; and it was ultimately determined, that combining these circumstances with the intended absence of the Governor-general, Sir Alured Clarke, Commander-in-chief in India, should remain to direct the military operations in that quarter; and that the immediate command of the army assembled at Madras, and the general conduct of the southern war should devolve on Lieutenant-General Harris, the local Commander-in-chief of the troops of that presidency. To the benefit of various military experience, General Harris added the inestimable advantage of a personal knowledge of every locality, connected with the operations of the impending service, obtained during the campaigns of 1790, 1791, and 1792; and an intimate acquaintance then acquired, and recently improved, (while exercising the powers of Commander-in-chief and provisional governor,) with the personal character, and varied qualifications of every individual whom he might find it necessary to employ; and the penetration with which this knowledge was exercised, may be appreciated by the universal admission, that in estimating the acknowledged merit of every branch of military preparation for the campaign of 1799, none was more perfect, perhaps none so efficient, as the admirable selection of the principal staff of Lieutenant-General Harris.¹

Lord Mornington lived in the Fort, probably at the Admiralty House. Lord Clive continued to live in the Garden House, the present Government House. Lord Mornington was in Madras from 31st December 1798 to the 5th September 1799, when he sailed for Calcutta in H.M.S. *La Sybille*.

¹ Lieutenant-General George Harris became Commander-in-Chief in Madras in 1797 in succession to Major-General Alured Clarke, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India. General Harris acted as provisional Governor from 21st February 1798 when Lord Hobart left Madras until the 31st August

The happy consequences of the recent changes effected at Hyderabad, were manifested in the timely march and actual arrival at the appointed rendezvous before General Harris was ready to move, of the whole subsidiary force, and a selected body from the late French battalions, amounting together to ten thousand infantry with their guns, and a better chosen, though not so numerous a body of cavalry as that which had accompanied and incumbered Lord Cornwallis. The appointment to the general control and direction of Nizam Ali's contingent, of Captain Malcolm, who in his capacity of assistant to the Resident, had himself materially contributed to the political and military arrangements which secured their services, was an important branch of the new organization. His personal acquaintance with the chiefs, and his conciliatory and animated manners, gave a new tone to their proceedings; and the energy and efficiency of the troops of Nizam Ali in 1799, formed a remarkable contrast with their conduct in

Feb. 3. 1791 and 1792. On the 3d of February, Lord Mornington issued his final instructions for the advance of the army, and the first movement was made 11. on the 11th.

Although the strength of the army above the ghauts, in 1792, exceeded in number, by upwards of six thousand men, that which was destined for the campaign of 1799, and nearly ten thousand, if the corps of Nizam Ali be excluded *; yet, in the former

1798 when Lord Clive assumed office. He met Lord Mornington first, when the latter stayed at Fort St. George on his way to Calcutta. In July 1798, when the Madras treasury was depleted of funds, a public meeting was held and a committee appointed to raise funds, in order that military preparations might be begun.

		Total.
* European cavalry	... 884	
Native ditto	... 1751	
	—	2635
European artillerymen	...	608

war, a number exceeding that difference, was employed in the fortresses on the lines of communication; and, as all the means of every description for the reduction of the enemy's capital, was now to accompany the army for terminating the war by a single blow; the plan of the campaign excluded the occupation of intermediate posts, and rendered disposable about an equal number of troops. The amount of those equipments, described by the modern technical designation of *materiel*, had never been equalled on any former occasion; and, if there were any question regarding their efficiency, it arose, in a great degree, from their abundance. The powers of the Commander-in-chief were co-extensive with the resources which he might find it necessary to command; and his authority was ordered to be obeyed, without reference, by all officers, civil and military, to whom he might find it necessary to issue his commands. The energies of the state, exercised in

				Total.
European infantry	...	4381		
Native ditto	...	10,695		
				15,076
Gun lascars	...	1483		
Pioneers	...	1000		
				2483
				20,802
Subsidiary force serving with Nizam Ali			6536	
His infantry, formerly French	...		3621	
				10,157
				30,959
Bombay army		6,000
	Grand Total	...		36,959
Battering guns	40	
Field ordnance	57	
Howitzers	7	

besides the field train, with the contingent of Nizam Ali, and besides his regular and irregular horse, about 6000.

Army of 1792 ... 43,113.

their most important and critical form, were cramped by no restrictive suspicions of imaginary abuse. The jealous taint which on former occasions we have seen embodied in the fear of weakening power by delegation, was now contrasted with the generous and masterly conviction, that ample authority, and broad discretion, wisely conferred, are more precious to the giver, than the receiver : and, in the energetic language of the author of this liberal policy : " when Lieutenant-General Harris took the field, I thought it my duty to invest him with the most extensive powers, which it was possible for me to delegate ; and he has carried with him to the gates of Seringapatam, the full vigour and energy of your Supreme Government."¹

An adequate corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, who exercised the civil and military authority in the province of Baramahal, was destined to collect, arrange and eventually escort further supplies of provisions to the army in advance. A similar corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, was appointed for a corresponding service in Coimbatore, and finally the important army* of Bombay had ascended into Coorg, and agreeably to instructions waited the orders of Lieutenant-General Harris for their further guidance. This army was commanded by Lieutenant-General James Stuart, the same excellent and estimable officer who commanded the right wing of the army under Lord Cornwallis in the preceding war, and brought into the present campaign every advantage of local information which could give efficiency to his military experience.

General Stuart, after assembling his army at Cannanore, finally marched from that station on the

¹ Letter from Lord Mornington to the Court of Directors dated Fort St. George, 11th May 1799. (Owen : *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 111-12.)

* 6420 fighting men, artillery and infantry, European and native.

21st of April. He arrived at the top of the Poodicherrum¹ ghaut on the 25th of the same month, and proceeded, in obedience to his instructions, to assume a defensive position close to the frontier of Mysoor. The nature of the country, every where covered with thick woods, in most places nearly impenetrable, made it impossible to occupy a regular defensive position, and compelled him to place his troops in several divisions, so disposed, as to be capable of affording reciprocal support: the most advanced of these was the height of Sedaseer,² indispensable with reference to an early junction, as being the only spot from which the signals, established between the two armies, could be observed.

On the morning of the 5th of March, the very day Mar. 5 on which General Harris crossed the frontier, a few tents were descried from the hill of Sedaseer, about nine o'clock, and gradually the pitching of an extensive encampment in advance of Periapatam, and little more than six miles distant, and on further observation, a green tent of large dimensions was perceived, indicating the presence of the Sultaun. The ground at Sedaseer was occupied by a brigade of three native battalions, under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, and although the information of trust-worthy spies recently returned from Seringapatam, gave reasonable assurance that the Sultaun, at the time of their departure was still at the Madoor river,³ and that a detachment under Mahommed Reza, usually called the Binky*

¹ *Poodicherrum*.—Pudiyacharan Pass, from Cannanore through Irukkur to Virajendrapet in Coorg.

² *Sedaseer*.—Siddeswara Hill near Periapatam.

³ *Madoor river*.—The Maddur river is the *Shimsha*, which rises in the District of Tumkur in the middle of the Mysore State, and runs almost due south, until it joins the Cauvery below the Cauvery falls, on the borders of Madras and Mysore. Maddur is about 36 miles north-east of the town of Mysore.

* This word signifies *fire*, and the title was a sort of nickname given to this officer, from his being peculiarly expert at that species of devastation in an enemy's country.

Nabob constituted the only force west of the river Cavery; General Stuart thought it prudent to send forward another battalion to a convenient position for reinforcing, if it should be necessary the advanced brigade at Sedaseer.

March 6. Early on the morning of the 6th, Major-General Hartley, the second in command, went forward to reconnoitre the enemy's army, which was discovered to be in motion; but their movements were so well concealed by the closeness of the country, that it was impossible to ascertain their precise object, until between the hours of nine and ten, when a simultaneous attack was made on the front and rear of the position; and the battalion destined to reinforce it, was prevented from joining by the intervention of two columns from the right and left, which united in the rear, at the instant of the commencement of the attack in front.

Before the enemy had accomplished this purpose, Major-General Hartley had time to apprise General Stuart of their attack, and remained himself to give any assistance that might be necessary. The best position was immediately assumed, the brigade was completely surrounded on every side, and had to contend with a vast disparity of numbers; the troops were aware that many hours must elapse before they could receive efficient support, but they were also animated by the conviction that aid would ultimately arrive; and maintained their ground with so much cool resolution, that the utmost efforts of the Suldaun's best officers and troops were unable to make any serious impression on these three sepoy battalions.

As soon as General Stuart received intelligence of the perilous situation of his advanced corps, he marched without a moment's hesitation, with the two flank companies of His Majesty's 75th, and the whole of the 77th under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop. It was half past two before he arrived with this small but most efficient body in sight of the enemy's divisions, which had penetrated to the rear and

possessed themselves of the great road leading to Sedaseer. The energy of the attack rendered it of short duration; less than half an hour was sufficient to accomplish the precipitate flight of the Mysoreans through the woods, to join the division which still continued the attack in front. On arriving at Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor's post, General Stuart found his men exhausted with fatigue, and their ammunition almost expended. At twenty minutes past three, the enemy retreated in all directions, and left General Stuart to admire the immoveable steadiness of the native troops in a protracted encounter of nearly six hours, and the energy of the Europeans whom he had led to their aid. The success was materially enhanced in value, by finding on collecting the reports of corps, that his loss was considerably smaller than might have been expected; amounting only to one hundred and forty-three men, while that of the enemy was unusually severe, amounting according to credible reports to upwards of two thousand; a difference, to be ascribed chiefly to a judicious occupation of ground, and a cool reservation of fire in the defensive position; and in the reinforcement, to the effective consequences of a rapid and vigorous encounter.

The raja of Coorg personally accompanied General Stuart, and witnessed for the first time the conduct of European troops in the presence of an enemy. There was a chivalrous air in all that proceeded from this extraordinary man, and some passages of his letter to the Governor-General, giving an account of the operations of this day are tinged with his peculiar character. "General Stuart marched with two regiments of Europeans, keeping the remainder of the army in the plain of Kanydygood; on approaching, he ordered the two regiments to attack the enemy. A severe action ensued, in which I was present. To describe the battle which General Stuart fought with these two regiments of Europeans; the

discipline, valour, strength, and magnanimity of the troops, the courageous attack upon the army of Tippoo, surpasses all example in this world. In our Shasters, and Purānas, the battles fought by Allered and Maharut have been much celebrated, but they are unequal to this battle; it exceeds my ability to describe this action at length to your Lordship." After reciting the flight of the Sultaun's troops, the relief of the advanced post, and the ultimate retreat of the enemy, he concludes,—“In this manner General Stuart, before my eyes, while I was looking on, having chastised my enemy, has provided great happiness for me, and all the subjects of my country. General Stuart has in this manner achieved a glorious deed.”

The first impression on the Sultaun's mind, was to renew the attack on the ensuing day, with augmented numbers, but in the mean while General Stuart had changed all his dispositions. The chief object for which this advanced post had been occupied, must necessarily cease to exist, during the presence in its front of the Sultaun's main army; and the security of the abundant depôt of provisions in the rear, accessible by other routes, rendered necessary a new and more concentrated disposition of the troops: and the evacuation of the post of Sedaseer, afforded to the Sultaun the faint colour of describing as a victory what every officer in his army felt to be an ignominious repulse. “Having (in the language of the raja of Coorg) brought disgrace upon himself, he employed all his art and knowledge to recover his lost reputation; and having in this manner considered for five days, but not having taken up resolution to attack the Bombay army again, he marched

Mar. 11. on the sixth (the 11th of March) to Seringapatam;” and thence, with no favourable anticipations, to oppose the progress from the east, of the more formidable army of General Harris, to which our narrative must return.

In order that General Harris might be enabled to give his undivided attention to military operations, he was assisted by a political and diplomatic commission, to act not only in communication, but in *obedience to his orders*, and the mere recital of the names, will be sufficient to announce its importance and efficiency. The Honourable Colonel Wellesley, (now Duke of Wellington,) Lieutenant-Colonel Close, (afterwards Sir Barry Close,) Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, with Captain Macaulay as their Secretary.¹ The winding route of the army under General Harris, from the vicinity of Arcot, was continued through the vale of Amboor, and the province of Bāramahāl, whence it ascended the ghauts, and encamped within the English frontier, near Rayacota, on the 4th of March

Mar 4.

After entering the enemy's country on the 5th, 5 with one of the divisions, some days were necessarily occupied in reducing that portion of the congeries of hill-forts in the vicinity of Rayacota,² which the treaty of 1792 had left in possession of the Sultaun;

¹ Lord Mornington's instructions to General Harris, dated 22nd February 1799:—

"I have reason to believe that many of the tributaries, principal officers, and other subjects of Tippoo Sultaun, are inclined to throw off the authority of that Prince, and to place themselves under the protection of the Company and of our allies. The war in which we are again involved, by the treachery and violence of the Sultaun, renders it both just and expedient that we should avail ourselves, as much as possible, of the discontents and disaffection of his people. It is, therefore, advisable, to arrange a plan for the regular conduct of all negotiations connected with that object.

"Being apprehensive that your more important avocations will not admit of your taking part in the details of the business, I hereby direct you to constitute a commission for the purpose.

The commissioners are to act constantly in communication with you, and to obey whatever directions you shall think proper to signify to them." (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, p. 80.)

² Two small fortified hills were taken on the 7th March, Uddanahalli and Ratnagiri in the Hosur Taluq of Salem District

Mar 7 and on the 7th, the head-quarters were established at Kellumungulum,¹ about sixteen miles within the territory of Mysoor: on the 9th, the whole army was collected on that ground, and made its first united movement on the enemy's country on the 10th, the day which General Harris had indicated to General Stuart, as the latest to which, if possible, his arrival before the enemy's capital ought to be protracted.

The contingent of Hyderabad, consisting altogether of about ten thousand infantry with their field guns, strengthened by His Majesty's 33d foot, and followed by the largest portion of Nizam Ali's cavalry, was placed under the separate command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley; and although the order of march varied with the nature of the ground, this strong and important corps usually formed a distinct column parallel to that of the main army, for the protection of the intermediate columns of the battering train and its regular stores, together with the more irregular masses of the departments of grain and the general baggage. Corps detached from each column, moved in the front and rear of the intermediate space, and afforded an effectual protection to the whole of this enormous mass.²

Although every resource of the state had been applied by the Governor-general, to perfect the equipments of the army; although every energy of the Commander-in-chief, and an experienced and enlightened staff, had been applied to the organization of that undisciplined crowd of persons, not military, employed with upwards of sixty thousand oxen,

¹ *Kellumungulum*.—Kilamangalam. The village lies in a hollow; it is nine miles from Hosur, and 68 miles N.N.W. of Salem.

² The formation of the troops from day to day is given in detail in Beatson's book—*A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, comprising a narrative of the operations of the army under the command of Lieutenant-General George Harris and of the siege of Seringapatam, by Lieutenant-Colonel Beatson. London, 1800.

chiefly untrained, in the regular branches of the commissariat; besides, a countless amount of brinjaries, and grain and provision merchants; the defects and counteractions to be surmounted, in the introduction of order among men, whose habits and interests equally tended to confusion, began to shew themselves on the first march. The army halted on the Mar. 11. 11th; moved on the 12th, and again halted, from the 12. 13. same cause on the 13th, and marched on the 14th to 14. an encampment within sight of Bangalore, and distant from it about nine miles.¹

It will be recollected, that from this fortress (now dismantled), to Seringapatam, there is a choice of three routes; the central, and the shortest, by Cenapatam; the more northern, by Holioordroog, used by Lord Cornwallis, in 1792, and the most southern, by Caunkanhully, in 1791. It was, of course, of the greatest importance, that the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the intended route; and without attempting the shorter mountain road, by which the English commissioners were led, and their animals crippled in 1783,² it was necessary to advance to the ground now occupied; before either of these routes could be entered with advantage. The movement, however, and all the corresponding demonstrations, produced, as was intended, the impression, that Bangalore was to be restored and occupied;

¹ From Kilamangalam, the army marched north-west almost in a direct line towards Bangalore, leaving the village of Anekal on the right, passing through Kalagondahalli and Jigani. A halt was made on the 11th as "a quantity of the public stores had not at that time arrived in camp." On the 13th again, "a considerable quantity of powder, shot, and stores, not being arrived in camp, the orders (for marching) were countermanded." (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan.*)

² This was the commission of Messrs. Staunton, Sadlier, and Huddleston, who were "led over routes, impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden, in which several of the camels were destroyed." (Chap. XXIX.)

and, that the army would advance by the route of Cenapatam. The Sultaun, on his return from Coorg, had himself made his first march on that road, and the corps under Seyed Saheb, and Poornea, who had hitherto accompanied and harrassed every march, now took the same direction, first destroying all the dry forage in Bangalore and its vicinity, which was
 Mar. 14. distinctly seen from the camp, in a widely-extended blaze.

The same mortification and from the same cause, was experienced in a third day's halt on this ground, where a selection was made of every store, which could by any possibility be dispensed with, to be destroyed, for the purpose of increasing the available
 16. carriage. On the 16th the army entered the road of
 18. Kaunkanhully, and on the 18th again halted a fourth day: "the loss of powder, shot, and other military stores had already been so considerable as to excite some degree of alarm at this early period of the campaign."* Historical truth, which even in feeble hands may transmit the lessons of experience, has made it necessary to dwell on the inevitable imperfections of this great equipment, which no wisdom could repair, and no liberality remove; and for the purpose of obviating the necessity of recurrence to the same subject, it may be sufficient here to explain, that a fifth halting day occurred on the 31st, and on the last eighteen marching days from the 16th of March, the day on which the army entered the road of Kaunkanhully, till the 5th of April, when it entered its ultimate encampment before Seringapatam, the average length of each day's march did not quite amount to five miles and two-thirds.

With the exception of a company of native infantry, destroyed by a charge of cavalry on the flank, in consequence of the inexperience of the young officer who commanded, in not reserving his fire, no

* Beatson, page 65.

unusual events occurred in this tedious march, until the 21st, when the army encamped at Kaunkanhully. Mar. 21 The destruction of the intermediate tanks at Achel, between this place and Sultanpet, had compelled Lord Cornwallis, in 1791, to make the longer march, the injurious effects of which, on his exhausted cattle, were sensibly and severely felt during the remainder of the campaign. The anxious and active reconnoissance of the deputy quarter-master-general,* enabled him to ascertain, in the course of the day, without being himself observed, that the tanks were still full, and that it was just possible to avert consequences still more injurious than those experienced in 1791: a detachment sent forwards at ten at night, arrived in time to fill up the breaches which had just been opened, and to remove the milk† hedge, intended to poison the residue of the water. The body of Mysorean troops left to cover this work of destruction, although not surprised, were attacked at rather an earlier moment than was expected, and suffered a more serious loss than was supposed or reported by the assailants; the leading division of the army followed at day-light, and the head quarters were established on that ground on the 22d. 22.

On the 24th, while in act of crossing the Madoor 24. river, whence the Sultaun had marched for the attack of General Stuart;¹ a letter was received from that

* Major Allan.

† Euphorbia Tiraculli.

[*Euphorbia Tiraculli*, a shrub or small tree, with cylindrical green branches, the thickness of a lead pencil, which is often to be seen round villages in the drier parts of South India and Ceylon, though not really a native." (Eyson: *A Botany for India*.) A large number of species of the order are dangerously poisonous.]

¹ Beatson notices that Tippoo apparently, in the first instance, intended to move from Maddur towards Bangalore to attack General Harris, but changed his mind and turned westward to meet General Stuart and the Bombay army. There had been a heavy fall of rain, and Tippoo himself wrote that that fall of rain was a most auspicious omen in his favour, which gave

officer which removed the uneasiness occasioned by vague and contradictory reports, and gave the first authentic account of his success and unimpaired efficiency. The Sultaun who left Periapatam on the 11th, remained for some days in the vicinity of the capital to refit; his first movement was in the direction of Cenapatam, but learning on the 16th, that General Harris had entered the southern road, he deviated by his right to Malvilly,¹ and marched to the Madoor river, where he encamped on the 18th, and was joined by Seyed Saheb and Poornea, who had also crossed from the central road. The southern road from this river to the point where General Harris first entered it, presented numerous situations, where the advance of the English army might have been obstructed, and at least materially delayed by steady troops, without any risk of disaster to themselves; but it was a close woody country, and we have had occasion to observe, that after some early experience of disadvantage, it had become the fixed system of Hyder, as well as Tippoo, to prefer an open field; and although, on his arrival at the river, he opened several roads through the woods which indicated an intention of departing from this general rule, he not only abstained from any effectual attempt, but even, after examining and occupying the finest imaginable position for opposing the passage of the river in front, and placing beyond it a strong corps to operate at the same time on the enemy's right flank, from very advantageous ground, with an open rear and a secure retreat from both positions; he abandoned the intention of giving

him the hope of being able to defeat General Stuart. (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, footnote, pp. 71-72.)

¹ *Malvilly*.—Malvalli, a town in the Mysore District, 28 miles east of Mysore, 18 miles south of the railway at Maddur. Two miles from the town, close to the Mysore road, the action took place. Bullets are frequently found in the neighbourhood after rain.

battle on this ground, as strongly recommended to him by Monsieur Chapuis, and his own best officers, because the plan of defence necessarily involved the risk of a few guns; and he determined to fight on ground which he had examined about two miles to the westward of the fort and village of Malvilly; which, among other advantages gratuitously bestowed on his enemy, gave them, during the intended action, the most convenient cover for their unwieldy impediments.

On the 27th, the English army, on preparing to Mar. 27 take up its ground of encampment to the westward of Malvilly, distinctly perceived the Sultaun's army drawn up on a height little exceeding two miles from the intended encampment. The great object of the English General was, to escort in safety to the spot on which they were to be used, the effective means of reducing the capital, and not to seek for serious action until that object should be attained. He accordingly ordered the ground of encampment to be marked, and the troops to continue their march, in such order as should admit either of encampment or action, the principal division under his own orders being destined to form the right, and the column under the Honourable Colonel Wellesley the extreme left, and eventually to turn the enemy's right. The troops intended for the advanced pickets under Colonel Sherbrooke moved out as usual to examine their ground, and they were soon threatened by large bodies of the enemy; after some manœuvring they took post with their right to a village, and the support of these troops eventually brought on the action. The column of the principal division, or right wing of the army, successively deployed into line on the left of the pickets, and when formed, advanced on the enemy. An interval between two brigades caused by the nature of the ground, seemed to present an opportunity for an effort of cavalry, which the Sultaun himself directed and accompanied, till in the very act to charge.

The charge was prepared with deliberate coolness, and executed with great spirit; it was purposely directed against the Europeans, and although many horsemen fell on the bayonets, was completely repelled without causing the slightest disorder in the ranks, and the advance of the line being continued in a direction outflanking the enemy's left, the Sultaun's guns began soon afterwards to be withdrawn from the heights.

In the meanwhile, the division under Colonel Wellesley moved in echelon of corps, to turn the enemy's right, supported on his right by a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Floyd; the English centre being entirely refused, and Colonel Floyd being prepared to act with either attack, as circumstances might require: the remainder of the cavalry was on the right, keeping in check a body of horse, which threatened by a circuitous route to attack the baggage. As Colonel Wellesley approached his object, the Sultaun's cushoons advanced in every creditable style, in front of their guns, against the 33d, which was the leading corps, giving their fire, and receiving that of the 33d, together with a discharge of grape, till within sixty yards, when the regiment continuing to advance with a quickened step, they gave way; and Colonel Floyd, availing himself of the critical instant, charged and destroyed them to a man. The guns now began to be withdrawn from this flank also, and an appearance of making a stand on another height occupied by the second line of the Mysoreans, was only intended to cover their retreat.

The result to the Sultaun of this injudicious affair, was the loss of upwards of a thousand men, and to the English of sixty-nine only: and the superiority of the Mysorean equipments rendering farther pursuit unavailing, General Harris returned to occupy the encampment marked out in the morning.

The Sultaun had appointed as his rendezvous in the event of defeat, a ground about twelve miles to the westward; and the corps moved, each independent

of the other, with a degree of confusion and despondency which could scarcely be imagined from the English accounts.

From this western ground the Sultaun, on the 28th, moved in a direction exactly north; and on the Mar. 29th nearly S. E. with the view of placing his whole 29. army in General Harris's rear during the remainder of his march to Seringapatam, by the expected route of 1791, which had been so totally destroyed under his own inspection, that not a particle of dry forage, and scarcely a pile of grass, was left unconsumed.

General Harris, however, had taken an unexpected direction, and during the execution of this detour was actually south of the Cauvery.

A short march on the 28th, brought the army to 28. the point from which it had long been secretly determined to deviate to the south, if, on examining the ford at Sosilla, about a mile above the confluence of the Cauvery and Caupani,² and about fifteen miles east of Seringapatam, it should be found to answer the description given by native reporters; the distance from this encampment somewhat exceeded twelve miles, and the escort to cover the reconnoissance, under the deputy quarter-master-general, reached the vicinity of the ford, just at dark, without seeing an enemy, and conducted themselves so adroitly, as to excite no apprehension in the inhabitants of a movement in that direction by the English army, and they took, therefore, no steps to remove their property; the escort returned to camp at midnight, and on the 29th, the leading division was across the river, and 29. found both there and on the route, a profusion of

¹ Tippoo was at Arakere, eight miles east of Seringapatam on the 30th. (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, p. 84.)

² Sosilla.—Sosale, a large village on the left bank of the Cauvery at its confluence with the Kabbani river, which, rising in the jungles of the Wynaad, Malabar District, flows east through Nanjangud to the Cauvery at Tirumakudal Narsipur.

forage and cattle. The battering train, and the last of the army, were over on the 30th, and the whole ar.31. halted on the 31st, to benefit by an abundance so grateful and important.

The inducements to this judicious and well concealed movement, had long engaged the most serious consideration. It was foreseen, that by whatever route the army should advance, the forage and provisions would be destroyed or removed, and that the nearer approach to the capital, would be rendered a perfect desert; an unexpected change of route, which should secure even one day's abundant forage, would, under such circumstances, be in that single view, a most important advantage; and a southern movement was recommended by the farther consideration, of rendering fruitless the preparations the Suldaun might have made on the northern bank, and compelling him to change his line of operations. The forage and pasture on that bank, was known to be systematically destroyed, while that on the opposite, was reserved for his own army; and some portion of it at least would, by this movement, be secured for the allies. An ultimate position for the siege, to the south of the Caverry, would facilitate the junction of General Stuart from Coorg, and of the supplies from Coimbetoor, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown; and finally, the best opinions inclined to prefer an attack on the capital from the S. W., if on inspecting its present state, known to be in many respects materially altered since 1792, no forcible reason should appear for changing that design.

No advantages anticipated by the English General from this unexpected movement, could approach the corresponding impressions of astonishment, disappointment, and dismay, produced on the mind of Tippoo Suldaun, when he arrived near Malvilly, on discovering that all his intermediate plans of defence, counteraction, and annoyance, had been rendered absolutely nugatory, and that he was

even too late for disturbing the passage of the Cavery. His march was continued in the direction of the bad ford of Arakerri, to Bennoor,¹ where reflecting on the disastrous issue of his two first efforts at Sedaseer and at Malvilly, and on the able movement by which his next preparatory measures had been foiled, he sunk into absolute despondency, and in this state he received the whole of his principal officers. "We have arrived (said he) at our last stage (intimating that there was no hope), what is your determination?" "To die along with you," was the universal reply. After some gloomy consultation, it was the prevailing opinion that the English General would cross over to the island of Seringapatam by the southern fords, and then assume his ultimate position for the siege. The determination was accordingly formed at this council, to anticipate his movement, as was easily practicable with their efficient equipments, by crossing at the ford of Arakerri, and assuming a strong position on General Harris's supposed route. The intended position was near the village of Chendgal,² south of the island from which the principal ford takes its name, and there it was determined to give battle, with the solemn and unanimous resolve to make a last and desperate effort, with no alternative but death or victory. Every person present was deeply affected by the solemn air and visible distress of their sovereign; and one of the chiefs, with a heart too full for ordinary self-command, on taking leave prostrated himself at the Sultaun's feet and embraced them, the ceremony usual among Hindoos and Mahommedans on taking leave for a long absence. The Sultaun dissolved into tears: the whole assembly caught the infection: all followed the example, and reiterated

¹ *Bennoor*.—Bannur, a village on the left side of the Cauvery, about twelve miles south-east of Seringapatam.

² *Chendgal*.—Chandagal, a village due south of the southern branch of the Cauvery, at the point where the Paschimvahini river joins it.

the voice of the first chief; and the ceremonial and declarations of the day indicated a reciprocal adieu for the last time in this world. Meer Sadik was dispatched to superintend the destruction of all the buildings on the esplanade, on the side of the expected attack, and such of those in Sheher Gunjaum as had not already been destroyed. The Sultaun's two eldest sons, who were present with the army, were sent to Seringapatam, with orders to make a proper defence in the event of their father's death, and the army crossed on the ensuing day to examine and prepare the position at Chendgal, from which there was a safe retreat, within a new exterior line on the island, commanded by the guns of the fort, which had been constructed since 1792; and the encampment was pitched within these lines, which were little more than an hour's march from the intended field of action.

- April 2. On the 2d and 3d of April, the troops were under arms in their appointed stations, concealed as much as practicable from observation, and the Sultaun anxiously examined, from the adjacent high grounds, the slow progress of the English army, in order that the action might commence at the proper moment after the columns should point to the Island. He had, however entirely misapprehended the General's intentions, and found that on his arrival at the point of expected deviation to the right, he made a detour to the left, for the purpose of avoiding the intermediate low grounds, and reaching by a more level but circuitous route, the position occupied by General Abercromby, in 1792, to the south-west of the western angle of the capital.

The dispositions which had been made by the Sultaun, for an action expected to be, at least in the first instance defensive, were inapplicable to offensive movements, and the nature of the ground offered no advantage for such an operation. The English army was accordingly permitted to pass at the distance of

three miles from the main position, without the slightest attempt to execute the desperate resolutions which had been formed at Bennoor.

Twenty-five days later than the time which General Harris had announced in his original instructions to General Stuart, as the most advanced period of the season, to which his arrival at Seringapatam could be safely protracted, he took up his ground for the siege of that capital, exactly one month from the first advanced movement, into the territory of Mysoor, and after a march of one hundred and fifty-three miles and a half, which distance being divided by twenty-three, the number of marching days, gives $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles as the average of each day's march within the enemy's territory, and divided by the whole number of days employed in effecting the arrival of the army at its object, gives for its average progress, under five miles a day. MAR. 5.

To men unused to the practical observation of the departments of an army, or accustomed to departments previously organised, it cannot be easy at once to comprehend a scene, in which elementary training, and military operation, is one and the same process, in which the raw material, instead of the manufactured instrument, is put into the master's hand. The first impression, without such explanations, would be that of surprise, perhaps of censure, at the tardy progress. Men of experience and reflection viewed the conjuncture with far other feelings, which cannot perhaps be expressed in a more authentic form, than is exhibited in an original letter now before me, written to a private and confidential friend, by one of the most accomplished officers of the staff, five days after the arrival of the army. "We have here, in despite of all the accumulated difficulties which daily attended and impeded our march, an adequate battering train complete, with twelve hundred rounds for the cannon, and a good proportion for the howitzers, thirty-three days provi-

sion for our fighting men, (capable of lasting much longer if necessary,) and every reasonable expectation of farther supplies. I can hardly believe, when I look at the mass of men and matter collected here, that it is possible we should have moved it from Rayacotta to this ground in one month. On the 13th we expect the united force of Stuart and Floyd to join us: and if no untoward accident occurs to mar our plans, the campaign, hitherto so apparently tardy, will be the most extraordinarily rapid that has ever been recorded. A direct move to the capital of an enemy, one hundred and fifty miles from your frontier, without occupying a single intermediate post! The Governor-General is bold in his plans, and I think, bold as they are, they will be attended with complete success: and that unless something approaching the miraculous should interpose to save the place, it will be ours about the end of this month: "and whatever anxiety might have been felt in the previous contemplation of these difficulties, or during the period which was occupied in surmounting them, the confidence expressed by this officer, was now the universal sentiment of the army.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Attack of the enemy's posts on the 5th March fails—succeeds on the 6th—General Floyd's march to bring up the Bombay army—Detachment under Kummer-u-Deen well commanded—Ineffectual efforts—Junction formed—General Stuart crosses to the north—Second departure of General Floyd, to bring up the provisions from the rear—Unexplained failure of provisions—how relieved—Subject still under discussion—Sultaun's anticipation and present opinion, regarding the point of attack—Two plans submitted to General Harris—he decides on that which involves crossing the river in the act of assault—Commencement of the siege—Northern attack—Southern—on the 17th—Second parallel on the 20th—Tippoo proposes negotiation—General Harris sends him his ultimatum—rejected with disdain—Sortie on the 22d—Batteries open 23d—Arduous operation of establishing the third parallel, 26th and 27th—Another advance to negotiation—answered by still offering the same ultimatum—Sultaun's despondency—Breaching batteries—directed to the true breach, 2d May—Breach practicable on the 3d—Arrangements for assault on the 4th—Intermediate proceedings of the Sultaun—Flat-teries—Seyel Ghoffar—Astrology—Incantations—Roused by the assault.

THE front of the encampment was distant about three thousand five hundred yards from the works of the fort: an aqueduct, branching from the Cavery, a few miles to the westward, and passing in a winding and irregular course, and varying distance

along the front, was occupied, at all its strong points, by the Mysorean troops, and some intermediate cover enabled the rocket men towards evening, to project those dangerous missiles into most parts of the camp, and to occasion some disquietude for the safety of the park of artillery stores: an attack was accordingly ordered soon after sun-set in two columns, under the direction of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley and Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, for the purpose of establishing advanced posts nearly in the positions contested with General Abercromby in 1792. The object failed on the right from the darkness of the night, and from the unexpected impediment of a succession of deep trenches in a grove; and on the left it was not wholly attained. The loss from these circumstances April 6 fell somewhat heavy; but on the morning of the 6th the attack was renewed, under the same officers, on an enlarged scale, better proportioned to the numbers to be dislodged, and completely succeeded. The Mysoreans were forced to retire with precipitation, and strong advanced posts were established within eighteen hundred yards of the fort, with their left on the river and their right at Sultaunpet; including, within the latter extremity, extensive plantations, which furnished a most important and abundant store of materials for the batteries and approaches.

¹ On the 30th March, General Harris crossed the Cauvery at Sosale, about 20 miles below Seringapatam by the river. On the 31st, the army halted; on the 1st April, the army marched and encamped thirteen miles from Seringapatam. On the 2nd, the army marched on only three miles owing to delay caused by the Nizam's cavalry having occupied a wrong position. On the 3rd, the army encamped on the high road five miles from Seringapatam. On the 4th April, the army marched keeping on the high grounds about four miles from the fort, and on the 5th, took up its ground opposite the west face of the fort, at a distance of three thousand five hundred yards. It fronted east, and the right was on high commanding ground which gradually fell to the left which was secured by an aqueduct and by the river Cauvery. (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan*, pp. 84-88.)

On the same day, Major-General Floyd, with four regiments of cavalry, and the greater part of the left wing of the army, marched on Periapatam, for the purpose of strengthening the Bombay army, under Lieutenant-General Stuart, and enabling it to form the ultimate junction for the siege of the capital. Nearly the whole of the Mysorean cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry, regular and irregular, under the command of Kummer-u-Deen, were immediately detached with orders, if possible, to prevent the junction, or in every event to cripple the equipments. The Sultaun's cavalry had on no occasion been so well commanded, or held themselves so effectually prepared, at a moment's warning, to profit by the slightest irregularity or error, and strike a decisive blow, as throughout the whole of this march to and from Periapatam; but the only result was to compel their opponents to corresponding vigilance and care, and of course to retard their movements. The raja of Coorg continued to accompany General Stuart to Periapatam, but at that place took his leave, to return for the arrangement of those measures of supply which might eventually be necessary. His romantic character rendered him an object of peculiar interest to General Floyd, and the officers of the division from the eastward; and a squadron of the 19th dragoons sent as an escort, with the staff officer who first communicated with General Stuart (the first European cavalry the raja had ever seen) was a novelty at which he expressed his admiration, with that natural and extravagant energy, which the habits of civilized life, have a tendency to restrain. He accepted with enthusiasm the invitation to see the line of the eastern division under arms, and was received with suitable honours. He expressed a just approbation of every thing he saw, but continued after his return to General Floyd's tent, to testify his particular and unwearied admiration of the 19th regiment, intimating a wish to procure at a proper time for his own

personal use, one of the dragoon's swords; he was informed in general terms that he would be gratified, and on his rising to take his leave, General Floyd unclasped his own sword, and, in a few words judiciously suited to the occasion, begged that he might be permitted to present it for the raja's use; the offer and the acceptance were appropriate and impressive, and the raja continued in after times to exhibit this valued gift to his European visitors, as one of his most precious memorials, and to recount with animation when, and by whom, it had been worn, and how, and on what occasion conferred.

The united corps formed their ultimate junction April 14 with General Harris before Seringapatam on the 14th, 15. and on the ensuing day the Bombay army crossed the river to the north, and occupied ground on a continuation of the line of General Harris, and to the westward of Lord Cornwallis's right in 1792, for the general purposes of the siege, and with a more special view to the enfilade of the face to be attacked, and of the exterior trenches or field works, constructed for impeding the future progress of the approaches from the south.

19. On the 19th, Major-General Floyd again marched with the whole of the regular cavalry, a brigade of infantry, and all Nizam Ali's cavalry, by the route of Mysoor and Nunjendgode, to the head of the Caveriporam pass, for the purpose of bringing forward the convoy of provisions under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown from Coimbatoor, together with that collected by Lieutenant-Colonel Read in Baramahal; the junction of the troops under these officers, would give Major-General Floyd sufficient strength to cover the whole returning convoy; the cattle of the public departments and all the brinjaries accompanied this division, for the three-fold purpose of augmenting the means of bringing forward the expected supplies, refreshing the cattle with good forage, and relieving the army from the insalubrity of the deaths which must have

occurred if they had remained, the ground being already thickly strewn with dead cattle. The departure of all followers, really superfluous, gave also the important advantage of lessening the consumption of food, a subject which had now become the source of most painful anxiety and alarm. The circumstance is thus stated in *Beatson's View of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*,* published in 1800. "On the 16th of April it was discovered upon measuring the bags which contained the rice, in order to ascertain the exact quantity remaining in camp, that our stock was much diminished, and that there was only sufficient remaining for eighteen days' consumption for the fighting men of the army. The cause of this alarming and unexpected deficiency had not been satisfactorily explained; but such was the actual pressure of our situation at the moment we were about to commence the siege. Happily, from this alarm the Commander-in-Chief was soon afterwards effectually relieved, by a tender, for the public service, of twelve hundred bullock loads of rice," &c. &c.: and it appears that this tender was made on the 22d, three days after the march of Major-General Floyd.†

After a lapse of eighteen years, this transaction still continues to be an unfit subject for historical disquisition. The constituted authorities in England, are still at public variance on the justice, the wisdom, and consistency of their own respective proceedings: and, the author feels the propriety of remitting to the future historian, the issue of a case deemed to be still undecided.¹

Before the arrival of General Harris, the Sultaun inclined to the expectation of an attack, either on

* Pages 99, 100.

† General Floyd returned with his convoy on the 11th of May.

¹ The "transaction" was an extraordinary one. "On the 16th of April, it was discovered, upon measuring the bags which contained the rice, in order to ascertain the exact quantity

the northern face, at the point intended by Lord Cornwallis, or on the north-eastern angle, which general rumour had then indicated as one of the projects which his Lordship had considered. On finding that the army passed on to a western encamp-

remaining in camp, that our stock was much diminished, and that there was only sufficient remaining for eighteen days consumption for the fighting men of the army" (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultann*, p. 100). Major-General Floyd was detached with a body of troops, five regiments of cavalry and the left wing of the army, towards the Baramahal to bring in supplies of grain which had been collected by Colonel Read. After he had left on the 19th April, the Commissary of Grain, Major Hart, informed the Superintendent of Bazaars (Captain Macleod) that he had in his possession about one hundred thousand seers of rice, his own private stock, to dispose of. The matter was reported to the Commander-in-Chief, General Harris, who ordered that Major Hart should at once bring this private store to the public account. The amount of grain thus acquired made the total amount available sufficient for the subsistence of the army up to the 20th May, and so relieved all anxiety on this account. Major Hart was subsequently dismissed from the army for misconduct. He had proposed, when he offered the store of rice in his possession to the Commander-in-Chief, to sell it to government at the then prevailing bazaar rate, which of course was a much higher rate than that at which he had purchased the stock before he crossed the Mysore frontier. Major Hart's dismissal led to a long controversy between the Board of Control and the Directors of the East India Company, the former taking Major Hart's side. The Directors disputed the right of the Board of Control to interfere in the matter, and eventually in 1815 the case came before the Privy Council. The Directors, while dismissing Major Hart from the service, directed that he should be paid for the rice he had supplied, and the Board of Control interfered with a view to allowing Major Hart a larger sum for the grain than the Directors wished. The dispute ended in a victory for the Board. The whole of the dispute is set out in a large volume. ("Correspondence and Proceedings relative to the Draft of 177 of the season 1806-7, ordering a reimbursement to Major Thomas Hart for grain supplied to the army before Seringapatam in April 1799, and The Mandamus served by the Court of King's Bench upon the Court of Directors for the transmission to India of that draft, as altered by the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India," London, 1816.)

ment, it was the general impression, among his best officers, that the attack would be made on the south-western, and not on the western angle. They had a strong confidence, that the siege could not be sufficiently advanced to give the assault, before at least, the occasional rise of the river, which always precedes its steady periodical filling, should render too precarious for such a risk, any plan of operations, which should involve crossing the river in the act of assault; although on General Harris taking up his ground, they made active defensive preparations on the south bank of the river, near the western angle, where some lines, *en cremaille*, had already been constructed. They rather suspected all the demonstrations on that point to be intended as a feint; and were at least as anxiously occupied on the south-western angle, and the southern face, in contemplation of an attempt from the English to establish themselves on the island; and this persuasion was not shaken, until General Stuart, by crossing to the northern bank on the 15th, and taking all the preparatory measures for the permanent occupation of his ground, forced the conviction, that the assault would be prepared to cross the river, from one or both attacks on the western angle, and its vicinity: the passage of both branches being practicable, while the river was dry, as had been sufficiently ascertained before the commencement of the actual operations of the siege.

The alternative of two plans of attack was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief by the chief engineer about the 12th. It is not intended to deviate from the usual plan of this work by entering into the detailed operations of this siege, however interesting in their nature, and important in their consequences, and little beyond those general views which the reader has been accustomed to expect, shall be attempted, in recounting its most prominent events.

Independently of several subordinate considerations, the practicability of carrying on the siege, even after the filling of the river, was the chief recommendation of an attack on the south-western angle, and the risk of being obliged to abandon the enterprise if it should, from any unforeseen contingency, be protracted until the same periodical event, was the main disadvantage of that on the western angle, which left the bed of the river interposed. In every other respect, the vicinity of the western angle was the weakest part of the fort; capable of being breached for the ultimate assault by one operation; furnishing the opportunity of a perfect enfilade of the northern and south-western* faces; and the option of assaulting from either or both banks; but the chief engineer added as a disadvantage of this plan, independently of the intervention of the river, that the western extremity of the fort, from the circumstance of its gradually narrowing to a point, offered greater facilities than any other which could be attacked, for a retrenchment to cut off the whole space attacked, and to protract the operations of the siege.†

The Commander-in-Chief, after giving a deliberate consideration to this important alternative, decided on ultimately storming across the river, confident in the ample means he possessed of bringing the contest to that issue, before the filling of the river, and trusting for the rest to the approved excellence and tried valour of his officers and men.

The period which was permitted to elapse before the commencement of decisive operations, did not include one hour of lost time. Every moment had

* It fronted about W.S.W. for about five hundred yards, and from a work at that point, took a direction which fronted nearly S.S.W.

† The reader who may wish for details, will find them stated with minute accuracy in "Beatson's View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun."

been improved in collecting and making up such a stock of materials as should insure an uninterrupted progress, whenever the siege should commence; an event which may most correctly be dated on the 17th April 1 of April; when an attempt of the enemy to establish a redoubt on the northern bank, on ground commanding that intended for General Stuart's approaches and batteries, rendered it necessary to dislodge them without loss of time. This operation, covered by all the fire from the southern bank which could be brought to bear on the requisite points, was conducted with great gallantry by Colonel Hart, under a severe cannonade from the fort; the troops were ultimately established in good cover within 1,000 yards of the western angle of the fort, and this advanced post was afterwards connected with those previously established, in such a manner as to give great security to the subsequent operations.

At the proper moment after the enemy's attention had been seriously drawn to the north, the southern operations also commenced; the bed of a water-course, forming, with little farther labour, a parallel one thousand yards from the fort, was occupied without much opposition by a proper number of troops under Major Macdonald, and connected during the night by a regular approach from the former less advanced positions; while on the northern branch, work was in progress for the erection of the first batteries.

Some misapprehensions in the engineer department caused the loss of a day; but on the 20th a 20. battery from the northern bank opened with good effect on the enfilade of the south-western face, and of the entrenchment occupied by the enemy south of the river. Two guns were brought to a covered position on the enfilade of the left of those entrenchments. An advanced position near an old powder-mill was occupied in force upwards of four hundred yards in advance of the general line of the enemy's

other field-works. From this it was necessary in the first instance to dislodge them, and the attack was made at six o'clock in the evening, under the direction of Colonel Sherbrooke, in three columns, led by himself and by Colonels St. John and Money Penny, with such judgment and energy, that two thousand of the enemy were dislodged with a loss of two hundred and fifty men ; while the English casualties amounted to one man killed and four wounded : and the possession of this entrenched position enabled the English to establish, in the course of the night, a parallel at the distance of seven hundred and eighty yards from the fort, and four hundred and forty from the enemy's remaining entrenchments.

This system, ultimately the most rapid, of safe and gradual advance almost literally without loss, made a more serious impression on the Sultaun's mind than could have been effected by precipitate measures, and produced a disposition to negotiate. On the 9th he had merely made an advance, by affecting to desire an explanation of the cause of hostilities, for which General Harris, with proper brevity, referred him to the letters which he had received from Lord Mornington. On the present occasion, the Sultaun noticed the powers announced by Lord Mornington, to be vested in General Harris, and requested to be informed of his pleasure, regarding a conference between proper persons to be appointed on both parts : the General's reply took an abstract view of the anxious and repeated efforts of the Governor-general to avert war by negotiation, and the Sultaun's rejection of the means proposed, until the lateness of the season had left no alternative but the advance of the armies : but as the Sultaun now desired to know his pleasure regarding the points at issue, and it was hoped that the request was made in sincerity, he enclosed the draft of a preliminary treaty, containing the conditions on which alone any negotiation could be founded. The main conditions were,

the cession of one half the territory possessed by the Sultaun before the war—the payment of two crores of rupees, one immediately, and the other within six months—and the delivery as hostages, of four of his sons, and four of his principal officers, to be selected by General Harris; and the General added, that unless his acceptance of these terms under his seal and signature, were returned to the English camp within twenty-four hours, and the hostages and specie, in twenty-four hours more, the allies reserved to themselves an extension of their demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, until a definitive treaty could be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect.

If, as the best information gives reason to conclude, the Sultaun's judgment had not yet risen to a just conception of his danger, it is still more evident, that his spirit had not yet sunk to the level of his fortunes. He raved at the arrogance and tyranny of the conditions, talked of the pre-ordained decrees of fate which might still invert the relative condition of the belligerents; in the short span of human life, it was of little importance, whether an inevitable event should arrive a few days or years sooner or later, and it was better to die like a soldier, than to live a miserable dependent on the infidels, in the list of their pensioned rajas and nabobs; and he declared his disdain of returning any reply to such propositions.

Indications of erecting an additional battery on April the northern bank, produced a vigorous and well-conducted sortie upon all the out-posts and advanced works of that attack: it commenced by a demonstration on the rear, about half past two in the morning, which was immediately followed by a serious assault on the front, with about six thousand infantry, including the French corps who led the principal attack, and behaved with great spirit, some of them having fallen within the entrenchment upon the English bayonets, and others quite close to it. The attack

was continued or renewed for several hours, but it was every where received and repulsed with such perfect steadiness, that it was at length abandoned, with the loss of near seven hundred men. The English loss was comparatively small, and the chief injury of the attack arose from the suspension of the intended work.

April 23 On the 23d the enlarged batteries of both attacks opened with great effect; silenced every gun opposed to them, and had so perfect an enfilade that it appeared impossible, without new means, for any troops to remain for the defence of the curtains. The usual operations of taking off the defences and advancing the approaches were carried on till the 26th, when it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from their last exterior intrenchment, distant three hundred and eighty yards from the fort, covered on their right by a redoubt, and on the left by a small circular work open in the rear; works which, added to the serpentine direction of the intrenchment, and in some places to regular masonry en cremaille, protected them, in a considerable degree, from the enfilade of the northern batteries, and afforded an imperfect flanking defence.

26. The Honourable Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches, was charged with the direction of the attacks for dislodging them. A little after sun-set, and shortly before the period appointed for the relief of the troops in the trenches, the attack was made in two columns, under Colonel Money Penny and Major Skelly on the enemy's right and centre; both succeeded, and the united columns turning to their right, pursued the enemy, who continued firing as they retreated; the assailants however being severely galled from the fire of the fort, and having in a great degree accomplished the main object of the attack, took post in an aqueduct which had formed the ditch of the enemy's entrenchment, and was now destined to be the third parallel of the besiegers.

The circular work still occupied by the enemy on their left, was however found to have a greater command than was expected over the water-course, the enemy had collected in great numbers at this important point, and the situation of the troops who had taken post was considerably exposed. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the 74th, arriving at this moment with a part of the relief for the trenches, and the importance being urgent, of instantly dislodging the enemy from the circular work, he proceeded, and with no more than one hundred and twenty men, not only charged and dislodged an enemy amounting to thousands, but favoured by the night, pursued them across the Periapatam bridge, entered the right of the enemy's camp on the island, spiked some of their guns, and making use of the most skilful means to conceal his numbers and secure his retreat, returned in perfect order under cover of the confusion he had created. In the fort and on the island, a recollection pervaded every mind of the events of the 6th of February 1792, and a general impression prevailed that the assault of the fort had commenced. The projection of fire-balls had not yet superseded in Seringapatam the ancient practice of India, to favour the assailants more than the defenders, by blue lights on the ramparts; and a general and beautiful illumination of the whole fort was followed by a furious random discharge of artillery. The Sultaun's second son commanded at the southern face, and ordered with the utmost consternation the Mysoor gates to be shut; the proper persons were not to be found for upwards of half an hour. The remainder of the night was employed by the English in connecting the acquisitions of the day with the former approaches, and on account of the advanced position and imperfect cover, the troops who, according to ordinary detail, would have returned to camp, remained as a double guard to the trenches.

The circular work however alternately gained

and lost had not been retained by the besiegers, and during the night was re-occupied in great force by the enemy. From this work, and from some ruins and other cover in the vicinity, and under its protection, the flanking musquetry of the enemy became so galling at day-break of the 27th, that it became a serious question whether the English troops would be able to maintain a position which had already cost so many brave men to acquire. The Commander-in-Chief, who had a distinct view of the whole from the more elevated ground, and perceived at once the critical situation of the troops, and the essential importance of holding the position, gave peremptory orders that it should be held to the last extremity, and that the enemy should, at whatever risk, be instantly dislodged from the circular work, and ruined buildings; an operation which must necessarily be performed under the whole fire of the fort, distant only three hundred and eighty yards, as well as of the exterior musquetry and rockets. Colonel Wallace was charged with the execution of this most critical and dangerous service, which he performed with distinguished gallantry and success. After seizing the circular work, and effecting a lodgment behind it, he found his position still annoyed from the ruins; and detached Major Skelly to dislodge the enemy, and establish himself in the cover which they afforded; this operation was effected with similar decision and success; both of the posts were formed on the ensuing night into strong and regular posts, and the advanced parallel was now perfectly secured against all ordinary molestation from its right, and the progress in every other quarter enabled General Harris to look with renewed confidence to the farther operations of the siege.

It was impossible that the dark obstinacy of the Sultaun's mind, the flattery of juvenile expectants, by whom he loved to be surrounded, in preference to the experienced and the brave, or even the apathy

of the fatalist, could be any longer blind to the rapid approach of the last moment, in which negotiation could avail. The religion which he revered, as well as that which he had cruelly persecuted, were equally invoked; the moolla and the bramin were equally bribed to interpose their prayers for his deliverance, his own attendance at the mosque was frequent, and his devotions impressive, and he intreated the fervent *amen* of his attendants to his earnest and reiterated prayers; the vain science of every sect was put in requisition, to examine the influence of the planets, and interpret their imaginary decision. To all, the period for delusion appeared to have ceased, and all announced extremity of peril.

Driven on the 27th from his last exterior line of defence, the Sultaun appears for a moment to have perceived the true character of the approaching crisis; and with a mind half reconciled to terms which he hoped would be less humiliating than those announced on the 22d, and a still more anxious desire for deception and delay, he addressed a letter to General Harris, stating, that he was about to send ambassadors to adjust the points at issue: to which the General immediately replied, that however justified by his non-compliance with the terms offered on the 22d, and by the subsequent change of circumstances, in extending those demands, the allies were disposed to evince their moderation, by still adhering to the conditions of that date, but that he would receive no ambassadors, unless accompanied by the hostages and the treasure; and finally, that these conditions were open to his assent, under his seal and signature, until three o'clock on the morrow, and no longer: under the condition also that the hostages and treasure should reach the English camp before noon on the ensuing day.

After the Sultaun's perusal of this reply, mixed indications rather of grief than rage, finally subsided into a silent stupor, from which he seldom seemed to

wake, except for the purpose of affecting a confidence, by which no one was deceived, that the capital could not be taken. But no trace was evinced of those active energies of mind and body, by which alone such a confidence could be reasonably supported: the enemy had sufficiently indicated, not indeed the precise spot, but the near vicinity of the spot in which their breaches would be effected, and the most judicious of his officers had suggested to him the obvious operation of cutting off the whole angle, by a retrenchment of easy execution. He listened in silence while it was contended by the flatterers, that there was every where a second rampart, to which the enemy could not ascend, and that it would be impracticable for them to pass along the exterior rampart, while the interior should be lined with musquetry: it was rejoined, that the interior rampart could not singly be relied on, from its being completely enfiladed; that the proposed retrenchment would check the heads of the assailing columns, and support whatever flanking fire could be brought into operation, and that it did not diminish, but encrease the means of defence on which the opposite party relied, besides providing for subsequent resistance in the event of the two ramparts being carried. But it was all deliberation and no decision; this essential work was not attempted, and the Sultaun even relaxed in that personal inspection which he had hitherto practised, as if desirous to hide from his own observation, the extent and imminence of his danger.

In the meanwhile, the approaches and breaching batteries of the besiegers were rapidly advancing; and when completed, the true point of attack being concealed till the latest possible moment, the fire was chiefly directed against those works which had the power of flanking the future breach, and the passage of the river. A stone glacis, affording very imperfect cover, which ran along the northern face, extended round the western extremity, but terminated at the

south-western face of the angle bastion; whence there was no other cover than the mere retaining wall of the counterscarp which was much lower than the crest of the glacis, and afforded a full view of the *fausse braye* and rampart. Over the angular bastion towered a large cavalier, which had been long silenced, but appeared to contain a small interior retrenchment, where a few men were occasionally observed.

It was not until the morning of the 2d of May May 2. that the batteries, after having previously destroyed the shoulder of the angle bastion, began to form the breach about sixty yards to the south-east of that work. On that day the *fausse braye* was completely breached, and on the 3d the rampart was in the same 3. condition; the breach was reported practicable; the river had been forded in the night; it was ascertained that the descent into the ditch from the retaining wall of the counterscarp was only seven feet: that the ditch itself was fordable; that the rubbish of the rampart and *fausse braye* formed an irregular but continued slope from the ditch to the summit of the rampart; and means to accompany the assault were provided for the descent from the counterscarp into the ditch.

The troops destined for the assault were placed in the trenches before day-break on the 4th; the command of the assault was committed to Major-General Baird, and the troops were disposed into two columns, the right under Colonel Sherbrooke, and the left under Colonel Dunlop, which were to issue together from the trenches, and after surmounting the breach to wheel to the right and left, and after carrying the rampart, and occupying such works as might be expedient, were to meet on the eastern face of the rampart, and there be guided by circumstances. The Honourable Colonel Wellesley commanded a powerful reserve. All these arrangements having been previously directed, the troops, amounting to 4376

men, silently took their appointed stations in the trench.

The intermediate military conduct of the Sultaun may furnish some aid to a just estimation of his character. On the day of General Harris's ultimate encampment before the place, the Sultaun caused a small tent to be pitched for his personal accommodation, on a large cavalier, on the south face, whence he directed the early operations, which have been described; when General Stuart passed the river to the northward, the Sultaun moved his head-quarters (where all reports were ordered to be made), to the western angle, whence he superintended the efforts made to dislodge that army from its northern position. On the opening of the first batteries, he removed from this exposed situation, and fixed his head-quarters in the northern face (on which, from its construction, the enfilade was less extensive than on the south western), in an apartment formed by an old gateway, which had for some years been closed by an exterior revetment. The troops on duty at the several works, were regularly relieved; but the general charge of the angle attacked was committed to Seyed Saheb, assisted by Seyed Ghoffar, an officer of a provincial corps of English sepoy, taken with Colonel Brathwaite, who subsequently entered into the Sultaun's army, and became a zealous and able servant of his new master. The large cavalier behind the angle bastion, was committed to Monsieur Chapuis. The Sultaun's eldest son, with Poornea, commanded a detached corps to disturb the northern attack; his second son commanded the Mysoor gate, and southern face; and Kummer-u-Deen was absent, watching General Floyd. Among his own personal staff and attendants, it has been observed, that there was not one man of professional character. He fancied, the attachment of men raised by his own favour, to be more genuine and sincere, than the support of persons possessing established character and

high pretensions; and whenever a report was made of the alarming progress of the besiegers, these ignorant sycophants affected to ascribe it to fear. Seyed Ghoffar was early in the siege wounded in the hand, but did not confine himself. He saw distinctly what was to happen; "he is surrounded (said this excellent officer) by boys and flatterers, who will not even let him see with his own eyes. I do not wish to survive the result. I am going about in search of death, and cannot find it." In the forenoon of the 4th of May, he saw in common with other experienced observers, that the trenches were unusually crowded, and concluded that the assault was about to be given; nothing could persuade the Sultaun and his flatterers, that the enemy would dare the attempt by day-light, and the kelledar, Nedeem, one of the new men, was so grossly ignorant and destitute of all reflection, as to make an issue of pay to some of the troops on duty, which caused their absence at the moment of assault; the Sultaun, however, in reply to the report from Seyed Ghoffar, said it was proper to be alert, but that the assault would be given at night; meanwhile that officer had satisfied himself by farther observation, that an hour would not elapse before it should commence, and in a state of rage and despair hurried towards the Sultaun: "I will go (said he) and drag him to the breach, and make him see by what a set of wretches he is surrounded; I will compel him to exert himself at this last moment." He was going, and met a party of pioneers, whom he had long looked for in vain, to cut off the approach by the southern rampart, "I must first (said he) shew these people the work they have to do," and in the act of giving his instructions, was killed by a cannon shot.

In the meanwhile, Tippoo, as if despairing of human aid, was seeking those delusive means of penetrating into futurity, so familiar in the history of every country, and of even engaging supernatural

aid, through the incantations of the bramins, from whom he had merited the most earnest prayers for his destruction. The Jebbum, at an enormous expence, was in progress; and the learning and sanctity of the high-priest at Cenapatam, was farther propitiated by costly offerings. The Sultaun, in his early youth, treated with derision the science of astrology, and various statements are given regarding the completion of the particular prediction, which made him a convert to its reality; but it must have preceded the marriage of his son to the daughter of the Bebee of Cannanore, and his discoveries at Coimbetoor, in 1789, which he relates with considerable ostentation of his own proficiency in the science. Either from chance, or from right judgment respecting objects more real than those of their pretended science, the astrologers had exhibited to the Sultaun a set of diagrams from which they gravely inferred, that as long as Mars should remain within a particular circle, the fort would hold out; he would touch the limit on the last day of the lunar month, the 4th of May, and on that day they dared only to recommend, that the Sultaun should present the prescribed oblations, for averting a calamity: which oblations were ordered to be prepared on the 3d of May. On the morning of the 4th, about nine o'clock, he proceeded to the palace, bathed, and presented the oblation, through the high-priest above-mentioned, with the customary formalities; and with the farther solemnity of attempting to ascertain the aspect of his fortunes by the form of his face reflected from the surface of a jar of oil, which constituted a part of the oblation; a result depending on mechanical causes, by which the reflection of any face may be formed to any fortune.

Having finished these ceremonies about the hour of noon, he returned to his accustomed station, and shortly afterwards ordered his usual mid-day repast, when intelligence was brought of the death of Seyed

Ghoffer: he was greatly agitated at this event, but gave the proper orders in consequence; and sat down to his repast, which he had scarcely finished when a report was made to him of the actual assault, and he hastened to the breach along the northern rampart.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Selection of the hour of assault—Awful expectation—Brilliant opening—Breach carried—Right column succeeds rapidly—Left more slowly—The Sultaun in person—retires to the interior fort—Motives uncertain—Falls—Seyed Saheb—Proceedings at the palace—Major Allan—The princes—received by General Baird—sent to camp—Sultaun's fate still unknown—found at length—identified—Funeral solemnities—General Orders—Lieutenant-Colonel Close—Fall of the Sultaun, a relief from some embarrassing questions—Eldest son surrenders—all the principal officers—Poonna—Dhoondia—General Harris marches to the northward—Peaceable submission of the whole country—Characters of Hyder and Tippoo contrasted—Commission for the affairs of Mysoor—Principles which guided their decisions—Right of conquest—Claims of humanity—Suggestions of policy—Central government to be formed—Conflicting claims of the ancient and late family—discussed—Determination to restore the ancient Hindoo house of Mysoor—Relation of the new state to the British Government—distinguished from all preceding arrangements—The experiment successful—Wisdom of considering its farther application.

ALTHOUGH General Harris had ordered the troops destined for the assault to be placed in their appointed stations before day-light on the 4th of May, this arrangement was made for the purpose of eluding observation. The breach was reported to be perfectly practicable on the evening of the 3d, but

he was desirous that the forenoon should be employed in extending its breadth; in taking off any remaining defences; and in destroying any repairs which the besieged might have effected during the night; and he was farther induced to fix on the hour of one, as that at which, from the known habits of the natives regarding refreshment and repose, they would be the least prepared to expect him.

The state of silent and awful expectation, in the trenches, and throughout the army, as the expected hour approached, may be more easily imagined than described. The distinguished officer appointed to lead the assault beheld those walls, within which he had himself been immured in irons, during a tedious imprisonment of nearly four years; the faithless captivity and secret massacre of his countrymen were unhappily known to him from no borrowed sources, and the prospect of avenging the wrongs which he had witnessed and partaken, and of terminating, in one short hour, the future possibility of every similar outrage, formed a mass of reflections and of motives capable of rousing to the highest pitch of animation, a less ardent spirit than that of Major-General Baird. Within a few minutes of one, he sent round to the corps composing the assault, to be ready at an instant's warning, and when the precise moment had arrived, he ascended the parapet of the trench, in full view of both armies; a military figure suited to such an occasion; and with an energy and animation not to be surpassed, drawing his sword, and addressing the soldiers in a tone which thrilled along the trenches, he desired them to "follow him, and prove themselves worthy of the name of British soldiers. A small but gallant band of Mysoreans met the forlorn hope on the slope of the breach, the greater portion of both fell in the struggle; but in less than seven minutes from the period of issuing from the trenches, the British colours were planted on the summit of the breach. To the great surprise of

the assailants, a deep and apparently impassable ditch was interposed, between the rampart they had surmounted, and the great cavalier which overlooked the breach, and formed a portion of the interior line of defence; and two discharges of grape from the retrenchment in that work, had fallen heavily among the approaching columns: but the opposition ceased on their farther progress.

As soon as the assailants had ascended in sufficient force they wheeled in obedience to orders, to the right and left; General Baird himself accompanying the right attack. Three cavaliers, from which serious resistance, was apprehended, were fortunately abandoned, as the column proceeded along the rampart, from the apprehension of their retreat being cut off: a subaltern of the Scotch brigade, Lieutenant Molle, having peculiarly distinguished himself by preceding the head of the column, at the distance of several yards, pressing, with the utmost animation for the first of the cavaliers, and singly displaying to the assailants, and to the whole army, the actual possession of that important work. General Baird, after occupying these and other necessary points; arrived without much serious loss, after surmounting the breach, in less than an hour at the portion of the rampart, over the eastern gateway.

The left hand column had not been so rapid in its progress. Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop was seriously wounded in a personal conflict with one of the Mysorean chiefs at the summit of the breach; and as the column advanced, a succession of well-constructed traverses along the northern rampart, presented the most formidable resistance. It was the Sultaun himself who animated their exertions, and had passed the nearest traverse just as the left column began to advance from the breach, the resistance in front was most powerfully seconded by the flanking musquetry of the inner rampart. All

the commissioned officers attached to the leading companies, were soon either killed or disabled. Lieutenant Farquhar, of the pioneers, attempted to lead them, and was instantly killed. Captain Lambton, Brigade-Major to Major-General Baird, next placed himself at their head; and at that moment obtained a support which facilitated all the subsequent operations.

On reaching the summit of the breach, and discovering the ditch interposed between the exterior and interior ramparts; General Baird had ordered every possible effort to be made for effecting the passage; a narrow strip of the terreplein, left for the passage of the workmen, employed in the excavation of the ditch, was discovered by a detachment of the 12th. The passage of the ditch, and the ascent of the inner rampart of the south-western face, were effected by mere climbing, without material opposition; that face of the inner rampart having to the last moment been scoured by a perfect and destructive enfilade, which had greatly facilitated the operations of the right attack. On reaching the summit of the inner rampart, this detachment turned to the left, got possession of the western cavalier, and then proceeded to attack in flank the defenders of the interior northern rampart, who fled before them. At the instant of Brigade-Major Lambton's putting himself at the head of the left attack, this detachment of the 12th pushing along the inner rampart, were approaching the flank of the traverse, defended by the Sultaun; and the defenders, instead of the assailants now became exposed to the destructive effects of a flanking fire. Brigade-Major Lambton, thus supported, urged the attack with the greatest animation; the two parallel columns on the outer and inner ramparts, preserving their proper relative positions, rapidly gained ground, and the Mysoreans reluctantly abandoned every successive traverse, until in addition to the front and flanking fire which

has been described, they arrived at a part of the rampart whence they distinctly perceived the troops of the right attack already arrived over the eastern gateway, and ready if necessary to fall on their rear; from that moment all confidence was lost; and the confusion became irreparable. A principal passage was near, from the outer to the inner rampart, and through a regular gateway in that work to the body of the place; the troops began to escape, some in that direction, some over the ramparts, and a large portion by the water-gate which led to the river. The Sultaun had received a slight wound and mounted his horse a few minutes before this occurrence; if an attempt at flight had been his object, the water-gate was near, and his escape was more than possible; he took the direction of the body of the place through the gateway of the interior work, with intentions, which can only be conjectured, and were not perhaps distinctly formed in his own mind; the most sanguine hope could only have led to an honourable capitulation in the palace; to close the gate of the interior rampart, if practicable, would have been unavailing for the purpose of defending the inner fort; for these works were no longer defensible after General Baird had passed the point of their junction and the rampart which he now occupied was itself a part of the interior work. Among the conjectures of those who were chiefly admitted to the Sultaun's intimacy, in the last days of his existence was one founded on obscure hints which had escaped him, of the intention to destroy certain papers, to put to death his principal women, and to die in defence of the palace. He was destined to a fall more obscure and unnoticed; no individual among the assailants was aware of his presence on the northern rampart, and he was entirely undistinguished in the ultimate mass of fugitives; before he reached the gate, he had received a second wound but did not fall. Fugitives from the body of the

place, as well as the exterior rampart were crowding in opposite directions, and with various intentions towards this gate the detachment of the 12th had descended into the body of the place, for the purpose of arresting the progress of the great mass passing through the gate from the exterior works, to the interior of the place and the two columns of the assailants were now directing a destructive fire by regular platoons, into each side of the arch. In attempting to pass through, the Sultaun received a third wound from the interior detachment; his horse was at the same instant brought down, and his faithful attendants perceiving his situation, placed him in his palankeen, but the space became so crowded, and choaked up by the dead and dying, that it was impossible to remove him; and he appeared to have afterwards moved out of the palankeen. While in this situation, some English soldiers entered the gateway, and a personal attendant proposed that he should make himself known for the preservation of his life. The Sultaun either suspected an opposite result from such a disclosure, or determined not to be so preserved; and peremptorily forbad it but one of the soldiers attempting to seize his sword belt, the Sultaun almost fainting from his wounds, seized a sword which lay near him, and made a desperate cut at the soldier, who shot him through the temple, and he instantly expired.

Major Lambton, with the left attack, had meanwhile, in obedience to the general instructions of the day, proceeded without farther opposition along the northern rampart, and joined Major-General Baird over the eastern gate-way. No intelligence had been received of the Sultaun, nor was any suspicion entertained of his actual fate. Three officers of the general staff, Majors Allan, Beatson, and Dallas, observed as they passed along the rampart, two men lying desperately wounded near the inner ditch, one of whom, by his dress and complexion, appeared to be of

distinction; and they descended for the purpose of more particular examination. It was not the Sultaun; but Major Dallas recognised and addressed him by his name—*Seyed Saheb*. He was supported in his attempt to rise, and clung round Major Dallas's knees in the most affecting manner, imploring compassion for himself, and for the honour of his family. The officers were in the act of placing him in his palankeen, which had tumbled into the ditch, and had sent for a surgeon to dress his wounds, when a renewal of a heavy fire of musquetry compelled them to attend to other duties, and he soon afterwards expired.

The same officers, proceeding along the southern works, ascended a cavalier, which overlooked some part of the interior area of the palace, and perceived indications which induced them to infer the presence of the Sultaun, which Seyed Saheb had previously assured them to be probable; and reported these observations to General Baird, who had also received similar information, and had halted to refresh the troops, and complete all his dispositions on the ramparts, before he should proceed to summon the palace. These preparatory measures being effected, he requested Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-master-general, to undertake the important charge of proceeding with a flag of truce to the palace, to offer protection to Tippoo Sultaun, and every person within it, on the condition of immediate and unconditional surrender, and to declare, that in the event of the slightest resistance, they must all abide the worst consequences of an assault. A part of the 33d was already drawn up before the gate of the palace, and Major Allan was accompanied by a portion of the 12th, and a battalion of sepoys, while General Baird prepared the flank companies, now somewhat recovered from their fatigues, and the heat of a most oppressive day, to execute, if it should be necessary, the final alternative which he had announced.

Major Allan executed the delicate charge committed to his discretion with distinguished humanity and judgment. He found the attendants of the palace exhibiting from a front balcony, marks of the utmost consternation ; and on his invitation, some of them descended by an unfinished part of the wall. There was an obvious wish for delay, which Major Allan strongly deprecated as pregnant with inevitable destruction. He insisted on returning with them, and giving personally to the Sultaun the assurances with which he was charged ; and he ascended, accompanied by two officers* only. Before entering the palace, he explained that the flag which he held in his hand was a pledge of security ; and farther to conciliate their confidence, he took off his sword and insisted on committing it to the charge of the Kelledar, who was one of the persons that had descended. The aspect of many hundred troops in the courts which he afterwards passed, rendered the situation critical ; but neither encreased nor diminished the danger arising from one person out of three being unarmed. After many hesitations, which had nearly exhausted his patience, he was at length conducted to an apartment, where he was received by two of the Sultaun's sons, one of whom he recognised as one of the hostages of 1792. After such assurances of personal safety and protection to every person within the walls, as the feelings of an honourable and humane mind suggested on such an occasion, his great object was to impress on their attention as the sole means of preserving their father's life, whose escape was impossible, the necessity of his immediate surrender. They assured him that the Sultaun was not in the palace ; many unnecessary impediments were made to the opening of the gate and their objection of not daring to sanction the measure, without their father's order, seems to indicate their belief at that moment that he was still alive.

Captain Hastings Fraser and Captain Schohey.

They were at length convinced that the measure was necessary to their own security, and gave a fearful assent.

Major Allan on opening the gate found a large body of troops drawn up, with General Baird at their head that officer had in the intermediate time received unquestionable information of the secret massacre of every European prisoner taken during the siege ; his indignation was raised to the highest pitch ; the soldiers in the ranks, half frantic with rage, and burning to exact a memorable retribution, could in their present temper, scarcely have been admitted with safety within the gates of the palace and General Baird, instead of immediately entering, ordered the princes to be brought out to him this also was attended with many terrors and considerable delay, but every feeling of indignation subsided on their appearance, he was sensibly affected at their approach, and his gallantry during the assault, was not more distinguished than the humanity and kindness which he displayed on this occasion. He ordered that they should be conveyed under a proper escort, with suitable honours from the troops, to the Commander-in-chief and no intelligence having yet been received of the Sultaun, General Baird proceeded, properly attended, to search the palace, (which had been surrounded to prevent escape) avoiding of course, the apartments of the women. All search being found unavailing, the kelledar was apprised of the serious consequences to himself, which might ensue, in the event of his any longer refusing to disclose the place of the Sultaun's concealment. At what period he was himself informed, has not been distinctly ascertained, but he at length described the spot where he understood him to have fallen, wounded only as he then supposed. General Baird personally proceeded to the gate-way, which exhibited a horrible

On the ensuing day the fact was ascertained beyond all question by the exhumation of the bodies.

picture; it was already night, but the political importance of ascertaining the fact, rendered it necessary to cause the bodies, heaped in mass over each other, to be separately removed for examination by torch-light; the only man alive in the gateway, saved from suffocation by getting under the palankeen, was the personal attendant to whom we have already adverted, and on being informed of the object of search, he pointed out the spot where the Sultaun lay. The body on being brought out, was immediately recognised by the kelledar and several others, and being placed in a palankeen, was conveyed to the palace, where its identity was satisfactorily ascertained by the unanimous testimony of all the domestics.

The Sultaun's second son who commanded the southern face, had escaped by the Mysoor gate in the confusion of the storm, and surrendered himself on the ensuing morning. He, as well as the younger May 5 brothers, were received with distinguished consideration by General Harris, and the motives for their first removal no longer existing, they were invited to return to their respective apartments in the palace: the brutal apathy of the elder, on viewing his father's body, and the affecting indications of grief exhibited by the two younger sons, marked a singular contrast of character; but both added to the evidence, if any had still been wanting, of the unquestionable identity of the body; and orders were immediately given for its interment on the same evening, at the particular request of his sons, and under the immediate direction of the Cauzee of Seringapatam.

His remains were deposited near those of his father, in the superb mausoleum of the Lall Baug, with all the splendour and distinction which the religious observance of Mahommedan rites, and the military honours of European sepulture could bestow. Peals of thunder terrific* and extraordinary even †

* Two officers and several men were killed in camp.

† I have repeatedly marked, from the adjacent heights, the

in this district, burst over the Island of Seringapatam immediately after the funeral; and the wanderings of a pious imagination might innocently deem this awful close intended to mark the termination of the ceremony, and the memory of the scene.

The general orders and official reports of the Commander-in-Chief, and the recorded applause of the Governor-General on the occasion of this memorable conquest, constitute at once the most authentic and interesting evidence of the personal merit which was deemed most worthy of applause. These documents are subjoined in an Appendix for the satisfaction of the reader,* who will not fail to remark the prominent place assigned in this distinguished list to the Adjutant-General of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel Close,† whose eulogium echoed the feelings of every heart, for his extraordinary services had been obvious to the daily and hourly notice of every officer and soldier.

The fall of the Sultaun relieved the Governor-General from the embarrassment of determining the future treatment to be assigned to his expected prisoner; of reconciling compassion to the fallen,

course of the thunder clouds; there seemed to be a distinct tendency to burst over the island of Seringapatam and its immediate vicinity; and I do not think that imagination had any thing to do with this remark.

Appendix at the end of the volume.

† Afterwards Major-General Sir Barry Close, now unhappily no more!

[Barry Close entered the Madras army as a Cadet in 1771. He was Aide-de-Camp to General James Stuart in 1783 when Stuart was arrested by Lord Macartney. He became Adjutant-General under Lord Cornwallis in 1790-92, and again in 1799. He was Resident at Mysore after the war until 1801, and then went to Poona as Resident. He retired from the army in 1811 and died in 1813.]

with indignation against recent and wanton murder; and, of forgetting the crimes of his captive, in the sense of what he owed to his own dignity. General Harris was equally relieved from every immediate care, excepting the security and consolidation of his conquest and its dependencies, by the surrender of Poornea, Kummer-ü-Deen, and Futteh Hyder, the May 14 Sultaun's eldest son; with nearly all the principal officers, civil and military; and by the useful aid derived from the first of these persons, in suggesting a variety of practical details, for the proper disposal of the wreck of Tippoo Sultaun's army. Dhoondia, the prisoner, whose singular history has already been noticed, had, in a few days, already collected a band of desperate freebooters, troublesome, rather than formidable, except as regarded their encreasing numbers; and General Harris, after making a proper provision for the care of the capital, and committing its command to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, found it expedient to move the army to the northward, whence these audacious banditti were dislodged, after considerable resistance; the principal posts were occupied in an adequate manner; and the territories of the fallen Sultaun peaceably submitted to the future decision of the victors.

Thus terminated a dynasty composed only of two Sovereigns, the first of whom had risen from obscurity

¹ During the siege, under the orders of Tippoo, twelve or thirteen Englishmen, soldiers who had been taken as prisoners, were murdered in the fort. (Report of Capt. W. Macleod, dated 16th July 1799, quoted in Beatson's *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, pp. 166-168.)

² *Kummer-ü-Deen*.—Kammar-ud-din, who, with four thousand Mysore cavalry, had been sent to try and impede the march of General Floyd, sent in a message to General Harris on the 7th May to the effect that he surrendered, and was ready to obey orders; and by the 14th of May he and all the principal surviving Commanders of Tippoo had submitted, with the whole of the Mysore troops. (Beatson: *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*, pp. 198-199.)

to imperial power, and the last, educated as a Prince, had fallen in the defence of an hereditary crown: resembling in some of the circumstances of its close, the fate of the Roman capital of the Eastern empire: substituting, like that catastrophe, in place of the fallen dynasty, not only the power of a new Sovereign, but the influence of a new race; yet exhibiting the marked contrast, of kindling, not quenching in its fall, the lights of science and civilization.

The characters of Hyder and Tippoo have been developed in the narrative of their conduct with a degree of detail which might have rendered a distinct delineation unnecessary, but a sketch of both, for the purposes of recapitulation and contrast, may still be acceptable and useful.

Hyder Aly Khân was born in 1722 and died in 1782, having lived nearly sixty-one years, and reigned near twenty-two. In person he was tall and robust; his neck was long, and his shoulders were broad: in his youth he was peculiarly active, in later years disposed to corpulence for a native of India, inclining to a complexion fair and florid. With a prominent and rather aquiline nose, and small eyes, there was in his countenance a mixture of sternness and gentleness but the leading impression on the minds of those who describe it, was that of terror; an inference resulting perhaps as much from experience as from physiognomy. His voice was mellow and musical, and on ordinary occasions, he spoke in a subdued tone. In dress he exhibited rather an extravagant mixture of the soldier and the fop; a turban of brilliant scarlet, projecting by means of a cane frame, and almost overshadowing his shoulders, was the great peculiarity of his dress; and it has been stated, perhaps without much exaggeration, that one hundred cubits of fine turban* web were rolled up in its various involutions. The other parts of his dress were (excepting in the

* *Dustâr è sed dusta ber ser è mohârie mê bust.* A phrase found in two or three of the manuscript histories of Hyder.

field) studiously splendid, and he delighted to see his public officers magnificently attired. His toilet was performed in the manner of the bramins, his eyebrows and whiskers being shaved away, or the hairs pulled out, so as to leave a line scarcely visible.

He was fond of show and parade, and on great occasions was attended by a retinue of one thousand spearmen splendidly clothed and armed, preceded by bards, who sung his exploits in the Canarese language.

He was a bold and skilful horseman, and delighted chiefly in that simple mode of conveyance. His efficiency as a swordsman was highly estimated in his youth; and as a marksman he was perhaps unrivalled. It was scarcely ever known that his ball missed the mark; and volunteers engaged in single combat with the royal tiger in the public shews, confident of being preserved in the last extremity by the fusil of Hyder, from the balcony.

He could neither read nor write any language; but exclusively of Hindostanee, his mother tongue, he spoke with entire fluency the Canarese, Mahratta, Telegoo, and Tamul languages. Of the Persic or Arabic he had no knowledge whatever; and the sum of his literary attainments consisted in learning to write the initial of his own name, *H.*, to serve as his signature on public occasions; but either from inaptitude to learn, or for the purpose of originality, he inverted its form instead of *Unlearned*, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, he formed his mind upon a broad experience and sagacious observation of mankind, whom, in the actual scene on which he moved, he generally trusted as they deserved, to the precise extent to which they could not deceive; with ostensible frankness, and perpetual suspicion and in the few instances of a more liberal confidence, his penetration was once, and but once, deceived, in Kundè Row.

He possessed the talent ascribed to some other

eminent men, and perhaps to all with some exaggeration, of attending to several subjects at once; dictating to a moonshee, hearing and answering the report of a spy, and following the recital of a complex account, at one and the same time, and giving to each individual his appropriate instruction.

A harem of six hundred women might seem to constitute in itself evidence of the absence of particular attachment; if numerous examples, and among others, that of Nizam Ali, had not exhibited the mental thralldom exacted by an individual of the groupe. But Hyder, in his intercourse with the harem, had no feeling distinct from animal instinct. To a person who should exclusively have observed this part of his character, his whole soul would have seemed absorbed in a passion to which he brought no portion of mind; the animal, not the man, was sunk in sensuality; the mind was never permitted to wander from the most rigid attention to public business; every thing was examined both in abstract and detail, and no business was ever delayed from the indolence or self-indulgence of the sovereign. From sun-rise till past the noon, he was occupied in public durbar; he then made his first meal, and retired to rest for an hour or two. In the evening, he either rode out, or returned to business, in which he continued to be engaged till near midnight, when he made his second meal; sometimes drank largely, but secretly, of European liquors, and retired to rest.

Of his temper as of his countenance, he possessed the most disciplined command; his apparent bursts of anger were not the effect of mental disturbance, but of the alleged necessity of ruling with a sceptre of iron; and keeping for ever present the terror of his power. In an humble sphere, he would probably have been deemed a man of wit, but he tempered a natural facetiousness with the gravity belonging to his exalted station; and though reserved from a sense of propriety and from habit, no person could relax more agreeably

in social intercourse, and even in public audience ; but on ordinary occasions, the principle of terror was ever predominant ; and he sunk from dignity to inspire fear. On occasions apparently trivial, he would pour forth a torrent of that obscene abuse, in which he excelled, on persons of whatever rank ; and there were, moreover, in his whole court, perhaps, not six persons who had not, on some one occasion, sustained the actual lash of the *côrla* (long whip.) The same use of the tongue and whip in his subordinate officers, recommended them to his notice as zealous servants, exercising an efficient command ; and it was a common trick of Aboo Mahommed, his chief *chôbdâr* when his master appeared displeased at some supposed relaxation, (or as he chose to interpret, was in ill temper,) to bring him into good humour by the sound of the *côrla* at the gate, and the cries of an innocent sufferer seized casually in the street for the purpose. On the conquest of a new country, it was his invariable habit to inflict some memorable severities, not only for the purpose of extorting money, but with the avowed object of impressing his new subjects with a salutary terror of his name. On the same avowed principle, of inspiring terror into all descriptions of men, whether absent or present, he availed himself of a police too horribly perfect, to punish with boundless cruelty, the slightest levity of observation, made in the confidence and seclusion of domestic intercourse, that had any reference to his public or private conduct : and thus, where it was worse than death to blame, unqualified applause became the necessary habit of public and of private life.

In spite of this reputation, and the notorious system of exaction and torture applied to every individual who had to render an account ; men of almost every country were attracted to his court and standard, by brilliant prospects of advancement and wealth ; but a person, once engaged in his service, and deemed to be worth keeping, was a prisoner

for life; he would hear of no home but his own standard, and suffered no return; but the summary severity, cruelty, and injustice of his character were directed rather to the instruments than the objects of his rule; official men had cause to tremble; but the mass of the population felt that the vigour of the government compensated for many ills, and rendered their condition comparatively safe.

In action, Hyder was cool and deliberate but enterprising and brave when the occasion demanded. In his early career, and in his wars with the native powers, he was far from sparing of his person, but opposed to Europeans, it was observed that he never personally encountered the heat of action. His military pretensions are more favourably viewed in the conduct of a campaign than of a battle; and if the distinction can be allowed, in the political, than in the military conduct of a war. In the attack and defence of places he and his son were equally unskilled; because in that branch of war, no experience can compensate for want of science.

In council he had no adviser, and no confidant; he encouraged, on all occasions, a free discussion of every measure suggested by himself or by others, but no person knew at its close, what measures he would adopt in consequence.

Hyder was of all Mahommedan princes the most tolerant, if, indeed, he is himself to be considered as a Mussulman. He neither practised, nor had ever been instructed how to practise, the usual forms of prayer, the fasts, and other observances. He had a small rosary, on which he had been taught to enumerate a few of the attributes of God, and this was the whole of his exterior religion. It was his avowed and public opinion, that all religions proceed from God, and are all equal in the sight of God; and it is certain, that the mediatory power represented by *Runga Sawmey*,¹

The temple of Ranganathaswami on the island of Seringapatam—a Vishnu temple of great sanctity.

the great idol in the temple of Seringapatam, had as much, if not more of his respect, than all the Imaums, with Mahommed at their head.

In common with all Sovereigns who have risen from obscurity to a throne, Hyder waded through crimes to his object; but they never exceeded the removal of real impediments, and he never achieved through blood what fraud was capable of effecting. He fixed his stedfast view upon the end, and considered simply the efficiency, and never the moral tendency of the means. If he was cruel and unfeeling, it was for the promotion of his objects, and never for the gratification of anger or revenge. If he was ever liberal, it was because liberality exalted his character and augmented his power; if he was ever merciful, it was in those cases where the reputation of mercy promoted future submission. His European prisoners were in irons, because they were otherwise deemed unmanageable; they were scantily fed, because that was economical; there was little distinction of rank, because that would have been expensive: but beyond these simply interested views, there was by his authority no wanton severity; there was no compassion, but there was no resentment; it was a political expenditure, for a political purpose, and there was no passion, good or bad, to disturb the balance of the account. He carried merciless devastation into an enemy's country, and even to his own, but never beyond the reputed utility of the case. he sent the inhabitants into captivity, because it injured the enemy's country, and benefited his own. The misery of the individuals was no part of the consideration, and the death of the greater portion still left a residue, to swell a scanty population. With an equal absence of feeling, he caused forcible emigrations from one province to another, because he deemed it the best cure for rebellion; and he converted the male children into military slaves, because he expected them to improve the quality of his army. He gave fair, and

occasionally brilliant encouragement, to the active and aspiring among his servants, so long as liberality proved an incitement to exertion, and he robbed and tortured them, without gratitude or compunction, when no farther services were expected: it was on account of profit and loss, and a calculation whether it were most beneficial to employ or to plunder them.

Those brilliant and equivocal virtues which gild the crimes of other conquerors, were utterly unknown to the breast of Hyder. No admiration of bravery in resistance, or of fortitude in the fallen, ever excited sympathy, or softened the cold calculating decision of their fate. No contempt for unmanly submission ever aggravated the treatment of the abject and the mean. Every thing was weighed in the balance of utility, and no grain of human feeling, no breath of virtue or of vice was permitted to incline the beam.

There was one solitary example of feelings incident to our nature, affection for an unworthy son, whom he nominated to be his successor, while uniformly, earnestly, and broadly predicting, that this son would lose the empire which he himself had gained.

Tippoo Sultaun was born in 1753,* and died in 1799, in his forty-seventh year, having reigned seventeen years and four months. In person, he was

* It is singular that there should be any doubt regarding his age, at the time of his death. By a genealogical tree, in my possession, prepared, as I conclude, from the records of the palace, by the English officer charged with the immediate care of the family, he was fifty and a quarter years by the Girra, at the time of his death; of course lunar, as are all accounts so kept; this would make his age by the solar reckoning about forty-eight years and nine months, and the date of his birth about July 1750. Butcherow repeated to me the Canarese verse, recording his birth, in the year *Angsera*, 17th of the month *Margêser*, which would date his birth about January 1753, and his age at the time of his death, (as Butcherow, a confidential public officer, positively affirmed,) forty-six years and four months, solar reckoning. The first of these accounts can scarcely be correct; Hyder married, or was betrothed to the mother of Tippoo, in

neither so tall nor so robust as his father, and had a short pursy neck; the large limbs, small eyes, aquiline nose, and fair complexion of Hyder, marked the Arabic character derived from his mother. Tippoo's singularly small and delicate hands and feet, his large and full eyes, a nose, less prominent, and a much darker complexion, were all national characteristics of the Indian form. There was in the first view of his countenance, an appearance of dignity which wore off on farther observation; and his subjects did not feel that it inspired the terror or respect, which in common with his father, he desired to command. Hyder's lapse from dignity into low and vulgar scolding, was among the few points of imitation or resemblance, but in one it inspired fear, in the other ridicule. In most instances exhibiting a contrast to the character and manners of his father, he spoke in a loud and unharmonious tone of voice he was extremely garrulous, and, on superficial subjects, delivered his sentiments with plausibility. In exterior appearance, he affected the soldier; in his toilet, the distinctive habits of the Mussulman; he thought hardness to be indicated by a plain unincumbered attire, which he equally exacted from those around him, and the long robe and trailing drawers were banished from his court. He had heard that some of the monarchs of antiquity marched on foot at the head of their armies, and he would sometimes affect a similar exhibition, with his musquet on his shoulder. But he was usually mounted, and attached great importance to horsemanship, in which he was considered to excel. The conveyance in a palankeen he derided, and in a great degree prohibited, even to the aged and infirm; but in all this tendency,

Coromandel, in 1750. Tippoo was certainly born at Deonhully, and Hyder did not return thither till 1751. He was again in Coromandel in 1752, whence his wife was probably sent to Deonhully on the occasion of her pregnancy, for he himself remained in Coromandel till 1755.

there was as much of avarice as of taste. He was a minute reformer in every department, to the extent of abridging, with other expences of the palace, the fare of his own table, to the pleasures of which he was constitutionally indifferent; and even in the dress of his menial servants, he deemed respectable attire, to be a mark of unnecessary extravagance.

Of the vernacular languages, he spoke no other than Hindostanee and Canarese; but from a smattering in Persian literature, he considered himself as the first philosopher of the age. He spoke that language with fluency; but although the pen was for ever in his hand, he never attained either elegance or accuracy of style. The leading features of his character were vanity and arrogance; no human being was ever so handsome, so wise, so learned, or so brave as himself. Resting on the shallow instructions of his scanty reading, he neglected the practical study of mankind. No man had ever less penetration into character; and accordingly no prince was ever so ill served; the army alone remained faithful, in spite of all his efforts for the subversion of discipline and allegiance. Hyder delegated to his instruments a large portion of his own power, as the best means for its preservation. Tippoo seemed to feel every exercise of delegated authority as an usurpation of his own. He would familiarly say to the soldiers, if your officer gives you one word of abuse, return him two. The revolutionary doctrine of equality imported from France, scarcely appeared to be a novelty. No person ought to be of importance in a state but the Sovereign alone; all *other* men ought to be equal; the murder of the Sovereign was not an extraordinary incident in the history of any nation, and probably arose from laxity in command.

From constitutional or incidental* causes, he

*Obstructio in urethra. One of the "*vitia obsecanarum partium*," which a medical friend tells me was unknown to Hippocrates, Galen, or Celsus.

was less addicted than his father to the pleasures of the harem, which, however, contained at his death about one hundred persons.

From sun-rise until midnight he devoted his whole time to public affairs, with the interruptions necessary for meals, and for occasional exercise, seldom imitating his father's practice of a short repose in the heat of the day. But his occupation was not business. he was engaged in the invention of new machinery never finished, while the old was suffered to decay. His application was intense and incessant; he affected to do the whole of his own business, and to write with his own hand the foul draft of almost every dispatch, however unimportant; and he suffered the fate familiarly known to attach to that absurd pretension: the machine stood still, because the master would not let it work. A secret emissary had been sent to Poona, he reported, and reported, and represented that his cash was expended: after the lapse of several months, Tippoo delivered a foul draft to a secretary—let this be dispatched to A B, at Poona. Here I am said the emissary! he had returned for some weeks from mere necessity: he had presented himself daily at the durbar, and could never before attract notice. The Sultaun for once hung down his head.

The ruling passion for innovation absorbed the proper hours for current business: and failures of experiment, obvious to the whole world, were the topics of his incessant boast as the highest efforts of human wisdom. Hyder was an improving monarch, and exhibited few innovations. Tippoo was an innovating monarch, and made no improvements. One had a sagacious and powerful mind; the other a feeble and unsteady intellect. "There was (says one of my manuscripts*) nothing of permanency in his

* By the venerable Seyed Hussein, who, with most of the native authorities, mentioned in the preface to the first volume, have paid the debt of nature since I left Mysoor.

views, no solidity in his councils, and no confidence on the part of the governed: all was innovation on his part, and the fear of farther novelty on the part of others; and the order of to-day was expected to be reversed by the invention of to-morrow. It may be affirmed of his principal measures however specious, that all had a direct tendency to injure the finances, undermine the Government, and oppress the people. All the world was puzzled what distinct character should be assigned to a sovereign who was never the same. He could neither be truly characterized as liberal or parsimonious; as tyrannical or benevolent; as a man of talents, or as destitute of parts. By turns, he assumed the character of each. In one object alone he appeared to be consistent, having perpetually on his tongue the projects of jihad—holy war. The most intelligent and sincere well-wishers of the house concurred in the opinion of his father, that his heart and head were both defective, however covered by a plausible and imposing flow of words; and they were not always without suspicions of mental aberration."

Tippoo, like his father, admitted no associate in his councils: but, contrary to his father, he first determined, and then discussed; and all deviation from the opinion which he announced, or was known to favour, was stigmatised as obstinacy or incapacity.

As a statesman, Tippoo was incapable of those abstract views, and that large compass of thought, embraced by his father's mind. His talents as a soldier, exhibited the same contrast. He was unable to grasp the plan of a campaign, or the conduct of a war; although, he gave some examples of skill in marshaling a battle. Unlike his father, whose moderation was ever most conspicuous in success, whose equanimity was uniform in every aspect of fortune, and, who generally extracted some advantage from every discomfiture, Tippoo was intoxicated with

success, and desponding in adversity. His mental energy failed with the decline of fortune ; but it were unjust to question his physical courage. He fell in the defence of his capital ; but, he fell, performing the duties of a common soldier, not of a general. The improvement in his infantry and artillery, would have been considerable, had it not been marred by incessant dislocations, and unmerited promotions : but, his army, as a whole, gradually declined in efficiency, as it departed from the admirable organization received from his father. The success of the campaign of 1786, may, in part, be ascribed to the remains of that organization. His failure against the English, arose from the false policy of neglecting his most efficient arm—the cavalry.

During the life of Hyder, it was the fashion to indulge in high expectations of the qualities of the heir apparent, but it was the homage of disappointed, uninformed, and generally of unworthy men. Hyder in his life-time was stigmatized as a tyrant ; comparison made him almost seem merciful : the English prisoners hailed the intelligence of Tippoo's accession ; and they learned to mourn for the death of Hyder.

The tolerant spirit of Hyder, reconciled to his usurpation the members of every sect : appropriate talents regulated his choice of instruments, to the entire exclusion of religious preference ; and it may be affirmed that he was served with equal zeal by men of every persuasion. Hyder was seldom wrong, and Tippoo seldom right in his estimate of character : and it is quoted as a marked example, that Hyder knew Seyed Sahib to be a tolerably good man of business, but neither a brave nor a sagacious soldier ; and, accordingly, never employed him in an important military trust. Tippoo in the campaign of 1790, had himself degraded him for incapacity, but in 1799, committed the post of danger, and the fate of empire, to the same incompetent hands. A dark and intolerant bigotry excluded from Tippoo's choice all but the

true believers; and unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindoo in his dominions. In the Hindoo no degree of merit was a passport to favour; in the Mussulman no crime could ensure displeasure.

In one solitary instance, the suppression of drunkenness, he promoted morals without the merit of virtuous intention: bigotry exacted the literal version of a text generally interpreted with laxity: arrogance suggested that he was the only true commentator: and the ruling passion whispered that the measure was new. Both sovereigns were equally unprincipled; but Hyder had a clear undisturbed view of the interests of ambition in Tippoo, that view was incessantly obscured and perverted by the meanest passions. He murdered his English prisoners, by a selection of the best, because he hated their valour: he oppressed and insulted his Hindoo subjects, because he hated a religion which, if protected, would have been the best support of his throne; and he fawned, in his last extremity, on this injured people, when he vainly hoped that their incantations might influence his fate: he persecuted contrary to his interest; and hoped, in opposition to his belief. Hyder, with all his faults, might be deemed a model of toleration, by the professor of any religion. Tippoo, in an age when persecution only survived in history, renewed its worst terrors; and was the last Mahommedan prince, after a long interval of better feeling, who propagated that religion by the edge of the sword. Hyder's vices invariably promoted his political interests; Tippoo's more frequently defeated them. If Hyder's punishments were barbarous, they were at least efficient to their purpose. Tippoo's court and army was one vast scene of unpunished peculation, notorious even to himself. He was barbarous where severity was vice, and indulgent where it was virtue. If he had qualities fitted for empire, they were strangely equivocal; the disqualifications were obvious and

unquestionable; and the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysoor, "that Hyder was born to create an empire, Tippoo to lose one."

Hyder might have been rendered, in the early part of his career, a firm and efficient ally of the English government; and a clear view of his own interests would probably have rendered him faithful, if treated with fidelity. The unhappy ascendancy of Mahommmed Ali made him their inveterate enemy, and he transmitted that sentiment to his son, who had at no period either the inclination or the sagacity to become a faithful ally. The English Government had uniform and incessant grounds of dissatisfaction with the conduct of Tippoo. Hyder had just grounds to complain of the English Government.

So soon as the willing submission of the whole June 4. country of Mysoor had been fully ascertained, the Governor-general with the special concurrence of Nizam Ali, appointed a commission* to conduct and order, for the common benefit of the allies, the ultimate arrangement of the conquest.

The East India Company and Nizam Ali derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms; the cession of any portion of it to any other party might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right. The Mahrattas had obviously forfeited every pretension to participate; the progeny of Tippoo Sultaun could claim no title which had not been superseded by the right of conquest; and in estimating their claims it was impossible to forget the usurpation of Hyder, and the sufferings of the family expelled by his crimes. A descendant of that family existed at Seringapatam, but although he might have much to hope from the

* General Harris, Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close,

humanity of the conquerors, he could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory.

To the free and uncontrolled exercise of the right of conquest no obstacle existed in the internal state of the country: the people had manifested the most anxious desire for a new settlement; all the Mahomedan officers of the late government were in Seringapatam, at the discretion of the allies, and from the uniform policy of the late dynasty, never possessed any influence in the country capable of disturbing such a plan of internal government as should be deemed just and expedient.

In regulating therefore the right of conquest, no principle could be more justly assumed than that indemnification and security, the original objects of the war, should constitute the basis of the peace.

To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and Nizam Ali, would have afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas; and by injudiciously enlarging the dominions of Nizam Ali, who was incompetent to manage what he already possessed, and thus placing many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysoor in his possession, that important barrier would be in a situation to endanger, not to strengthen, the British possessions.

The establishment of a central government in Mysoor, under the protection of the English state, would obviate many of these objections; and the admission of the Mahrattas, however destitute of every claim of right, to a limited participation in the division of the conquered territory, (on the express condition, however, of a new treaty calculated to preserve the general tranquillity of India,) was, after a full consideration of various plans, that which appeared best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties, and to secure to the English Government a less invidious and more efficient share of financial, commercial, and military strength. The future

distribution of territory on these principles having been calculated, on a fair consideration of the convenience of the parties, to whom it should be allotted, the delicate and important question remained, of determining in what hands the new government of Mysoor should be placed ; and although no positive right existed, the choice would naturally fall on either the family of Tippoo Sultaun, or the ancient house of the rajas of Mysoor.

The claims of humanity on both sides rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. The usurpation, although comparatively modern, had yet subsisted a sufficient time to have extinguished the hopes of the ancient family, and accustomed them to the humility of their fortune ; while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, educated with the proudest expectations, would be deeply sensible to the disappointment of their hopes.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun, if placed on the throne, must be subjected to the same diminution of power and territory, which had formed a leading object of the war against his father : and, educated in the same principles and prejudices, would have felt such a condition to be little short of the most abject and humiliating degradation. In the most narrow view of the subject, the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of a settlement, founded on the partition of his father's dominions. The foundation of such a settlement would have been laid in the principle of its own dissolution. The interests, the habits, the prejudices and passions, the vices, and even the virtues of such a prince, must have concurred to cherish an aversion to the English name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause of their enemies. A hostile power would have been weakened, not destroyed : and a point of union for every hostile machination would have remained in the centre of the English possessions.

The restoration of the descendant of the ancient

rajas of Mysoor, was recommended by the same course of reasoning which excluded the heir of the usurpation. The kingdom of Mysoor, so long the source of calamity and alarm, would become a barrier of defence, and an accession of strength; and, in addition to these motives of policy, every moral consideration, and every sentiment of generosity, favoured the restoration of the Hindoo family of Mysoor. Such is the brief statement, imperfectly abstracted from the public records, of the principles which guided Lord Mornington in determining to re-establish that ancient family in the government of Mysoor; and, to soften the decision to the heirs and adherents of the usurpation, he granted to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, a more munificent maintenance, than they had enjoyed during the late reign; and to the Mahommedan officers, and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaun, pensions founded on the same truly economical views of wise liberality.

The delicacy was observed of removing from Seringapatam to their future residence at Vellore, the families of the late dynasty, before the commissioners should hold any intercourse with the family of the raja of Mysoor but on the departure of the principal branches, they paid a visit to the future raja, whom they found with others of his persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation which excited the strongest sensations of compassion. The future raja himself was a child of five years of age, but the widow of that raja from whom Hyder usurped the Government, still remained, to confer with the commissioners, and to regulate with distinguished propriety the renewed honours of her house.

The adjustment of the treaty of partition, and of the subsidiary treaty of Mysoor, followed as the necessary consequences of those principles which have been stated: the portion of territory conditionally reserved for the Mahrattas was ultimately divided

between the other allies, because no inducements were sufficient to procure from that people an assent to conditions which involved some relaxation of their pretensions to universal plunder. The subsidiary treaty of Mysoor was founded on principles which established the most perfect community of interests between the English Government and the new state: the English Government was charged with the duties of external defence, the new state with those of internal administration, including the extent of military police required in a country composed of the re-union of a multitude of petty principalities. The raja was installed at the seat of his ancestors, in the presence of an immense multitude of Hindoos, who testified the most unfeigned delight at a spectacle which revived the long extinguished hope of perpetual emancipation from Mahomedan tyranny. The practical efficiency of the Government was secured by the uncommon talents of Poornea in the office of minister to the new raja, and that efficiency was directed to proper objects, by the controul reserved to the English Government in the provisions of the treaty; and by the happy selection of Lieutenant-Colonel Close to be political resident at the new court, a man whose eminent talents, extensive experience, and conciliatory manners, enabled him to guide the new minister, without permitting him to feel the existence of control. A large portion of the wreck of the infantry was employed under the new Government; and by a supplemental treaty, concluded after the experience of a few years, a respectable part of the excellent cavalry of Mysoor, who in the intermediate time had been employed with distinguished credit under Colonel Wellesley, in Decan, were reserved for the service of the state, and prevented from swelling the numbers of that confederation of disbanded armies which, under the designation of Pindarees, is in the year 1817 opposing to the English prosperity in India, a more embarrassing

necessity for incessant and extensive preparation, than they have hitherto experienced from long established Governments; the Mahomedans of the nineteenth century retracing the steps of Sevajee in the seventeenth.

Among the inconveniences of that singular and generally beneficial government, established by the British nation in India, is the practice of committing the higher offices of the army and the state, and almost all situations of trust and emolument to Europeans; and thereby excluding the natives of the country from every object of honourable ambition. The settlement of Mysoor was distinguished from all preceding measures of British policy, was quoted with applause in the remotest parts of India, and was acknowledged with unlimited gratitude by the people to be governed, by leaving every office civil and military to be filled by the natives themselves, with the single guard of those powers of interposition in the internal affairs of the government which were reserved by a special provision of the treaty. It is obvious that any ostensible exercise of such a power by the British political resident, would have a direct tendency to weaken and subvert the authority of the native government, and that such an interposition, to be efficient to its true purposes, must be delicate, silent, and unobserved; the experiment was new, and with relation to its remote consequences of momentous importance; the eminent talents of the minister and resident were supported by the cordial co-operation, in the military command, of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, a name which no epithet can exalt; and Lord Wellesley had the satisfaction of being enabled to declare at the close of his memorable administration in India, that the actual success of the arrangement of Mysoor had fulfilled his most sanguine expectations.

It is not intended to suggest that the exclusive employment of native agency is an example fit for

imitation in the more extended scale of our national administration in India; but the general success of this experiment, and the practice (where discretionary power has been allowed) of the most efficient public officers in the south of India, have established the wisdom, the safety, and may we add the justice, of committing to the governed, a larger interest in the prosperity of the Government; of securing fidelity by opening to their hopes a field of moderate and legitimate ambition; and thus temperately regulating that system of exclusion which, in its present state, no humility can otherwise contemplate than as the brand of national degradation.¹

¹ The despatch from the Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors, dated Fort St. George, 3rd August 1799, (Owen: *Selections from the Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 132-159), and the treaties give fully the settlement with Mysore and the reasons for it. The history of Mysore since the restoration of the former dynasty has been one of long peace. The palace in the old capital, the town of Mysore, was re-built, and the Maharaja's family have since resided there during most of the year. Sir Thomas Munro, who had pointed out the objections to the system of subsidiary alliances, involving the guarantee of possession of his dominions to the Maharaja with the loss of many of the essential attributes of sovereignty, laid stress on the advisability of the appointment of an Indian as Dewan or Prime Minister of the State. Wellesley adopted this expedient and Purnaiya, the Brahmin minister under Tippoo, was appointed to this office. His administration was eminently successful, and in 1805, Lord Wellesley was able to record that "the affairs of the Government of Mysore had been conducted with a degree of regularity, wisdom, discretion and justice unparalleled in any Native State in India." The post of Resident was held by a succession of distinguished men, among them Major Mark Wilks, who held the office during the absence of Sir John Malcolm from 1805 to 1808. In 1831, Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General at the time, superseded the Maharaja and entrusted the administration into the hands of two Commissioners, the senior appointed by himself and the junior by the Government of Madras. In 1834, these were replaced by one Commissioner appointed by the Government of India. Under Sir Mark Cubbon, who assumed office in 1834, the administration of the State was conducted on lines which won almost universal admiration. Sir Mark Cubbon

remained in office until 1861, when he resigned and left India, only to die on the voyage to England. A statesman of the old school, he administered Mysore affairs with marked success for twenty-six years. In 1865, the Maharaja adopted a son, from one of the leading families of his house, an adoption which was recognized in 1867 by Queen Victoria and her Government. In 1868, he died at the age of seventy-four and the young Maharaja, the adopted son, was installed at Mysore. The management of the State continued to be vested in the English Commissioners until 1881, when the care of the State was handed over to the Maharaja, Chamarajendra Wodeyar. That Ruler pursued a liberal and enlightened system of administration, and in 1892, Lord Lansdowne, when Viceroy, was able to say: "There is probably no State in India where the ruler and the ruled are on more satisfactory terms, or in which the great principle, that government should be for the happiness of the governed, receives a greater measure of practical recognition." The Maharaja died in 1894 in Calcutta, lamented throughout the State by Europeans and Indians alike. His son, the present Maharaja, was installed in 1895 when ten years old. He was invested with full powers in 1902 and in November 1913, the Instrument of Transfer of 1881 was replaced by a treaty, which now governs the relations between the Government of India and the State. Under the present Maharaja, the advance in administration has been continuous and solid. He and his father before him have recognized that, for good government, it is of the utmost importance that the Minister or Dewan should be chosen with the greatest care and deliberation and then completely trusted. Mysore has been fortunate in a succession of ministers of conspicuous ability and loyalty, with the result that it has prospered, and now takes rank as one of the best governed States in India. Its history has fully justified the settlement made by the great Governor-General in 1799.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

G. O. BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

"Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

"THE Commander-in-Chief congratulates the gallant army, which he has the honour to command, on the conquest of yesterday: The effects arising from the attainment of such an acquisition, as far exceeds the present limits of detail, as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparalleled valour of the troops, surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

"While Lieutenant-General Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the assault, he cannot omit to return his thanks, in the warmest terms, to Major-General Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and for the humane measures which he subsequently adopted, for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major-General Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who on that great occasion acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.

"The Commander-in-Chief requests that Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department; and his best acknowledgments are due to Major Beatson, for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service, by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

"The merits of the artillery corps, are so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander-in-Chief can only desire Colonel Smith, to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

"In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the Commander-in-Chief feels himself called upon to notice, in a most particular manner, the exertion of Captain Dowse and his corps of pioneers, which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labour, and the ability with which that labour was applied.

"On referring to the progress of the siege, so many occasions have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel Money Penny, the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, Major Macdonald, Major Skelly, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several outworks and posts of the enemy, demands to be recorded. And the very spirited attack led by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of His Majesty's 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy's works, on the 26th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the Commander-in-Chief.

"The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honourable conclusion, has been such, as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post, at the village of Agrar, was seized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigour with which every attack of the enemy on the out-posts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shewn in the assault of the breach, by the corps led by Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice, for which the Commander-in-Chief requests Lieutenant-General Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

"Lieutenant-General Harris trusts, that Lieutenant-General Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service; in the course of which he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of private friendship."

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ORDERS.

Dated Seringapatam, 8th May, 1799.

"Lieutenant-General Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army the following extract of a report transmitted to him yesterday, by Major-General Baird, as it places, in a distinguished point of view, the merit of an officer on the very

important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good conduct, since he has served with his army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander-in-Chief.

"If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.

True Copies,

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,

Military-Secretary."

NO. II.

G. O BY GOVERNMENT.

"Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, having this day received from the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander-in-Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army, which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

"His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned; the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

"Under the favour of Providence, and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honourable issue.

"But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor-General in council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendour and glory, unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

"The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, by restor-

ing the peace and safety of the British possessions in India on a durable foundation of genuine security.

"The Governor-General in council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that in this arduous crisis the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame and power.

"By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in council.

(Signed) J. WEBBE,

Secretary to the Government."

No. III.

G. O. BY GOVERNMENT.

"Fort St. George, 24th May, 1799.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council is pleased to publish in General Orders the following copy of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief.

"MY LORD,

"I have forwarded to your Lordship, by various hircarrahs, an account of the success of the army in the assault of Seringapatam, with copies of the orders issued on that occasion: in those orders I expressed my approbation of the conduct of the troops in general, and my sense of the merits of those officers whose behaviour had attracted particular notice.

"It remains for me to state what is in justice due to others, whom, for obvious reasons, I could not present in the same manner to your Lordship's notice; these are officers on the general staff, in my family, and others whose zeal induced them to forward the public service by the exertion of their abilities in aid of departments to which they were not officially attached.

"In every point of view I must call your Lordship's particular attention to the Adjutant-General of the army. His general character as an officer is too well established, by a long and distinguished course of the most meritorious service, to

require my testimony ; but the particular exertion of his talents on the present service, in directing, regulating, and assisting, the progress of our departments, when embarrassed by all the difficulties attending a deficiency of conveyance for an uncommonly extensive equipment, during the advance of the army ; and the ability, zeal, and energy, displayed by him in superintending the various operations of an arduous siege, where he was ever present, stimulating the exertions of others, or assisting their judgment and labour with his own, claim from me to be stated to your Lordship in the most forcible terms. It is my earnest wish that my sentiments, on this subject may be publicly recorded, and it is my firm opinion, that if the success of this army has been of importance to the British interests, that success is to be attributed, in a very considerable degree, to Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

"From the officers more immediately in my family, I have derived all the assistance in the conduct of the public service, which I had reason to expect from their experience ; and I am highly indebted to your Lordship for the indulgence with which you attended to my wishes in the selection of Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew and Captain Macaulay as my confidential staff.

"Major Dallas has strong claims to be particularly recommended to your Lordship's notice : the readiness with which he came forward to exert his personal influence with the principal natives in the bullock department, at a period when it seemed scarcely possible to move forward the public stores ; the effectual aid which he gave to the store department, by his personal assistance in its arrangements, and the duty, equally important and laborious, which he voluntarily took upon himself, of seeking and securing forage for the public cattle during the marches of the army, are amongst the many instances in which his zeal has been distinguished, and which entitle him to the attention of Government.

"In the department of the quarter-master-general, the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson and Major Allan has been very satisfactory to me : Captain Turing has ably assisted Lieutenant-Colonel Close in the Adjutant-General's office ; and Captain Orr of the guides has merited great praise, by his judgment, diligence, and activity in conducting the marches of the army, and of all the detachments of importance, which, since our encampment here, it has been necessary to make under Major-General Floyd.

"Captain Macleod, of the intelligence department, has been employed in the management of the bazars of the army, in the arrangement of the banjarries, and on a variety of services not specially the duty of any regularly established office, but which required a perfect knowledge of the customs of India,

and the strictest integrity in the person charged with their execution. I have, on all such occasions, given my full confidence to Captain Macleod, and his conduct has shewn him deserving of the trust.

"I have thought it a necessary part of my public duty to make this report to your Lordship, for the information of Government, and have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HARRIS.

"Seringapatam, May 13th 1799."

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General in council directs the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army in the field to assure the officers on the general staff of the army, those composing the confidential staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and those whose zeal, ability and exertion have been distinguished in aid of the departments to which they were not officially attached, that his Lordship entertains the highest sense of their several eminent services during the late glorious campaign in Mysore.

"The conduct of the Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Close, has amply justified the implicit confidence reposed by the Governor-General in council in his extensive knowledge, approved experience, superior talents, ardent valour, and indefatigable activity.

"The uniform zeal, perseverance, and fortitude with which Lieutenant-Colonel Close has exerted all these great qualities, in every trial of difficulty and danger, entitle him to the praise, respect and esteem of the Governor-General in council. His Lordship feels himself bound, by every obligation of justice and public duty, to recommend the extraordinary merits of Lieutenant-Colonel Close to the particular approbation of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to the applause and gratitude of his country.

"The selection which the Commander-in-Chief had so judiciously made of Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew and Captain Macaulay, for his confidential staff, was confirmed by the Governor-General in council, with a just expectation that His Excellency would derive considerable advantage to the public service from their able assistance.

"The Governor-General in council is happy to record a public acknowledgment of the distinguished conduct of Major Dallas, and to assure that officer that his Lordship has a just sense of the important services which he has rendered in his successful superintendence of the laborious departments under his charge,

"It is very satisfactory to his Lordship to remark, that the conduct of the quarter-master-general's department, under Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson and Major Allan, and that of the department of the guides under Captain Orr, has met with the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief; his Lordship desires that his public thanks may be conveyed to those officers, and on this occasion his Lordship thinks it proper to publish to the army the particular thanks which he had already directed the Commander-in-Chief to convey to Major Allan and Captain Orr, for the essential services rendered by them on the 22d March last, after the battle of Mallavelly.

"His Lordship is also happy to concur in the honourable testimony borne by the Commander-in-Chief to the merits of Captain Turing and of Captain Macleod, and directs that his thanks may be conveyed to those meritorious officers.

"In all ranks and departments of the allied army his Lordship has observed, with sincere pleasure, a general spirit of harmony and concord, which (under the happy auspices of the Commander-in-Chief) has united every heart, head, and hand, in the common cause, signalized each progressive operation of the campaign, with a peculiar character of alacrity and ardour, and crowned its early conclusion with victory, triumph and renown.

"By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in council,

J. WEBBE, *Secretary to Government.*"

N. B. The name of Captain Malcolm was inadvertently omitted in these communications, but General Harris paid a just and ample tribute to his services with Nizam Ali's troops, in an official letter addressed to the Governor-General.

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